TC-05 CONTINUOUS INTERNAL ASSESSMENT -2 LEGAL METHOD BEFORE THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA IN THE MATTER OF ANN SAURABH DUTT ...APPELLANT VERSUS LIEUTENANT COLONEL ... RESPONDENT SAURABH IQBAL BAHADUR DUTT WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 2 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ……… ................................................. 4 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ……… ................................................. 5 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.. ................................................. 7 STATEMENT OF FACTS…………. ................................................. 8 STATEMENT OF ISSUES………… ............................................... 10 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS …... ............................................... 11 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED……... ............................................... 13 ISSUE 01: whether the appellants conduct, including her professional decisions and separate residence, amounts to cruelty under section 27(1)(d) of the special marriage act, 1954…………………………..........................................................13 1.1. cruelty has to be determined from the overall conduct and circumstances of the matrimonial relationship ................................................................13 1.2. the pursuit of a profession does not exclude the surrounding conduct from judicial scrutiny ....................................................................................... 16 1.3. the appellants separate stays and unilateral decisions, considered cumulatively, satisfy the threshold of cruelty ..........................................17 ISSUE 02: Whether the wife's separate residence, due to her professional commitments and the medical needs of their daughter, constituted desertion. ....19 2.1 The factum of separation stands established and is undisputed ...............19 2.2 The Animus deserendi of the appellant is established by her conduct ....21

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 3 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t 2.3 The initial reasons for separation do not constitute a reasonably cause for its indefinite continuation ..............................................................................23 ISSUE 03: whether the family court and high court were justified in granting divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. ..................................................25 3.1. whether the appellants conduct amounts to cruelty in matrimonial law ...25 3.2. whether the career pursuit can be a valid legal justification excusing cruelty and desertion .......................................................................................26 3.3. whether the concurrent findings of the family court and high court warrant confirmation ........................................................................................27 PRAYER ............................................................................................. 29

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 4 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Abbreviations Full form AIR All India Report SCC Supreme Court Cases Hon’ble Honourable SC Supreme court Const Constitution Art Article § Section & And No. Number

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 5 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CASES N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534........................................13, 14, 18 Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, AIR 1988 SC 121 .......................................13, 14 Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, AIR 2002 SC 2582 ...............................13, 15, 18 A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, AIR 2005 SC 534 .....................................13, 16, 18 Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511 .................................13, 16, 18, 25 Bipin Chandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176 ........20, 21, 26 Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar v. Adhyatma Bhattar Sri Devi, AIR 2002 SC 88 .....21, 22 Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, AIR 2002 SC 591 ..........................21, 23 Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40 ...........................21, 23 Sanat Kumar Agarwal v. Nandini Agarwal, AIR 1990 SC 594 .............................23 Sudama Pandey v. State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 293 .............................................27 Alamelu v. State, AIR 2011 SC 715........................................................................27 Parminder Singh v. Gurpreet Singh, (2018) 13 SCC 352 .....................................28 STATUTES The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27(1)(d), No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India) .....................................................................................13, 14, 19, 25, 26 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27(1)(b), No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India) .......................................................................................................20, 21 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 22, No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India) .......................................................................................................22, 23 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27(1), No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India) .......................................................................................................22, 27

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 6 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t OTHER AUTHORITIES INDIA CONST. art. 136 ..................................................................................27, 28

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 7 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The Respondents most humbly submit to the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. The Appellants have approached this Hon’ble Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 136. SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL BY THE SUPREME COURT (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. The Respondents submit that jurisdiction under Article 136 is extraordinary and discretionary, to be exercised only in exceptional cases involving a substantial question of law of general public importance or gross miscarriage of justice. Since the Family Court and High Court of Gujarat correctly applied the law in their concurrent findings, no such exceptional circumstance exists warranting interference. The present memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments of the present case on behalf of the respondent

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 8 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t STATEMENT OF FACTS PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE The appellant is Ann Saurabh Dutt, the wife, and a practicing professional dentist by occupation, with a private dental clinic in Pune. The respondent is Saurabh Iqbal Bahadur Dutt, lieutenant colonel, serving in the India army, posted previously in Pune and then in Kargil. BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE The respondent, is a serving officer in the Indian army, subject to postings and frequent transfers demanded by army life. The appellant is the wife, a professional, engaged in the practice of dentistry. The two having married and cohabited together along with their minor child. The dispute arose, when the appellant without the knowledge or consent of the respondent, unilaterally moved with the minor child to another city and withdrew from the marital home. Aggrieved by this conduct, the Respondent initiated proceedings before the Family Court seeking dissolution of the marriage on the grounds of cruelty and desertion, culminating a decree of divorce CAUSE OF ACTION Aggrieved by the decree of divorce granted by the family court, the appellant filed an appeal in the high court, which was dismissed. The high court affirmed the findings of the family court. Still aggrieved by the high courts decision, the appellant filed a special leave petition under article 136 of the constitution of India before the Hon’ble court, saying that the lower courts of erred in their judgement by branding the pursuit of her professional career as an act of cruelty

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 9 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t and desertion. The Respondent has opposed this challenge, raising the preliminary objection that the present petition seeks a re-appreciation of concurrent findings of fact arrived at by two courts below, and that the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court under Article 136 ought not to be exercised to disturb such findings in the absence of any perversity or error of law. PRESENT APPEAL The family court granted a decree of divorce on the grounds of desertion and cruelty, a decision which the Gujrat high court subsequently upheld. The high court upheld the family courts findings, stating that the unilateral relocation of the appellant with the minor child fell under the ambit of desertion and cruelty as given under section 27(1) of the special marriage act, 1954, disagreeing with her claim that such relocation was a legitimate act of professional autonomy. The appellant has now approached the Hon’ble supreme court of India via the present appeal, challenging these concurrent findings, to re-characterize her conduct as an act of professional autonomy rather than cruelty and desertion.

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 10 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t STATEMENT OF ISSUES ISSUE I WHETHER THE APPELLANTS CONDUCT, INCLUDING HER PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS AND SEPARATE RESIDENCE, AMOUNTS TO CRUELTY UNDER SECTION 27(1)(D) OF THE SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954 ISSUE II WHETHER THE WIFE'S SEPARATE RESIDENCE, DUE TO HER PROFESSIONAL COMMITMENTS AND THE MEDICAL NEEDS OF THEIR DAUGHTER, CONSTITUTED DESERTION ISSUE III WHETHER THE FAMILY COURT AND HIGH COURT WERE JUSTIFIED IN GRANTING DIVORCE ON THE GROUNDS OF CRUELTY AND DESERTION

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 11 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ISSUE 01: WHETHER THE APPELLANTS CONDUCT, INCLUDING HER PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS AND SEPARATE RESIDENCE, AMOUNTS TO CRUELTY UNDER SECTION 27(1)(D) OF THE SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954 It is most respectfully submitted that the Appellant’s conduct, when assessed cumulatively and in its matrimonial context, amounts to cruelty under Section 27(1)(d) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The Respondent does not contend that her professional career or separate residence, by themselves, constitute cruelty. In N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi and Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised that cruelty must be determined from the overall circumstances and cumulative effect of conduct. Further, A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur and Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh support assessment of the nature and effect of conduct within the matrimonial relationship. The Appellant’s repeated stays at her parental home and establishment of a dental clinic without informing the Respondent or his family, considered together, caused serious matrimonial strain and satisfy the threshold of cruelty ISSUE 02: WHETHER THE WIFE'S SEPARATE RESIDENCE, DUE TO HER PROFESSIONAL COMMITMENTS AND THE MEDICAL NEEDS OF THEIR DAUGHTER, CONSTITUTED DESERTION The respondent humbly submits that the Appellant’s prolonged separate residence constitutes desertion under Section 27(1)(b) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The initial grounds of the minor child's medical treatment and the Appellant's career pursuits cannot be stretched indefinitely to justify a permanent repudiation

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 12 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t of marital obligations. While temporary separation for valid reasons is recognized in law, its indefinite continuation coupled with an overt refusal to reconcile transforms a temporary departure into legal desertion. The Appellant's conduct in establishing a permanent independent life in Ahmedabad and resisting the Respondent’s formal attempts at restitution under Section 22 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 clearly manifests the requisite animus deserendi. ISSUE 03: WHETHER THE FAMILY COURT AND HIGH COURT WERE JUSTIFIED IN GRANTING DIVORCE ON THE GROUNDS OF CRUELTY AND DESERTION It is submitted that the concurrent findings of cruelty and desertion recorded by the Family Court and affirmed by the High Court are legally sound and warrant no interference. The Appellant's unilateral relocation with the minor child, without the Respondent's consent, reflects a sustained pattern of conduct amounting to mental cruelty, having deprived him of companionship and access to his child without justification. Her plea that this relocation was an exercise of career autonomy does not excuse what otherwise constitutes desertion, since desertion must be assessed as a continuing state of things, and any later claim of willingness to continue the marriage cannot override conduct showing a clear intention to abandon it. Finally, as the Family Court and High Court, upon independent appreciation of the same evidence, arrived at identical conclusions, and the Appellant has shown no perversity, error of law, or conflict with the record, this Hon'ble Court ought not to disturb these well-reasoned concurrent findings.

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 13 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ISSUE 01: WHETHER THE APPELLANTS CONDUCT, INCLUDING HER PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS AND SEPARATE RESIDENCE. AMOUNTS TO CRUELTY UNDER SECTION 27(1)(D) OF THE SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954 1. It is most respectfully submitted that the Appellant’s conduct, when assessed cumulatively and in its matrimonial context, amounts to cruelty under Section 27(1)(d) of the Special Marriage Act, 19541. The Respondent does not contend that her professional career or separate residence, by themselves, constitute cruelty. In N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane2, Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi3 and Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised that cruelty must be determined from the overall circumstances and cumulative effect of conduct. Further, A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur5 and Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh6 support assessment of the nature and effect of conduct within the matrimonial relationship. The Appellant’s repeated stays at her parental home and establishment of a dental clinic without informing the Respondent or his family, considered together, caused serious matrimonial strain and satisfy the threshold of cruelty. 1.1 CRUELTY HAS TO BE DETERMINED BY THE OVERALL CONDUCT AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE MATRIMONIAL RELATIONSHIP 1 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27(1)(d), No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India). 2 N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534. 3 Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, AIR 1988 SC 121. 4 Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, AIR 2002 SC 2582. 5 A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, AIR 2005 SC 534. 6 Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511.

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 14 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t 2. It is most respectfully submitted that Section 27(1)(d) of the Special Marriage Act, 19547 permits dissolution of marriage where, after solemnisation of the marriage, the respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty. It is duly submitted that the provision does not prescribe an exhaustive definition of cruelty. The determination of cruelty therefore depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The principles developed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in cases concerning cruelty under matrimonial law are relevant for determining the nature and effect of the conduct complained of. 3. It is humbly submitted that in N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane8, the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised that cruelty has to be determined with reference to the circumstances of the particular marriage and the effect of the conduct upon the matrimonial relationship. It is therefore submitted that the conduct complained of cannot be considered by separating each incident from the circumstances in which it occurred. 4. It is further submitted that in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi9, the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised that cruelty does not have a fixed or exhaustive standard and must be determined having regard to the nature of the conduct and the circumstances of the case. Conduct which may appear insignificant when considered separately may acquire legal significance when considered as part of a continuing course of conduct. The Respondent therefore submits that the cumulative effect of the conduct on record is relevant for determining whether the statutory threshold of cruelty has been satisfied. 7 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27(1)(d), No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India). 8 N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534. 9 Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, AIR 1988 SC 121.

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 15 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t 5. It is further submitted that in Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta10, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that mental cruelty must be assessed from the cumulative effect of the conduct and the circumstances of the matrimonial relationship. It is therefore submitted that the conduct complained of in the present case must be considered as a whole and not by examining each circumstance in isolation. 6. It is most humbly submitted that the record provides the necessary matrimonial context. The Appellant, while professionally qualified, established her own dental clinic in Ahmedabad and sent invitations for its inauguration without informing the Respondent or his family. It is further submitted that, during her stay in Ahmedabad, the Appellant repeatedly stayed at her parental home instead of the matrimonial home. These facts are not relied upon merely because the Appellant pursued a profession or exercised independent choices. They are relevant because of the manner in which those decisions were made and their effect upon the matrimonial relationship. 7. The Respondent humbly submits that the Appellant’s initial relocation to Ahmedabad was occasioned by legitimate medical circumstances, including her pregnancy and the medical condition of their daughter. It is duly submitted that the Respondent does not dispute the legitimacy of such circumstances. However, the subsequent establishment of the dental clinic without informing the Respondent or his family, together with the repeated stays at the parental home, constitutes separate conduct which must be considered in the context of the matrimonial relationship. The grievance of the Respondent therefore concerns the manner and effect of 10 Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, AIR 2002 SC 2582.

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 16 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t the subsequent conduct and not the Appellant’s professional qualification or career. 1.2 THE PURSUIT OF A PROFESSIONAL CAREER DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE SURROUNDING CONDUCT FROM JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 8. It is most respectfully submitted that the right of a spouse to pursue a profession is distinct from the manner in which professional decisions affect the matrimonial relationship. The Respondent does not contend that the pursuit of a career, by itself, constitutes cruelty. It is submitted that professional decisions may be relevant where they form part of a course of conduct which affects the matrimonial arrangement and causes serious mental suffering 9. It is duly submitted that in A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur11, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that cruelty must be determined having regard to the circumstances of the particular marriage and that the conduct must be of sufficient gravity to constitute cruelty. The fact that spouses are educated or professionally employed does not alter this legal test. The relevant consideration remains the nature, circumstances and effect of the conduct complained of. The Respondent therefore submits that the Appellant’s profession cannot be considered separately from the conduct surrounding its pursuit. 10. It is further submitted that in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh12, the Hon’ble Supreme Court supports an assessment of mental cruelty based upon the overall circumstances and cumulative effect of the conduct between the spouses. Accordingly, the Appellant’s professional decisions, her manner 11 A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, AIR 2005 SC 534. 12 Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511.

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 17 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t of participating in the matrimonial home and her residential arrangements are required to be considered together. 11. It is most humbly submitted that the Respondent’s case does not rest upon the proposition that the Appellant was required to discontinue her professional career. The Respondent’s submission is confined to the effect of the conduct on the matrimonial relationship. It is therefore submitted that the Appellant’s professional decisions are relevant only to the extent that they form part of the conduct complained of and contributed to the matrimonial strain established on the record. 1.3 THE APPELLANTS SEPARATE STAY AND UNILATERAL DECISIONS, CONSIDERED CUMULATIVELY, SATISFY THE THRESHOLD OF CRUELTY 12. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that living separately for a period of time does not, by itself, constitute cruelty. However, the circumstances leading to the separation, the manner in which the separation was maintained and its effect upon the matrimonial relationship are relevant considerations. It is therefore submitted that the Appellant’s physical distance from the matrimonial home must be assessed together with the other conduct appearing from the record. 13. It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant, while residing in Ahmedabad, repeatedly chose to stay at her parents’ home instead of the matrimonial home and established her dental clinic without informing the Respondent or his family. It is further submitted that these circumstances, when considered together with the matrimonial discord appearing from the record, demonstrate repeated unilateral decisions concerning matters affecting the shared matrimonial life. The Respondent submits that the cumulative effect of such conduct is materially different from a case

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 18 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t involving only professional employment or temporary residence elsewhere. 14. It is duly submitted that the principles laid down in N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane13, A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur14, Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh15 and Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta16 require the conduct of the spouses to be assessed in its matrimonial context and with regard to its effect upon the relationship. It is therefore submitted that the Appellant’s professional aspirations cannot be treated as the basis of the Respondent’s claim. The relevant consideration is the surrounding conduct, including the repeated stays away from the matrimonial home and the unilateral decisions affecting the matrimonial arrangement. 15. The Respondent humbly submits that the absence of an intention to cause mental suffering does not, by itself, determine whether the conduct amounts to cruelty. It is further submitted that the assessment must remain concerned with the nature, circumstances and effect of the conduct upon the matrimonial relationship. The Respondent therefore relies upon the cumulative impact of the conduct appearing from the record and does not contend that the Appellant’s professional aspirations, considered independently, were wrongful. 16. It is most respectfully submitted that the Respondent’s case rests upon the cumulative effect of the conduct and not upon any isolated act. The establishment of the Appellant’s dental clinic, the manner in which the decision was communicated, her repeated stays at her parental home while in Ahmedabad, and the resulting strain upon the matrimonial relationship are required to be considered together. It is duly submitted that none of 13 N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534. 14 A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, AIR 2005 SC 534. 15 Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511. 16 Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, AIR 2002 SC 2582.

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 19 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t these circumstances, considered in isolation, is being treated as automatically constituting cruelty. Their legal significance arises from their place within the broader course of conduct established on the record. 17. It is therefore most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the conduct of the Appellant, when assessed cumulatively and in its matrimonial context, satisfies the threshold of cruelty under Section 27(1)(d) of the Special Marriage Act, 195417. The Respondent does not contend that the Appellant’s professional career, by itself, constitutes cruelty. It is submitted that the manner in which her professional and residential decisions were made, together with her repeated stays away from the matrimonial home and the surrounding conduct, caused serious matrimonial strain. The finding of cruelty is therefore liable to be sustained. ISSUE 02: WHETHER THE WIFE'S SEPARATE RESIDENCE, DUE TO HER PROFESSIONAL COMMITMENTS AND THE MEDICAL NEEDS OF THEIR DAUGHTER, CONSTITUTED DESERTION. 18. It is humbly submitted that wife’s separate residence constituted desertion. The Counsel will argue in a three-fold argument where the respondent shall substantiate, firstly, the factum of separation stands established and is undisputed, secondly, the animus deserendi of the appellant is established by her conduct, lastly the initial reasons for separation do not constitute a reasonable cause for its indefinite continuation. 2.1 THE FACTUM OF SEPARATION STANDS ESTABLISHED AND IS UNDISPUTED 19. It is humbly submitted that desertion under the marriage between the spouses of different religions registered under the Special Marriage Act, 17 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27(1)(d), No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India).

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 20 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t 1954 comes under the ambit of Section 27(1)(b)18 of the act which states that, subject to the provisions of this Act and to the rules made thereunder, a petition for divorce may be presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife on the ground that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. Thus, a minimum separation of two years preceding the petition is required to prove desertion 20. In the case of Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati19, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the legal ingredients of desertion, establishing that desertion requires two essential conditions: i. The factum of separation; and ii. The intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). 21. It is submitted that the appellant, a Christian and the respondent, a Hindu solemnized an interfaith love marriage according to both of their religious rites, which was subsequently registered under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. After brief periods of cohabitation in Pune and Kargil, the appellant returned to Ahmedabad during her pregnancy and gave birth to their daughter. Following the birth of their daughter, the appellant briefly rejoined the respondent at his military posting in Kargil. However, due to the child's critical health condition the appellant returned to Ahmedabad for the child's treatment. The parties have lived separately, continuously and without interruption, since 11.01.2013. This lack of physical cohabitation is undisputed between the parties. 22. Applying the aforesaid legal position to the facts of the present case, it is submitted that the parties have admittedly lived separately, continuously 18 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27(1)(b), No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India). 19 Bipin Chandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176.

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 21 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t since 11.01.2013. The period of separation far exceeds the statutory threshold of two years prescribed under Section 27(1)(b) of the Special Marriage Act, 195420. It is therefore submitted that the first essential ingredient of desertion i.e. the factum of separation as laid down by this Hon'ble Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati21, stands fully satisfied and established on record, both in fact and in law. 2.2 THE ANIMUS DESERENDI OF THE APPELLANT IS ESTABLISHED BY HER CONDUCT 23. It is humbly submitted that in Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar v. Adhyatma Bhattar Sri Devi22, this Hon'ble Court held that the essential ingredients of desertion must subsist not merely at inception but throughout the entire statutory period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the divorce petition 24. The hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey23 has reiterated that desertion is not a withdrawal from a place, but desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other. 25. The respondent further submits that the hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena24, laid down four essential conditions to prove desertion: a. Factum of separation. b. Animus deserendi (intent to desert). c. Absence of consent of the aggrieved spouse. d. Absence of a reasonable cause. 20 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27(1)(b), No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India). 21 Bipin Chandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176. 22 Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar v. Adhyatma Bhattar Sri Devi, AIR 2002 SC 88. 23 Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, AIR 2002 SC 591. 24 Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40.

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 22 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t 26. It is most respectfully submitted that the Respondent, being the aggrieved party, had invoked the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights under Section 22 of the Special Marriage Act, 195425. The Appellant contested and resisted the said proceedings, declining to rejoin the Respondent despite this formal and unambiguous invitation to resume cohabitation. 27. It is further submitted that the Appellant unilaterally established a permanent professional dental clinic in Ahmedabad and distributed marketing materials/pamphlets without informing or consulting the Respondent. 28. Applying this to the present case it is further submitted that the Appellant's establishment of a permanent professional clinic in Ahmedabad is a long- term, non-reversible economic and social establishment and when read together with her consistent preference for residing at her parental home rather than the matrimonial home even during her visits to Ahmedabad, clearly shows no intention on the part of appellant to cohabit with the respondent. 29. Applying the principle laid down in Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar v. Adhyatma Bhattar Sri Devi26 to the present case it is submitted that, the Appellant's intention to permanently forsake cohabitation is a continuing course of conduct. This intention is evidenced by the Appellant's unilateral establishment of an independent professional and residential life in Ahmedabad, and her sustained resistance to the restitution proceedings initiated by the respondent under Section 22 of the Special Marriage Act, 195427. The persistence of this intent across the entire statutory period, 25 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 22, No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India). 26 Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar v. Adhyatma Bhattar Sri Devi, AIR 2002 SC 88. 27 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 22, No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India).

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 23 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t from separation to the filing of the present petition, thus stands firmly established. 30. It is submitted that the Appellant's act of setting up a permanent commercial and professional establishment a dental clinic outside the matrimonial home is objective conduct evidencing a permanent forsaking of the Respondent, consistent with this Hon'ble Court's holding in Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey28 that desertion connotes the intentional and permanent abandonment of one spouse by the other, and not merely a withdrawal from a particular place. It is further submitted that the Appellant did not merely engage in employment outside the matrimonial sphere she established an independent life devoid of any structural provision or plan to re-integrate into a shared matrimonial home. 31. In the present case, there is a clear absence of consent laid down in the case of Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena29 as an essential condition to prove desertion which can be inferred though the respondent’s act of invoking the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights under Section 22 of the Special Marriage Act, 195430. It is submitted that consent cannot be inferred when the aggrieved spouse actively pursues legal remedies to restore the matrimonial bond. 2.3 THE INITIAL REASONS FOR SEPARATION DO NOT CONSTITUTE A REASONABLE CAUSE FOR ITS INDEFINITE CONTINUATION 32. In Sanat Kumar Agarwal v. Nandini Agarwal31, the Supreme Court held that desertion must be inferred from the conduct and expression of intention both before and after the act of separation, meaning a customary 28 Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, AIR 2002 SC 591. 29 Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40. 30 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 22, No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India). 31 Sanat Kumar Agarwal v. Nandini Agarwal, AIR 1990 SC 594.

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 24 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t or temporary departure transforms into desertion if a spouse subsequently demonstrates a permanent intent to break off cohabitation and refuses reconciliation. Thus, the question of desertion including the presence or absence of reasonable cause is a matter of inference to be drawn from the totality of facts, viewed through the conduct and expressed intention of the parties both prior to and subsequent to the act of separation. 33. It is submitted that the Appellant's professional commitments and the minor daughter's medical situation were the stated reasons for the initial separation. The respondent further submits that the postings of the respondent were a part of the respondent's job profile and were dictated by service exigencies outside his control while the setting up of a permanent employment as a dental clinic was a voluntary choice made by the appellant without the respondent's knowledge or consent. 34. It is on record that efforts were made during the pendency of proceedings before the Family Court to bring about a reconciliation between the parties, and that such efforts did not fructify. It is further submitted that during the time period when the Appellant visited Ahmedabad and the Respondent was concurrently present, the Appellant chose to reside at her parental home rather than the matrimonial residence. 35. Applying to the present case, it is humbly submitted that even though appellant's professional commitments and the medical situation of minor daughter provided initial justification for separation however, such factors cannot be weaponized to justify an indefinite separation. Appellant's subsequent establishment of a permanent dental clinic in Ahmedabad was a voluntary and unilateral choice, made without the Respondent's knowledge or consent and represents a decisive shift from temporary, cause-based absence to a permanent, independent establishment. Therefore, it is submitted that through the act of setting up of a permanent,

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 25 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t independent economic establishment and resistance towards the restitution of conjugal rights the appellant demonstrates a permanent intent to break off cohabitation. ISSUE 03: WHETHER THE FAMILY COURT AND HIGH COURT WERE JUSTIFIED IN GRANTING DIVORCE ON THE GROUNDS OF CRUELTY AND DESERTION 36. It is most respectfully submitted that the concurrent findings of the family court and the high court holding the appellant guilty of cruelty and desertion are legally sound, factually well founded and warrant no interference by this Hon’ble court. 3.1 WHETHER THE APPELLANTS CONDUCT AMOUNTS TO CRUELTY IN MATRIMONIAL LAW 37. Section (27)(1)(d), of the special marriage act, 195432 permits either spouse to seek a decree of divorce on the ground that the respondent "has since the solemnization of the marriage treated the petitioner with cruelty." 38. It’s pertinent to note that the provision does not lay down any definition of what constitutes cruelty, it’s left to judicial interpretation. It’s submitted that this hon’ble court, in the absence of a statutory definition has consistently held that cruelty, whether physical or mental, need not consist of a single dramatic act but may be constituted of multiple continuous acts rendering cohabitation intolerable. 39. In the case of Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 51133, this court held that mental cruelty must be assessed from the spouse’s point of view, it can include  Denial of marital obligations 32 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27(1)(d), No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India). 33 Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511.

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 26 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t  Long separation that makes cohabitation impossible 40. Applying these parameters, it’s submitted that the appellants conduct falls within the parameters given by the court. The appellant unilaterally relocated with the minor child without consulting the respondent, thereby denying him access to the child without cause, and this isn’t a temporary lapse but a prolonged pattern of conduct by the appellant, it therefore meets the threshold of cruelty under section (27)(1)(d)34 as judicially interpreted by this hon’ble court. 3.2 WHETHER “CAREER PURSUIT” CAN BE A VALID LEGAL JUSTIFICATION EXCUSING DESERTION AND cruelty 41. section 27(1) of the special marriage act35 states that either spouse can file a petition for divorce on the ground that the other has deserted him/her for a continuous period of not less than 2 years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition 42. This hon’ble court in Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhawati, AIR 1956 SC 17636, held that desertion comprises both factum of separation and animus deserendi, without reasonable cause, consent and against the will of the spouse and without any subsequent Bonafide efforts by the spouse to return or reconcile the marriage 43. The appellant did not merely continue her career pursuit while actively trying to maintain the marital bond, but instead relocated with a minor child to another city, without prior consent of the husband, thereby severing his bond not only with his spouse but also with his minor child. 34 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27(1)(d), No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India). 35 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27(1), No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India). 36 Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhawati, AIR 1956 SC 176.

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 27 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t 44. It is submitted that the reasonable cause exception under section 27(1)37 only applies when the separation is genuinely justified for pursuit of career and the spouse makes active efforts to return or reconcile, but here the professional justification is accompanied by a unilateral and complete severance of contact, so the reasonable clause plea cannot absolve this conduct 45. It is also submitted that the animus deserendi is evident in the appellants behaviour; her relocation wasn’t temporary, but a permanent act not accompanied by any efforts to reconcile is therefore submitted that the Appellant's plea of career pursuit does not constitute a valid legal justification excusing her conduct. 3.3 WHETHER THE CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF THE FAMILY COURT AND HIGH COURT WARRANT CONFIRMATION 46. the present proceedings appear before this hon’ble court under article 136 of the constitution of India38. This section talks about concurrent finding of facts which gives the SC power to hear appeals from any court’s decision, but this isn’t meant to be used like an ordinary appeal where the court rechecks all the facts of the case from scratch 47. In Sudama Pandey v. State of Bihar, (2002)39, the court stated that it rarely interferes with facts already agreed on by 2 lower courts, unless there has been a grave mistake causing real injustice- not just a difference of opinions. 48. In Alamelu v. State, (2011)40, this Court reiterated that even though the powers under Article 136 are very wide, it will not interfere with 37 The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27(1), No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India). 38 INDIA CONST. art. 136. 39 Sudama Pandey v. State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 293. 40 Alamelu v. State, AIR 2011 SC 715.

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 28 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t concurrent findings of fact "save in very exceptional cases," and that the assessment of evidence by the courts below is accepted as final except where the conclusions are "manifestly perverse and unsupportable by the evidence on record." 49. In Parminder Singh v. Gurpreet Singh, (2018) 13 SCC 35241, this Hon'ble Court, laid down a clear four-fold test for interference under Article 13642 — holding that concurrent findings of fact are binding on this Court unless they are shown to be: (i) perverse, "to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such findings"; (ii) against the evidence on record; (iii) against the pleadings; or (iv) against any provision of law. In the absence of any of these four defects, the Court held it is "not permissible for this Court to again appreciate the evidence in appeal and reverse any of the findings." 50. Applying the four-fold test laid down in Parminder Singh v. Gurpreet Singh43, it is submitted that amounts to an invitation to this Court to re- appreciate the same evidence and arrive at a different conclusion — an exercise this Court has consistently declined to undertake. 51. It is therefore submitted that in the absence of perversity, conflict with evidence or pleadings, or conflict with law the court ought not to disturb the findings of the family court and the high court 41 Parminder Singh v. Gurpreet Singh, (2018) 13 SCC 352. 42 INDIA CONST. art. 136. 43 Parminder Singh v. Gurpreet Singh, (2018) 13 SCC 352.

Continuous Internal Assessment- II (Legal Method) 29 | P a g e M e m o r a n d u m o n b e h a l f o f r e s p o n d e n t PRAYER Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities cited. It is most humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge, hold and declare the following: I. THAT the concurrent findings of cruelty and desertion recorded by the Family Court and affirmed by the High Court be upheld, as the Appellant's unilateral relocation with the minor child amounts to cruelty and desertion under Section 27(1) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and; II. HOLD the concurrent findings of cruelty and desertion recorded by the Family Court and affirmed by the High Court be upheld, as the Appellant's unilateral relocation with the minor child, without the Respondent's consent, constitutes a sustained course of conduct amounting to cruelty and desertion under Section 27(1) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and; III. DECLINE to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below, in the absence of perversity or error of law, and dismiss the present Special Leave Petition, thereby sustaining the decree of divorce granted in favour of the Respondent. And/or Pass any other order in favour of the respondent that this Hon’ble court may deem fit in the light of justice, equality and good conscience All of which is most humbly prayed PLACE: Supreme Court of India DATE: 11/09/2026 Sd- Counsels on behalf of respondents

Flipso

Memorandum on behalf of respondent

nidhi pujari