1 | P a g e 1- GROUNDS FOR INVESTIGATION Scottish Government Resources, Public Money and Potential Party-Political Use: 2017–2026 1. Basis and purpose of the investigation There are sufficient public-interest grounds to justify a structured, independent and evidence-led examination of whether Scottish Government resources have, during the period 1 January 2017 to 31 August 2026, been used in circumstances that may have blurred or crossed the constitutional and administrative boundary between the functions of the Scottish Government and the activities of the Scottish National Party ("SNP"). This request does not assert that any named individual has committed an offence or breached a rule. Rather, it identifies a series of objectively testable issues concerning: • public expenditure; • procurement; • Government employees and Special Advisers; • Government premises; • Government vehicles and equipment; • official communications; • Government information; • ministerial and political communications; • conflicts of interest; • political impartiality; • value for money; • financial regularity and propriety; • record-keeping and transparency. The purpose of the investigation should be to establish the facts, determine whether applicable rules were followed and identify whether any weaknesses or irregularities were isolated or systemic. The investigation should apply the rules, guidance and codes in force at the relevant time. The current Scottish Ministerial Code should not be treated as retrospectively governing conduct occurring under earlier editions, although the underlying principles of public accountability, propriety, political impartiality and separation of public and party resources remain relevant to the investigation.
2 | P a g e 2. The primary constitutional principle: public resources must not be used for party-political purposes The most direct basis for investigation arises from the Scottish Ministerial Code. The current Scottish Ministerial Code expressly provides that Ministers must not use public resources for party-political purposes. It also requires Ministers to keep separate their roles as Ministers and MSPs, uphold the political impartiality of the Civil Service and avoid asking civil servants to undertake activities that conflict with the Civil Service Code or create the appearance that official resources are being used for party-political purposes. The Code further states that Government facilities should generally not be used for party or constituency work and that official facilities and resources may not be used to disseminate material that is essentially party political. These provisions provide a direct and legitimate basis for examining whether: • Government premises were used for party activity; • Government equipment was used to produce party material; • civil servants undertook party work; • Government communications resources produced political material; • Government information was repurposed for party communications; • public expenditure generated an identifiable party-political benefit. The investigation should therefore establish whether the practical separation between Government and party resources was maintained. 3. Ministerial standards: public interest, integrity, objectivity and accountability The Ministerial Code incorporates the Seven Principles of Public Life, including selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. The Code states that Ministers are responsible for their own behaviour and are ultimately accountable to the First Minister for their conduct under the Code. It also states that Ministers have a duty to Parliament to account for policies, decisions and actions within their responsibilities. These principles are directly relevant to the proposed investigation because the question is not merely whether expenditure was technically recorded. The investigation must establish whether decisions concerning public resources were: • made in the public interest; • objectively justified; • properly authorised; • transparent; • appropriately documented;
3 | P a g e • free from undisclosed conflicts; • and capable of being defended under public scrutiny. The Code also imposes an ongoing duty on Ministers to ensure that no conflict, or reasonably perceived conflict, arises between their public duties and private interests. Accordingly, where a Government transaction involves a person, organisation, company, adviser, supplier or other entity with a significant political connection, the investigation should examine the relevant declarations, safeguards and decision-making records. 4. Political impartiality of the Civil Service The investigation is also grounded in the statutory framework governing the Civil Service. The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 provides the statutory basis for the Civil Service Code and requires civil servants covered by the Code to carry out their duties with integrity and honesty, and with objectivity and impartiality. The legislation also provides that the relevant Civil Service Code applies to civil servants serving the Scottish Executive and forms part of their terms and conditions. The Scottish Ministerial Code expressly links Ministers' responsibilities to the political impartiality of the Civil Service and states that Ministers should not ask civil servants to engage in activities likely to call that impartiality into question or create criticism that official resources are being used for party- political purposes. This makes the following questions legitimate matters for investigation: 1. Were civil servants asked to undertake party-political work? 2. Were Government-paid staff involved in preparing party material? 3. Were Government staff directed to produce material for political events? 4. Was Government time used to support political campaigning? 5. Were civil servants involved in party conferences or meetings other than where a legitimate official purpose existed? 6. Were boundaries between ministerial Government work and party activity adequately maintained? The investigation should distinguish carefully between political advice properly given to Ministers in their Government capacity and work performed for a political party. 5. Special Advisers: legitimate political advice versus party activity Special Advisers occupy a distinctive position because they provide political advice to Ministers while being employed within Government. Their political character does not remove the need to establish what capacity they were acting in at any particular time.
4 | P a g e The investigation should therefore examine Special Adviser activity where there is evidence of movement between: • Scottish Government employment; • ministerial offices; • SNP employment; • SNP campaigning; • party communications; • election campaigns; • leadership campaigns; • referendum campaigning. The central question should be: Was the individual undertaking work in support of the Minister's Government responsibilities, or work on behalf of the political party? The distinction is particularly important because the Ministerial Code recognises that Special Advisers have different rules from ordinary civil servants, including specific provisions concerning party functions, while nevertheless placing boundaries around their Government role. The investigation should therefore seek: • contracts; • job descriptions; • calendars; • diaries; • tasking records; • emails; • correspondence; • expense claims; • meeting records; • political-event attendance; • instructions from Ministers; • records concerning work undertaken for party organisations. 6. Public expenditure: regularity, propriety and value for money The Scottish Public Finance Manual (SPFM) provides the Scottish Government's framework for the proper handling and reporting of public funds.
5 | P a g e The SPFM states that expenditure should represent value for money, while taking account of risks relating to regularity and propriety. The procurement section of the SPFM similarly states that public procurement should be focused on value for money, conducted to high professional standards and in accordance with relevant legal requirements, with appropriate oversight by trained and authorised staff. This provides a financial basis for examining not only whether money was spent, but: • why it was spent; • who authorised it; • whether the expenditure was within delegated authority; • whether it served a legitimate Government purpose; • whether appropriate controls were applied; • whether the taxpayer received the intended benefit; • and whether any political benefit was generated without reimbursement. A transaction can therefore warrant investigation even where the accounting entry itself appears regular, if the underlying purpose or use of the expenditure is unclear. 7. Procurement law and procurement integrity Where suppliers, contractors or consultants are involved, the investigation should apply the procurement regime applicable when the relevant procurement commenced. For the relevant period this includes, as applicable: • the Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014; • the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2015; • the Procurement (Scotland) Regulations 2016; • relevant subsequent amendments; • Scottish Government procurement policy; • Scottish Public Finance Manual requirements; • applicable procurement guidance and internal controls. Scottish Government guidance states that procurement activity must be conducted in accordance with the relevant legal framework and that the procurement system is intended to secure value for money, professional standards and legal compliance. The Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 establishes statutory requirements concerning regulated contracts, procurement strategies, transparency and other procurement duties.
6 | P a g e The statutory guidance also identifies requirements concerning the selection of tenderers and award of contracts and states that award criteria must be proportionate and related to the goods, works or services being provided. Accordingly, procurement involving politically connected individuals or organisations should not automatically be treated as improper. However, where such a connection exists, the investigation should establish whether: • conflicts of interest were identified; • relevant declarations were made; • the procurement route was lawful; • competition was genuine where required; • direct award or non-competitive action was properly justified; • evaluation criteria were properly applied; • value for money was demonstrated; • the contract was actually delivered; • contract amendments were justified; • and the supplier subsequently provided political services or support. This is a legitimate control-testing exercise rather than an assumption that political affiliation invalidates a procurement decision. 8. Procurement transparency and supplier relationships The investigation should pay particular attention to suppliers where there is an apparent connection between Government procurement and political organisations. Such connections could include: • directors; • owners; • beneficial owners; • former Special Advisers; • former political staff; • party officials; • campaign personnel; • political donors; • individuals moving between Government and party employment. Political association alone should never be treated as evidence of wrongdoing.
7 | P a g e However, it is a legitimate forensic indicator requiring examination where combined with other factors such as: • unusual procurement procedures; • repeated direct awards; • absence of competition; • unexplained amendments; • inadequate documentation; • unusually rapid procurement; • personal relationships; • undisclosed interests; • or subsequent political work for the same entity. 9. Government communications and the public/private boundary The Ministerial Code contains specific restrictions on Government publicity. It states that official facilities funded from public money may be used for Government publicity and advertising but may not be used for dissemination of material that is essentially party political. This provides a clear basis for examining: • Government photography; • video production; • graphics; • social-media content; • speechwriting; • media preparation; • Government press offices; • Government photographers and videographers; • official social-media accounts; • Ministerial social-media accounts; • political-party social-media accounts. The investigation should establish the production chain for relevant material: commission → staff member → Government resource → production → approval → publication → subsequent political use.
8 | P a g e The mere fact that a Minister later uses information or imagery generated during Government activity does not automatically establish misuse. The critical question is whether public resources were used to create or disseminate material that was essentially party political, or whether an official Government purpose genuinely existed. 10. Government facilities and property The Ministerial Code specifically addresses the use of Government property and resources. It states that Government property should not generally be used for constituency work or party- political activities and that where party or personal events are held at the First Minister's official residence they should be at the individual's or party's expense, with no cost falling on the public purse. This warrants examination of: • Bute House; • ministerial offices; • Government buildings; • meeting rooms; • Government vehicles; • official residences; • Government studios; • communications facilities; • Government IT systems. For each potentially relevant event, the investigation should establish: Who was present? Why was the facility used? Who arranged it? Who paid? What staff time was involved? What was produced? Was any party activity involved? Was reimbursement required? Was reimbursement made? Was the use authorised?
9 | P a g e 11. Government information and political communications The investigation should also examine whether Government-originated information was subsequently used for party-political purposes. This includes: • ministerial briefing papers; • policy submissions; • statistics; • research; • speeches; • talking points; • internal analysis; • communications planning; • media lines; • policy announcements. The investigation should distinguish between legitimate use of Government information by Ministers performing their public functions and any direction to civil servants to create material whose purpose was essentially party-political. The Ministerial Code expressly recognises that Ministers may receive briefing for party-political occasions explaining Government policies or actions, but states that such briefing should not contain material designed to promote one party's line or anticipate criticism from other parties. This is an important distinction and should form part of the investigative methodology. 12. Elections, referendums and periods of heightened political activity The investigation should conduct enhanced sampling around: • Scottish Parliament elections; • UK general elections; • local elections; • SNP leadership contests; • independence-related campaigns; • party conferences; • major political announcements. This is not because Government activity during an election period is inherently improper. Government continues to function during elections.
10 | P a g e The reason for enhanced scrutiny is that periods of heightened political activity create a greater risk of: • role confusion; • overlapping communications; • political use of Government-produced material; • inappropriate staff involvement; • increased ministerial media activity; • use of Government facilities; • or confusion between official and party communications. The Ministerial Code specifically recognises the need to preserve Civil Service impartiality during pre- election and pre-referendum periods. 13. Freedom of Information and transparency The Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (FOISA) provides an important transparency mechanism for establishing the documentary record. The Act establishes a general right of access to information held by Scottish public authorities, subject to statutory exemptions. The investigation should therefore use FOISA strategically to obtain underlying records where appropriate, rather than relying solely upon summaries, press statements or published expenditure data. Requests should seek specific classes of recorded information, including: • emails; • attachments; • calendars; • meeting records; • procurement files; • invoices; • purchase orders; • contracts; • expenditure records; • expense claims; • briefing documents; • communications plans;
11 | P a g e • social-media production records; • Special Adviser correspondence; • conflict-of-interest records; • authorisations; • reimbursement records; • internal reviews. Where information is exempt, FOISA requires the authority to identify the relevant basis for exemption; the Act also contains provisions governing information otherwise accessible and other exemptions. The investigation should therefore request partial disclosure wherever possible, rather than treating an exemption as necessarily preventing disclosure of an entire record set. 14. Records management and evidential preservation A meaningful forensic examination requires preservation of the underlying evidence. The investigation should therefore seek preservation of: • Government email accounts; • ministerial correspondence; • Special Adviser correspondence; • electronic calendars; • procurement systems; • financial systems; • purchase-card records; • expense systems; • document-management systems; • Government social-media production records; • meeting-room bookings; • vehicle records; • visitor records where lawfully available; • relevant communications with external suppliers. The objective is to prevent a situation in which an investigation is limited to selected summaries while the underlying evidential trail is unavailable. Where records have been deleted under normal retention policies, the investigation should establish:
12 | P a g e • the applicable retention policy; • the deletion date; • whether deletion was routine; • whether any legal hold or investigation existed; • whether backups or alternative records exist. 15. Public audit and the Auditor General for Scotland The Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act 2000 provides the statutory framework for public audit and accountability. The legislation provides for audit of relevant accounts and reporting by the Auditor General for Scotland. Audit Scotland's public-audit framework is concerned not simply with whether figures have been recorded, but with whether public bodies properly discharge their responsibilities and whether public spending and performance are subject to effective independent scrutiny. The 2026 Code of Audit Practice describes public audit as providing assurance that public bodies properly discharge their responsibilities and supporting democratic scrutiny of how public money is raised and spent and the outcomes achieved. This creates a legitimate route for escalation where evidence emerging from the proposed reconciliation identifies matters that warrant independent public audit consideration. The appropriate question for referral would not necessarily be whether a criminal offence has occurred. It could instead be whether there are concerns regarding: • regularity; • propriety; • governance; • financial controls; • value for money; • transparency; • public-resource management; • or systemic weaknesses. 16. Scottish Parliament scrutiny The Scottish Parliament's Public Audit Committee provides an additional constitutional mechanism for scrutiny.
13 | P a g e The Committee's remit includes consideration of: • accounts laid before Parliament; • reports made to Parliament by the Auditor General for Scotland; • and other documents concerning financial control, accounting and auditing in relation to public expenditure. The Committee's work is specifically directed toward scrutinising whether public money is spent efficiently and effectively and holding public-sector leaders to account for how public funds have been spent. Accordingly, where a properly documented investigation identifies material concerns relating to Government expenditure or financial control, consideration should be given to referral to: • the Auditor General for Scotland; • the Scottish Parliament Public Audit Committee; • another relevant parliamentary committee; • or another competent authority, depending upon the nature of the evidence. Such a referral should be evidence-led and should distinguish clearly between established facts, unresolved questions and allegations. 17. The role of the Accountable Officer The financial framework also makes it important to examine the responsibilities of those accountable for public expenditure. The Scottish Public Finance Manual provides the framework for handling public funds, while the statutory public-finance regime establishes the wider accountability and audit architecture. The investigation should therefore identify, for material transactions: • the spending authority; • delegated authority; • accountable officer responsibility where relevant; • finance approval; • procurement approval; • Ministerial involvement; • written authority where required; • and subsequent audit or assurance. Where an official decision departed from normal procedures, the investigation should establish whether that departure was: 1. authorised;
14 | P a g e 2. documented; 3. justified; 4. proportionate; 5. consistent with applicable financial guidance. 18. What would constitute a material investigative concern? The following should be treated as potential indicators warranting further examination, rather than proof of misconduct: Financial indicators • unexplained Government expenditure; • repeated small payments to the same politically connected supplier; • unusual expenditure around political events; • expenditure lacking a clear Government purpose; • Government-funded services subsequently supplied to a political organisation. Personnel indicators • Government staff undertaking identifiable party work; • unexplained staff activity around campaigns; • Special Adviser role overlap; • Government employees producing party material; • use of Government-paid time for political activity. Procurement indicators • repeated direct awards; • inadequate competition; • unexplained procurement exemptions; • supplier connections not apparently considered; • unexplained contract amendments; • inadequate conflict declarations. Communications indicators • Government-produced material appearing substantially unchanged in party communications; • Government staff producing material for political accounts; • Government equipment being used for political production;
15 | P a g e • Government communications staff undertaking party work. Facilities indicators • party events held using Government facilities without reimbursement; • Government vehicles used for party activity; • Government premises used to produce political material; • unexplained Government expenditure connected with political events. Information indicators • Government briefings apparently prepared specifically for party purposes; • civil servants being asked to anticipate attacks from political opponents; • official material being transferred to party organisations; • Government-originated analysis appearing in political communications in circumstances suggesting improper preparation or transfer. No individual indicator should be treated as conclusive. The investigation should instead determine whether several indicators converge around the same transaction, individual, supplier, event or period. 19. The forensic methodology required The appropriate methodology is a cross-system reconciliation, rather than a collection of isolated complaints. The investigation should create four principal evidential datasets. A. MONEY Government payment → recipient → supplier/individual → political connection → service delivered → resulting benefit B. PEOPLE Government employee/Special Adviser → period of employment → paid time → instructions → activity → beneficiary C. RESOURCES Government facility/equipment/system → user → date → purpose → cost → output → subsequent use D. INFORMATION Government document/data/briefing → author → recipient → purpose → subsequent publication/use → political beneficiary The four datasets should then be cross-matched.
16 | P a g e For example: Supplier + Government payment + Special Adviser connection + political communications + election period would warrant significantly greater scrutiny than any one of those factors considered independently. 20. Required standard of evidence The investigation should maintain a strict distinction between: FACT Something directly established by documentary evidence or reliable testimony. INFERENCE A conclusion reasonably drawn from multiple pieces of evidence. CONCERN An unresolved issue requiring further investigation. ALLEGATION A claim made by an individual or organisation that has not yet been established. FINDING A conclusion reached following examination of the available evidence. This distinction is essential because the investigation should be capable of producing findings that clear individuals and transactions as well as findings that identify shortcomings. 21. No presumption of guilt Nothing in this request should be interpreted as alleging that SNP membership, political affiliation, political employment, ministerial office or contact between Government Ministers and party officials is itself improper. Nor should a Government contract with a politically connected person automatically be treated as evidence of corruption. The relevant issue is whether the rules governing public money and public resources were followed. Similarly, the use of Government information by Ministers is not inherently improper. The question is whether Government officials were improperly directed to undertake party-political work or whether Government resources were used to create or disseminate material that was essentially party political. The investigation should therefore be neutral, evidence-led and capable of disproving as well as substantiating concerns.
17 | P a g e 22. Why an independent examination is justified An independent examination is justified where the issues under investigation concern the conduct, expenditure or decisions of the institution whose own records and internal processes are being examined. This does not imply that Scottish Government officials are incapable of conducting an internal review. Rather, independent scrutiny would provide greater assurance where the investigation concerns: • Ministers; • senior political figures; • Special Advisers; • Government communications; • procurement; • expenditure; • internal authorisation; • or the adequacy of Government controls themselves. The appropriate independent mechanism may depend upon the evidence. Possible routes include: • Auditor General for Scotland; • Audit Scotland; • Scottish Parliament scrutiny; • Public Audit Committee; • FOI review and appeal mechanisms; • relevant procurement challenge mechanisms; • internal audit; • disciplinary procedures; • or, where evidence indicates potential criminality, referral to the appropriate law- enforcement authority. 23. The central investigative question The investigation should ultimately answer: Between 1 January 2017 and 31 August 2026, were Scottish Government money, personnel, procurement arrangements, facilities, equipment, communications or information used
18 | P a g e consistently with the legal, financial, procurement, ethical and constitutional requirements governing public administration, or did any such resources provide an improper party-political benefit to the SNP or another political organisation? If the answer is that the rules were followed, the investigation should document the evidence demonstrating that conclusion. If the evidence establishes departures from the rules, the investigation should identify: • the date; • the resource; • the value; • the individual or organisation involved; • the decision-maker; • the authorisation; • the applicable rule; • the nature of the departure; • the political benefit; • whether reimbursement occurred; • whether the matter was reported; • whether corrective action occurred; • and whether the incident appears isolated or systemic. 24. Requested outcome The appropriate outcome should not simply be a narrative report. The investigation should produce a documentary audit trail capable of independent verification. For every material finding, the final report should identify: Field Required information Date Date of transaction/event Resource Money, staff, facility, equipment, information or procurement Individual/entity Person, department, supplier or organisation Government purpose Stated official purpose Political connection Relevant connection, if any Cost/value Financial or estimated resource value Authority Person/body authorising the activity Procurement Route and applicable rules Evidence Primary records supporting the finding Rule Applicable Code, legislation, policy or guidance Finding Compliant / concern / irregularity / unresolved
19 | P a g e Political benefit Evidence-based assessment Recovery Reimbursement or corrective action Referral Audit, parliamentary or other referral if warranted 25. Conclusion: the public-interest case for investigation There is a compelling public-interest rationale for examining these matters comprehensively. The issue is not party politics. The issue is the protection of public money, public institutions and politically impartial public administration. The Scottish Ministerial Code expressly requires Ministers not to use public resources for party- political purposes and requires separation between ministerial responsibilities and party or constituency interests. The Civil Service's statutory framework requires integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality. The Scottish public-finance framework requires expenditure to be managed with regard to regularity, propriety and value for money. Scottish procurement law and policy impose requirements concerning transparency, competition, proportionality, equal treatment and value for money. The public-audit framework provides independent mechanisms for examining whether public bodies have properly discharged their responsibilities, while the Scottish Parliament's Public Audit Committee exists specifically to scrutinise public expenditure and reports from the Auditor General. Taken together, these frameworks establish that the protection of public resources from improper political use is not merely a matter of political convention. It is part of the wider architecture of ministerial accountability, civil-service impartiality, financial control, procurement integrity, public audit and democratic scrutiny. The proposed investigation should therefore be understood as an attempt to test the operation of those safeguards over an extended period. The central issue is ultimately simple: Can the Scottish Government demonstrate, through its own records and independently verifiable evidence, that public money, public servants, public facilities, public procurement, public communications and public information were kept appropriately separate from party-political activity throughout the period 2017–2026? If that evidence exists, it should be capable of being produced. If it does not, that absence is itself a matter requiring explanation. The appropriate response is therefore not assumption, accusation or political inference, but a properly scoped forensic investigation, supported by primary records, applicable law and independent public scrutiny.
20 | P a g e 2- Request for a Scottish Government–SNP Forensic Reconciliation 2017–2026 Subject: Comprehensive forensic reconciliation of Scottish Government resources and SNP activity, including money, procurement, personnel, facilities, communications and information I request a comprehensive review and disclosure of information concerning the use of Scottish Government resources in circumstances involving the Scottish National Party (SNP), SNP office- holders, elected representatives, political advisers, party officials, campaign personnel, associated organisations and SNP-connected companies or individuals. The requested review should cover the period 1 January 2017 to 31 August 2026. The purpose of this request is to establish, on an evidence-based and transaction-level basis, whether Scottish Government money, personnel, procurement arrangements, facilities, equipment, communications, information or other public resources were used for purposes that were wholly or partly party-political, and whether any such use complied with the applicable rules, policies, procurement requirements and Ministerial Code. This request is not based on an assumption of wrongdoing. It seeks sufficient records to distinguish legitimate Government activity from potential political use of public resources and, where appropriate, to identify any evidence of improper diversion, authorisation, facilitation, concealment or benefit. 1. Government payments and procurement Please provide records sufficient to identify all Scottish Government payments, contracts, procurement awards, grants, purchases and other financial transactions involving: • current or former SNP office-holders; • SNP employees or officials; • SNP campaign personnel; • Special Advisers with current or former SNP roles; • companies owned, controlled or directed by such persons; • organisations substantially associated with the SNP; • known SNP donors where a relevant Government transaction exists; • persons or companies subsequently providing services to the SNP or SNP campaigns. For each relevant transaction, please provide, where held: 1. supplier/recipient name; 2. company number; 3. date; 4. amount;
21 | P a g e 5. description and purpose; 6. contract or purchase-order number; 7. procurement route; 8. whether competitive tendering occurred; 9. any direct-award or waiver justification; 10. decision-maker/authorising officer; 11. conflict-of-interest declarations; 12. relevant business case; 13. evaluation documents; 14. contract and amendments; 15. invoices; 16. payment records; 17. evidence of deliverables; 18. correspondence concerning the award; 19. correspondence concerning any political or personal connection; 20. records demonstrating value for money. Particular attention should be given to transactions involving persons who have held senior SNP, campaign or ministerial advisory positions. 2. Civil servants and Special Advisers Please provide records sufficient to establish whether Scottish Government employees, civil servants or Special Advisers undertook work that directly or indirectly supported: • SNP party activity; • SNP conferences; • SNP leadership campaigns; • Westminster or Scottish Parliament election campaigns; • independence referendum campaigning; • SNP fundraising; • SNP social-media activity; • SNP speeches or political communications; • SNP press or campaign material; • party events or meetings. Where available, please provide:
22 | P a g e • calendars; • diary entries; • meeting records; • work instructions; • emails; • briefing requests; • tasking records; • timesheets or workload records; • expense claims; • travel records; • records identifying the commissioning Minister or official; • records identifying the purpose of the work; • records concerning whether the work was undertaken in an official or personal/party capacity. Where individual hours were not recorded, please provide the Government's records explaining why they were not recorded and any alternative information from which the resource commitment can be reconstructed. 3. Special Adviser activity Please identify all Special Advisers during the period who: • held an SNP office or party role; • worked for the SNP before or after Government employment; • worked on an SNP election or referendum campaign; • attended SNP conferences or party events; • produced or assisted with political material; • participated in political activity while receiving Scottish Government remuneration. For each relevant individual, please provide records sufficient to distinguish: Government duties from party-political activity. Please also provide the applicable authorisations, guidance, declarations and records concerning use of Government time and resources. 4. Government facilities
23 | P a g e Please identify Government facilities used by Ministers, Special Advisers or officials in circumstances involving SNP or political activity, including, where relevant: • Bute House; • ministerial offices; • Scottish Government offices; • meeting rooms; • Government studios; • official residences; • Government vehicles; • Government communications facilities. For each identified event or use, please provide: • date and time; • persons present; • purpose; • booking record; • official/party classification; • cost; • staff involved; • equipment used; • authorisation; • applicable policy; • records concerning reimbursement where party or personal activity was involved. The review should specifically distinguish between: 1. legitimate Government business; 2. Government activity that also produced political benefit; 3. party-political activity using Government facilities; 4. personal political activity using Government resources. 5. Government equipment and communications Please identify Government equipment, systems or staff resources used in connection with political or party-related communications, including: • cameras; • photography;
24 | P a g e • video production; • editing; • Government computers; • phones; • internet/IT systems; • communications staff; • social-media staff; • press officers; • Government photographers or videographers. Particular attention should be given to material published on: • official Scottish Government accounts; • First Minister accounts; • Ministers' personal accounts; • SNP accounts; • campaign accounts; • other political accounts. Where Government personnel assisted with material subsequently published on a Minister's personal or political channel, please provide records sufficient to establish: • who produced it; • who requested it; • who approved it; • where it was produced; • equipment used; • staff time involved; • Government cost; • stated Government purpose; • whether it was subsequently used for SNP or campaign purposes. 6. Government information and briefings Please identify Government briefing material, policy documents, statistics, speeches, submissions, correspondence or other information provided to Ministers or political advisers that was subsequently reproduced or used in: • SNP speeches;
25 | P a g e • SNP conference addresses; • SNP press releases; • SNP social-media content; • election material; • referendum material; • party political communications. For each relevant instance, please provide sufficient records to establish: 1. the original Government document; 2. author; 3. date; 4. intended recipient; 5. stated Government purpose; 6. subsequent political use; 7. date of political publication; 8. any material changes; 9. whether civil servants were instructed to prepare it for a political occasion; 10. whether the use complied with the applicable Ministerial Code and Government guidance. Particular attention should be given to situations where Government officials prepared material shortly before an SNP conference, election campaign, referendum campaign or major SNP political announcement. 7. Government procurement and SNP-connected companies Please conduct a cross-reference of Scottish Government procurement records against: • Companies House director records; • beneficial ownership information held by Government; • Special Adviser records; • SNP office-holder records; • SNP employment records where available; • political donations; • declared interests; • previous SNP campaign roles. Where a supplier has a significant SNP connection, please provide the procurement records necessary to establish whether:
26 | P a g e • the relationship was known to the Government; • a conflict was declared; • the relationship was considered during procurement; • competition was undertaken; • an exception was relied upon; • value for money was assessed; • the supplier subsequently provided services to the SNP or a political campaign. 8. Government–SNP personnel crossover Please identify individuals who, during the period 2017–2026: • moved between Scottish Government and SNP employment; • served as Special Advisers and subsequently worked for the SNP; • served the SNP and subsequently became Government employees or advisers; • simultaneously held Government and politically relevant roles; • had declared political interests relevant to Government procurement or expenditure. For each person, provide employment dates, roles, relevant declarations and records concerning any overlap in duties or resources. 9. Public money and SNP activity Please identify any instance in which Scottish Government funds, grants, payments or other public expenditure: • were paid directly to the SNP; • were paid to an SNP-controlled or SNP-associated organisation; • were paid to an individual who subsequently transferred funds or value to the SNP; • funded activity subsequently used by the SNP; • funded personnel who subsequently undertook party-political work; • funded goods, services or communications subsequently used for SNP purposes. Where any such transaction exists, please provide the complete financial and documentary audit trail. 10. Election and referendum periods Please conduct enhanced review around: • Scottish Parliament elections; • UK general elections; • local elections;
27 | P a g e • SNP leadership contests; • independence referendum-related campaigning; • major SNP fundraising campaigns; • SNP conferences. The purpose is to identify whether Government resources increased or changed in character immediately before, during or after political campaigns. Please provide records sufficient to compare Government activity during these periods with ordinary Government activity. 11. Specific examination of senior political figures The review should include, where relevant to Government records: • John Swinney; • Nicola Sturgeon; • Humza Yousaf; • other serving or former First Ministers; • Scottish Government Ministers; • Ministers' Special Advisers; • senior SNP office-holders who interacted with Scottish Government personnel. For each person, the review should establish: • Government role; • SNP role; • dates of each role; • relevant expenditure; • procurement connections; • Government staff involvement; • Government facilities used; • Government communications; • political communications derived from Government material; • conflicts/declarations; • relevant authorisations. This is an evidence-gathering exercise and should not be interpreted as alleging misconduct by any named individual. 12. Four-way forensic reconciliation
28 | P a g e Please provide information sufficient to conduct the following four reconciliations: A. Money Scottish Government → recipient → SNP connection → subsequent benefit B. Personnel Government employee/SpAd → Government-paid time → activity → SNP/political benefit C. Resources Government facility/equipment/system → user → activity → political use D. Information Government-originated material → Minister/adviser → political communication → SNP benefit 13. Irregularity and control testing For each potentially relevant transaction or activity, please identify whether the records indicate: • legitimate Government purpose; • party-political purpose; • mixed Government/political purpose; • inadequate separation of functions; • failure to declare an interest; • non-competitive procurement; • inadequate procurement justification; • unauthorised expenditure; • use of Government staff for political work; • use of Government facilities for political work; • use of Government information for party purposes; • reimbursement or recovery; • investigation or internal review; • referral to another body. 14. Evidence preservation Please preserve all relevant records pending completion of this review, including: • emails; • electronic calendars; • procurement records; • financial records;
29 | P a g e • invoices; • expense claims; • meeting records; • Government briefings; • ministerial submissions; • social-media production records; • IT records; • FOI correspondence; • Special Adviser records; • conflict-of-interest declarations; • procurement waivers; • contracts; • communications with suppliers. 15. Final requested output I request that the Scottish Government provide, where possible, a consolidated schedule showing: Dat e Governmen t resource Person/entit y SNP connectio n Purpos e Amount/resourc e Authorisatio n Evidenc e Findin g The final reconciliation should distinguish clearly between: GREEN — legitimate Government activity AMBER — potential political benefit/control weakness RED — evidence of Government resources being used for party-political activity CRITICAL — evidence suggesting deliberate diversion, concealment, false accounting or improper financial/political benefit I further request that any conclusion of improper use be supported by the underlying documentary evidence and that allegations, suspicions and established facts be clearly distinguished. The central question for the review is: Between 1 January 2017 and 31 August 2026, did Scottish Government money, personnel, procurement, facilities, equipment, communications or information improperly support SNP activity, and, if so, who authorised, facilitated, received or benefited from that support and what documentary evidence establishes the connection? Where the requested information is already publicly available, please provide the relevant publication, dataset, document title and location rather than simply referring to the general Scottish Government website.
30 | P a g e Where information is held by another public authority, please identify the authority and the relevant record or dataset where possible. Where any part of the request is considered exempt from disclosure, please provide the non-exempt portion and specify the precise exemption relied upon.
31 | P a g e SECTION X — FOREIGN RISK, FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND TRANSNATIONAL CORRUPTION Scottish Government ↔ SNP Forensic Reconciliation, 2017–2026 Purpose and grounds for investigation As part of the wider forensic reconciliation of Scottish Government resources and SNP activity between 1 January 2017 and 31 August 2026, I request a specific and comprehensive investigation into potential foreign funding, foreign interference, foreign influence, bribery, corruption, sanctions exposure, undisclosed beneficial ownership and foreign-linked intermediaries. This section should be treated as an integrated investigative workstream and should not be examined independently of the financial, procurement, personnel, Special Adviser, facilities, equipment, communications and information-flow investigations requested elsewhere. The purpose is to determine whether foreign actors or foreign-linked entities had financial, political, commercial or other relationships with the SNP, Scottish Government, Ministers, Special Advisers, officials, contractors, suppliers, donors or associated individuals and whether any such relationships resulted in, or were intended to result in, an improper political, financial or governmental benefit. The existence of a foreign connection should not itself be treated as evidence of wrongdoing. International engagement, diplomatic contact, foreign investment, overseas business activity, legitimate political donations and lawful hospitality may all have legitimate explanations. The investigation should instead establish the source, ownership, purpose, recipient, intermediary, decision-making connection and ultimate benefit associated with each material relationship. Foreign funding and financial flows The investigation should identify and reconcile relevant money, assets, services or other benefits originating directly or indirectly from foreign governments, foreign nationals, foreign companies, state-owned or state-controlled entities, foreign political organisations, overseas trusts and foundations, or persons acting on their behalf. The investigation should establish the ultimate source of funds rather than relying solely on the identity of the immediate payer. Where funds have passed through companies, individuals, trusts, consultants or other intermediaries, the investigation should establish the beneficial owner, controlling person, origin of funds, purpose of the transfer and ultimate recipient. Particular attention should be given to transactions where an apparently domestic donor, company or intermediary may have received funds or instructions from an overseas source before making a political donation, providing a service, entering into a contract or conferring another benefit. The relevant financial records should be reconciled against SNP accounts, political donations, campaign expenditure, Electoral Commission records, Scottish Government expenditure, procurement records, grants, contracts, expenses and other relevant public records. Foreign-linked intermediaries The investigation should identify individuals, companies, consultants, advisers, agents, trusts and other organisations that may have acted between a foreign source and the SNP, Scottish Government or politically connected individuals.
32 | P a g e For each material intermediary, the investigation should establish: foreign source → intermediary → recipient → purpose → decision → benefit. The investigation should determine who funded the intermediary, who controlled it, whether it received instructions, what services it provided, whether it received remuneration and whether it subsequently transferred money, services, information, access or other benefits to the SNP, Government personnel or associated persons. Particular attention should be given to opaque ownership structures, nominee arrangements, offshore entities, recently established companies, common directors or addresses, unexplained corporate relationships and intermediaries whose apparent commercial activity does not adequately explain the relevant financial or political transactions. Foreign governments and state-linked entities The investigation should identify relevant dealings between the SNP or Scottish Government and foreign governments, diplomatic missions, foreign ministries, state agencies, state-owned enterprises, state-controlled corporations, sovereign wealth entities and other organisations with substantial foreign-government involvement. Relevant records should include meetings, correspondence, ministerial diaries, invitations, hospitality, travel, procurement, contracts, grants, policy discussions, representations, requests and subsequent Government decisions. Where a foreign state-linked entity has obtained a Scottish Government contract, grant, procurement award or other Government benefit, the relevant procurement and decision-making records should be examined to establish whether the transaction was properly authorised, competed, disclosed and managed and whether any political or personal relationship affected the process. Foreign political influence and interference The investigation should identify evidence of attempts by foreign governments, foreign political organisations, foreign companies, foreign nationals or their intermediaries to influence SNP policy, Scottish Government policy, Ministers, Special Advisers, civil servants, elections, referendum activity, political communications, procurement or other Government decisions. The relevant investigative chain should be: foreign actor → contact → request/message → political or Government recipient → response → decision/outcome. The purpose is to distinguish ordinary diplomatic or commercial engagement from activity intended to obtain political access, policy influence, procurement advantage, political financing, Government action or another benefit. Where foreign influence is alleged or identified, the investigation should establish whether the foreign actor provided funding, hospitality, travel, information, strategic advice, political support, services or other benefits and whether the recipient was required to disclose the relationship. Foreign travel, hospitality and gifts
33 | P a g e The investigation should identify foreign-funded or foreign-hosted travel, accommodation, hospitality, meals, entertainment, event attendance, gifts, tickets and other benefits provided to Ministers, former Ministers, Special Advisers, senior officials, SNP office-holders or other relevant persons. For each material benefit, the investigation should establish who provided it, who paid for it, its value, purpose, date, recipient, relevant communications, whether it was declared or reimbursed and whether the recipient subsequently participated in a Government or political decision relevant to the provider. Particular attention should be given to situations where a foreign-provided benefit was followed by a procurement decision, policy intervention, political appointment, Government access or other material action. Bribery and improper inducements The investigation should examine evidence that money, employment, contracts, hospitality, travel, gifts, political support, services or another advantage may have been offered, promised, requested or accepted in connection with a Government or political act. Each potential case should be reconstructed by identifying: provider → benefit → recipient → request/promise → expected act → actual act → decision → beneficiary. The investigation should determine whether the evidence supports a legitimate explanation or whether there is evidence of an improper inducement, quid pro quo, abuse of position or other unlawful conduct. An unusual payment or political relationship should not automatically be characterised as bribery. Any bribery finding should be based on evidence satisfying the relevant legal test. Corruption and misuse of public office The investigation should examine whether any public office, Government authority, public money, Government personnel, procurement process, confidential information, facility or official access was used to provide an improper benefit to a foreign person, foreign company, political organisation, private individual or intermediary. This should include potential conflicts of interest, preferential treatment, procurement manipulation, improper grants, improper appointments, misuse of Government information, political interference and other conduct potentially inconsistent with applicable law, Government policy, procurement rules or ethical requirements. Foreign-linked procurement Scottish Government procurement and contracting records should be cross-referenced against foreign ownership, beneficial ownership, political donations, declared interests, directorships, foreign state connections and relevant political or Ministerial contacts. Enhanced scrutiny should be applied to: • direct awards; • non-competitive procurement;
34 | P a g e • procurement waivers; • emergency procurement; • unusual contract extensions; • material contract variations; • repeat awards; • politically connected suppliers; • foreign state-linked suppliers; • unexplained conflicts of interest; • unusual timing surrounding political or Government decisions. The purpose is not to presume that such circumstances are improper, but to determine whether the procurement process was properly conducted and whether any foreign or political relationship materially influenced the outcome. Sanctions and restricted persons/entities Relevant individuals, companies, beneficial owners and counterparties should be screened against applicable UK, UN and other legally relevant sanctions regimes. Where a potential match is identified, the investigation should establish identity, nationality, ownership, control and the nature and timing of any transaction or relationship. A possible name match should not be treated as a confirmed sanctions match without appropriate identity verification. The investigation should determine whether any Government, SNP or associated transaction involved a sanctioned person or entity, a person controlled by a sanctioned individual or an entity subject to applicable restrictions. Politically exposed persons and foreign political connections The investigation should identify relevant foreign politically exposed persons and senior foreign political figures connected with SNP office-holders, Scottish Ministers, Special Advisers, civil servants, donors, suppliers or contractors. Relevant relationships should be examined through: foreign political figure → individual/company → SNP → Scottish Government → decision/benefit. Where such relationships exist, the investigation should establish their nature, duration, financial component, disclosure status and relevance to any Government or political decision. Foreign information and influence operations The investigation should examine whether foreign actors or foreign-linked intermediaries supplied political messaging, policy documents, research, statistics, briefing material, draft speeches, communications strategy or other information subsequently used by the SNP or Scottish Government.
35 | P a g e Where Government-originated material subsequently appears in SNP, campaign or foreign-linked communications, the investigation should establish the source of the material, who accessed it, who authorised its use and whether the transfer or subsequent use was legitimate. The same analysis should apply where foreign-supplied information subsequently appears in Government or political communications. Concealment and source obfuscation The investigation should identify evidence of deliberate concealment or misrepresentation concerning foreign funding or influence, including concealed beneficial ownership, false donor identity, undisclosed intermediaries, inaccurate payment descriptions, false invoices, hidden reimbursement arrangements, undeclared hospitality, unexplained transfers or deliberate suppression or alteration of relevant records. Any apparent administrative error or inadequate record-keeping should be distinguished from evidence of deliberate concealment. Authorisation, knowledge and benefit For every material case, the investigation should establish: Who initiated the activity? Who authorised it? Who facilitated it? Who received the money or benefit? Who knew about the foreign connection? When did they know? What action followed? Who ultimately benefited? Was the relationship or transaction disclosed? Was any public resource involved? This analysis should be applied individually to Ministers, former Ministers, Special Advisers, civil servants, SNP office-holders, contractors, suppliers, donors and intermediaries where there is an evidential connection. Integrated foreign-risk reconciliation The foreign-risk investigation should be linked to the wider forensic database so that the following datasets can be cross-matched: Foreign money ↔ SNP finance ↔ Government expenditure ↔ Procurement
36 | P a g e ↔ Donors ↔ Companies ↔ Beneficial owners ↔ Ministers ↔ Special Advisers ↔ Civil servants ↔ Foreign contacts ↔ Travel and hospitality ↔ Government decisions ↔ Political communications ↔ Ultimate benefit Every significant relationship should receive a unique evidence/case identifier and should be traceable to the underlying documentary records. Foreign-risk escalation framework The investigation should distinguish clearly between: GREEN — legitimate foreign engagement: ordinary diplomatic, commercial or political activity supported by evidence and appropriately disclosed. AMBER — potential risk: foreign connection, control weakness, conflict, unusual transaction or undisclosed relationship requiring further examination. RED — substantiated concern: documentary evidence of an undisclosed or improper financial, political, procurement or Government-resource connection. CRITICAL — potential criminal/regulatory matter: evidence capable of supporting a potential finding involving bribery, corruption, unlawful political financing, sanctions violations, deliberate concealment or other serious misconduct. The colour classification should represent investigative priority and evidential assessment, not a presumption of guilt. Final foreign-interference question The completed investigation should answer: Did any foreign government, foreign national, foreign company, foreign political organisation, foreign state-linked entity or foreign-linked intermediary provide money, property, services, hospitality, political support, information, access or another benefit to the SNP, Scottish Government personnel or associated persons between 1 January 2017 and 31 August 2026? It should then determine: Who was the ultimate source, who controlled the benefit, whether an intermediary was used, who received it, who authorised or facilitated the relevant activity, who knew about it, what
37 | P a g e political or Government decision was involved, whether the relationship was properly disclosed, whether any public resources were involved, who ultimately benefited, and whether the evidence supports a finding of improper foreign influence, unlawful funding, bribery, corruption, sanctions exposure, concealment or other misconduct? Evidence standard All significant findings should be supported by primary documentary, financial, procurement, communications or other independently corroborated evidence wherever available. Foreign nationality, overseas residence, political association, international travel, diplomatic contact, foreign investment or foreign corporate ownership should not, by themselves, constitute evidence of criminal conduct. The investigation should distinguish throughout between fact, allegation, intelligence, circumstantial evidence, reasonable investigative inference and established finding, and should identify the specific legal, regulatory or policy framework applicable to each conclusion.
38 | P a g e COMMANDER’S BRIEF MATRIX Scottish Government Resources / Potential Party-Political Use Investigation Period: 1 January 2017 – 31 August 2026 R ef Investigativ e Line Core Question Primary Evidence Required Applicable Framework Risk / Significance Immediate Action C B- 01 Public Money Was Scottish Government expenditure used for a purpose that directly or indirectly benefited a political party? Payment ledgers, invoices, purchase orders, expense claims, approvals, departmental cost centres Scottish Public Finance Manual; Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act 2000; applicable financial policies HIGH – potential misuse of public funds Conduct transaction- level reconciliation C B- 02 Governmen t Staff Were civil servants paid from public funds while undertaking party-political activity? Diaries, emails, tasking records, timesheets where available, calendars, correspondence Civil Service Code; Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010; Ministerial Code HIGH – political impartiality/p ublic- resource issue Identify personnel and reconstruct activity C B- 03 Special Advisers Did Special Advisers operate beyond their Government role in support of party activity? Contracts, job descriptions, calendars, emails, instructions, expenses, party- event records Special Adviser Code; Ministerial Code; Civil Service framework HIGH Map Government/ party role overlap C B- 04 Governmen t Premises Were Government buildings or official residences used for party activity without proper authority or reimbursement ? Room bookings, visitor logs, diaries, photographs, event invitations, invoices, security records Ministerial Code; Government property/financi al rules MEDIUM– HIGH Match events against Government records
39 | P a g e C B- 05 Governmen t Vehicles Were Government vehicles or drivers used for party-political activity? Vehicle logs, driver records, itineraries, fuel records, ministerial diaries Ministerial Code; Government vehicle policy MEDIUM– HIGH Reconstruct journeys and purpose C B- 06 Governmen t Communica tions Were publicly funded communication s resources used to create or distribute essentially party-political material? Drafts, design files, photography/vid eo records, social-media production records, invoices Ministerial Code; Government communications guidance HIGH Establish production and approval chain C B- 07 Governmen t Information Was Government- produced information or analysis improperly transferred or repurposed for party political purposes? Briefing papers, emails, attachments, data files, requests, publication records Ministerial Code; Civil Service Code; FOISA/records framework HIGH Trace document origin → recipient → use C B- 08 Procuremen t Were contracts awarded in accordance with applicable procurement law and policy? Tender files, evaluation records, procurement strategy, contracts, award notices Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014; Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2015; applicable rules HIGH Full procurement- file audit C B- 09 Political Connections Were relevant conflicts or political connections identified and properly managed? Declarations, conflict registers, procurement files, company records, correspondence Ministerial Code; procurement rules; conflict policies HIGH where corroborated Identify connections and test disclosures C B- 10 Direct Awards Were non- competitive or direct awards Contract notices, exemption/justifi cation records, approvals, Applicable procurement HIGH Sample and prioritise
40 | P a g e properly justified? procurement advice legislation and SPFM unusual awards C B- 11 Suppliers Did Government- funded suppliers subsequently provide political services or benefits? Contracts, invoices, deliverables, party records, public-company information, communications Procurement framework; financial propriety rules HIGH if linked to public expenditure Conduct supplier-to- party cross- match C B- 12 Political Events Were Government resources used around party conferences, campaigns, elections or political events? Event calendars, travel records, expenses, staff records, communications material Ministerial Code; Civil Service Code; financial rules MEDIUM– HIGH Enhanced sampling around political events C B- 13 Election Periods Did Government and party activity become materially intertwined during election periods? Diaries, communications, staffing, Government announcements, party material Ministerial Code; Civil Service impartiality requirements HIGH where overlap exists Build election- period timelines C B- 14 Photograph y / Video Was Government- funded photography/vi deo subsequently supplied to party organisations? Original files, metadata, commissioning records, invoices, publication history Ministerial Code; communications expenditure rules HIGH if no Government purpose Digital- forensic comparison C B- 15 Social Media Were Government staff/resources used to produce content for political-party channels? Content calendars, drafts, analytics, production records, staff correspondence Ministerial Code; Civil Service Code HIGH Trace content ownership and production
41 | P a g e C B- 16 Ministerial Offices Were Ministerial offices used for activity that was essentially party political? Diaries, meeting- room bookings, emails, visitors, photographs Ministerial Code MEDIUM– HIGH Identify recurring meetings/eve nts C B- 17 Governmen t Announcem ents Were official announcement s structured or timed primarily to support party political objectives? Decision papers, communications strategy, ministerial approvals, media plans Ministerial Code; Government communications principles MEDIUM– HIGH Compare Government rationale with political use C B- 18 Reimburse ment Where a political or private benefit occurred, was the public cost reimbursed? Invoices, repayment records, finance correspondence, accounting entries SPFM; Ministerial Code; departmental policies HIGH if absent Identify unrecovered costs C B- 19 Audit Trail Can Government demonstrate who authorised each material expenditure/re source decision? Delegated- authority records, approvals, finance systems, procurement records SPFM; internal financial controls HIGH Identify undocument ed decisions C B- 20 Record Keeping Do sufficient records exist to establish what happened? Email retention, document systems, diaries, calendars, procurement files FOISA; records- management policies; applicable statutory duties HIGH if material gaps Preservation notice / records audit C B- 21 FOI Transparenc y Have relevant records been disclosed, withheld or destroyed in accordance with FOISA and records obligations? FOI requests, responses, exemptions, internal reviews, disclosure logs Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 MEDIUM– HIGH Audit significant FOI trails
42 | P a g e C B- 22 Internal Controls Did existing Government controls identify or prevent questionable expenditure? Internal audit reports, risk registers, finance reviews, compliance checks SPFM; internal governance framework HIGH if systemic weakness Review control effectiveness C B- 23 Public Audit Does the evidence indicate a matter requiring independent audit scrutiny? Consolidated evidence matrix, financial analysis, control findings Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act 2000; public- audit framework HIGH Prepare evidence-led referral C B- 24 Parliamenta ry Accountabil ity Is there sufficient evidence to warrant consideration by a Scottish Parliament committee? Finalised findings, financial evidence, audit material Scottish Parliament scrutiny framework HIGH Prepare neutral briefing C B- 25 Systemic Pattern Are individual incidents connected by common people, suppliers, processes or political events? Cross-reference database and timeline All applicable frameworks CRITICAL if established Network analysis / pattern assessment C B- 26 Overall Finding Can the Scottish Government demonstrate an effective separation between Government resources and party activity? Consolidated evidence pack Ministerial Code; Civil Service Code; financial/procur ement framework STRATEGIC Produce final investigative assessment
43 | P a g e COMMANDER'S PRIORITY ASSESSMENT Priority Criteria Recommended Treatment 🔴 P1 – Immediate Evidence of public money directly funding identifiable party activity; Government staff undertaking party work; deliberate concealment; significant unexplained expenditure Preserve evidence immediately; forensic examination; consider independent referral 🟠 P2 – High Politically connected procurement; repeated direct awards; Government communications reused politically; unexplained resource overlap Full documentary examination and transaction reconciliation 🟠 P3 – Moderate Isolated facility, vehicle, staffing or communications concerns with uncertain political purpose Targeted investigation and corroboration 🟠 P4 – Routine Apparent technical/control issues without evidence of political benefit Administrative review / control improvement ⚪ No Finding Evidence establishes legitimate Government purpose and proper authorisation Record rationale and close line of inquiry COMMANDER'S DECISION GATES GATE 1 — Is there evidence of a Government resource? YES → identify resource, value, date and responsible authority. NO → close or downgrade the line of inquiry. ↓ GATE 2 — Was there a legitimate Government purpose? YES → test whether the resource was subsequently diverted or reused. UNCLEAR → obtain underlying records. NO → escalate priority. ↓ GATE 3 — Was there a political-party benefit? YES → establish whether the benefit was incidental, unavoidable, authorised, reimbursed or improper. UNCLEAR → forensic comparison of Government and party outputs. ↓ GATE 4 — Were applicable rules followed?
44 | P a g e Test: • Ministerial Code; • Civil Service Code; • SPFM; • procurement legislation; • internal Government policies; • delegated authorities; • records/FOI requirements. ↓ GATE 5 — Is there evidence of a wider pattern? Cross-match: People + Money + Suppliers + Facilities + Communications + Political Events If multiple datasets converge, classify as a potential systemic governance issue rather than an isolated incident. ↓ GATE 6 — Is independent scrutiny warranted? Consider: • Auditor General for Scotland; • Audit Scotland; • Scottish Parliament; • Public Audit Committee; • relevant procurement mechanism; • other competent authority where the evidence warrants it. COMMANDER'S ONE-PAGE SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE OBJECTIVE Determine whether Scottish Government resources were used consistently with the legal, financial, procurement, ethical and constitutional framework governing public administration between 2017 and 2026. PRIMARY TEST Public resource → authorised Government purpose → proper expenditure/procurement → impartial administration → no improper party benefit → complete audit trail.
45 | P a g e FIVE QUESTIONS 1. WHO authorised or used the resource? 2. WHAT public resource was used? 3. WHY was it used? 4. WHO BENEFITED from its use? 5. WHAT RULE governed the decision, and can compliance be demonstrated? PRIORITY EVIDENCE 1. Financial records 2. Procurement files 3. Ministerial/Special Adviser diaries 4. Government email and tasking records 5. Communications-production records 6. Government facility/vehicle records 7. Conflict-of-interest declarations 8. Government/party content comparison 9. FOI and records-management history 10. Audit and internal-control records COMMAND ASSESSMENT The investigation should not begin with an assumption of misconduct. It should begin with a testable proposition: Can the responsible public authority demonstrate, from contemporaneous records, that public resources were used for legitimate Government purposes and that appropriate separation from party-political activity was maintained? Where the answer cannot be established from the available evidence, the appropriate classification is “unresolved — further evidence required”, rather than an allegation of wrongdoing. Where evidence establishes improper use, the finding should identify the resource, decision, rule, responsible authority, financial impact, political benefit and remedial/referral action separately.
46 | P a g e COMMANDER'S FOREIGN MONEY / CORRUPTION OVERLAY SNP ↔ Scottish Government Forensic Investigation 2017–31 August 2026 Investigation code: FM-CORR-01 Purpose: Identify and trace foreign money, foreign-linked persons/entities, bribery, corruption, illicit influence, sanctions exposure and foreign-state activity intersecting with SNP or Scottish Government activity. 1. COMMANDER'S QUESTION Did foreign governments, foreign state-linked entities, foreign companies, foreign nationals, intermediaries or other overseas sources provide money, assets, services, influence or other benefits to the SNP, Scottish Government personnel or associated persons, and was any such activity unlawful, improperly concealed, improperly disclosed, or connected to Government decisions or political activity? For every potential case establish: SOURCE → INTERMEDIARY → RECIPIENT → PURPOSE → DECISION → BENEFIT → DISCLOSURE → LAW/RULE → EVIDENCE 2. FOREIGN-EXPOSURE CATEGORIES Investigate separately: A. Foreign money • donations; • loans; • gifts; • sponsorship; • hospitality; • grants; • consultancy payments; • contracts; • property; • travel; • accommodation; • equipment;
47 | P a g e • services supplied below market value. B. Foreign persons • foreign nationals; • overseas donors; • foreign businesspeople; • political figures; • diplomats; • state-linked executives; • foreign agents/intermediaries. C. Foreign companies • overseas corporations; • subsidiaries; • shell companies; • trusts; • holding companies; • companies with opaque beneficial ownership. D. Foreign governments • embassies; • ministries; • state agencies; • sovereign wealth funds; • state-owned enterprises; • intelligence/security-linked bodies where lawfully identifiable. E. Foreign political organisations • foreign political parties; • political foundations; • campaign organisations; • lobbying organisations; • advocacy organisations. 3. FOREIGN MONEY DATASET
48 | P a g e FOREIGN_FINANCIAL_RECON Field Record transaction_id Unique ID date Date amount Amount/currency GBP value Converted value source Person/entity nationality Where relevant residence Jurisdiction beneficial_owner Identified/unknown country Country intermediary Person/company recipient SNP/Government/person/company payment type Donation/loan/service/etc. stated purpose Description actual purpose Forensic assessment political connection Yes/no Government connection Yes/no disclosure Yes/no Electoral Commission record Reference Companies House record Reference bank evidence Where available sanctions screening Result bribery indicator Yes/no concealment indicator Yes/no evidence Evidence IDs finding Conclusion risk G/A/R/C 4. FOREIGN SOURCE TEST
49 | P a g e A payment must not be treated as "foreign funding" merely because it passed through an overseas bank. Establish: 1. Ultimate source 2. Beneficial owner 3. Nationality/residence 4. Corporate control 5. Intermediaries 6. Purpose 7. Legal status 8. Disclosure 9. Political recipient 10. Government connection Example Overseas company ↓ UK subsidiary ↓ Director ↓ Political donation ↓ SNP ↓ Government decision This is a lead requiring investigation, not proof of bribery. 5. FOREIGN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP Create: FOREIGN_UBO_RECON Cross-reference:
50 | P a g e • Companies House; • Persons with Significant Control; • overseas corporate registers where accessible; • Electoral Commission records; • procurement records; • Government declarations; • sanctions lists; • court records; • official parliamentary records. Look for: • nominee directors; • common addresses; • common directors; • related companies; • unexplained ownership changes; • rapid incorporation before donations/contracts; • offshore holding structures; • trusts; • unexplained intermediaries. 6. BRIBERY TEST Do not classify an unusual payment as bribery simply because it was made to a politician or politically connected person. Test the complete sequence: 1. Benefit Was money, property, hospitality, employment, contract, gift or other advantage provided? 2. Provider Who supplied it? 3. Recipient Who received it? 4. Intention
51 | P a g e Was it intended to influence conduct? 5. Conduct What act/decision was expected or actually performed? 6. Authority Did the recipient have power over that matter? 7. Connection Was there a temporal or documentary connection? 8. Concealment Was the payment disguised or routed through another person? 9. Disclosure Was it properly declared? 10. Benefit Who ultimately benefited? 7. BRIBERY MATRIX BRIBERY_CASE Question Evidence Who provided benefit? Who received benefit? What was provided? Value? Date? Foreign connection? Government decision nearby? SNP decision nearby? Communication before payment? Communication after payment? Promise/request? Actual decision?
52 | P a g e Question Evidence Disclosure? Intermediary? Concealment? Benefit to decision-maker? Benefit to party? Evidence of intent? Applicable offence/rule? Finding? 8. FOREIGN INFLUENCE MATRIX FOREIGN_INFLUENCE_RECON Investigate: • meetings with foreign officials; • foreign-government invitations; • foreign-funded events; • overseas travel; • foreign hospitality; • foreign-linked lobbying; • policy advocacy; • donations; • Government procurement; • parliamentary activity; • ministerial meetings. For every event: FOREIGN ACTOR → CONTACT → MESSAGE/REQUEST → UK POLITICAL ACTIVITY → GOVERNMENT DECISION 9. FOREIGN TRAVEL Create:
53 | P a g e FOREIGN_TRAVEL_RECON For every relevant trip: • traveller; • Government/SNP capacity; • destination; • dates; • host; • payer; • accommodation; • flights; • hospitality; • business purpose; • political purpose; • Government purpose; • meetings; • attendees; • subsequent Government decision; • subsequent SNP activity; • declaration; • reimbursement. Red flag Foreign entity pays for travel. ↓ Traveller subsequently exercises Government/political influence. ↓ No adequate declaration. That becomes RED pending evidence of purpose and intent. 10. FOREIGN HOSPITALITY / GIFTS Track: • meals;
54 | P a g e • accommodation; • flights; • events; • sporting tickets; • entertainment; • gifts; • conference attendance; • private hospitality; • overseas visits. Cross-match against: Ministerial Code declarations Parliamentary Register of Interests SNP declarations Government expenses Electoral Commission rules 11. FOREIGN STATE-LINKED COMPANIES Create a dedicated flag: STATE_LINKED = YES Potential categories: • state-owned; • state-controlled; • government contractor; • sovereign wealth entity; • state-backed investment; • foreign-government subsidiary; • politically controlled company. Then cross-reference against: Scottish Government procurement SNP donations SNP suppliers
55 | P a g e Government policy decisions Ministerial meetings Foreign travel 12. SANCTIONS / AML OVERLAY Where legally and technically appropriate, screen relevant entities against: • UK sanctions; • UN sanctions; • applicable overseas sanctions; • corporate ownership information; • politically exposed person indicators; • adverse official findings. Record: SANCTIONS_STATUS • Clear • Potential match • Confirmed match • Historical match • Requires manual review Do not treat a name match as a confirmed sanctions match without identity verification. 13. FOREIGN POLITICALLY EXPOSED PERSONS Create: FOREIGN_PEP_RECON Record whether relevant persons are: • foreign ministers; • senior government officials; • ambassadors; • senior political figures; • senior state-company executives; • close family/associates where legally relevant.
56 | P a g e Then cross-reference: PEP → SNP → Government → Money → Decision 14. FOREIGN DONATION RECONCILIATION Compare: SNP Electoral Commission donation against Donor identity/residence/company against Corporate ownership ultimate beneficial owner against Foreign connection nationality/state/company against Timing Government/SNP decision or campaign The key question: Was the donor legally entitled to make the contribution and was the true source correctly identified and reported? 15. FOREIGN MONEY → SNP → GOVERNMENT TEST This is a particularly important chain. FOREIGN SOURCE ↓ DONOR / COMPANY ↓ SNP ↓
57 | P a g e SNP OFFICE-HOLDER ↓ GOVERNMENT POSITION ↓ POLICY / PROCUREMENT / DECISION ↓ FOREIGN BENEFIT This does not prove corruption. It identifies a relationship requiring documentary testing. 16. FOREIGN MONEY → INTERMEDIARY → SNP Watch for: FOREIGN PERSON ↓ UK COMPANY ↓ INDIVIDUAL ↓ DONATION / SERVICE ↓ SNP Investigate whether the intermediary: • had a legitimate business purpose; • was acting independently; • received money from the foreign source; • donated shortly afterwards; • was reimbursed; • was instructed by another person; • concealed the true source. 17. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT → FOREIGN BENEFIT
58 | P a g e For every foreign-connected Government supplier: Government contract ↓ foreign ownership ↓ foreign government/state connection ↓ political relationship ↓ Government decision-maker ↓ communications ↓ benefit Investigate especially: • non-competitive awards; • emergency procurement; • unusual extensions; • unexplained contract variations; • politically connected intermediaries; • unusual timing; • undisclosed conflicts. 18. FOREIGN INFORMATION / INFLUENCE Investigate whether foreign actors supplied: • policy papers; • talking points; • statistics; • lobbying material; • draft speeches; • campaign messaging;
59 | P a g e • media material; • research; • strategic advice. Then establish: WHO CREATED → WHO RECEIVED → WHO USED → WHERE PUBLISHED 19. DIGITAL / COMMUNICATIONS OVERLAY Where legally obtainable, investigate: • Government email; • ministerial email; • official correspondence; • meeting calendars; • SNP communications; • publicly available political communications; • social media; • published lobbying records. Search combinations of: foreign actor + SNP foreign actor + Minister foreign company + Scottish Government foreign donor + SNP foreign travel + Minister foreign hospitality + SNP foreign contract + Scottish Government foreign lobbying + Scottish Government 20. CONCEALMENT TEST Escalate if evidence suggests: • donor identity deliberately obscured; • payment routed through intermediary; • false description;
60 | P a g e • false invoice; • hidden beneficial owner; • undeclared hospitality; • altered records; • unexplained cash; • deliberately incomplete declaration; • destruction/suppression of records. CRITICAL Only where documentary evidence supports deliberate concealment. 21. BRIBERY VS LEGITIMATE POLITICAL CONTACT The investigation must distinguish: GREEN Foreign diplomat meets Scottish Minister. No payment. Normal diplomatic/business activity. AMBER Foreign-linked organisation provides hospitality. Declared and legitimate. RED Foreign-connected individual provides undisclosed benefit while seeking a Government decision. CRITICAL Evidence shows benefit was intentionally provided in exchange for a Government/political act. 22. FOREIGN THREAT MATRIX Risk Example Priority Foreign donation Overseas source 🟠 Hidden foreign donor Intermediary 🔴 Foreign state-linked company Government supplier 🟠 Undeclared hospitality Minister/official 🔴
61 | P a g e Foreign-paid travel Political/Government figure 🟠 Foreign lobbying Government decision 🟠 Foreign benefit → decision Possible quid pro quo 🔴 Concealed foreign payment Hidden source 🔴 Foreign payment → SNP → Government decision Potential influence chain 🔴 Evidence of bribery Benefit-for-act 🔴/CRITICAL 23. INTEGRATION WITH THE ORIGINAL FOUR DATASETS The foreign overlay must join the existing database. FOREIGN SOURCE │ ↓ FOREIGN MONEY │ ┌──────────────┼──────────────┐ ↓ ↓ ↓ SNP MONEY PERSON COMPANY │ │ │ └──────────────┼──────────────┘ ↓ SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT │ ┌─────────────────┼─────────────────┐ ↓ ↓ ↓ MONEY PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT │ │ │ └─────────────────┼─────────────────┘ ↓ FACILITIES / IT │ ↓
62 | P a g e COMMUNICATIONS │ ↓ INFORMATION │ ↓ GOVERNMENT DECISION │ ↓ BENEFIT 24. MASTER FOREIGN CASE FILE Every serious foreign case receives: FM-YYYY-NNNN with: 1. Persons 2. Companies 3. Countries 4. Source of funds 5. Beneficial owners 6. Intermediaries 7. Payments 8. Gifts 9. Hospitality 10. Travel 11. Government contracts 12. Government meetings 13. SNP activity 14. Political donations 15. Communications
63 | P a g e 16. Government decisions 17. Applicable rules/law 18. Evidence 19. Knowledge 20. Authorisation 21. Benefit 22. Concealment 23. Loss 24. Finding 25. FINAL FOREIGN-CORRUPTION TEST A case can only progress to a serious corruption finding where the evidence establishes the relevant components. SOURCE Where did the money/benefit originate? CONTROL Who actually controlled it? TRANSFER How did it reach the recipient? PURPOSE Why was it provided? CONNECTION What political/Government relationship existed? DECISION What action or decision followed? BENEFIT Who benefited? KNOWLEDGE Who knew? AUTHORISATION Who authorised?
64 | P a g e DISCLOSURE Was it properly declared? CONCEALMENT Was anything deliberately hidden? INTENT What does the evidence demonstrate? LEGAL TEST Which specific law/rule applies? 26. COMMANDER'S MASTER FINDING The investigation should ultimately answer: Did any foreign government, foreign national, foreign company, foreign state-linked entity, intermediary or other overseas source provide money, property, services, hospitality, employment, political support or another benefit to the SNP, Scottish Government personnel or associated persons? Then: Was the source lawful and properly disclosed? Then: Was the benefit connected to a Government or political decision? Then: Did any individual obtain, authorise, facilitate, conceal or benefit from an improper transaction? Finally: Is there evidence of bribery, corruption, illicit foreign influence, unlawful political financing, sanctions exposure, false accounting or other criminal/regulatory misconduct? 27. COMMANDER'S EVIDENCE STANDARD No case should be upgraded merely because: • a person is foreign; • a company is foreign-owned; • a donor supports independence; • a politician met a foreign official; • a supplier has political connections;
65 | P a g e • a Government decision benefits a foreign company. The escalation must be driven by documentary, financial, communications or other independently corroborated evidence. Foreign connection = investigative lead. Financial connection = stronger lead. Undisclosed benefit + relevant decision = serious red flag. Documented quid pro quo = potential bribery case. Documented concealment + financial benefit + intent = highest priority.
66 | P a g e A forensic investigation dataset, each dataset/table should have a clear explanation of what it contains, how it is built, and what its purpose is. Dataset / Table Explanation How to Build It Purpose 1. People Master Central register of every relevant person. Collect names from Government, Parliament, SNP, Electoral Commission, Companies House and FOI records. Record aliases, roles and dates. Creates the master identity file used to connect people across all other datasets. 2. Organisations Master Register of Government bodies, SNP entities, companies, charities, contractors and other organisations. Record legal name, trading names, company number, directors, addresses and relationships. Prevents the same organisation appearing under different names and allows reliable matching. 3. Government Payments Money paid by Scottish Government bodies to external recipients. Download official expenditure datasets and standardise supplier names, dates, amounts and descriptions. Establishes where public money went. 4. Government Procurement Contracts, tenders, frameworks and awards. Collect procurement notices, contract award information, frameworks and tender documents. Determines why a supplier received public money and how it was selected. 5. Supplier Ownership Ownership and control of companies receiving Government money. Match suppliers to Companies House directors, PSCs, shareholders where available and historical records. Determines who actually controls or benefits from suppliers. 6. SNP Donations Donations received by the SNP and relevant associated entities. Download Electoral Commission returns and standardise donor names, dates and amounts. Allows comparison between Government- connected individuals/companies and political funding.
67 | P a g e 7. SNP Expenditure Money spent by the SNP and relevant campaign organisations. Extract Electoral Commission spending returns and categorise suppliers/services. Identifies whether Government-connected suppliers or individuals subsequently received party money. 8. Government Personnel Ministers, civil servants, Special Advisers and relevant staff. Build employment/appointment timelines from official publications, FOIs and parliamentary records. Establishes who had access, authority or responsibility at each point in time. 9. Political Roles SNP and campaign positions held by relevant individuals. Record party offices, campaign positions, adviser roles and dates from official and reliable sources. Allows Government roles to be compared with political roles and potential conflicts. 10. Personnel Activity What Government-paid personnel actually did. Reconstruct from FOI correspondence, diaries, calendars, emails, meeting records and published material. Tests whether publicly funded personnel performed Government or party-political work. 11. Special Adviser Activity Specific activity involving Special Advisers. Identify adviser, Minister, date, task, documents and political/Government purpose. Separates legitimate political advice to Ministers from potential party-political activity using public resources. 12. Government Resources Buildings, vehicles, computers, cameras, staff time, communications systems and other resources. Record each identified use, date, user, location, purpose and cost where available. Tests whether Government resources were used for political/party purposes. 13. Government Communications Government press releases, speeches, briefings, videos, social-media content and publications. Archive material with publication date, author, department and original source. Creates the Government-side evidence for content and information-flow comparisons.
68 | P a g e 14. SNP Communications SNP press releases, speeches, videos, social posts and campaign material. Archive publicly available material and record date, author/account and context. Allows comparison with Government communications and identification of potential reuse of Government material. 15. Document Comparison Government documents compared with SNP material. Use keyword/document similarity analysis, then manually verify important matches. Determines whether internal Government material appears to have been repurposed politically. 16. Ministerial Diaries Meetings, engagements and events involving Ministers. Collect published diaries and FOI-released calendars/meeting records. Reconstructs who met whom, when and why. 17. Government Contracts → Political Connections Links contracts to politically connected people/entities. Join Procurement + Organisations + People + Political Roles. Identifies contracts requiring enhanced scrutiny, without assuming wrongdoing. 18. Government Money → Political Money Tracks potential movement between public- funded suppliers and political organisations. Join Government Payments + Supplier Ownership + SNP Donations + SNP Expenditure. Tests the strongest question: did public money potentially end up financing political activity? 19. Events Timeline Chronological record of significant Government and political events. Combine dates from all datasets into one timeline. Reveals patterns and sequences that aren't obvious in individual datasets. 20. Conflict-of- Interest Register Potential relationships between decision- makers and recipients. Match officials/ministers/advisers against suppliers, directors, donors and organisations. Tests whether relevant interests were declared, managed or undisclosed. 21. FOI Register Every FOI request and relevant response. Record request number, date, question, response, documents and department. Creates a searchable map of what information Government has disclosed or withheld.
69 | P a g e 22. Evidence Register Master catalogue of every piece of evidence. Give every document, webpage, filing, email, FOI and dataset a unique evidence ID. Makes every finding auditable back to its source. 23. Allegations Register Separates allegations from verified facts. Record allegation, source, date, people involved and evidence supporting/refuting it. Prevents rumours or political claims from being treated as established facts. 24. Findings Register Formal conclusions from the investigation. Link each finding to the underlying transactions, documents and evidence. Provides the final evidence-based conclusions. 25. Risk / Red- Flag Register Prioritised list of transactions or events needing investigation. Apply predefined criteria such as non-competitive procurement, undisclosed connections or unusual payment patterns. Tells investigators where to spend investigative effort first.
70 | P a g e The most important relationships The datasets should join together, rather than operate as isolated spreadsheets. A. Public money investigation Government Payment ↓ Supplier ↓ Company ownership ↓ Director / PSC ↓ Political connection ↓ SNP donation / SNP expenditure ↓ Evidence ↓ Finding Purpose: determine whether there is a documented connection between public expenditure and political activity.
71 | P a g e B. Government employee investigation Person ↓ Government employment ↓ Government-paid time ↓ Activity ↓ Government purpose? ↘ Political purpose? ↓ SNP benefit? ↓ Evidence Purpose: distinguish legitimate Government work from potentially inappropriate political activity.
72 | P a g e C. Procurement investigation Contract ↓ Procurement process ↓ Supplier ↓ Owners/directors ↓ Political connections ↓ Conflict declaration ↓ Decision-maker ↓ Value / deliverables ↓ Finding Purpose: determine whether a politically connected supplier received preferential or otherwise questionable treatment.
73 | P a g e D. Information investigation Government briefing ↓ Minister / SpAd ↓ Government speech / announcement ↓ SNP speech / communication ↓ Compare wording + information ↓ Timing ↓ Political purpose? ↓ Finding Purpose: determine whether Government-produced information or work was subsequently used in a party-political context.
74 | P a g e Recommended table structure For the actual database, I'd use five levels: LEVEL 1 — MASTER DATA • PEOPLE • ORGANISATIONS • GOVERNMENT_BODIES • POLITICAL_ROLES LEVEL 2 — MONEY • GOVERNMENT_PAYMENTS • PROCUREMENT • CONTRACTS • SUPPLIER_OWNERSHIP • SNP_DONATIONS • SNP_EXPENDITURE LEVEL 3 — PEOPLE & RESOURCES • GOVERNMENT_PERSONNEL • SPECIAL_ADVISERS • PERSONNEL_ACTIVITY • GOVERNMENT_RESOURCES • MINISTERIAL_DIARIES LEVEL 4 — INFORMATION & EVENTS • GOVERNMENT_COMMUNICATIONS • SNP_COMMUNICATIONS • DOCUMENT_COMPARISON • EVENTS • FOI_RECORDS LEVEL 5 — FORENSICS • EVIDENCE • ALLEGATIONS • RED_FLAGS • FINDINGS
75 | P a g e That structure is important because the evidence table should sit underneath everything. A conclusion should never exist without being able to trace: Finding → evidence → document/transaction → person/entity → date → source. That gives you a dataset that can ultimately answer not just "what happened?", but "how do we know?" and "what evidence supports the conclusion?"
76 | P a g e A forensic reconciliation system, not merely a list of allegations. The key is to make every alleged connection traceable from public resource → person/entity → activity → SNP benefit → evidence → conclusion. I’ve also checked the current Scottish Government transparency material. The Government publishes monthly/annual expenditure over £25,000 going back through 2017, plus separate ePC spending data; these give us a substantial primary-source transaction universe. (Scottish Government) SNP–Scottish Government Forensic Reconciliation Case SG-SNP-2017-2026 Finding standard We should not label a transaction "corruption" simply because the recipient has an SNP connection. Every record gets one of these statuses: • GREEN — legitimate Government activity • AMBER — potential political benefit / control weakness • RED — evidence of Government resources supporting party-political activity • CRITICAL — evidence suggesting intentional diversion, concealment, false accounting or personal/party enrichment And separately: • UNSUBSTANTIATED • CORROBORATED • ESTABLISHED • DISPROVED That prevents political association from becoming a substitute for evidence. Dataset 1 — Government payments / procurement → SNP-connected persons & companies SG_PAYMENT_RECON Field Purpose transaction_id Unique identifier payment_date Date financial_year 2017–18 etc. government_body Paying body directorate Government unit
77 | P a g e supplier Recipient company_number Companies House identifier amount Gross payment procurement_route Tender/framework/direct award/etc. contract_id Procurement reference contract_start/end Contract period description Published description approver Decision-maker if obtainable political_connection SNP/other/none connection_type Employee/director/donor/former adviser/etc. connection_start When relationship began connection_end When relationship ended SNP_role Party role government_role Government role conflict_declared Yes/no/unknown competition Competitive/non-competitive waiver Yes/no justification Reason for exception deliverables What Government received value_for_money Assessment SNP_benefit None/possible/identified evidence_ids Linked evidence risk Green/Amber/Red/Critical finding Final conclusion First target population Search every supplier against: • SNP office-holders; • former SNP staff; • Special Advisers; • campaign strategists;
78 | P a g e • donors; • directors/shareholders; • companies owned/controlled by politically connected people; • organisations receiving SNP funding; • organisations sharing personnel/address/contact details with SNP entities. Important: the connection is a search criterion, not an allegation. The Government's own procurement directory provides the framework/contract universe, while the £25,000 expenditure data provides the payment universe. (Scottish Government) Dataset 2 — Civil servant / Special Adviser time → political activity SG_PERSONNEL_POLITICAL Field Purpose person_id Unique person name Name grade/role Government position employment_start/end Period ministerial_office Relevant Minister SpAd Yes/no political_role SNP role if any date Activity date activity What they did location Where government_hours Working-time question official_capacity Yes/no government_instruction Who requested it political_party Party involved party_event Event output Briefing/video/email/etc. government_purpose Claimed purpose party_purpose Apparent party purpose
79 | P a g e cost Direct/estimated approval Authorisation evidence Source finding Assessment Key control test The current Ministerial Code expressly says Ministers must not use public resources for party- political purposes, must uphold Civil Service impartiality, and should not ask civil servants to undertake activities that create the appearance of official resources being used for party purposes. (Scottish Government) Special Advisers are different from permanent civil servants: they exist specifically to provide political advice to Ministers on Government policy, but their formal function remains assistance to Ministers/Government. (Scottish Government) So we need to distinguish: Government policy assistance from SNP political assistance. Dataset 3 — Government facilities / equipment / communications → political use SG_RESOURCE_USE This is broader than money. Field Example resource_id SG-RES-0001 resource_type Building/equipment/vehicle/IT/studio date/time Exact use location Bute House/etc. user Minister/official/SpAd account Government/personal/SNP activity Video/meeting/event content Description government_staff People involved equipment Camera/computer/etc. working_time Hours
80 | P a g e direct_cost Known estimated_staff_cost Calculated political_content Yes/no party_benefit None/possible/identified authorisation Who approved rule Applicable policy evidence FOI/email/photo/video/etc. conclusion Finding This is particularly important because the Code says Government property should generally not be used for party-political activity, and official facilities/resources cannot be used to disseminate material that is essentially party political. (Scottish Government) Dataset 4 — Government information / briefings → SNP communications SG_INFO_TRANSFER This could become the most revealing dataset. Field Purpose info_id Unique date Date government_document Document classification Public/internal/etc. author Civil servant/SpAd recipient Minister/office stated_purpose Government purpose subsequent_use Speech/video/press release/SNP material SNP_publication Yes/no publication_date Date wording_overlap Exact/close/none substantive_overlap Assessment political_message Party-political content? election_context Yes/no conference_context Yes/no
81 | P a g e government_cost Cost evidence Documents risk G/A/R/C conclusion Finding The critical test The Ministerial Code explicitly permits a Government briefing for a party-political occasion to explain Government policies/actions, but says it cannot contain material designed to promote one party's line or anticipate political criticism. (Scottish Government) So we can actually test this. For example: Civil servant briefing ↓ Minister's SNP conference speech ↓ compare: • paragraphs; • statistics; • policy announcements; • political attacks; • messaging; • recommendations; • unique information. That gives us an objective documentary comparison. Dataset 5 — People/entity master file We need this before doing the joins. PERSON_ENTITY_MASTER Every relevant person/company gets one record. entity_id entity_type full_name aliases
82 | P a g e company_number director_history shareholder_history SNP_role SNP_role_start SNP_role_end government_role government_role_start government_role_end special_adviser ministerial_role donor donation_amount donation_date campaign_role family/associate_links companies addresses evidence This is where we add: John Swinney Nicola Sturgeon Humza Yousaf Peter Murrell Colin Beattie and relevant ministers, Special Advisers, senior civil servants, SNP officials, campaign staff and suppliers. But the database should expand beyond named politicians. Otherwise we risk confirmation bias. Dataset 6 — Events/timeline SG_SNP_EVENT
83 | P a g e Every potentially relevant event: event_id date time person organisation government_role SNP_role location event_type government_business party_business documents communications expense staff_present supplier political_output election_related referendum_related risk This lets us detect patterns. For example: Government meeting → SNP conference speech next day → identical policy material. Or: Government procurement → SNP-connected company → SNP activity shortly afterwards. The database doesn't conclude wrongdoing; it identifies the sequence requiring examination. 7. The transaction-link engine This is the important part. For every Government transaction:
84 | P a g e Match against A. People • directors • employees • advisers • donors • ministers • party officials B. Companies • current directors • historical directors • beneficial ownership • registered addresses C. SNP • payments • donations • contracts • employees • officeholders D. Time Look for relationships within: • 30 days • 90 days • 1 year • 3 years Example SG PAYMENT £18,500 ↓ COMPANY X ↓
85 | P a g e Director: PERSON A ↓ Former SNP strategist ↓ Government contract ↓ No competition ↓ Political connection declared? NO ↓ Company subsequently provides campaign services? ↓ TRACE MONEY Only after that investigation do we decide whether it is actually significant. 8. The £25k dataset isn't enough This is crucial. The Scottish Government publishes spending over £25,000, but we shouldn't assume transactions below £25k are irrelevant. The Government separately publishes ePC expenditure over £500, and FOI material shows that even below-£500 ePC transaction-level information can exist. (Scottish Government) Therefore: Tier 1 >£25,000 Bulk automated screening. Tier 2 £500–£25,000 Procurement/ePC/expense screening. Tier 3 <£500 Targeted examination where: • supplier is politically connected;
86 | P a g e • location is politically significant; • description is unusual; • repeated transactions occur; • transactions cluster around an election/conference; • same supplier appears repeatedly. This avoids the classic fraud mistake of assuming the important transaction is necessarily large. 9. Special Adviser money This needs its own financial series. The Scottish Government's published data gives Special Adviser remuneration of: • £1.045m — 2017–18 • £1.105m — 2018–19 • £1.310m — 2019–20 • £1.619m — 2020–21 • £1.435m — 2021–22 • £1.910m — 2022–23 and more recent FOI data gives: • £1.449m — 2021–22 • £1.910m — 2022–23 • £2.136m — 2023–24 • £1.945m — 2024–25. (Scottish Government) These discrepancies in overlapping years are themselves something we should reconcile—likely differences in methodology/reporting—but we should not assume that without checking. The investigation should calculate: Public cost of politically appointed personnel → documented Government activity → political activity → estimated proportion attributable to each. 10. The Swinney social-media sub-ledger I'd make this a dedicated table: SWINNEY_MEDIA content_id date
87 | P a g e platform account video/photo/text location government_property government_equipment civil_servants special_advisers external_supplier government_hours government_cost government_account personal_account SNP_account government_material_used party_material_used government_policy political_message election_context source_file finding Why? Because the Government has confirmed that Special Advisers can support additional content on the First Minister's personal social-media profiles as part of their normal duties, while individual hours spent aren't routinely recorded. (Scottish Government) That gives us a very specific forensic question: How much public staff time and equipment is being used to create content that appears on a personal political channel, and does the content remain within the Government-communications boundary? 11. Procurement red-flag algorithm Every politically connected supplier gets scored.
88 | P a g e +2 Former/current SNP official +2 SNP campaign employee +2 SNP donor +3 No competitive process +2 Exception/waiver +2 Decision-maker has political connection +3 Government output subsequently used by SNP +3 Money subsequently flows to SNP +5 Evidence of concealment/false documentation Then: 0–3 = GREEN 4–7 = AMBER 8–11 = RED 12+ = CRITICAL This is an investigative prioritisation score, not a finding of wrongdoing. 12. The "money back to SNP" test This is the strongest possible link. For each politically connected Government supplier: Scottish Government ↓ Supplier
89 | P a g e ↓ Directors/shareholders ↓ SNP donations ↓ SNP contracts ↓ SNP campaign expenditure ↓ Individuals We then ask: Did public money ultimately finance SNP activity? That requires an actual financial trail. A supplier merely having an SNP connection doesn't satisfy the test. 13. Government → party personnel test Another powerful test: Scottish Government ↓ Civil servant / SpAd ↓ Government salary ↓ Political activity ↓ SNP For each activity we calculate: Government-paid hours × employment cost/hour =
90 | P a g e estimated public resource Then classify the activity. The Ministerial Code provides the governing boundary: Ministers must not use public resources for party-political purposes and must protect Civil Service impartiality. (Scottish Government) 14. Facilities test We should search: • Bute House • St Andrew's House • Victoria Quay • ministerial offices • Government meeting rooms • Government studios • official vehicles • Government IT • Government cameras • Government phones • Government videographers • Government photographers Then cross-match against: • SNP conferences; • leadership campaigns; • election campaigns; • referendum campaigns; • SNP social media; • party press releases; • SNP fundraising. 15. Information-flow test This is where the investigation can become very powerful. Take every major SNP political communication between 2017–2026.
91 | P a g e Compare it against: • Scottish Government briefing papers; • ministerial submissions; • civil-service correspondence; • FOI releases; • Government press releases; • policy drafts; • ministerial speeches. Then use document similarity and chronology to establish: Government-originated material → Minister → SNP communication If the information was already public and legitimately used by a Minister, that's generally uninteresting. If previously internal Government work was repurposed for party political campaigning, it becomes AMBER/RED depending on circumstances. 16. The evidence hierarchy Every database record should have a source grade. A1 — Primary official document Bank record, contract, invoice, Government email, official minutes. A2 — Official FOI disclosure Government-released correspondence/data. A3 — Statutory filing Electoral Commission, Companies House, Parliament. B1 — Contemporaneous media Useful corroboration. B2 — Later reporting Lead only unless independently corroborated. C — Political allegation
92 | P a g e Lead only. D — Social media assertion Lead only unless independently verified. This is essential when investigating political figures. 17. What we can populate immediately We already have primary-source datasets covering: • Scottish Government spending over £25,000 from 2017 onward; (Scottish Government) • ePC spending; (Scottish Government) • Government procurement/framework information; (Scottish Government) • Special Adviser remuneration; (Scottish Government) • Ministerial Code requirements; (Scottish Government) • Government FOI material concerning First Minister communications and political activity; • SNP Electoral Commission accounts from 2017 onward. (Electoral Commission Search) So this is actually buildable from public records, rather than hypothetical. 18. Initial case-control table Investigation Status now Next evidence Government → SNP direct payments 🟠 No established evidence Full payment matching Government → SNP-connected companies 🟠 Investigate Companies House + procurement Government contracts without competition 🟠 Investigate Tender/waiver files Government staff → SNP work 🟠 Investigate Diaries/emails/time records Special Advisers → SNP activity 🟠 Investigate calendars/comms Government facilities → SNP activity 🟠 Investigate diary/photos/video Government equipment → party content 🟠 Investigate asset/content records Government communications → SNP 🟠 Investigate document comparison
93 | P a g e Public money → political campaign 🔴 Only if financial trail established Bank/contract tracing Intentional diversion ❌ Not established Transaction evidence Concealment/false accounting ❌ Not established Accounting/document evidence The core output The final product should be a relational case database, with these tables: PEOPLE ENTITIES GOV_PAYMENTS PROCUREMENT PERSONNEL_ACTIVITY RESOURCE_USE GOV_DOCUMENTS SNP_DOCUMENTS EVENTS DONATIONS SNP_PAYMENTS COMPANY_DIRECTORSHIPS COMMUNICATIONS EVIDENCE ALLEGATIONS FINDINGS with the central relationship: ┌── PEOPLE │ GOV RESOURCE ────┼── COMPANY/ENTITY │ ├── EVENT │ ├── DOCUMENT
94 | P a g e │ └── SNP ACTIVITY │ ↓ FINANCIAL / POLITICAL BENEFIT │ ↓ EVIDENCE │ ↓ FINDING The first operational sweep I'd start 2017-01-01 through 2026-08-31, and run the following in order: 1. All Government payments >£25k → entity matching. 2. All procurement awards → political-connection matching. 3. All ePC spending → targeted political/location/supplier matching. 4. All Special Advisers → identity/role/timeline database. 5. All Swinney/Sturgeon/Yousaf ministerial offices → personnel/activity reconstruction. 6. All First Minister political/Government diaries available through FOI. 7. Government-produced speeches/briefings → SNP speech/content comparison. 8. Government facilities/equipment → political-content audit. 9. Government suppliers with SNP connections → beneficial-owner/donation/campaign cross- match. 10. Every RED/CRITICAL hit → transaction-level evidence file. One limitation: I can't create the persistent Canvas/database document in this session because Canvas requires you to be logged in. But the schema above is the actual structure I'd use, and we can continue populating it directly in the conversation from the primary-source records.
