MLF Magazine 2026 Final

MLF 2026 Strategy & Heritage

MLF 2026 Strategy & Heritage

MLF 2026 Strategy & Heritage M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 Strategy & Heritage MESSAGE BY LT GEN TS ‘MAUN’ SHERGILL, PVSM, PhD CHAIRMAN MILITARY LITERATURE FESTIVAL ASSOCIATION We are at our tenth edition of the Military Literature Festival at Chandigarh from 13-15 November 2026. Recently, we have carried out an outreach to universities, colleges and schools at Chandigarh, Patiala, Ferozepur and Amritsar to increase our bandwidth in serving the youth of Punjab and India. Meanwhile under a nuclear umbrella, conflicts continue in Ukraine, Gaza, Lebanon, Israel, Iran and by the Houthis in Saudi Arabia. Western nations with a strong maritime tradition and superior navies had blockaded, cannonaded and landed troops in less advanced civilizations to carve out their empires in the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th centuries CE. Since the 1920s the United States followed a strategic policy of ‘containing’ Eurasia and other continents from the seaboard and quite often it included landing troops and fighting wars. The advent of the airplane increased the ability of advanced nations to further strategies of warfare through the employment of aircraft carriers however, to land troops and to secure intended areas, there was a requirement of troop-carrying vessels and landing craft. In an environment of satellite constellations, artificial intelligence and an array of missiles in ‘all- seeing’ warfare; aircraft carriers, troop-carrying vessels and landing craft have become considerably vulnerable and what could be achieved through a threat in place, needs action and increasingly, the likely loss of troops to do that unhinges a strategy that earlier used to work. It has been through history those people that can endure more than their adversary win in the end. What does come to mind is the Gladiator’s salute on entering an arena in Rome -‘Ave Imperator, morituri te salutant!’ — ‘Hail Emperor, those who are about to die salute you!’ Old empires and their people soften while younger nations in comparison are hardened by adversity. Lt Gen TS ‘Maun’ Shergill, PVSM, PhD Chairman Military Literature Festival Association

MLF 2026 Strategy & Heritage M L F 2 0 2 6 Code of the Warrior I am a Warrior, Fighting is my Dharma I will Train my Mind, Body and Spirit to Fight I will excel in all Weapons and Devices of War, Present and Future I will always Protect the Weak I will be Truthfulness to Bluntness I will be Humane, Cultured and Compassionate I will fight and embrace the Consequences God, give me Strength that I ask nothing of You

MLF 2026 Strategy & Heritage Editorial Military literature encompasses a wide range of genres from fiction and poetry to, biographies, memoirs, and historical accounts. It captures the realities of war, the spirit of sacrifice, and the courage of soldiers who serve their nations in times of conflict. Through compelling narratives, military literature preserves experiences of those who have fought on the battlefield and provides valuable insights into leadership, strategy, discipline, and human endurance. Beyond recounting tales of war and valour, military literature plays an important role in shaping public understanding of national security. It fosters patriotism, honours the sacrifices of servicemen and women, and helps future generations appreciate the cost of peace and freedom. Military literature also serves an educational purpose. It prepares citizens to understand challenges facing society and nations, promotes awareness of geopolitical realities, and highlights the significance of unity during times of crisis. Through both factual accounts and imaginative works, it inspires courage, strengthens national character, and contributes to a deeper understanding of military history, strategy, and the human dimensions of war. Military Literature Festivals (MLF) brings together experts and provide a platform for the citizens to catch up on issues Military. We are into the 10th Edition of MLF Chandigarh. It is noteworthy that MLF Chandigarh is managed by a team of volunteers – pro bono. The canvas is large. In addition to the routine festivities glorifying military hardware, singing and dancing on popular folklores, exhibitions and food courts, there will be serious discussions on the ongoing conflicts, geostrategy and geopolitical issues concerning the region and the world. The panellists have been chosen from among experts. There are Veteran Officers, Bureaucrats, Professors and Journalist who are specialists of their subjects. We also have students who have contributed to the Magazine and also graced the stage. This is the fifth edition of our ‘Annual Magazine on Strategy & Heritage’. The central theme of this year’s Magazine is based on the following issues: • Punjab Rising 2040. • Space Warfare. • Counter Terrorism. • Ongoing Wars in Ukraine and Iran including Lessons Learnt. • Heritage and Heroes of Punjab. • Stories of Valour and Leadership in Indian Battles. Happy Reading. Maj Gen Harvijay Singh, SM

MLF 2026 Strategy & Heritage Page No Subject and Author 1. Punjab Rising 2040: Lt Gen T S Shergill PVSM, PhD and Jaimal Inder Singh Shergill 9. Space as the Decisive Domian of Modern Warfare: Maj Gen Harvijay Singh, SM 13. Military Satellites: Editor’s Note 16. AI in Counter Terrorism: Maj Amrit Pal Singh 19. Three Strategic Lessons from Middle East’s Unfinished War: Maj Gen Neeraj Bali, SM 22. IRAN: THE MOST NATURALLY DEFENDED COUNTRIES ON EARTH: Editor’s Note 23. Reconstitution; the New Mantra of Modern Warfare: Shri Rajinder Paul Singhal 27. Silent Winks, Loud Impact: Shaman Shetty 31. Siachen: A Frontline Above the Clouds and Beyond Imagination: Brig Gurwant S Baghiana 34. The Art of Warfare Modern Warfare: Maj Gen Harvijay Singh, SM 38. Dhol, Gurbani and Gharanas: The Living Arts of Punjab: Ruchi Dubey 41. Indian Army: A Nation Builder Through Character, Leadership & Industry: Brig PK Sharma 44. Victory on The OP Hill: Col Tejinder Singh Dhaliwal 47. Lieutenant General Harbkash Singh, Padma Vibhushan, Vir Chakra: Saviour of Punjab in the 1965 War: Maj Jagatjeet Singh 51. Murat of the Khalsa: Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa: Maj Abhaijeet Singh 54. Youth, Our Strength: Akshita Vishal 58. Outreach Programme to Schools and Colleges. 59. Photo Gallery M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 1 Strategy & Heritage PUNJAB RISING 2040 A Strategic Agenda for Punjab: Agriculture + High-Value Manufacturing + Digital Industry + Reliable Power + Secure Water Lt Gen T S Shergill PVSM, PhD and Jaimal Inder Singh Shergill Where Punjab Stands Today • Income: Punjab once topped India in per-capita income. It is now 19th among all States and Union Territories, and 10th among major States. • Debt: Outstanding debt is projected at about ₹4.47 lakh crore by March 2027, roughly 45% of Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP). Servicing it costs about ₹43,000 crore a year. • Water: Punjab pumps about 1.56 times its annual groundwater recharge, the highest rate in India. About three-quarters of its blocks are over-exploited. • Industry: Manufacturing has stagnated and firms are moving to neighbouring States. Agriculture alone cannot lift the State. Party manifestos offer sops adding to the debt. None sets out where Punjab must be by 2040, or how it gets there. The Central Idea: develop Punjab as a distributed agro-industrial, engineering, digital and high-value horticulture State. It would be built on the new expressways, railways and airports, powered by firm low- carbon electricity, with its water table steadied and its border districts turned from a liability into a gateway. Ten Commitments for 2040 1. Five economic regions, 8–10 specialised industrial nodes of 1,000–1,500 acres, built along the new expressway spine and expandable with demand. 2. Airport-oriented export hubs at Amritsar, Mohali, Halwara, Adampur, Bathinda and Pathankot. Fly high- value goods, not bulk crops. 3. A 10-year Border Economic Development Zone for Pathankot, Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Tarn Taran, Ferozepur and Fazilka, with incentives tied to jobs. 4. Move Ludhiana–Jalandhar industry up the value chain, for example from bicycles to e-bikes, motors, controllers and exports. 5. Firm, clean power: solar, biomass and storage now, and 1,400 MW of nuclear capacity by 2037–40. 6. Steady the water table by 2035 through village-pond fisheries with recharge, floodplain wetlands and recharge with treated monsoon surplus. 7. Diversify about 7 lakh hectares out of paddy with assured markets and end stubble burning by 2030. 8. Industry-run skills centre at every node, university research parks at Mohali, Patiala, Ludhiana and Amritsar. 9. Punjab facilitates; investors invest. No new open-ended subsidies; every incentive is time-bound and performance-linked. 10. A public scorecard that measures jobs, exports and water saved, not investment announced.

MLF 2026 2 Strategy & Heritage Why the Old Model No Longer Works • Before 1966, industry was kept near Delhi and away from the border for fear of interdiction by Pakistan. With satellites, drones and long-range missiles, any location can be struck, so that logic no longer holds. • The new question is not "how far is the factory from the border?" but "how resilient is the system if one node is disrupted?" The answer is many medium-sized nodes linked by road, rail, power and data. • This suits Punjab, whose industry is overwhelmingly MSMEs, not giant heavy industry. • Coal pitheads & gas pipelines are far away - heavy industry like steel, cement & petrochemicals will not be competitive. Punjab's advantage is its people, engineering skill, agriculture, universities and location. • Punjab should stop seeing itself as "an agricultural State that needs industry" and become "an Agri- industrial State whose farms feed its factories". Three value chains that link farm and factory: • Farmer → grading and cold chain → food processing → packaging → logistics → export. • Crop residue → biomass and biogas → energy → bio-materials. • Engineering tradition → machine tools → robotics → electric-vehicle (EV) components → defence and aerospace parts. Corridors of Development: Spine Already Exists • Delhi–Amritsar–Katra Expressway: greenfield corridor of 670 km. Links Patiala, Sangrur, Ludhiana, Jalandhar, Kapurthala and Amritsar to Jammu & Kashmir, also serves Dera Baba Nanak and the Kartarpur Corridor. • Amritsar–Jamnagar Economic Corridor: about 1,300 km. Its greenfield Amritsar–Bathinda section - 155 km - gives Punjab its first direct link to the Gujarat ports. • Ludhiana–Bathinda–Ajmer Expressway (6-lane, greenfield) and Amritsar– Kolkata Industrial Corridor complete the grid. • The task for Punjab is to build economic nodes around this spine. That means feeder roads, rail sidings, substations, water, common effluent treatment, warehouses, testing laboratories and worker housing. • Land acquisition must be fast and fair. Delays in Punjab sections put Union funding at risk. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 3 Strategy & Heritage Five Economic Regions These are five connected systems, not isolated estates. Existing industrial hubs are upgraded, not displaced. Region Districts Specialisation North Pathankot, Gurdaspur Defence and aerospace components, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) parts, avionics, communications equipment, precision engineering, horticulture (dual-use, not weapons manufacture) Central-West Amritsar, Tarn Taran Agri-export gateway: processed vegetables, fruit, dairy, spices, ready-to-eat foods, textiles, sports goods, light engineering Central Ludhiana, Jalandhar, Kapurthala Advanced engineering, machine tools, EV components, sports goods, railway equipment (building on the Kapurthala rail coach base); horticulture, fruits, Vegetables. South-West Bathinda, Mansa, Ferozepur, Fazilka, Muktsar Agro-processing, agricultural machinery, seed processing, solar and electrical equipment, logistics on the Jamnagar corridor East Mohali, Patiala, Sangrur The "brain": Artificial Intelligence (AI), software, biotechnology, medical technology, semiconductor design; universities → laboratories → start-ups → product companies Ludhiana example: bicycle → e-bicycle → motor and controller → battery management → lightweight materials → export product. This is far more realistic than a steel plant. AI is not a separate industry. It should be applied to Punjab's strengths: AI with agriculture, manufacturing, logistics, healthcare, defence engineering and water management. Airport – Oriented Export Hub Principle: do not fly potatoes; fly high-value products. Berries, flowers, speciality vegetables, certified seed, pharmaceuticals, medical devices and precision components can bear air freight. Airport Primary role Amritsar (Raja Sansi) International food and flower exports; it already has an air-cargo terminal with cold storage Mohali (Chandigarh International) Biotechnology, information technology (IT), medical technology Halwara (Ludhiana International) Engineering exports and high-value perishables; commercial flights began on 15 May 2026 Adampur (Jalandhar) Sports goods, certified seed potato, Doaba horticulture Bathinda (Virk Kalan) Agri-processing and logistics, linked to the Jamnagar corridor Pathankot Horticulture, defence and aerospace supply chain Around each airport and expressway junction, build high-value horticulture clusters on this chain: farm → grading → pre-cooling → cold store → processing → airport or expressway → market. All stages should sit within a short distance of each other.

MLF 2026 4 Strategy & Heritage Border Economic Development Zones • The border districts were held back by an outdated military-strategic logic. Today their risk is no different from the hinterlands, so they deserve full development. • Build on what exists: the Punjab Industrial and Business Development Policy already gives the Extreme Border Zone (within 30 km of the border) exemption from change-of-land-use requirements, 100% exemption from external development charges, and 75% exemption on specified State duties. • Upgrade this to a 10-year Border Economic Development Zone covering Pathankot–Gurdaspur, Amritsar–Tarn Taran, Ferozepur, Fazilka and border blocks of Muktsar. • Years 1–5: 100% reimbursement of eligible State Goods and Services Tax (SGST) and fees; discounted land; a subsidised power connection; fast-track approvals. • Years 6–10: reimbursement tapers down each year. • Conditions: minimum jobs and investment, local procurement, worker training and a five-year operating commitment. This keeps out subsidy-chasers. • Ask the Union for a central package like the one given to the Hill States, since only the Union can relieve central taxes. • A prosperous, densely employed border is itself national resilience. The aim is economic vitality, not militarisation. In time, the border should become Punjab's western gateway to South Asian trade. Energy: Firm, Clean and Reliable Industry, cold chains, data centres and AI need power around the clock, including at night and in winter fog. The portfolio has five parts: • Solar for cheap daytime power, extended across canal tops, rooftops and the clusters at Bathinda, Mansa, Ferozepur and Patiala. • Biomass and Compressed Biogas from paddy straw, which turns a pollution problem into rural income. • Hydro from optimising the existing system and completing the projects in the pipeline. • Storage using batteries and pumped hydro where they make economic sense. • Nuclear for firm, zero-carbon baseload. Major transmission upgrades must accompany all of it. Nuclear, the New Opportunity • The SHANTI Act (December 2025) allows private and joint-venture companies to build and operate nuclear plants under central licence. Punjab no longer must wait for the Union alone. • Option A: 2 × 700 MW Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR), at about ₹22,000–30,000 crore. This would produce 9–10 billion units of electricity a year. • Option B: Bharat Small Reactors (about 220 MW each), placed on retired thermal-plant sites such as the Bathinda plant site and Ropar's retired units. These sites already have land, grid connections and water, and need less cooling water than a large plant. • Site by evidence, not by river: a Punjab-wide study should rank sites on cooling-water security, seismic risk, flood risk, population, grid access and emergency planning. The Sutlej and Beas are candidates, not foregone conclusions. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 5 Strategy & Heritage Period Nuclear milestone (realistic, not political, timetable) 2027–28 Site screening, then detailed site, environmental, water and grid studies 2029 Regulatory site approval and project sanction 2030–31 Land, infrastructure, first concrete 2031–36 Civil construction and equipment 2037–40 Unit 1 commissioned (2037–39); Unit 2 commissioned (2038–40) Punjab's current generation base Thermal plant Capacity Status Talwandi Sabo (Mansa) 1,980 MW Private; largest in Punjab Rajpura, Nabha Power (Patiala) 1,400 MW Private Guru Hargobind, Lehra Mohabbat (Bathinda) 920 MW State-owned Guru Gobind Singh, Ropar 840 MW State-owned; 2 of 6 units retired Guru Amar Das, Goindwal Sahib (Tarn Taran) 540 MW State-owned since 2024 Guru Nanak Dev, Bathinda — Closed 2018; site used for solar Hydro: Ranjit Sagar, Upper Bari Doab Canal (UBDC) Stages I–II, Mukerian, Anandpur Sahib and Shanan, with additions at Shahpur Kandi, UBDC Stage III and Mukerian Stages II–III. Solar clusters: Bathinda, Ferozepur, Mansa, Hoshiarpur, Patiala, Sangrur, Ludhiana and Nawanshahr. Water Security: Steadying the Groundwater The diagnosis: Punjab extracts about 156% of its annual recharge. Over-pumping for paddy is the main cause. Dams and lined canals add to the problem by cutting the natural seepage that once fed the Great Indus Aquifer. The fix must work on both fronts: put water back in, and pump less out. A. Village-pond fisheries with recharge (panchayat land) • Revive every village pond as a "twin pond": desilt it and treat village wastewater through the three-pond natural treatment model, as in the Seechewal and Thapar systems. • Stock the treated pond with fish. Panchayats auction fishing rights, which creates village income and pays for maintenance. • Pair each pond with a filtered recharge shaft or injection well that passes below the clay layer. Fishponds left alone silt up, seal, lose water to evaporation - the recharge shaft makes the pond recharge. • Use low-lying panchayat land for new fishery-cum-recharge ponds, with leases conditional on maintenance and water-quality testing.

MLF 2026 6 Strategy & Heritage B. Floodplain Wetlands Along the Rivers • Demarcate the active floodplains of the Sutlej, Beas, Ravi and Ghaggar as no-construction zones. • Create off-channel wetlands and recharge basins that fill during floods, such as those of September 2025. They cut flood peaks, recharge the aquifer and support fisheries. • Pay farmers an annual flood-easement lease for floodplain land kept as wetland. They keep ownership and earn from fish and fodder. • Use Harike, Kanjli and Ropar wetlands as models; they are already internationally recognised Ramsar sites. Add eco-tourism where suitable. C. Recharge with treated surplus water from dams and canals • When Bhakra, Pong, Ranjit Sagar reservoirs release monsoon surplus, route it through canal networks to recharge basins and to disused tubewells converted into recharge wells, instead of letting it flood. • Treat before recharge: use settling tanks plus sand-and-gravel filters and test every site. Never inject untreated water; a polluted aquifer cannot be cleaned. • Clean the downstream drains first. Buddha Nallah (Ludhiana), Kala Sanghian and Chitti Bein must be treated to standard, so river water is fit for recharge. • Make rooftop and paved-area recharge mandatory in all towns and industrial nodes. D. Pump less, and measure everything • Shift area out of paddy to crops that use less water (see Section 8) and expand direct seeded rice (DSR) and short-duration varieties. • Pay farmers voluntarily for water and power saved, and switch feeders to solar so farmers can sell surplus power. • Install a piezometer in every block with a public online dashboard. Target: the water table stabilised in most blocks by 2035. • Punjab's river and ground waters are its most strategic assets and must be protected in every forum and used more productively at home. Paddy Diversification and Ending Stubble Burning • Paddy covers about 31 lakh hectares and produces about 19 million tonnes of straw a year. Aim to move about 7 lakh hectares out of paddy by 2030. • Diversification works only with an assured market. Link maize, pulses, oilseeds, cotton (South-West) and horticulture to buyers in the processing nodes: maize to starch, feed and ethanol; pulses and oilseeds to food processing. • Use procurement contracts and price-backed buy-back agreements with processors, so the farmer takes no greater risk than with paddy. • Within paddy, move to short-duration varieties and DSR to save water and widen the window for managing residue. • Stubble fires fell from about 76,900 (2020) to about 5,100 (2025). Finish the job: biomass boilers, CBG plants and pellet plants in every district create a paddy-straw economy, so straw earns money instead of being burnt. • Target: zero stubble burning by 2030, with custom-hiring centres within reach of every village. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 7 Strategy & Heritage Education and Skills • An industry-run skills centre at every industrial node, co-designed with employers, so training matches real jobs and is backed by apprenticeship guarantees. • Upgrade Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs) and polytechnics in machining, mechatronics, EV technology, drone assembly, food technology, cold-chain operation and solar installation. • University research parks at Mohali, Patiala, Ludhiana and Amritsar, linking campuses to start-ups and product companies. • Vocational and digital skills in schools from Class 9, including English, coding and practical AI tools. • Give the young a reason to stay: good jobs at home and a clear path from training to employment are the best answer to emigration. • Agricultural extension 2.0: train farmers in horticulture, precision irrigation and post-harvest handling, which are the skills that raise income per acre. How It Is Financed Principle: Punjab facilitates; investors invest. The State provides land, planning, utilities, skills, approvals and time- bound incentives. Capital comes mostly from others: Union schemes, the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), Railways, the Power Ministry, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) and private nuclear operators, central public-sector companies, private developers through public-private partnerships (PPP), banks, and sovereign and institutional investors. • No new open-ended subsidies. Every incentive is capped, time-bound and tied to jobs, investment or exports. • Capture land value: a share of the rise in land value around new nodes and stations funds local infrastructure. • Ring-fence the programme in a dedicated development company that publishes accounts. Component Indicative investment Industrial parks and clusters ₹20,000–30,000 crore Logistics and cold chain ₹8,000–12,000 crore Airport cargo and industrial infrastructure ₹4,000–7,000 crore IT, AI and innovation parks ₹8,000–15,000 crore Grid strengthening ₹10,000–15,000 crore Renewables and storage ₹15,000–25,000 crore Nuclear (1,400 MW) ₹22,000–30,000 crore Border-zone infrastructure ₹5,000–8,000 crore Indicative total ₹92,000–1,42,000 crore These are order-of-magnitude figures, not Government estimates. Each component needs a Detailed Project Report (DPR). Water-recharge works would be funded largely through Union water-conservation and rural-employment schemes.

MLF 2026 8 Strategy & Heritage Mr Jaimal Inder Singh Shergill completed his under and post-graduate studies from the USA, where he received the Wall Street Journal academic excellence award and is also part of his University's Hall of Fame for Athletics. He has thirty years of experience in retail banking, wealth management, asset management, corporate and investment banking. He has been executing challenging goals in highly regulated environments. He has helped create the first Bollywood theme park in the world in Dubai and also advised many start up's when he founded a Venture Consultancy in the UK. Lt Gen T S ‘Maun’ Shergill was commissioned into Deccan Horse in 1964, which he later commanded. He served in Indo-Pak wars of 1965 & 1971; Commanded an Infantry Division on LOC and a Corps in North- East. He was Commandant IMA where he instituted `The Code of the Warrior.’ The General is a graduate of the United States Command and General Staff College, with a Master of Military Art and Science degree. He has been Military and Defence Attaché in Washington, DC, and, accredited to Canada. After retirement he was appointed Chairman, Punjab Public Service Commission and Senior Advisor to the Chief Minister, Punjab, with Cabinet rank. He created the Military Literature Festival Association, Chandigarh that has held a Military Literature Festival every year since inception. He is author of the book “Counterinsurgency Support to a Host Nation,” and Co-author with Captain Amarinder Singh, of the book, “Monsoon War-Indo Pak War 1965”. Roadmap 2027–2040 Years Phase Key actions 2027–28 PLAN Industrial land bank, Border Zone policy, corridor master plan, airport cargo plans, nuclear site study, pond and wetland survey 2028–31 BUILD Industrial parks, cold chains, logistics terminals, grid upgrades, pond recharge and floodplain wetlands, skills centres 2030–34 INDUSTRIALISE MSMEs, food processing, engineering, defence components, electronics; paddy diversification at scale 2032–36 DIGITALISE AI and IT clusters at Mohali, Ludhiana, Amritsar, Patiala, university towns 2028–38 ENERGY Renewables and storage first; nuclear construction in parallel 2037–40 POWER 1,400 MW nuclear online: a firm power platform for the next phase How Success Will Be Measured Judge the programme by results, not by investment announced. Publish a scorecard every year on: • Manufacturing value added and exports. • Jobs created per acre of industrial land. • Farm income per acre, and crop output per unit of water. • Depth to water table in each block. • Electricity reliability and cost to industry. • Number of MSMEs growing into larger enterprises. • Private capital attracted for every rupee of public money. The Vision in One Sentence; Punjab should not try to copy Gujarat or Maharashtra. It should become India's first large-scale integrated agro-industrial, engineering, digital and high-value horticulture State: connected by expressway, rail and air, powered by a diversified low-carbon grid, with its water secured and its border districts turned from a liability into an asset. The skeleton is being built. What Punjab needs now is the industrial flesh, reliable energy and secure water around it. About the Authors M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 9 Strategy & Heritage Space Warfare began with Ballistic-missile technology in WWII, accelerated during the Cold War with reconnaissance satellites, and today includes dedicated space forces, orbital weapons and the ability to strike satellites using Anti Satellite Systems (ASAT). Starting with Sputnik-1 in 1957, Space and Satellite have moved from being just an eye in the sky to a to Weaponised Domain. United States and China have an independent space force. Other nations (India, France, Spain, Russia) operate space commands within their Air Forces or Defence agencies. Core Components of Warfare in the Space Domian • Orbital Surveillance (Eye in the Sky): Continuous tracking of military assets anywhere on the globe including missile launches, troop movements, and electronic emissions including infrared (thermal) signatures, radar reflections, electronic emissions, and other spectral indicators. • Electronic Warfare (EW): Disruption of satellite-dependent systems through jamming, spoofing, dazzling, and high-power electronic attack, aimed at corrupting navigation signals, degrading communications, blinding optical sensors, and forcing adversary platforms into denial, delay, or mis-targeting cycles. • Cyber Operations: Target ground stations, satellite control networks, and digital backbone of space systems through intrusion, disruption, data corruption, and command-link manipulation, aiming to degrade mission control systems and compromise the integrity of orbital operations. • Space-based Sensors: Infrared missile-warning platforms, SIGINT collectors, and radar-imaging satellites that provide persistent, all-weather detection of heat signatures, electronic emissions, surface movements, and concealed military activity – leading to early-warning, and theatre-wide situational awareness. • Anti Satellite (ASAT) Weapons: Kinetic interceptors, co-orbital stalkers, electronic attack systems, and cyber intrusion tools designed to disable, degrade, or destroy satellites by impact, proximity operations, signal corruption, or command-link compromise.

MLF 2026 10 Strategy & Heritage (Jilin – 1 is a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellation - a swarm of small satellites delivering high-resolution imagery and 4K video, with military-grade revisit rates and global coverage). (MizarVision is not a satellite, it is an AI-powered geospatial intelligence platform). Krasukha-4 is a microwave jammer that blinds airborne and satellite sensors. Murmansk-BN is a HF strategic jammer that disrupts global communications. Together, they formed a layered EW shield: - Krasukha-4 to protect local high-value assets from ISR. - Murmansk-BN to disrupt regional/continental command networks. Examples from the Iran War. • United States - every significant military capability deployed during the war depended on satellite services: GPS guidance leading to precision, global strike coordination through Satellite Communications, Intelligence Collection based on a dense orbital surveillance network and reliable early-warning sensors tracking incoming Iranian missiles and drones. • Iran’s counter-strategy - focused on blunting America’s space-enabled advantages through EW, and targeted disruption of satellite-dependent systems. On the face of it, it is hard to accept ….. Di Iran do all that? …….. Yes, they did but with support from Russia and China. o Russia - supplied EW systems and satellites which provided round-the-clock optical and radar imagery. And the EW Systems a GPS jamming campaign o China – provided an encrypted navigation alternative to the GPS. Orbital Surveillance (Eye in the Sky) Orbital surveillance is conducted using infrared, radar, and signals-intelligence satellites that monitor a target throughout its activity. The War produced an information environment which included commercial satellite constellations making the battlefield partially transparent to anyone with internet access and analytic capability. American forces could destroy Iranian infrastructure, suppress missile launches, and disrupt Iranian communications – but they could not prevent China’s Jilin-1 Satellites from photographing their carrier strike groups and aircraft clusters. Neither they could stop MizarVision from publishing those photographs publicly. Electronic Warfare EW in the Iran War revolved around jamming, spoofing, and attempts to blind satellite-dependent systems — a deliberate strategy to erode the US military’s space-enabled kill chain. Iran deployed Russian-origin systems such as Krasukha-4 and Murmansk-BN, using high-power interference to disrupt GPS signals, corrupt satellite communications, and force navigation failures across both military and civilian platforms. A clear example came when Iranian GPS jamming around the Strait of Hormuz displaced navigation of more than 1,100 commercial vessels, collapsing AIS timing and freezing tanker traffic. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 11 Strategy & Heritage Cyber Operations targeted the digital backbone of satellite services — ground stations, relay nodes, and command networks. US Cyber Command and Space Command started the campaign by disrupting Iranian command-and-control infrastructure, aiming to blind sensors, sever targeting links, and degrade flow of data between operators and the missile & drone forces. Iranian cyber units attempted intrusions against satellite-linked communication networks, interfered with Starlink connectivity through layered jamming-plus-spoofing attacks. Used state-linked hacking groups such as Handala to maintain operations via Starlink during national blackouts!! Rather smart. Space-based Sensors They were the backbone of US situational awareness, providing infrared missile warning, SIGINT, and radar-based tracking. Infrared early-warning satellites detected heat signatures of Iranian ballistic, and cruise missile launches within seconds. SIGINT platforms mapped electronic emissions from Air-defence radars, jammers, and command nodes. Synthetic-aperture radar satellites added all-weather visibility, allowing the US to maintain surveillance over mobile launchers and Air-defence batteries even during sandstorms or blackout. Together, these orbital sensors formed a persistent network that Iran could not hide from. ASAT Weapons ASAT contest in the War did not involve dramatic kinetic intercepts. They used quieter, more pervasive tools that disable satellites without touching them: electronic attack, cyber intrusion, and targeted strikes on ground infrastructure. Iran relied on Russian-origin jamming systems capable of interfering with satellite communications and GPS signals, degrading US space-enabled kill chains. Cyber operations attempted to penetrate satellite-linked networks and disrupt the ground stations that constellations depend on. And when Iranian forces struck US early-warning radars in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, they were effectively targeting the terrestrial half of America’s missile-warning architecture — a counter-space action that bypassed orbit entirely. This illustrates how modern ASAT warfare has shifted from orbital collisions to non-kinetic, deniable, ground-based attacks that can degrade satellite effects without ever firing a missile into space. Modern ASAT Demonstrations • China (2007), US (2008), India (2019) have demonstrated kinetic ASAT capability. • Russia has tested both kinetic and non-kinetic ASAT systems. • A Weapon in Orbit: On 14 Sep 2026, the US announced that it has launched a “highly classified” weapon into orbit - the first nation to openly admit possessing an operational space weapon.

MLF 2026 12 Strategy & Heritage SPACE WARFARE LESSONS FROM THE IRAN WAR (2026) 1. Before the first aircraft crossed the Gulf, space assets were already in motion saturating Iran with ISR – Lesson: Phase Zero of any conflict, Space Domain Awareness (SDA) Is No Longer Optional. Space has become the First Domain of Combat. 2. Nearly every US munition depended on GPS timing, satellite targeting, and orbital communications – Lesson: Without Satellites, There Is No Strike: Space Enables Precision. 3. Planet Labs, Maxar, and other commercial constellations provided transparent, high-tempo imagery - Lesson: Commercial space now part of the battlespace. Commercial Satellites - Combat Multipliers. 4. Iran attempted GPS jamming, Satcom interference, spoofing, and LEO disruption. US countered with adaptive routing, frequency hopping, and hardened TT&C links. (Telemetry, Tracking, and Command - lifeline between a satellite and ground controllers) – Lesson: Space EW is a continuous duel, not a one-off event. Space systems are only as secure as the ground stations that run them. 5. Infrared missile-warning satellites detected Iranian launches within seconds, feeding naval interceptors and Patriot batteries. Lesson: Boost-phase detection from orbit is the single most valuable defensive asset in a missile-rich theatre. Interceptors get time to react. 7. Iran’s limited ASAT capability forced the US to: alter satellite tasking windows, adjust orbital passes, and increase defensive manoeuvres – Lesson: ASAT threats shape strategy even when Not used. 8. Satellite imagery made the war visible to the world — Lesson: Space transparency displays missile impacts, troop movements, destroyed facilities - shaping global opinion, diplomacy, & escalation control. SPACE WARFARE LESSONS FROM ALLIED SUPPORT — RUSSIA & CHINA ENABLE IRAN Iran’s Air force was outmatched and Navy irrelevant. The Missile force survived and struck because allies kept it alive. Russia and China gave Iran four layers of space-enabled resilience — imagery, navigation, electronic protection, and cyber fallback — so that even if one system was blinded or jammed, Iran could still see, guide, protect, and launch its missiles and drones. 1. Russia and China never fired a missile, yet Iran fought with their borrowed eyes, ears, navigation, and electronics. Russia shielded Iran with EW systems (Krasukha-4, Murmansk-BN) which created: GPS denial zones, radar distortion bubbles, protection for Iranian command sites and degraded US ISR passes Allies Extended Iran’s Cyber Reach - Iranian cyber units received: toolkits for TT&C intrusion, routing-map intelligence, satellite-ground-station vulnerabilities and malware frameworks for uplink disruption. Lesson: Space support lets allies influence a war without crossing the threshold of open participation. 2. Iran’s accurate strikes were enabled by Russian satellites (Kanopus-V/Khayyam) - which provided round-the-clock optical + radar imagery, Chinese BeiDou encrypted navigation, Chinese TEE-01B with 0.5-metre resolution provided valuable optics of American bases. Lesson: Space Imagery, Strategic Reconnaissance, Space Domain Awareness and Precision targeting can be imported. About the Author Maj Gen Harvijay Singh, SM a third-generation officer, his two sons are also army officers. He holds the degree of BTech and Master’s Degree in Management Sciences. He has written books on Indo Pak Wars: 1948, 1965, 1971 - Battles That Made History, Indo Pak War 1947-48 (for Part D) and Gallant Soldiers: Short Stories of Big Deeds. He has also written Monographs on Grey Zone Warfare and Lessons Learnt from the Ukraine War. He is a regular contributor to Magazines on Military Strategy and Technology and a speaker on current Global Military events. He is the winner of ARTRAC Scholar Warrior Badge for writing on Contemporary Military Thinking and Strategy. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 13 Strategy & Heritage Key Point: The United States, China, and Russia possess the largest and most sophisticated military satellites, while India, France, Israel, Japan, Germany, and Italy maintain specialized surveillance satellites focused on regional security and strategic intelligence collection. MILITARY SATELLITES Modern warfare depends heavily on Military Satellites. They provide the "eyes, ears, voice, navigation system, and early warning network" of armed forces. Type Military Uses Strength Weakness 1. Surveillance Satellites Continuously monitor large areas to detect military activities, force movements, infra and battlefield changes. Global coverage, Persistent observation. Difficult to conceal large military formations Predictable orbital paths. Weather can affect optical systems. Vulnerable to anti-satellite attacks. 2. Reconnaissance Satellites Gather detailed intelligence through imagery and observation of enemy capabilities. High-resolution imagery. Strategic intelligence collection. Supports operational planning. Limited revisit times. Camouflage and deception can reduce effectiveness. 3. Early Warning Satellites Detect ballistic missile launches through infrared sensors. Immediate launch detection - precious minutes of warning. Can generate false alarms. Expensive to build and maintain. 4. Navigation Satellites Provide Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) for Precision-guided munitions, Troop navigation, Missile guidance, Aircraft and Naval operations. Enable precision warfare. Global coverage. Signals can be jammed or spoofed. 5. Military Communications Satellites Enable secure communication between commanders, ships, aircraft, and ground forces. Global Command and Control Secure Communications. Beyond-line-of-sight connectivity. Jamming threats High-value targets. 6. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Satellites Intercept electronic emissions such as: Military radios, Radars, Data links, Communications networks. Provides intelligence without physical access, detects hidden military activity. Encrypted signals may limit usefulness. 7. Radar Satellites (Synthetic Aperture Radar. Image targets through clouds, smoke, darkness, and bad weather. Day-night operation. All-weather capability. Detects hidden infrastructure. Requires complex data processing. Lower visual detail than optical imagery. 8. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Systems Destroy or disable enemy satellites. . Direct-ascent missiles. . Co-orbital satellite. . EW attacks. . Directed Energy Weapons. Can blind or disrupt enemy forces. Creates orbital debris. Escalation risk. 9. Electronic Warfare (EW) Satellites Jamming. Signal disruption. Electronic attack. Electronic protection. Non-kinetic effects Can degrade enemy command systems Requires advanced technology. Countermeasures available. 10. Next-Generation Military Satellites AI-Enabled Satellites Mega-Constellations 100s of satellites providing: Redundancy, Continuous coverage, greater resilience. Autonomous target recognition. Real-time battlefield analysis Reduced dependence on ground stations.

MLF 2026 14 Strategy & Heritage Nation Major Surveillance / Reconnaissance Satellites with Nations United States KH-11 (Crystal), FIA Radar, NROL series, Lacrosse/Onyx China Yaogan series, Gaofen series, Tianhui Russia Persona, Bars-M, Liana (SIGINT), Kondor India Cartosat series, RISAT series, EMISAT France CSO (Composante Spatiale Optique), CERES (SIGINT) United Kingdom Primarily relies on allied systems; Skynet supports military communications Israel Ofek series, Eros satellites Japan Information Gathering Satellites (IGS Optical & Radar) Germany SAR-Lupe, SARah Italy COSMO-SkyMed constellation Nation Navigation Satellites Communications Satellites SIGINT Satellites United States GPS WGS, AEHF Orion/Mentor, Trumpet China BeiDou Tianlian, Shentong Yaogan SIGINT Series Russia GLONASS Meridian, Blagovest Liana (Lotos-S, Pion-NKS) India NavIC GSAT-7, GSAT-7A, GSAT-7R EMISAT France Galileo Syracuse IV CERES United Kingdom GPS access via alliance Skynet 5/6 Primarily allied capabilities Israel GPS-assisted systems Amos (dual use) Ofek-derived intelligence payloads Japan QZSS X-Band Defense Communications Satellite IGS Intelligence Satellites Germany Galileo (shared civilian system) SATCOMBw SARah-supported intelligence network Italy Galileo (shared civilian system) SICRAL Intelligence via COSMO- SkyMed support M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 15 Strategy & Heritage Nation Radar (SAR) Satellites EW / ELINT Satellites ASAT Capability United States Lacrosse/Onyx, FIA Radar Trumpet, Orion/Mentor Proven (SM-3 intercept, 2008) China Yaogan SAR Series, Ludi Tance Yaogan ELINT Series Proven (ASAT test, 2007) Russia Kondor, Pion-NKS Liana (Lotos-S, Pion-NKS) Proven (Nudol ASAT, 2021) India RISAT Series, EOS-04 EMISAT Proven (Mission Shakti, 2019) France - CERES - Israel TecSAR (Ofek-8) Ofek Intelligence Payloads - Japan IGS Radar Series Limited capability - Germany SAR-Lupe, SARah Limited dedicated EW satellites - Italy COSMO-SkyMed Limited dedicated EW satellites - The United States, China, Russia, and India are the only nations to have publicly demonstrated direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. In Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and space-based electronic intelligence, the United States, China, and Russia maintain the most comprehensive constellations, while India is rapidly expanding its capabilities through RISAT, EOS, and EMISAT systems. Next-Generation Military Satellite Constellations Nation Constellation / Program Purpose United States Starshield, PWSA (SDA) Missile tracking, resilient communications, global ISR. China Guowang, Yaogan Next-Gen ISR, communications, strategic surveillance. Russia Razdan, Sphere Program Reconnaissance, communications, navigation support. India Defence Space Constellation (planned), NVS, EOS Series Integrated ISR, navigation, secure military connectivity. European Union IRIS² Secure communications and strategic autonomy. United Kingdom ISTARI Programme, Skynet 6 Military intelligence and communications. France Syracuse IV Reconnaissance and secure communications. Japan Future Defence Satellite Constellation Persistent surveillance and missile warning. Israel Next-Generation Ofek Series Real-time intelligence and target tracking. Future military space architectures are shifting from a handful of large satellites to distributed constellations of hundreds of interconnected spacecrafts, providing persistent surveillance, resilient communications

MLF 2026 16 Strategy & Heritage AI in Counter Terrorism (Maj Gen Amrit Pal Singh) It is largely feared that AI is a revolutionary force that will transform warfare, governance, and society and that the historical relationship between terrorism and technology suggests that AI may empower individual terrorists - the reality will likely be more restrained. Terrorist organisations have demonstrated an ability to absorb existing technologies and employ them creatively. The Sep 11 attacks combined two established methods—aircraft hijacking and suicide terrorism—in an innovative mix. Hezbollah has integrated drones, precision-guided munitions, and information operations into broader political-military campaigns. Terrorists are very adoptive of technology though they are not technological pioneers in the conventional sense. AI optimizes workflows, enables personalisation of propaganda and recruitment, and allows smaller groups and individuals to perform tasks that have previously required more manpower, technical expertise, time, and money. AI will also matter most in the areas of propaganda, recruitment, radicalisation, operational support, disinformation, and organisational maintenance. One of AI’s greatest benefits is that it allows less-trained people to conduct a range of activities that in the past were reserved for experts. Terrorist groups usually very opportunistically adopt technologies that are already commercially available, socially widespread, or proven by state actors and private industry. How Terrorist Groups Misuse AI • Recruitment and Creating Content: Extremist networks leverage generative AI for rapid propaganda, deepfakes, personalized recruitment, and scaling hate speech. Extremist groups deploy custom, fine- tuned chatbots and generative AI to groom vulnerable individuals, replacing human handlers with 24/7 personalized radicalization. Generative tools allow bad actors to rapidly scale deepfakes, multilingual narratives, and hyper-realistic media to maximize psychological impact. • Autonomous Weapons and Attacks: Terrorists and non-state actors integrate AI into uncrewed systems (drones) and self-driving vehicular bombs for autonomous navigation and target recognition. • Critical Infrastructure Sabotage: Neural networks and prompt injections are increasingly studied or used to probe cyber vulnerabilities in power grids, water supply networks, and transport systems. It is precisely this methodology of terrorists of using social media to gain traction that needs to be targeted and neutralised. Social media has emerged as the leading medium being exploited by criminals and terrorists in plying their trade. They use the ubiquity and the large quantity of messages and traffic to blend in their communications and to go unnoticed. It is the safety in the crowd of the media that they exploit to pass messages, post notices, recruit youth and claim credit by glorifying their foot soldiers. Opportunities in Counterterrorism • Speed and Scale: Governments and security agencies use AI to process vast streams of data, translate communications, and analyse threat scores from intercepted materials. • Content Moderation: Organizations like the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism and major platforms use machine learning to flag and remove terrorist propaganda. • Early Detection: Responsible AI models help identify indicators of radicalization, map extremist networks, and anticipate logistical vulnerabilities before attacks occur. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 17 Strategy & Heritage The qualities that make AI a powerful accelerant of radicalisation, however, also make it uniquely effective at counter-radicalisation. Large Language Models (LLMs) that power popular AI applications such as ChatGPT and Claude can be ‘fine-tuned’ to mimic styles, tones, and vernacular that resonate with individuals susceptible to terrorist propaganda. These fine-tuned LLMs can generate hyper-personalised counter-messaging content (social media posts, videos, images, and memes) that dispel terrorist propaganda and help prevent radicalisation. In other words, AI can be used to develop effective counter-messaging that debunks terrorist narratives in a format designed to convince at-risk individuals or sub-groups. There are concerted efforts in place by social media platforms like Facebook to deny the use of their platform by terrorists. The use of technology by terror perpetrators and the proliferation of tech savvy terrorists are what governments and security agencies are grappling with. While it may be argued that most recruitment and indoctrination by terror groups happens offline, yet it is irrefutable that the internet and specifically social media platforms that are largely the choice of terror communication networks. There is no single technological fix to terrorism but increasing use of technology by terrorists does make it imperative to find ways to deny them use and track them as they use social media to plan and execute strikes and to organise interference in counter terror operations such as stone pelting. The use of AI by social media platforms in identifying and isolating message strings or individual posts by terrorists is not new. AI models such as image matching, identification of clusters, language understanding and cross platform collaboration to name a few are used by Facebook to make social media a tool to spot terrorists and the accounts they use. All these and many more methods exist to spot and deny terrorist the use of social media for terror related communications. The proactive use of these technologies to identify and track terror planning is relevant. Mostly, terrorists replicate connections between handlers across the border and themselves in electronic connections or radicalise in clusters that also form on social media as they exchange messages and bomb recipes. The case of Najibullah Zazi, the New York Subway Bomb plotter, a chemical engineer who was identified and stopped by the FBI’s Joint Terrorist Task Force in New York in Sep 2009 is an example of the use of technology to monitor such terror links and intercept terrorists. As many as thirteen internet companies are part of a Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism. AI is being used by most of these social media platforms and indicates cross collaboration between Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and many more, for work on systems to take action against violent extremism content and block terrorist accounts. Facebook in 2017 launched a very successful Online Civil Courage Initiative which is a project involving around hundred anti-hate anti-extremism organisations across Europe to produce effective counter speech programs. There are initiatives that have been taken up between community leaders and tech entrepreneurs to organise hackathons to push back extremism and propagation of on-line hate in Manilla, Dhaka and Jakarta by Facebook. India too needs to ‘smell the cordite’ and carry forward governmental collaboration with these developers who have a large workforce of community operations teams which can lead to creation of local teams that can apply language-based detection and counter speech techniques to defeat the forming of terror linkages or track them for viable counter action as they develop. Credible counter speech narratives can be put forward by voices of the community to convince fence sitters amongst the youth from getting radicalised.

MLF 2026 18 Strategy & Heritage Technology and specifically AI provides the means to stop the spread of terrorist content on social media, and, its use in antiterrorism operations is recent. Nevertheless, it provides the necessary opportunity to get a head start on denial of media and analysis to spot likely incidents in the making. It is the human Interface of the law and security agencies that need to focus on the use of human inputs and data feeding to the AI models that can be and must be developed to effectively use technology to defeat the terrorist. The deployment of components of the NATGRID, a nationwide antiterrorism network with inputs from all state-controlled law enforcement agencies can be dovetailed and must be made operational. A large expenditure has been incurred on setting up of the Crime and Criminal Network & Tracking System (CCTNS) which is meant to seamlessly link the country’s police stations across the country as recently as in 2018. The system can be used to input data into AI models specially designed to spot terror activities emanating and being supported by social media. • The first step could be the development of a J&K specific AI model that has the capability to pick up propaganda videos, surreptitious messages, posts and message boards that the terrorist use. The intelligence apparatus can use the existing manpower on the ground to train themselves to fight the new with these new but imperative technologies. It is time to use technology to augment the fight on terror, not simply because we are up against an increasingly number of technology savvy terrorists, but also to recognise that the large data that passes on social and electronic media can only be tackled by use of technology in a superior and effective model. To blunt the impact of this threat, there is a need to revisit some of the lessons learned and best practices of the Global War on Terrorism, namely, multilateral cooperation, the importance of public-private partnerships, and early intervention to prevent individuals and groups from mastering new technologies toward nefarious ends. The time for upgradation in capabilities to step up for the tech battle against terror has come. We need to rapidly take smart steps in the fight against terror. M L F 2 0 2 6 About the Author Maj Gen Amrit Pal Singh has been a Divisional Commander of an Army Division in Northern Command, responsible for operations in Ladakh and Kashmir. He is qualified in ‘Intelligence Analysis and Global Security’ from The University of Maryland, USA. He has been the chief executive and headed the vertical in Army Training Command (ARTRAC) responsible for Institutionalised training at 32 pan India army training institutions. The General has Co-authored a book ‘Maoist Insurgency and India’s Internal Security Architecture’ and is a regular contributor to military journals, newspapers and think tanks.

MLF 2026 19 Strategy & Heritage THREE STRATEGIC LESSONS FROM MIDDLE EAST’S UNFINISHED WAR Maj Gen Neeraj Bali, SM (Retd) Seven months into Iran war, three strategic lessons have hardened into facts, and the map has grown larger "No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it." — Carl von Clausewitz In March, I began a series on the strategic lessons of the war between Iran and the US-Israel combine. Events have since outpaced the keyboard. A two-week ceasefire came and went. A memorandum signed in June unravelled by July. Washington answered Iran's closure of Hormuz with a blockade of its own. And in the past fortnight, missiles from Yemen have shut the main airport of the Saudi capital. So rather than adding new lessons, it is worth testing old ones against emerging facts. Three of them have not merely survived the past seven months. They have been confirmed, with uncomfortable precision. Lesson One: The Calendar is Not a Strategy My first lesson was that democracies too often substitute electoral politics for long-term thinking. When geopolitics is seen primarily through political prism, the outcome is naturally less than perfect. At one level, this is natural; human beings protect what they create and rarely advance what their rivals created. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, was a landmark 2015 agreement between Iran and the P5+1 powers (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) alongside the European Union. The JCPOA was not junked in 2018 because it had failed; it was torn up because it belonged to a predecessor. I did not expect the point about ‘electoral politics’ to be made quite so literally. On 8 Oct, President Trump announced that the US "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to Midterm Elections." A day earlier, reports had surfaced that White House had asked the Pentagon for strike options. This week came news that plans to use the so-called "mother of all bombs" against military sites are ready, should the order be given. Read together, these tell us something unusual. The tempo of the war—when to strike, when to talk, when to pause—is being set neither by the battlefield nor by the negotiating table. It is being set by 3 Nov, the day the US will vote in a consequential election for both houses. There is a cost to this that is easy to miss. An adversary who knows your deadlines owns a part of your strategy. Tehran does not need to win. It needs only to remain standing through an electoral cycle, and perhaps the next one. Every date announced in Washington is a date noted in Tehran.

MLF 2026 20 Strategy & Heritage The US must negotiate with itself—with its electorate, with Israel, with its Gulf partners—before it can negotiate with Iran. The electoral calendar has made that inner negotiation the main event. The outer one waits its turn. Lesson Two: Pressure Without a Door Builds a Wall My second lesson distinguished a strategy of coercion from one that pushes the adversary toward compliance. Coercion imposes costs that can harden the stance and the will of the adversary. A strategy for that encourages change in behaviour requires something coercion does not: a credible path to relief. Since August, the coercive side of the ledger has been run with near-textbook thoroughness. ‘Operation Economic Outcast’ widened sanctions against Iran's oil, finance and shipping. The US Treasury Secretary says that Iran has loaded no crude since late August. The rial trades near 2.7 million per dollar. Analysts at Kpler estimate that Iran's crude revenue could fall to zero by mid-December. Washington's own name for the policy is "absolute isolation." And yet the strait remains, by Tehran's reckoning, closed. The UK's maritime security agency reported ten attacks on shipping in the week to 16 Oct, making October the busiest month for attacks since March. One ship has sunk. An Iranian army spokesman put the terms bluntly: the strait will reopen when the US leaves the region. Why has maximum pain not produced maximum results? Because the door is still missing. President Pezeshkian summed up Tehran's view in a single sentence: "Every time we hold talks with the U.S., they attack again." Twice in a single year Iran joined negotiations and was bombed while they were under way. What was once an experience has become a doctrine. The current deadlock is, at its core, a dispute about sequence. Washington wants the nuclear issue to be tackled first. Tehran wants Hormuz, and the blockade addressed first. Each side wants the other to walk through a door that has not yet been built. Vice President Vance's recent call for a "meaningful" cut in enrichment—rather than its elimination—is the first faint outline of a hinge. It deserves more attention than it has received. There is also the paradox the second lesson warned of: Isolation is precisely the condition in which a besieged regime finds it easiest to explain hardship. When the pain is visibly imposed from outside, the rial's collapse becomes the enemy's crime, not the government's failure. Pain tells an adversary what you want him to stop. Only a door tells him what he gains by stopping. Lesson Three: Wars That Begin with Clarity End in Ambiguity— and Spread My third lesson was that militaries plan the opening of a war with rigour and its aftermath with assumptions. I traced how American strategy documents had, for over a decade, flagged the vulnerability of maritime chokepoints. The 2017 National Security Strategy spoke of the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. The 2022 strategy named Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab together. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 21 Strategy & Heritage Both are now contested. The Houthis entered the war on 28 March, firing missiles at Israel. For months, they were treated as a sideshow. In Sep, they launched a rapid offensive that seized ground near the Bab al- Mandab. On 4 Oct, Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces struck back. The Houthis answered with missiles and drones aimed at Saudi airports and energy infrastructure and told workers at Saudi oil facilities to evacuate. On 10 Oct, a strike on Riyadh's King Khalid International Airport killed at least twelve people and wounded more than three hundred—the deadliest attack inside the kingdom in over a decade. The UN envoy for Yemen now says the country has returned to "full-scale war." Consider the arc. A campaign conceived as an air war against one country has produced two contested straits, a Gulf capital whose airport is shut by missiles from Yemen, and a revived civil war on the Arabian Peninsula. None of this lay beyond foresight. The documents had named the places. It lay beyond the plan. The Houthi episode also teaches a corollary: proxies are not puppets. "Ansar Allah is not simply an Iranian proxy awaiting instructions," observes Andreas Krieg of King's College London. That cuts in two directions. • Washington cannot switch off the Houthis by squeezing Tehran harder. • And Tehran, which influences the Houthis without commanding them, can now offer that influence as a diplomatic asset. It has done exactly that, offering to mediate between Riyadh and the Houthis. Here lies the war's most striking irony. A campaign designed to isolate Iran has produced the spectacle of the Saudi foreign minister taking a call from his Iranian counterpart about attacks on the Saudi capital. The costs of ambiguity, meanwhile, land far from those who chose the war. On 11 Oct, two Indian seafarers went missing after a drone struck a tanker near Hormuz. Nobody in Washington, Jerusalem or Tehran planned for them. That is precisely the point. The Unfinished Question Seven months ago, the question in Washington was how quickly Iran would capitulate. Today, the questions are how many straits, how many capitals, and how many election cycles. That is what ambiguity looks like when it is allowed to compound. Clausewitz expected statesmen to be clear about what they intend to achieve before they begin. The three lessons above are, in the end, one lesson: clarity cannot be retrofitted. It must be bought before the first strike because after it, the price only rises. About the author Maj Gen Neeraj Bali, SM (Retd), is an Indian Army veteran and Director of the Chakra Strategic Forum, a think-tank focused on geopolitics and security. The author of the best-selling book The Winning Culture. He writes Lines of Influence, a Substack newsletter on power, strategy, and geopolitics, seen through an Indian lens.

MLF 2026 22 Strategy & Heritage Iran's geography has historically made it one of the most difficult countries to conquer. Sits on the Iranian Plateau, surrounded by mountain barriers and harsh deserts that restrict military movement and force attackers into a few predictable corridors – they provide strategic depth, defensive positions, and protection for major population centres. Iran’s mountains also provide the geological foundation for extensive underground cities, command centres, missile complexes, ammunition depots, and industrial facilities. They significantly enhance the survivability and resilience of Iran's military infrastructure. IRAN: THE MOST NATURALLY DEFENDED COUNTRIES ON EARTH Key Defensive Features Zagros Mountains (West): Stretching along Iran's border with Iraq, the rugged Zagros Mountains form a massive defensive wall. Their steep ridges, narrow valleys, and limited passes make large-scale armoured offensives extremely difficult and slow. Historically, they have been Iran's first line of defence against invasions from Mesopotamia. Highest peak - Qash-Mastan - 14,465 feet. Alborz (Elburz) Mountains (North): The Alborz range separates the Caspian coast from Iran's interior and protects Tehran. These mountains create a formidable barrier that channels movement through a few narrow routes. Highest Peak: Mount Damavand - 18,403 feet. Kopet Dag Mountains (Northeast): Along the Turkmenistan frontier, Kopet Dag range blocks easy access from Central Asia and acts as a natural shield for northeastern Iran. Highest Peak Kuh-e Quchan - 10,469 ft. Dasht-e Kavir (Great Salt Desert): This vast salt desert contains salt flats, marshes, and difficult terrain that severely restrict military mobility and logistics. Crossing it with a large force is challenging and hazardous. Dasht-e Lut Desert: One of the hottest and most inhospitable deserts on Earth, the Lut Desert is dominated by sand and gravel plains that are extremely hostile to sustained military operations. Both these deserts are Impossible for mechanized armies. Deadliest interior barrier of any country on Earth. Makran Range and Narrow Coastal Plains (Southeast): The rugged Makran region and limited coastal plain along the Gulf of Oman restrict amphibious landings and rapid inland movement. Any force landing on the coast must quickly confront mountainous terrain. Highest Peak Kuh-e-Bazman 11,450 feet. Makran Range facing the Strait of Hormuz averages 3500 – 4500 Feet. Narrow coastal plains one of the most strategic - features of Iran’s geography form a thin strip between the Makran Range and Persian Gulf - 3 to 30 Kms; no space for manoeuvre. Iran's islands transform the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz into a defensive bastion. Qeshm, Hormuz, Larak, Abu Musa, and the Tunb Islands provide surveillance, missile basing, and naval staging areas that enable Iran to monitor and influence one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints. Together with the country's mountains and deserts, the islands form the outer ring of Iran's layered defence strategy. The Iranian Plateau provides strategic depth for defenders. Major cities are protected behind multiple natural barriers. Attackers are forced into a few predictable corridors that can be heavily defended. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 23 Strategy & Heritage Reconstitution; the New Mantra of Modern Warfare (Shri Rajinder Paul Singhal, Additional Director General (Arbitration) (Retd), MES) Independent India’s Military achievements have run on two clocks. • One is the 1965 and 1971 clock: wars that achieved a lot and ended before the magazine ran dry. • The other is the nuclear clock, which whispers that any future war on the subcontinent must be short because it cannot be allowed to grow. Ukraine and West Asia Wara in contrast have been, let us just say, open ended. • Russia planned a brief “special operation” against Ukraine and instead finds itself sustaining an industrial war into 2026. A conflict that has swallowed men, matériel, and political bandwidth far beyond its design. What was to be a short, sharp war ….. it is already in its fifth year? • Israel, despite air supremacy and the densest missile-defence grid on the planet, has not translated tactical brilliance into a clean strategic full stop in West Asia - Gaza, Lebanon, the Red Sea, and two strike cycles against Iran have produced motion without closure. • And then, in May 2025, India wrote a different ending - After the Pahalgam massacre, the Indian Armed Forces launched Op Sindoor, striking nine terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The Raksha Mantri announce that more than a hundred terrorists were killed. Pakistan answered with drones and missiles from Jammu to Gujarat. India’s Integrated Air Command and Control System broke these salvos; wreckage fell in the fields of Ferozepur, Kapurthala, Pathankot, and Bathinda, but the riposte failed. The four-day crisis ended on India’s terms – Short & Sweet. Victory in a short exchange is not the same as readiness for a long one. The nuclear clock demands brevity; the industrial clock demands depth. India has mastered the first. The second remains the harder question — the question of magazines, manufacturing, mobilisation, and staying power. This brings forth three essential principles of modern warfare: Time, Space and Price. These are variables that determine whether a nation can endure past the first week, absorb shocks, reconstitute its strength, and shape the next phase of conflict. Time • The war that began in West Asia on 7 Oct 2023 has run through Gaza, Lebanon, the Red Sea, and two strike cycles against Iran. The opening salvo decided nothing - factories, stockpiles, alliances, and public endurance did. Israel degraded Hamas, battered Hezbollah, and in the twelve-day campaign of June 2025 struck Iranian launchers, air defences, and nuclear-linked infrastructure with American support. Iran’s proxy shield proved thinner than advertised. Yet Tehran immediately began reconstructing missiles, and the residual lever of the Strait of Hormuz stayed on the table. Reconstitution — not the single raid — is the grammar of these wars.

MLF 2026 24 Strategy & Heritage • Ukraine turned unmanned systems into a national industry and used long-range drones to impose costs on Russian oil refining, airfields, and logistics. Russia, absorbing staggering losses, still pushed forward and made significant territorial gains — a grim demonstration of industrial stamina. • Op Sindoor settled the immediate account. It did not settle the next decade. Precision strike and a layered air-defence grid imposed a pause — but they do not guarantee that ammunition, interceptors, drones, and political stamina will hold if the next pause fails. Space Ukraine and West Asia have abolished the idea of a safe hinterland. If a target can be seen, it can be hit, and almost everything can now be seen. Ukrainian has demonstrated that small drones, hidden and moved by civilian means, can reach bases that were once thought to lie in the strategic rear. • Ukrainian long-range drones have flown more than a thousand kilometres to punish refineries and force Moscow to pack Air-defence batteries around the capital and a handful of political sites— thereby thinning the shield everywhere else. • Israel hunted launchers, radars and production nodes across a country the size of a subcontinent. This was to ensure that the missile storms against Israeli cities would be smaller than the arsenal Iran had built to unleash. Factories, airbases, bridges and even political residences are now a part of the extended battlespace. Punjab has always been the sword-arm of India. It is also now among its most exposed roofs. Depth on the map is not depth in the electromagnetic and unmanned age. The May 2025 the Ministry of Defence recorded 863 drone intrusions along the Western Front in 2025 and brough down 237 of them, many carrying narcotics or warlike stores. Most were launched from a thin strip of Pakistani Punjab into a thin strip of Indian Punjab. Dispersal, deception, hardened shelters and a civil-defence habit are no longer luxuries. They are the price of a transparent frontier. Price • For seventy years Air Defence was a contest of quality: a few expensive missiles against a few expensive aircraft. Ukraine and West Asia have broken that bargain. A one-way attack drone can be built for a few tens of thousands of dollars; a Patriot or Arrow interceptor costs orders of magnitude more. Russia now fires such drones by the thousand each month. The Ukrainian Air Force said in Sep 2026 that it still intercepts more than ninety per cent of propeller-driven Shahed-type drones, but only about sixty per cent of the newer jet-powered versions (Reuters, 22 Sep 2026). The residual fraction, multiplied night after night, is enough to punish power plants and cities. Ukraine’s reply has been to industrialise the cheap side of the ledger: long-range strike drones against Russian industry, and interceptor drones priced in the low thousands of dollars. Fighters can do this work, but they burn airframe hours doing what guns, electronic warfare and expendable interceptors should do. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 25 Strategy & Heritage • West Asia tells the same story from the defender’s chair. In the twelve-day Iran–Israel war of June 2025 the IDF said Iran fired some 550 ballistic missiles and about a thousand drones; roughly nine in ten of the missiles that mattered were intercepted (IDF figures, June 2025). The shield held in large part because Israel also hunted the archer. Pre-emption of launchers is the only way to keep the intercept bill payable. A magazine that must fire a million-rupee missile at every cheap drone is a magazine that will run out. High-end systems are not obsolete. They are the last layer, not the first. These three lessons—time, space and price—meet in a fourth, which is the quiet protagonist of both distant wars and of Op Sindoor. Offensive strike gets the headlines. The campaigns that held, or failed, were decided by integrated air and missile defence: sensors, command networks, cheap inner layers, and the political nerve to fire or to withhold an expensive interceptor. Russia never won the air over Ukraine. That failure, more than any single Ukrainian innovation, is why a larger army has been condemned to attrition. Israel absorbed salvos that would have broken a thinner shield, then used the breathing space to hunt launchers. Ukraine survived by turning air defence into a national industry. When Pakistan answered to Op Sindoor, India’s layered grid—long-range systems, medium-range missiles, Akash, guns and the Integrated Air Command and Control System—was what kept a four-day crisis from becoming a four-week one. The collision is silent only until the debris falls in a Punjab field. Seven Lessons for India 1. Treat Air Defence as Strategy - it is no longer a belt around bases; it is the grammar of national survival. The cheap inner layers must thicken — guns, jammers, spoofers, electro-optical trackers, and domestic interceptor drones — so that S-400, MRSAM, and Akash are reserved for the ballistic and cruise threats that justify their cost. This means: • Mass production of low-cost counter-UAV systems. • Distributed EW nodes across Punjab, Rajasthan, and J&K. • AI-driven sensor fusion that treats every quadcopter as a data point, not a panic. Air defence must shift from “protecting assets” to shaping escalation. 2. Assume there is no Rear - Aviation, logistics, fuel farms, and command nodes must be dispersed, disguised, and rotated. This requires: • Decoy airfields, false signatures, and mobile shelters. • Redundancy in communications, including hardened fibre, microwave relays, and satellite backups. If drones can reach Chandigarh, then Chandigarh must behave like a forward base. 3. Do not Confuse May 2025 with a Short-War Doctrine - Op Sindoor proved India can win a four-day exchange. It did not prove India can sustain a four-month one. A short war is a political choice; a long war is a logistical test. India must build: • Magazines that survive the first week. • A dual-use industrial base that can surge production of drones, interceptors, EW kits, and precision munitions. • A mobilisation doctrine that integrates private industry, state police, and civil defence. Short-war success is not long-war readiness.

MLF 2026 26 Strategy & Heritage 4. Keep Expensive Weapons but do not Swat every Quadcopter - High-end platforms must be reserved for high-end threats. Every time a ₹300 Cr system engages a ₹30,000 drone, strategy loses. Need for: • Tiered engagement rules that push cheap threats to cheap counters. • Domestic drone interceptors as the first responder. • APS-style perimeter bubbles around critical bases. Atmanirbhar Bharat, in this reading, is not a slogan of pride — it is a slogan of endurance. 5. Build Political Stamina for a Long War: Modern Wars are fought not only in airspace and factories but in the public mind. Need to prepare for: • Sustained information warfare and psychological operations. • Civilian resilience, from blackout protocols to supply-chain continuity. • A political consensus that understands the difference between tactical losses and strategic outcomes. 6. Treat Reconstitution as a Permanent Activity: Ukraine and Iran have shown that the side which reconstitutes faster shapes the next phase of war. India must: • Pre-contract surge lines with private industry. • Stockpile critical components (propellants, chips, seekers, EW modules). • Train units in rapid repair and redeployment, not just initial deployment. Reconstitution is not a wartime improvisation; it is a peacetime discipline. 7. Integrate Space and Cyber as First-hour domains - The next conflict will begin with attempts to blind, jam, or confuse India’s sensors. India must: • Harden satellites, diversify orbits, and deploy rapid-launch replacements. • Build cyber-resilient command networks that degrade gracefully under attack. • Fuse space, cyber, and air defence into a single decision loop. If the first hour is lost, the first week becomes harder. About the Author Sh. Rajinder Paul Singhal, Additional Director General (Arbitration) (Retired), Military Engineer Services, an alumnus of the Punjab University with B.Tech (Hons.), served the nation in the MES for thirty-nine long years. He contributed to the drafting and issue of SSR-2020, governing military engineering works, and to the strengthening of civil–military infrastructure across operational and peace stations. He later held the appointment of ADG (Arb) and superannuated in 2023. The author is the presiding officer in multiple cases in Arbitral Tribunals and is an avid reader of history, Indian foreign policy and Military strategy. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 27 Strategy & Heritage SILENT WINGS, LOUD IMPACT “The battlefield has always favoured the soldier who observes the sky.” (Shaman S Shetty) A Different Battlefield From scouts and observation posts to aircraft and satellites armies have always tried to see farther and act fast and first. The battlefield has now acquired a new set of eyes - small, hard to detect and often silent. Drones have moved from being niche surveillance tools to a central part of modern warfare. A small, unmanned aircraft can watch an area, send live information to troops on the ground and even carry a weapon of its own. Low cost and wide availability make drones relevant even at the edge of the battlefield. Much of this relevance is simple economics. A modern battle tank costs several million dollars. A strike drone capable of destroying that tank can cost only a few thousand. This gap is forcing military planners everywhere to ask an uncomfortable question: how much should be spent to defeat a threat that is itself so cheap to build and so easy to replace? The real story though is not the machine. It is how drones are shrinking the space between seeing something and acting on it. A Century in the Making Unmanned flight over a battlefield is not new. The idea dates back to 1918 when the American Kettering Bug tried to fly itself into a target. For decades afterward drones stayed in a supporting role - target practice for gunners and reconnaissance. The first real hint of combat value came in 1982, when Israel used drones as decoys over Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, tricking Syrian air defences into switching on so that manned aircraft could destroy them. The 1991 Gulf War used drones mainly for reconnaissance and artillery spotting. A decade later the armed Predator over Afghanistan closed the loop entirely one aircraft that could find, fix and finish a target without a pilot ever leaving the ground. Even then most militaries still treated this as a tool for hunting insurgents not for fighting other armies. The Moment of Reckoning If there was a single moment the world understood that warfare had changed, it was the 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Over 44 days, Azerbaijani forces used Turkish strike drones and Israeli loitering munitions to destroy Armenian tanks, artillery and air-defence systems. This was not a raid against lightly armed fighters. It was a conventional army being taken apart from the air. Planners everywhere took note. Ukraine from 2022 scaled the lesson up beyond anything seen before. Ukraine: The War That Rewrote the Rules No conflict has stretched the drone’s role further than the war in Ukraine and none has done more to change how militaries around the world now think about the future of combat. What began in early 2022 with Ukraine’s Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s picking off Russian armoured columns on open roads - grew within two years into something far larger: the world’s first full-scale drone war, fought by both sides, day and night, along a front line stretching over 1,000 kilometres.

MLF 2026 28 Strategy & Heritage Core Technical Characteristics of an FPV Drone • Airframe — Mostly 5–7 inch quadcopters, sometimes fixed-wing for longer range. • Speed — 100–150 km/h, enough to chase vehicles or hit moving infantry. • Range - Standard RF-controlled: 1-3 km, Boosted: 5-10 km, OFC guided: 10-20 km, immune to jamming. • Flight Time — 5–10 minutes, battery-limited. • Cost — Basic FPV: $200–600, Industrial Ukrainians: $300–400, EW-hardened/AI variants: $1,000 – 5,000+. • Payload — 200 g–1 kg warheads: RPG-7 PG-7VL, Anti-personnel grenades, Custom shaped charges • Guidance: RF link: 2.4 GHz / 5.8 GHz (Express LRS, Crossfire, DJI O3), FPV goggles: sub-30 ms latency, 480p –1080p feed, Fiber-optic guidance: no RF emissions → no EW vulnerability. • Night Capability — Starlight sensors for 24-hour operations. Russia answered with mass launching of Iranian-designed Shahed drones at Ukrainian cities and power stations, turning cheap, slow-flying loitering munitions into a tool of long-range bombardment. Ukraine, in turn, pushed in a different direction: small, cheap, First-Person-View (FPV) drones, flown by a soldier wearing video goggles and steering the machine, often no bigger than a dinner plate, into a tank, a trench, or a group of soldiers. By 2023, FPV drones had gone from a volunteer, hobbyist effort to a formal pillar of Ukraine’s war effort. Costing as little as $400–700 each, they could be built on a production line or in a garage, and a single well- aimed strike could destroy a vehicle worth a hundred times as much. NATO officials later estimated that FPV drones costing under $1,000 had destroyed roughly two-thirds of all Russian tanks lost in the war — a statistic that, on its own, explains why every army is now watching this war so closely. The scale of this build-up is difficult to grasp. Ukraine now has more than 500 drone manufacturers, ranging from large state-backed producers to small workshops assembling machines by hand, and produced over two million drones of all types in 2024 alone. This is no longer a workshop hobby bolted onto a conventional army - it is a parallel arms industry, built at war speed. The contest has also become a race between the drone and its jammer. As Russian electronic-warfare units learned to jam the radio signals that FPV drones rely on, Ukraine responded with fibre-optic drones that trail a thin cable back to the operator instead of using radio at all, making them almost impossible to jam, and with early AI-guided drones that can lock onto and track a target even if the video link is cut. Neither side has found a lasting answer to the other — and that, more than any single weapon, is the real lesson of this war: every advantage in this contest is temporary. The war has not stayed in the air. Ukraine’s navy, badly outgunned on paper, has used unmanned surface boats packed with explosives — most famously the Magura V5, a low, fast, remote-controlled speedboat — to strike Russian warships in the Black Sea. Ukrainian forces used these sea drones to help sink or badly damage several vessels of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, including the missile corvette Ivanovets and the landing ship Caesar Kunikov, forcing the rest of the fleet to pull back from the Crimean coast altogether. A navy that had almost no warships of its own pushed back a much larger one, largely with machines that cost a fraction of a single missile. Faced with a threat this large and this constant, Ukraine set up a dedicated Unmanned Systems Forces branch in 2024 — the first time any country has made drones a full, separate arm of its military, alongside the army, navy, and air force. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 29 Strategy & Heritage Op Sindoor Op Sindoor gave the Indian armed forces their own experience of a serious unmanned aerial threat, with Air-Defence and Counter - UAS systems employed against attempted drone intrusions across multiple locations along the Western Front. Its significance went beyond numbers. It showed how a handful of small, cheap systems can force a defender to stay alert across a wide front simultaneously — and that no single counter-drone system, however capable, can handle every kind of threat on its own. Detection, identification, jamming, physical interception, and fast decision-making all have to work together, layered rather than relied upon individually. It also confirmed something India’s planners had been arguing for years: indigenous capability matters. A country that depends on imported systems for its counter-drone shield is one modification away from being caught out. India’s response did not begin with Op Sindoor — it began with watching others fight. Nagorno-Karabakh first prompted a serious rethink among Indian planners; Ukraine reinforced it. Since then, India has fielded Israeli-origin platforms like the Heron and Heron TP for endurance and surveillance, while pushing indigenous programmes such as Tapas and a growing family of smaller tactical drones. On the counter-drone side, the threat of swarms and loitering munitions has driven systems built for rapid, short-range interception, alongside networks meant to fuse radar, electro-optic, and Electronic Warfare data into one picture a commander can actually use. There has also been an organisational shift — toward dedicated drone formations and a proposed unified Drone Force meant to end the old pattern of each service buying and training on its own. Op Sindoor was the first real test of this preparation. That it held up is reassuring. But one validated response is not the same as a lasting edge; the technology will have moved on again before the lessons are fully written. What Comes Next The next phase of this contest is about scale and autonomy, not just numbers. Swarming — groups of drones coordinating rather than operating alone — is already being demonstrated. A layered defence built to stop one or two intruders may struggle against fifty arriving together. As jamming improves, drones that depend on a constant link to a human operator become vulnerable the moment that link breaks, pushing militaries toward machines that can finish a mission with the link cut, and toward harder questions about how much control stays with a human. Another direction is the blending of manned and unmanned systems — an unmanned aircraft flying alongside a crewed one, extending its sensors and weapons while keeping the pilot out of the most dangerous part of the fight. This is no longer a research-lab idea; it is being built into next-generation air combat programmes now.

MLF 2026 30 Strategy & Heritage For India, the priorities are concrete: one joint doctrine for unmanned systems instead of three separate service approaches, real investment in swarm and counter-swarm technology, Electronic Warfare built to survive a jammed environment, and enough trained operators to match the size of the inventory being bought. None of this is speculative. Much of it is already being tested in Ukraine’s skies. The only open question is whether India will be ready when it arrives here. Conclusion The drone has entered almost every serious conversation about modern warfare. Its size is small; its impact is not. From Ukraine to West Asia and now through Op Sindoor, the message is consistent. The battlefield is becoming more transparent. Decisions are moving faster. The distance between seeing a threat and acting on it keeps shrinking. Technology alone will not decide the next war. It will still take leadership, judgement, and courage to use what these machines see. But the officer who understands that technology, and the soldier who knows how to employ it, will hold an advantage the other side cannot easily buy back. The drone will not replace the soldier. It will change what is expected of him, and of the commander who has to decide in seconds what an aerial picture is actually telling him. The wings may be silent. Their impact will not be. About the Author Shaman S. Shetty is a serving officer of the Indian Armed Forces. An engineering graduate in Biotechnology he further honed his strategic acumen with an MBA in Supply Chain and Logistics equipping him to address the complexities of military logistics & resource optimization. He is presently pursuing a PhD in Supply Chain Management undertaking research aimed at enhancing logistics efficiency and resilience in supply chain. His multidisciplinary background spanning life sciences, business strategy & academic research reflects a committed approach toward strengthening the operational and strategic capabilities of the Armed Forces. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 31 Strategy & Heritage SIACHEN: A FRONTLINE ABOVE THE CLOUDS, AND BEYOND IMAGINATION (Brig Gurwant Baghiana, Retd) Siachen (Sia Chin) in Balti language means the ‘rose family’ and ‘found in abundance’. This portrays a romantic image of the place though nothing could be further from the truth, with the weather being brutally harsh and the geography treacherous to say the least. With these unforgiving attributes, it is no wonder that the Siachen Glacier earned the sobriquet of a place where ‘Courage and Fortitude’ rule. Factoring in an implacable enemy it has been aptly labelled the ‘Highest Battlefield in the World’ and is the largest complex of glaciers outside the polar regions. ‘OP MEGHDOOT’ was launched in 1984 and the Indian Army has been in occupation of the glacier since then, to include all the dominating heights and passes astride the Saltoro Ridge. In this sector the line separating the opposing forces is known as the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL,110 kilometres long) thus distinguishing it from the LoC and the LAC. In 2002, my unit was earmarked for a six-month stint on holding the icy heights of the glacier ranging from 12000 to 21000 feet plus and in temperatures varying from - 20 to - 45 degrees centigrade. Operationally the conflict had stalemated years ago with the interse distance between satellite posts being in the range of a few hundred meters. Kinetic exchanges were based on long range direct firing weapons like machine guns, automatic grenade launchers and indirect firing weapons like mortars and artillery. This frozen conflict thus had little scope for change in the status quo by physical assault, though a vigil had to be maintained. The aim spelt out for the tenure was gaining moral ascendancy over the enemy while ensuring security of one’s positions and troops. The credit for defining an unambiguous aim goes to the Commanding Officer which accorded ample latitude to the Company Commanders, to further translate it into executable actions. This directive style of command is rare, especially in such challenging operational areas and asks for great clarity of thought and courage of conviction to promulgate. Junior leaders improvised and innovated to achieve moral ascendancy by denying the enemy freedom of action to maintain his defences/habitat, interdicting his routes of maintenance and inflicting casualties with well-timed fire assaults.

MLF 2026 32 Strategy & Heritage Herein, the then recently acquired Handheld Thermal Imagers (HHTIs) from Israel played an instrumental role by enabling an almost 24-hour observation of the enemy, identifying his vulnerabilities and facilitating their targeting. It was no wonder that the unit performed exceptionally well and was conferred with the prestigious Chief of Army Staff’s Unit Citation for this tenure. The glacier requires specialized training, equipment and clothing to withstand subzero temperatures, sustain the super high altitude and negotiate the challenging terrain fraught with avalanches and crevasses. This is ensured by a rigorous three-week training capsule imparted in the Siachen Battle School for all inductees, followed by a stringent test, passing which was mandatory for induction. The conditions that prevail here impose a debilitating effect on the human body and individual tenures are restricted to three months with almost everyone reducing in BMI, despite the authorization of high calorific special rations. The critical deployments being in smaller numbers, multitasking was the norm with soldiers trained at operating medical equipment, radio sets and snow scooters other than their survival and combat gear. Commanders must be mentally geared up for surprises - contingency planning and flexibility in execution helps. Setbacks can manifest in the form of enemy inflicted casualties or terrain/weather induced ones. In the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation existing at the satellite posts, occupied by less than a section strength and led by young officers or select JCOs played a critical role. The orchestration of fire assaults would involve direct firing weapons from the satellite posts, mortars from the company headquarters and artillery from the battalion headquarters. The whole glaciated valley would reverberate with the thunder of explosions; giving an impression that the whole valley would implode. Casualties inflicted on the enemy were discerned from his behaviour and signal intercepts. The enemy would always plan a reprisal either in the same company complex or in a neighbouring location where he was comparatively better placed – the enemy did display a fair amount of aggression. Weapons were set on fixed lines during good visibility on each other’s vulnerabilities so these spots could be engaged at night or even during bad weather on detection of the slightest movement or even randomly to impose caution. Where maintenance routes to the forward locations were under the enemy’s observation and open to his interdiction, movement had to be planned deliberately especially keeping the phases of the moon in mind. These routes being along razor sharp ridge lines were secured with ropes to facilitate movement and a few hundred metres would take the better part of an hour to negotiate. Suffering a battle casualty at a forward post was a big challenge due to tenuous lines of communication overlaid with combative behaviour of the enemy. Casualty evacuation, in the midst of active hostilities, can pose a major decision dilemma as the process may itself entail suffering additional casualties, a truly testing time. Not ‘Delegating a Crisis’ was a major lesson learnt and arrival at an appropriate decision necessitated an intimate understanding of the terrain constraints and the prevailing operational circumstances. The criticality of logistic support cannot be overemphasized and required diligent planning and meticulous implementation. Specialised clothing provided is amongst the best in the world with multiple layers being used to trap ones’ own body heat to stay warm. The fingers and toes require extra attention, provided by two layers of gloves and three layers of special socks and specialized boots. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 33 Strategy & Heritage Air maintenance is critical for logistics and casualty evacuation, and helicopter pilots have been seen to evacuate casualties from postage sized helipads with only a few minutes break in total whiteout weather conditions, an exceptional feat indeed. Kerosene is literally the “elixir of life” - required for melting of ice for drinking water, cooking food, warming habitat, basic ablutions. Shaving and bathing are luxuries which are not affordable on the glacier and spending a hundred odd days without bathing is an accepted norm, however repugnant it may sound. The same set of clothes also sustain one, barring a rather infrequent change of undergarments. Communication with one’s family was the usual handwritten service letter and at times through the JWD Cable link to the Battalion HQs where one was patched to the STD PCO. This was indeed a rarity as other matters took precedence and mostly messages were relayed home through the STD PCO NCO. The advent of the satellite phone in the sector generated a lot of interest amongst all ranks as it assured a direct link home, something unbelievable when one is deployed in the most inhospitable terrain and weather in the world. Battery chargers for the HHTIs was another lesson in equipment management. This was scaled at one charger for three HHTIs and the deployment of the HHTIs being one per company the charger was perforce located at Battalion HQs. The charged batteries had to be flown in Cheetah helicopters and further moved to the satellite posts by link patrols. They rapidly discharged during this arduous journey and had to be kept warm with hot water bottles, literally being cradled like a small baby, for maintaining its charge. The night of our de-induction is vividly imprinted in one’s memory (most of the movement is undertaken at night to lessen the threat of triggering avalanches). The temperature was minus 42 degrees centigrade and fortunately the weather was clear as I led the last batch of my company. Being roped up together and taking a frequent pause to break the icicles that form between one’s moustaches and beard due to freezing of one’s breath, we negotiated the distance to Base Camp within 24 hours. The same route having been covered in 14 days during the induction which catered for the acclimatization schedule. My head bows in prayer for the one soul who didn’t join us during the de-induction and also for the pioneers who secured the Siachen Glacier in 1984 for the country, with very rudimentary logistic support, braving the unknown and in the face of a pernicious enemy. About the Author Brig Gurwant Baghiana (Retd) belongs to the elite 1/5 Gorkha Rifles (FF) that he Commanded. He is an aspiring soldier scholar and a fledging writer. He has done his MA in Political Science, MSc in Defence and Strategic Studies, MMS from Osmania University and MPhil from Punjab University in National Defence and Strategic Studies.

MLF 2026 34 Strategy & Heritage THE ART OF WARFARE MODERN WARFARE (Maj Gen Harvijay Singh, SM) hato vā prāpsyasi svargaḿ, jitvā vā bhokṣ yase mahīm tasmād uttiṣ ṭha kaunteya, yuddhāya kṛta-niścayaḥ Translated as: O son of Kuntī, either you will be killed on the battlefield and attain the heavenly planets, or you will conquer and enjoy the earthly kingdom. Therefore, get up with determination and fight: as stated in The Bhagavad Gita Chapter 2, Verse 37. War is most difficult to explain and understand, Modern War more so. Modern war is increasingly shaped by technology, networks, algorithms, and precision systems, yet victory still belongs to the side that adapts faster, thinks better, and sustains greater resolve. Technology changes the character of war; it perhaps does not change its enduring nature. Modern War Needs Support from Technology, but Technology Cannot Substitute for Morale and Strategy; Vietnam 1965-73, the United States fielded the most advanced machines of the era—B-52 bombers, helicopters, sensors, and overwhelming firepower—yet it could not convert those tools into victory because the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese fought with iron morale and a clear, patient strategy. Technology delivered tactical wins, but the side with stronger will, unity, and strategic clarity shaped the final outcome – a war powered by machines but was still decided by very motivated men and women. Ukraine – 2022, Russia entered the conflict with clear technological and numerical superiority—more troops, more armour, more aircraft, and a deep inventory of long-range missiles—yet Ukraine blunted this advantage through high morale, tight societal cohesion, and a decentralized, adaptive strategy that leveraged drones, communications, and small-unit initiative - modern war …. but still steered by morale and strategy. Faced with a larger and better-equipped Russian military, Ukraine's soldiers and citizens compensated for material disadvantages through superior morale, initiative, and strategy. Drones, precision weapons, and communications systems proved decisive only because they were matched by a determined people willing to fight for their survival. Modern War Demands Creative Insight, but it has no Patience for Romance or Sentiment. Only Ideas that Survive Contact Matter. • Modern war rewards imagination, but it is ruthless toward illusion. Before the Ukraine war, the tank was a decisive battlefield factor - armoured formations broke through enemy lines and exploited deep into the rear – did not happen for the Russians in their 2022 assault on Kiev. Tank formations broke up due Rasputitsa (Gen Mud). Stranded tanks were by hit drones, precision artillery, loitering munitions, and anti-tank missiles. Russia tried to use tanks according to old concepts and suffered heavy losses. Later adaption and not the romantic vision of armoured warfare helped the tank survive - tanks operating with Drone reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare support, dispersed formations, Camouflage and Cages. Tanks and Attack Heptrs were extensively used during the Battle of Avdiivka and were responsible for breaking up the stronghold successfully. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 35 Strategy & Heritage • In the Iran-Israel conflict, drones challenged Air-defence systems much as FPV drones challenged armour in Ukraine. Drones were employed not merely as strike weapons but also as tools to saturate, expose, and degrade sophisticated Air-defence networks. Cheap unmanned systems forced defenders to expend expensive Interceptors and revealed the vulnerability of even advanced missile-defence architectures – unlike the tanks, they have yet to adapt. The lesson is the same: no weapon system retains permanent dominance. Any capability that fails to adapt eventually becomes a target rather than an advantage. Modern War Rides Mathematical Precision, but Precision can Sometimes Render it Mechanical and Rigid: • The US Iran War o Over-reliance on precision airpower. US and Israel target lists were mathematically optimized – they however on 28 Feb 2026 in one of the first attacks of the war, hit a girls' elementary school in Minab, southern Iran, - around 165 people – most of them girls aged about 7 to 12 were killed (excuse – intelligence was not updated). o Advanced sensors, AI-assisted targeting, satellite intelligence, missile-defence networks, and precision-guided munitions enabled strikes with remarkable accuracy. Yet the conflict also highlighted that precision can create a false sense of predictability and control. Intelligence can be incomplete, targets can move and adversaries can adapt. Precision is indispensable, but when commanders become captive to models, target lists, and algorithms …… flexibility and judgment may suffer. War remains a contest between thinking opponents rather than a technical problem to be solved. • The Ukraine War From 13 - 16 Oct 2026 (as reported), Drone Warfare saw an exciting tango with Electronics and the Electro Magnetic (EMG) Spectrum – chaotic enough to affect Ukraine’s deep strikes into Russia and its Air Defence Interception capability. Starshield/Starlink speed restriction were imposed on Ukrainian military terminals - Ukrainian officials reported that Starshield terminals mounted on fast- moving drones started losing connectivity above roughly 160 km/h, affecting medium-range strike and interceptor drone missions.

MLF 2026 36 Strategy & Heritage o Starlink is a commercial SpaceX satellite internet constellation used by Ukraine for battlefield communications, logistics, intelligence flow, and defensive drones. It provides broadband connectivity via 1000s of LEO satellites and ground terminals. o Starshield – A military grade, US govt controlled version of Starlink, built on the same constellation but equipped with enhanced encryption, secure communications, Earth observation payloads, and mission specific sensors. It is designed for national security operations, with the Pentagon as its primary customer. Ukraine uses Starshield for offensive drone missions, long range strike coordination, and sensitive intelligence transmission. It is the backbone of Kyiv’s deep strike and interceptor drone ecosystem. o Speed caps cut drone links mid-flight, Bandwidth throttling killed real time targeting, missions were cancelled, interceptors failed & Drone units left blind without warning. Drone units reported connection drops for 10–20 secs at just 110–120 km/h, make drones “harder to control” – a point to note: a drone losing link for even 5 secs at speed becomes blind, drifts off course, or crashes. Frontline units reported significant drops in internet speeds & interruptions in communications with HQs - slowdown reduced the ability of Artillery & Drone teams to receive updated target data and threat alerts. Starlink/Starshield disruption hit mid-range strike missions, Air-defence intercepts, and front-line logistics. Units reported multiple mission failures. o Signals specialists received “No warnings’, causing immediate mission failures. Proposition for Drone Warfare: The most effective way to defeat a drone may be to disrupt the network that enables it rather than destroy the drone itself. Measure possible are increased latency, loss of connectivity, or degraded performance, through either electronic or cyber means. War Needs Broad, Disciplined Thinking. Yet, the Window for Decision is Measured in Heartbeats, Not Theories. • There is no formula for winning wars. If one existed, every war college would teach it and every army would employ it. History's great captains succeeded not because they found a permanent answer, but because they recognized the right answer for their own time, battlefield, and enemy. • Military institutions study war through doctrine, history, models, and theory because war is too complex to be understood through instinct alone. Broad and disciplined thinking provides context, purpose, and direction. Yet battle itself unfolds at a different rhythm. Opportunities appear without warning and disappear within moments. Commanders rarely enjoy the luxury of complete information, perfect intelligence, or lengthy deliberation. They must observe, orient, decide, and act while events continue to unfold around them. • The paradox is that war requires years of study but rewards seconds of judgment. Strategy may be developed in classrooms and headquarters, but success often depends on the ability of leaders and soldiers to recognize fleeting opportunities and act before an adversary can respond. The side that adapts faster frequently gains an advantage disproportionate to its material strength. • History repeatedly demonstrates that there is no permanent formula for victory. Every generation enters war with theories, assumptions, and preferred methods. The battlefield tests them relentlessly. Some survive; many do not. The most successful commanders are therefore not those who possess fixed answers, but those who combine disciplined understanding with the ability to make timely decisions amid uncertainty, friction, and chaos. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 37 Strategy & Heritage What Has Fundamentally Changed? 1. The battlefield is everywhere - Cyber networks, financial systems, and public opinion are now contested spaces. Russia’s 2014 Crimea Operation is a textbook Multi-Domain Campaign. 2. The combatants are no longer just soldiers - Hackers, influencers, corporations, militias, and regulators all shape outcomes. The Ukraine conflict is the clearest modern case where non-soldiers became decisive combatants across multiple domains. 3. The objective is not just territory but influence and dependency - The goal is to erode institutions, fracture alliances, and control narratives. China uses Belt and Road loans, port investments, and trade leverage to make Southeast Asian states economically dependent. 4. The tempo is persistent, not episodic - Grey‑zone operations run continuously, below the threshold of open war. China’s approach to Taiwan is one of the clearest demonstrations of persistent, continuous grey-zone activity — a campaign that never escalates into open conflict but never stops either. 5. The decisive weapon is ambiguity - Attribution is difficult; escalation is risky; deniability is strategic. North Korea’s 2014 Sony Pictures Hack (Ambiguity as a Weapon). The Sony Pictures cyberattack is one of the clearest demonstrations of ambiguity used as a strategic weapon. This aligns with the observation that modern adversaries “prefer to operate in the grey zone between war and peace,” using drones, IEDs, cyberattacks, and propaganda to impose costs without triggering full‑scale retaliation. About the Author Major General Harvijay Singh is a third-generation officer, his two sons are also army officers. He holds the degree of BTech and Master’s Degree in Management Sciences. He is a Certified Ethical Hacker and Cyber Forensic Investigator. He is Member and Historian of the Punjab Military Literature Society, Chandigarh. He has written books on Indo Pak Wars: 1948, 1965, 1971 - Battles That Made History, Indo Pak War 1947-48 (for Part D) and Gallant Soldiers: Short Stories of Big Deeds. He has also written Monographs on Grey Zone Warfare and Lessons Learnt from the Ukraine War. He is a regular contributor to Magazines on Military Strategy and Technology and a speaker on current Global Military events. He is the winner of ARTRAC Scholar Warrior Badge for writing on Contemporary Military Thinking and Strategy.

MLF 2026 38 Strategy & Heritage DHOL, GURBANI, AND GHARANAS: THE LIVING ARTS OF PUNJAB (Ruchi Dubey) I still remember the first time a dhol beat hit me in the chest rather than the ears — at the wedding of a junior colleague from my team, held in a small town outside Ludhiana, long before I understood anything about raags or gharanas. The drummer that evening was an old man with a limp who could barely walk to the procession, yet the moment the stick touched the skin he seemed to shed thirty years. That is the strange power of Punjab's musical inheritance: it does not live in books or archives so much as it lives in bodies, passed hand to hand, breath to breath, generation to generation. Four threads run through this inheritance — the dhol, gurbani kirtan, the martial ballads of the dhadd sarangi, and the classical gharanas — and together they say more about who Punjabis are than any history textbooks. The Dhol Does Not Ask Permission Where a Dhol enters a space; it announces itself loud and clear. At Vaisakhi, when the wheat stood gold and ready, it was the Dhol that told a village it was time to stop working and start celebrating — and out of that celebration grew Bhangra, a dance whose every jump and shoulder shrug is really just a translation of drum strokes into movement. Ask any Dholi and he will tell you that the dance does not lead the drum ……. the drum leads the dance ……. always has. Weddings, remains a Dhol’s domain. A baraat without a Dhol is not really a baraat; it is just a group of relatives walking somewhere. The drummer is the one who turns a walk into an arrival – the Dhol does not just accompany a celebration — it argues, teases, and negotiates its way through one. When Scripture Refuses to Stay Silent Gurbani is a different kind of sound altogether — quieter, but no less physical in what it does to a room. Every hymn in Gurbani carries a raag. Guru Nanak travelled with a rebab player, Bhai Mardana, and from that partnership grew a conviction that has never really left Sikh worship: that words about the divine are not complete until they are sung. That conviction has survived five centuries mostly through people, not manuscripts — through Ragis who spend years learning not just notes but a kind of humility that cannot be taught from a page. Walk into a gurdwara at dawn almost anywhere in Punjab, or for that matter almost anywhere Punjabis have settled in the world, and you will hear it: harmonium, tabla, a voice rising somewhere between prayer and performance. It is, perhaps, the most stubbornly unhurried thing left in modern Punjabi life. Everything else moves fast. Kirtan still keeps its soothing pace. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 39 Strategy & Heritage The Dhadd Sarangi — Voices of the Battlefield If the Dhol belongs to the open field and Gurbani to the Gurdwara's inner sanctum, the Dhadd Sarangi belongs to a stranger, more martial space in between — one where devotion and valour are the same emotion. The Dhadd is a small hourglass-shaped hand drum, cinched at the waist and tucked into the crook of one arm, its pitch bent and released by squeezing the lacing as it is played. Paired with it is the Sarangi, the familiar bowed string instrument, its voice closer to a human cry than any other instrument in the subcontinent. Together, a Dhadd and a Sarangi player — usually working as a small ensemble known as a Dhadi jatha — perform vars: long narrative ballads recounting battles, martyrdoms, and acts of extraordinary courage, delivered in veer ras, the classical sentiment of heroism. This is not incidental music. Tradition credits Guru Hargobind Sahib, the sixth Guru, with formally inviting Dhadi singers into Sikh worship, appointing bards to sing vars that reminded the community of valour even as they gathered for prayer — a deliberate braiding of the spiritual and the temporal that Sikhi calls Miri-piri. That braiding is nowhere more visible than at the Akal Takht in Amritsar, the seat of temporal authority facing the Harmandir Sahib, where dhadi jathas have long been a living part of how the community remembers its history: not as dates in a textbook, but as verses that make a listener's pulse rise before they have fully understood why. Even today, around Gurpurabs and days commemorating the Sahibzadas and other martyrs, Dhadi jathas travel from gurdwara to gurdwara, carrying vars that have been passed down almost entirely by the mouth and ear. The Gharanas — Music You Cannot Learn Alone If the Dhol belongs to the open field, Gurbani to the Gurdwara, and the Dhadd sarangi to the space where the two meet, the Gharana tradition belongs to something far more private — a teacher's home, a small room, years of repetition that outsiders rarely see. Punjab gave classical music some of its most formidable lineages, none more famous than the Patiala Gharana, shaped in the nineteenth century under royal patronage by Ali Bakhsh and Fateh Ali Khan, known for taans delivered at a pace that still leaves audiences slightly breathless. Punjab's tabla players developed a style of their own — heavier, more open-handed, unmistakably shaped by the same rhythmic bluntness you hear in a Dhol beat. Musicologists will tell you that is not a coincidence. Long before Patiala's court singers gave the gharana its name, there was Tappa — a form born not in any palace but on the backs of camels. Tappa originated from the folk songs of the camel riders in Punjab, quick and undulating phrases that mimicked a camel's swaying gait. It travelled a long way to reach the royal gharanas — from a desert track to a durbar hall — and once there, court musicians refined its restless ornamentation into one of the most demanding vocal forms a gharana-trained singer can attempt. Even now, it carries the dust of its origins in every bent note. What makes a gharana hard to describe to someone outside it is that it is not really a style you can pick up from a recording. It's closer to an apprenticeship in temperament. A student might spend a decade near a teacher before being trusted to perform alone, absorbing not just which notes to bend but when silence matters more than sound. No syllabus captures that. Only proximity does.

MLF 2026 40 Strategy & Heritage Four Traditions, One Street In real life, of course, none of these stays neatly separated the way an essay likes to pretend. A baraat led in by Dhol might pass a gurdwara and pause for a Shabad before moving on to a reception where a gharana-trained singer performs past midnight. A village mela might have folk drumming by afternoon and a Kirtan Darbar by evening, the same crowd sitting through both without thinking there is anything unusual about it. Somewhere in the same week, a Dhadi jatha might be singing vars at a Gurpurab a few streets over, their veer ras carrying an entirely different mood than the wedding drum or the evening raag yet drawing from the same well of devotion. Even Punjab's soldier-poets blur the lines — men who fought and also composed verse that later found its way into folk repertoire. Sacred, martial, and festive music in Punjab were never separate rooms. More like one long corridor with doors left open. What is Worrisome None of this is guaranteed to last. Bhangra has gone global, which is wonderful, except that the Dhol's rich vocabulary of strokes is often reduced, in remixes, to two or three loop able beats. Gharana training depends on unpaid years of apprenticeship at a time when very few young people can afford to give a decade to anything that doesn't pay rent. Kirtan is probably the safest of the three older traditions, protected as it is by the institutional life of the gurdwara, but even there, simpler harmonium renditions are slowly edging out the more demanding classical raag structures once expected of a trained ragi. The Dhadi tradition may be the most quietly vulnerable of all — there are simply fewer jathas learning vars by ear each year, and a var half-remembered is not really a var at all. None of these traditions will vanish overnight. They'll just thin out, quietly, unless someone insists on teaching them properly. Conclusion The Dhol, Gurbani, the Dhadd sarangi, and the Gharanas together tell a story that written history alone cannot capture — a story of a borderland people who turned rhythm into resilience, scripture into song, valour into verse, and mastery into inheritance. To hear a Dhol at Vaisakhi, a Shabad at dawn, a var sung by a Dhadi jatha outside the Akal Takht, or a taan trained through decades of a gharana's discipline is to hear Punjab's long negotiation with survival, faith, and pride rendered audible. As the region continues to sit at the crossroads of strategic pressures old and new, its living arts remain a quiet but stubborn reminder that heritage, properly tended, is itself a form of strength. And there is so much more to it, as the golden mustard fields of Punjab sing in their own tunes. Listen carefully, and you'll find the Dhol sounding on a glorious, star-studded night, reverberating long after the dancing stops; mornings with the trees swaying to Gurbani; a Dhadi's var carrying the memory of a battle two centuries gone; and somewhere, everywhere, music echoing throughout the soul of Punjab. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 41 Strategy & Heritage INDIAN ARMY: A NATION BUILDER THROUGH CHARACTER, LEADERSHIP & INDUSTRY (Brig PK Sharma) Both India and Israel were born amidst conflict and have faced persistent security challenges since independence. While armed forces are often viewed merely as a financial burden, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have remained central to Israel's national security and development. Over the decades, both nations have emerged as significant economies, but their approaches to defence preparedness and the role of the military have differed considerably. This comparison examines how the IDF and the Indian Army have contributed to national security and nation-building in their respective countries. IDF While Israel is firmly anchored in the Western world in terms of its values, it remains unique from many other Western democracies on account of its geopolitical situation and the central role that its military plays in so many areas of the country’s life. The founding of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948 was swiftly followed by a combined attack by five Arab armies (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq). This was to be the first real test of the IDF – a test which they ultimately emerged victorious. Ever since Israel has lived through numerous wars, military operations and other violent conflicts, such as the Arab uprisings in the Palestinian territories (known as the First and Second Intifadas). The IDF have earned for themselves a name for being dedicated, motivated and professional, they have also been a part of Nation building through Defence Industry and world class education provided by the IDF. IDF & Society A recent poll indicated that 91 per cent of the Jewish population trust their armed forces. This high level of esteem may be attributed to the fact that Israel feels the need of a powerful army for the survival of the community, the important societal role played by the IDF and the fact that they have emerged victorious from every war fought against other nations. Reflecting the philosophy of David Ben Gurion the founder of IDF, the Israeli Army is as “The People’s Army”, a citizen’s army that transcends social differences. An apolitical, national institution, in which every segment of heterogeneous Jewish immigrant society would be represented. Not just as an instrument of defence, but as an institution with a duty to undertake social tasks and help shape the new Israeli society. Most Israeli Jews consider the wars fought by the IDF as “wars of necessity”, forced upon the country because of repeated attacks by its Arab neighbours. Because of the existential importance of the IDF to the very survival of the State of Israel, there is a great willingness on the part of the Jewish Israeli society to contribute to and make personal sacrifices in defence of their country. Military service is seen as one way every individual can contribute to the existence of the state. It is described as a melting pot, a human mosaic, of different cultures and a catalyst for integration and communication, between the various sectors of society. Youth of Israel take great pride in serving the Nations Army.

MLF 2026 42 Strategy & Heritage The Defence industry of Israel is a strategically important sector and a large employer; it is not merely a major supplier for the IDF but the IDF itself has contributed many products. A major exporter of military equipment, three Israeli companies were listed on the 2017 ‘Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’ index of the world's top 100 arms-producing and military service companies: Elbit Systems, the Aerospace Industries, & RAFAEL. The Defence industry in Israel is a strategically important sector and a large employer within the country. Israel's defence industry comprises over 150 companies with annual revenues exceeding US$3.5 billion, exporting advanced military systems primarily to the U.S., Europe, India, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. IA as a Parallel Policies of the Government/Bureaucratic lobbyist were such that Indian Armed forces faced ‘neglect’ almost immediately post-independence. This could be seen as a result of the legacy of ‘British Indian Army’ being split into IA & Pakistan Army quite unlike the evolution of the IDF which was formed out of a necessity by ‘Volunteers’. Since Independence, India has faced multiple conflicts. The 1947-48 war halted Pakistan's initial aggression but left the issue of PoK unresolved. The 1962 Sino-Indian War exposed serious political and strategic shortcomings, resulting in a major setback. The Indian Army performed creditably in the 1965 war and achieved a decisive victory in 1971. In 1999, it successfully recaptured occupied territory during the Kargil conflict. These wars underscored the enduring reality that India, situated in a region of competing interests, requires a strong and capable military force. While the IDF has evolved into a ‘People’s Army & a Nation builder’, the IA finds itself on the back foot as far as ‘Funds, Indigenisation, Modernisation/ Equipment & Status’ are concerned. The disparity in weaponry, self-reliance and support from the Government are starkly different. Potential Capability of Contribution by IA Towards Nation Building Across the board the IA is a large employer in every field, be it engineering, armament, aviation, medical, logistics, electronics & communication, catering, education and others, deployed in remote areas, development of infrastructure (Border Areas) has been a primary contribution, connecting communities and inculcating pride of character in a secular army has perhaps been a distinctive achievement where all ‘Indians’ stand shoulder to shoulder for the defence of India. If the IDF contributes through education, so does the IA with over 37 Army Public Schools, 249 Army Pre- primary schools across India and 12 professional institutions of higher education, apart from the 142 defence training centres/academies in the country. IDF gets to enrol the best students in a mix of conscription and volunteers. Conscription is 24 months for females and 36 for males at the age of 18 - the short tenure has begun to hurt the IDF. The IA being voluntary gets a percentage of youth from those who qualify an exam. Manpower in the IA/IDF gets leadership roles at various levels in challenging situations which demand improvisation/out of box thinking and innovation. These young men and women get to experience an India which is not seen by the Bureaucrats, Politicians and Industrialists. They are aware of the needs in these areas. In India, absorption in corporate jobs is difficult and in Government Organisations virtually nil. IDF on the contrary is a certificate for jobs! M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 43 Strategy & Heritage IA & Society. Indian Armed Forces continue to be among the most trusted institutions in the country. According to Ipsos IndiaBus Trust in Institutions Survey (2025), they ranked highest in public trust - 56% of respondents rating them as the nation's most trusted institution. In contrast, political parties and politicians ranked among the least trusted. The military's professionalism, integrity, and selfless service continue to inspire confidence, while concerns over corruption and governance contribute to lower trust in many civilian institutions. India's defence exports have grown dramatically from ₹10,500 crore in 2018-19 to ₹23,622 crore (US$2.76 billion) in FY 2024-25, reflecting the success of the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative and increasing global acceptance of Indian defence products. Exports now reach around 80 countries, with both the private sector and DPSUs playing a significant role. While still below Israel's export levels, India has emerged as a rapidly growing defence exporter with ambitious plans to achieve ₹50,000 crore in annual defence exports by 2029. While Israel accelerated its defence self-reliance after 1967 and developed a globally competitive defence industry, India began a major push towards defence indigenisation only in the last decade. Despite significant progress under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative, India continues to import critical military technologies and platforms from countries such as Russia, France, Israel, and the United States. Although India's dependence on imports has declined, it remains one of the world's leading arms importers while simultaneously emerging as a growing defence manufacturer and exporter. A long-standing concern in India's defence management has been the large civilian support structure relative to the fighting force. Approximately 14.5 lakh military personnel are supported by nearly 4 lakh civilian employees across organisations such as MES, DRDO, defence accounts, quality assurance, estates, and logistics establishments. Critics argue that this creates a significant administrative and financial burden on the defence budget, reducing the proportion of resources available for combat capability and modernization. Concluding Thoughts The current security challenges posed by China and Pakistan highlight decades of underinvestment in military preparedness and indigenous capability development. Frequent emergency procurements reflect shortcomings in long-term planning, while surveillance and technological capacities require further strengthening. At the same time, the nation has yet to fully harness the Armed Forces' immense potential in nation-building, education, skill development, and fostering national character. Drawing lessons from Israel's success in developing world-class indigenous systems such as the Merkava, Uzi, and Iron Dome, India must view its Armed Forces not only as defenders of the nation but also as a strategic national resource contributing to technological advancement and national development. About the Author Brig PK Sharma was commissioned into the JAT Regt in his father’s footsteps. Has served as Instructor Class C. Has held staff appointments as BM, Col GS, BGS. Commanded his Bn from the Amritsar Border Op Rakshak to Arunachal, Assam, Nagaland and J&K. He has had the singular distinction of Raising NSG. A keen sportsman, he has played Cricket for East Zone & Army, captained his team for Services Basketball and been the Councillor for Command Zone Golf. He now actively pursues his hobbies of Painting, Angling for sport and golf.

MLF 2026 44 Strategy & Heritage Victory on the OP Hill 3 Nov 1965 (Col Tejinder Singh Dhaliwal) Cease Fire of 1965 Indo Pak War was declared on 25 Sep. Hostilities however did not end in Jammu & Kashmir even after the Cease Fire. Minor skirmishes and Artillery duels continued to disturb the peace. During this period, a significant offensive was planned by the Indian 25 Infantry Division in Mendhar Sector of the Jammu region. It involved capture of a mountainous enemy defended area called OP Hill located on the Chuni Nar feature with a height of 1524 metres (5136 Feet) South-West of the road Mendhar- Balnoi. The high feature looked deep into Indian Territory and dominated the road. It was captured by Pakistan in Aug on the sly and gradually built into a strong battalion defended area. Due to its dominant location, it was an excellent site for bringing down observed fire, hence the name OP Hill (Observation Post Hill). Pakistan used the feature well and stopped all day movements along road Mendhar-Balnoi. This made maintenance of an Indian Battalion located at Balnoi difficult …... OP Hill would have to be captured despite the Cease Fire. A battalion attack was launched on Night 6/7 Oct ….. it was repulsed with assaulting battalion suffering heavy casualties. A plan was made to launch a bigger deliberate attack to dislodge the enemy. The Chuni Nar feature is a complex labyrinth of rocky outcrop and numerous nalas with heavy undergrowth and steep rocky sides. The going for the attacker was tough while the defender was protected by rocks, bunkers, mines and wire obstacles along all approaches. Automatics were well sited and coordinated to protect vulnerable areas; the feature was well organised for all round defence. A Brigade attack by 120 Infantry Brigade of 25 Infantry Division was tasked for the. The objective was isolated from its reinforcement and replenishment bases. A simultaneous multi directional attack was launched. The Plan: Phase 1 on D Day. o 2nd Battalion, the DOGRA Regiment to capture Twin Pimples and Black Rocks from the Northeast. Attack with two companies up. Delta Company capture Black Rocks and Charlie Company plus a Platoon of Alfa Company capture Twin Pimples. Bravo Company Reserve to Delta Company and Alfa Company less a Platoon to Charlie Company. o 5th Battalion, the SIKH LIGHT INFANTRY Regiment to capture White Rocks from the South. Attack with two companies up. Bravo Company to capture White Rocks and exploit upto OP Hill if successful. Charlie Company to capture area between White Rocks and OP Hill. o Alfa and Delta companies to remain in reserve. Phase 2 on D+1 Day. o 7th Battalion, The SIKH Regiment to follow behind 2 DOGRA to capture Jungle and OP Hill. Attack with one company up. Alfa Company to capture Jungle Hill. Bravo Company to remain in reserve. D Day was on the cold night of 2 Nov. The assault began with Delta Company of 2 DOGRA crossing the Start Line on the Night of 2/3 Nov. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 45 Strategy & Heritage The attacking platoon under Captain Gautam Mubayi came under intense fire. Unfazed Mubayi pushed on regardless and attacked the enemy position. The enemy opened up with a LMG; Mubayi sensing the danger to his troops charged it with grenades unmindful of his personal safety and silenced the threat. Motivated by his assault, his platoon quickly finished the task of establishing a foothold for the battalion attack. Captain Mubayi was however fatally wounded and succumbed to his injuries on the objective. “Battles in the mountains are extremely tough, and the defender always has an advantage. This is where good leadership of our officers and the steadfastness of the DOGRA Soldiers carried the day for us” Lt Gen Sher Amir Singh, a Captain during the war and later Colonel Commandant of DOGRA Regiment The remaining company continued the assault despite stiff resistance and suffered heavy casualties. A platoon under 2nd Lieutenant DS Sauran went for the ‘Tit’ using a difficult and unexpected route from behind the enemy who was surprised and abandoned the post in a hurry leaving behind many casualties. At this stage Delta Company had also suffered heavy casualties and was relieved by the reserve Bravo Company. The assault on the ‘Black Rock’ recommenced with a fresh vigour. The enemy was equally determined and a fierce hand to hand combat ensued. The brave Dogras finally prevailed, and the objective fell at 4.30 AM on 3 Nov. 2 DOGRA had fought resolutely and defeated a well-entrenched enemy. They lost three Officers, one JCO and 59 ORs and over 120 wounded. A very heavy prize but a remarkable victory. The DOGRA Battle cry of ‘Jwala Mata Ki Jai’ will ring in the mountains of Mendher for times immemorial. Captain Muyabi was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. The Battalion was also awarded three Sena Medals and seven Mentioned in Despatches. 5 SIKH LI was a newly raised battalion with a very young officer …. only one company commander had more than three years’ service! This was a big challenge for the CO - he decided to lead the assault himself. The assault started with Bravo and Charlie Companies from the unexpected and difficult Southern approach in platoon waves along the narrow ledge completely surprising the enemy - the approach was heavily mined. The attack was launched before midnight on 2 Nov with throaty battle cries ‘Bole So Nihal, Sat Sri Akal’. The enemy threw everything - heavy artillery fire and automatics to break the assault. When Naik Darshan Singh of the leading section hit a minefield, he stepped into it and said, “Let us die and clear the way for others to succeed”. His left foot was blown off but he crawled forward, his left forearm too was severed but the resolute young Sikh was unstoppable. In a final gallant act, he took a hand grenade, pulled out its safety pin with his teeth and lobbed it into an enemy bunker silencing the MG. The task done, he closed his eyes on the field of glory, Darshan was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra (Posthumous) . Darshan’s valiant act was like a stone in the water, the ripples spread wide and quickly; the attackers rushed towards the objective with greater vigour. An aggressive hand-to-hand engagement followed, and the Pakistani position was captured under the command of Lt Col Sant Singh. (Later Brigadier Sant Singh) who moved from bunker to bunker motivating his men. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra and Sub Piara Singh of the battalion was awarded the Vir Chakra (Posthumous).

MLF 2026 46 Strategy & Heritage About the Author Colonel Tejinder Dhaliwal was commissioned into and commanded 15 BIHAR. He has vast experience in CI Operations, LAC and Instructor experience at Academies. He is presently CHIEF CO-ORDINATOR & INCHARGE of Military Literature Festivals in Punjab. Having tasted victory, Sant Singh decided to exploit the advantage and ordered the capture of three more objectives which were assigned to 5 SIKH …. the gamble paid off and OP Hill was captured. The hills reverberated with the sound of the success signal "Reveille on the Bugle". The battalion had won a bloody victory against tremendous odds and was awarded two Maha Vir Chakras, One Vir Chakra (posthumous) four Sena Medals and five Commendation Cards. 7 SIKH was initially detailed to capture Jungle and OP Hill by 6 AM on D Plus 1 Day. Accordingly, the battalion formed up at about 10 PM on 01 Nov and waited for the success signal from 2 DOGRA at the end of Phase 1 of the Brigade attack. Phase 1 got delayed due to stiff enemy resistance. Daylight was fast approaching and time was a crucial factor. 7 SIKH was ordered to rush Jungle Hill and capture it before daylight. 7 SIKH launched the assault with one company up. Alfa Company moving towards the Jungle Hill – they faced stiff resistance and heavy fire. The reserve Bravo Company following behind also faced a heavy barrage of Artillery Fire. Unfazed, the Sikhs continued with their assault. The defenders would not easily leave their secure defences and fought hard to hold ground. The attack continued well into the morning, and the objective was finally captured on 3 Nov, the company lost 21 brave soldiers. Meanwhile 5 SIKH LI had also exploited towards OP Hill which was captured by them after a long seven hours battle. Captain Sansar Singh was awarded the Vir Chakra. The remaining task allotted to 7 SIKH had already been completed by 5 SIKH LI. OP Hill complex was won by the brave soldiers of 2 DOGRA, 5 SIKH LI and 7 SIKH in a fierce battle which was marked by intense and bloody hand to hand combat. All battalions were awarded the Battle Honour OP Hill. Brigadier Sant Singh fought in World War II, 1948, 1965 and 1971 Indo Pak Wars. He won a Maha Vir Chakra in 1965 and 71 wars. Mendhar cantonment has been named ‘Sant Singh Lines’ in his honour. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 47 Strategy & Heritage LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARBAKSH SINGH, PADMA VIBHUSHAN, VIR CHAKRA: SAVIOUR OF PUNJAB IN THE 1965 INDO PAK WAR (Maj Jagatjeet Singh) Jodhe Vade Munaare Jaapan Khet Vich. The Warriors Look Like High Minarets in the Battlefield. Guru Gobind Singh Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, was born in 1913 in Badrukhan village, Sangrur, Punjab. He graduated from Government College Lahore, and was commissioned into 5th Battalion, the Sikh Regiment in 1935. He was a graduate of the 1st course at the Indian Military Academy (IMA). The general had to his credit the incredible feat of having led on the battlefront a Platoon, a Company, a Battalion, a Brigade, a Division, a Corps and an Army in his eventful career. A rare achievement by all counts. He commanded a company of 5 SIKH in 1942 in Malaya against the Japanese. During the withdrawal from Kuantan on 5 Jan 1942, Capt Harbaksh Singh drove into a Japanese ambush and was injured seriously. He suffered head injuries and was in a military hospital when the allies surrendered Malaya and Singapore to the Japanese in 1942. Then followed three years of a miserable existence as a Japanese Prisoner of War. Released at the end of the war in 1945, he remained in hospital for some months due to problems brought on by malnutrition and inhuman conditions in Japanese POW camps. Two years later, he was to see operations in Jammu and Kashmir. It was during the Kashmir operations that Harbaksh Singh, then a Lieutenant Colonel, proved his mettle. On 22 Oct 1947, Pakistani-backed tribesmen crossed into Jammu and Kashmir. The enemy soon reached the outskirts of Srinagar. When Lieutenant Colonel Dewan Ranjit Rai of 1 SIKH fell to enemy bullets at Baramulla, Harbaksh volunteered to command the battalion. He was however, posted as Deputy Commander 161 Infantry Brigade operating in this sector. There were reports of over 3000 raiders concentrating at Shalateng near Srinagar in preparations for an attack on Srinagar. He was tasked to conduct the battle against the belligerent raiders. He attacked Shalateng on 22 Nov with two infantry battalions, 1 SIKH and 1 (Para) KUMAON placed under his command with a troop of armoured cars of 7 CAVALRY. He in a brilliantly planned and executed operation, routed the enemy leaving 472 enemy dead on the field. The threat to Srinagar was over. If the city had fallen, it would have been one of the greatest disasters in Indian military history. This decisive battle, involving 1 SIKH and 4 KUMAON Battalions, proved to be a turning point in the war and a feather in the turban of their commander. On 12 Dec 1947, on hearing about the heavy casualties suffered by 1 SIKH, he proceeded to Uri and took over the command of the battalion voluntarily, shedding a star from his rank (Command of a Battalion was then by a Lt Col. He brought back the battalion to Srinagar and rehabilitated it. However, even before the rehabilitation was complete, the battalion was called out to fight the enemy who had crossed the snow-clad Pharikian Gali and had occupied Handwara in the Kashmir Valley. He led the truncated battalion and after a series of battles, the battalion drove away the enemy from the valley. In 1948 he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier and took over command of 163 Infantry Brigade.

MLF 2026 48 Strategy & Heritage On 17 May 1948, he was tasked to clear the enemy out of the Jhelum valley, up to Muzaffarabad and Domel. Brigadier Harbakhsh Singh's offensive, was a triumph. • Tithwal fell on May 23. In six days, he had in a lightning move secured all territory from Handwara to the Kishanganga River over the Nasta Chun Pass and Tithwal after fighting aggressive battles. If this outflanking move was supported with aerial supplies, the brigade would have reached Muzzafarabad. After the Kashmir operations, he went on to serve as the Deputy Commandant of the Indian Military Academy and in 1957 attended a course at the Imperial Defence College, UK. In Jan 1959, he became the first foreign officer to go on attachment with German Army's first division to be raised after its devastation in World War II. Later, he commanded 5 Mountain Division, 4 Corps and 33 Corps and finally took over as the Western Army Commander in Nov 1964. War clouds gathered once again in 1965, India and Pakistan went to war on 6 Sep after Pakistan started infiltrating troops in Kashmir. The Western Army area of operations included Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. The infiltrators in Kashmir were quickly beaten back; these operations included the capture of Hajipir Pass. In response, Pakistan launched operation Grand Slam in Jammu and made some initial gains in the Akhnoor Sector of Jammu. To ease pressure in the Jammu sector. The Indian Army launched a major offensive in the plains of Punjab in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor and was soon knocking on the doors of Lahore across the Ichhogil Canal. The Western Army offensive across the Punjab border went well till Pakistan counter attacked 4 Infantry Division at Khemkaran south of Amritsar. 4 Division comprising 62 and 7 Brigades, lost two-and-a- half battalions in a matter of hours and was virtually overrun. The situation on 7 Sep afternoon was grim, while the Division fell back to the village of Asal Uttar and hurriedly prepared a defended sector based on the surviving three-and-a-half battalions and 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 49 Strategy & Heritage On 9 Sep, Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division, whose existence was not known to India, attacked the Division. The plan was to attack and overrun the weak 4 Division while a strong combat group was to cut the lines of communication of both 4 Division, 7 Division on the Barki Axis and finally cut Grand Trunk Road at the Beas Bridge, effectively sealing off 11 Corps HQs and Corps troops from the south, and lines of communications of 15 Infantry Division in one sweep. The situation was extremely grim and consequently Delhi panicked. At 2.30 AM. on 9 Sep, the Indian Army Chief, General JN Chaudhary, called and spoke to General Harbaksh and after a heated discussion centred around the major threat that had developed, the Chief ordered the Army Commander to withdraw 11 Corps to hold a line on the Beas River close to Jalandhar city. General Harbakhsh Singh refused to carry out this order. The next morning, 4 Division stabilised the position, as the day ended, Pakistani 1 Armoured Division was devastated, despite overwhelming infantry superiority and the support of Patton tanks far more advanced than that of India. India won the battle, which was one of the turning points of the war. "The Fighting Fourth" along with 2 Armoured Brigade captured about 97 Pakistani tanks in destroyed, damaged or intact condition. Pakistan President Ayub Khan had boasted that the obsolete Indian Sherman and Centurion tanks of World War II vintage would be no match for Pakistan’s state-of- the-art American Patton tanks, and, dreamt of a blitzkrieg that would take his forces to Delhi. His dream was however shattered and Asal Uttar became a graveyard of the Pattons. The foolhardy plans had failed to take into account the inspiring leadership, bravery and resourcefulness exhibited by the outgunned Indian Army. When the Chief visited Western Command Headquarters at Ambala that afternoon on 10 Sep, the crisis was over and the subject was not discussed. Had General Harbaksh Singh carried out these orders, not only would have half of Punjab been under Pakistani occupation but the morale of the Indian Army would have been rock bottom, affecting operations in other theatres as well. “Had it been anyone other than Lt Gen Harbaksh, he would not have been able to resist the orders of the army chief. And had those orders been carried out, we would have had to surrender Amritsar, and the road from Beas onwards to Delhi would have been open because there would have been general panic.” Captain Amrinder Singh, former Chief Minister of Punjab and Aide de Camp to Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh during the war. General Harbakhsh was a straight talking, no-nonsense, professional soldier. He was quick to give credit wherever it was due but brooked no interference with his command and himself gave his undivided loyalty and full support to his subordinates. Despite being in command of a large Army in combat covering an extensive area from Ladakh to Rajasthan he was never seen to be under stress. He was always on the move and guided and inspired his command. When operations against the enemy were at their highest pitch and the Indian army was capturing one after the other Pakistani position, severely mauling enemy’s much boasted of armour (The Patton Tanks), he had the uncanny habit of turning up at the most unexpected spot.

MLF 2026 50 Strategy & Heritage This served the dual purpose of putting heart into his men and striking terror into the ranks of his foe, who soon started to fear every one of his moves. The general was honoured with a Padma Vibhusan, a rare honour for a soldier. “It has been my experience that he who plays ‘safe’, lies low and awaits developments, usually comes off second best. The commander who always tries to dominate a situation, is eager to seize the fleeting opportunity and is prepared to pounce on the enemy with inspired audacity usually carries the day, however adverse the circumstances of the battle”. Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 51 Strategy & Heritage MURAT OF THE KHALSA: SARDAR HARI SINGH NALWA (Maj Abhaijeet Singh) In over two and a half centuries that Afghanistan has existed, Britain, Russia and USA have tried to subdue the Afghans but to little or no success. Time and again they have thrown out invaders. It was only Hari Singh Nalwa who achieved the impossible and kept them under control. In 1881, The Editor of Tit Bits Newspapers in Britain compared many great generals of the past: "Some people might think that Napoleon was a great General. Some might name Marshall Hendenburgh, Lord Kitchener, General Karobzey or Duke of Wellington etc. And some going further might say Halaku Khan, Genghis Khan, Changez Khan, Richard or Allaudin etc. But let me tell you that in the North of India a General of the name of Hari Singh Nalwa of the Sikhs prevailed. Had he lived longer and had the sources and artillery of the British, he would have conquered most of Asia and Europe …." Hari Singh Nalwa (1791-1837) was the Commander-in-Chief of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and one of the most honoured Sikh Generals. He will always be remembered for his ability to triumph over Afghanistan. He was not only a capable General but an administrator of high calibre, a man of very high and noble character, a scholar, a farsighted person endowed with unique quality of self-sacrifice. Hari Singh was born in 1791 to S Gurdial Singh Kumedan of Gujranwala and Mata Dharm Kaur. His maternal grandfather, Sardar Hardas Singh, was killed when Ahmed Shah Abdali attacked Amritsar in 1762. Hari Singh was brought up by his maternal grandmother Kashibai, the daughter of Sadashivrao Bhau, Commander- in- Chief of the Maratha forces during Third Battle of Panipat. He was tutored well in administration by Kashibai, and in use of artillery-muskets by Fateh Khan Gardi, the personal bodyguard of Sadashivrao Bhau. Maharaja Ranjit Singh held a fair every year on the day of Basant Panchami. Many brave and valiant soldiers exhibited their skill of arms and riding and were suitably rewarded by the Maharaja. In the fair of 1805, young Hari Singh also displayed his skill at handling horses and weapons. The Maharaja was impressed and blessed him with a gold necklace and enrolled him as his Aide-de-Camp. Later Saradar Hari Singh got an opportunity to go hunting with the Maharaja. Suddenly a lion pounced upon him, Hari Singh held the lion by his jaws and smashed it on the ground. Before the lion could recover, he unsheathed his sword and dismembered the lion’s neck from his body. The Maharaja saw the scene from very close quarters. He was pleased and S Hari Singh was appointed the Commander of Sher Dil Regiment, which had a strong force of 800 horsemen and infantry soldiers. For his ability to kill a lion with his hands, he became famous as Nalwa (Legendary king Nall was known to kill lions with his bare hands). S Hari Singh Nalwa rapidly grew in the hierarchy to become a General in the Sikh Army and Commander - in - Chief along the Afghan Frontier (1825-1837). He had many conquests to his credit, the important ones being Kasur (1807), Sialkot (1808), Kashmir (1814), Multan (1818), Peshawar (1827). He was the Governor of Kashmir (1820-21) Hazara (1822-1837) and Peshawar (1834-37). Haripur city, tehsil and district, in Hazara, North-West Frontier Province, Pakistan, is named after him. He beat the Afghans at Attock Fort and held Afghanistan, something which even the British failed to do.

MLF 2026 52 Strategy & Heritage Although the relationships between the Sikhs and British had been defined by a treaty of 1809, yet a series of successes of the Khalsa army during 1818 to 1827, in the form of victory over Multan, Kashmir and Peshawar had caused much concern to the British. S Hari Singh Nalwa played a crucial role in all these battles and was often injured. The British were restless at the ever-increasing glory of the Khalsa Raj. Baron Charles von Hügel an Austrian nobleman who travelled through Punjab (1830s) writes: “Hari Singh was a highly intelligent man with an open mind. His manner of conversation was very attractive. He was fully aware of the state of kingdoms in Europe and well understood the functioning of East India Company.” During the Governorship of Kashmir, Hazara and Peshawar, he showed remarkable skill in the organisation of administration of these provinces known to be notorious. His overall reforms, encouragement to handicraft, expertise in collecting revenue and sorting out of miscreants won him great acclaim. Above all, Hari Singh was a unique marksman, and his deftness of handling horses was unparalleled. His attitude towards the troops was very cordial and brother like. He would share roasted grams with them and never let his high rank be a barrier between him and the men he led in battle. That is why his soldiers loved him. After every battle, he would organise the medical care of the wounded and provide his soldiers with much deserved good and sumptuous meal. Sir Lepel Griffin author of the book ‘The Punjab Chiefs (first published 1865) compared Hari Singh Nalwa to Marshal Murat — Napoleon’s famed cavalry commander and called Nalwa the “Murat of the Khalsa”, highlighting: his fearless cavalry leadership, his shock-action battlefield style, his ability to inspire troops and his decisive presence in frontier warfare. This comparison is one of the strongest British acknowledgments of Nalwa’s martial brilliance. Hari Singh Nalwa annexed Peshawar in 1834, a defining moment in Indian history. The city had last been held by an Indian ruler, Raja Jaipal of the Hindu Shahi dynasty, who fought Mahmud of Ghazni until his defeat in 1001 AD. For the next eight centuries, despite immense expenditure and repeated campaigns, no Indian power could hold Peshawar against the Afghans. It was Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa who finally achieved what had eluded empires: he captured and secured Peshawar for the Khalsa Raj, establishing firm frontier control from Jamrud to the Khyber. His authority left such an imprint that the Yusafzai Pathans remembered his name with awe for generations, a testament to the only Indian commander who halted centuries of Afghan incursions and held the gateway of India with unshakeable resolve. According to Olaf Caroe a British administrator and historian of the North-West Frontier: Pathan women used to scare their babies by saying "Hariya Raghle" (Hari Singh has come). “Hariya Raghle” stands as one of history’s most striking tributes: when a warrior’s reputation alone could silence a frontier valley. Hari Singh Nalwa controlled the Kyber Pass from 1807 to 1836; a military achievement with few parallels. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 53 Strategy & Heritage Jamrud Fort Fort Over 40,000 Afghanis attacked Jamrud fort on 25 April 1837. 800 Sikhs holding the fort fought valiantly and took a very heavy toll of the enemy. On 29 April, the west side wall of the fort got breached. A lady volunteer courier Bibi Harsharan Kaur carried a message for Hari Singh Nalwa who was ill with high fever. Against the advice of his ‘Vaid’ (Doctor) he marched with 5000 soldiers and reached Hari Singh Burj close to Jamrud before dawn. From here, he divided his army in three parts. And before dawn of 30 April, attacked the Pathans from three sides. The Pathans were surprised and it caused a great chaos in their rank and file ….. the inmates of the fort were overjoyed ….. many Pathans started absconding from the battlefield. The Army of Hari Singh fought aggressively and by evening had cleared all opposition. The enemy started retreating towards Kyber Pass with the Sikhs chasing them. Hari Singh also joined the chase. Night was falling by now. Nalwa had hardly gone some distance from Khyber Pass when a stray bullet hit his bodyguard, Ajaib Singh. He fell from his horse and died. Hari Singh Nalwa stopped; two more bullets were fired and these hit Nalwa. These bullets were fired by a Pathan who was with the band of soldiers of Hari Singh, the Pathan was killed by the Sikhs. The wounds of the bullets on the body of S Hari Singh were very deep. He was unable to stay in the field anymore and came back to the fort. His wounds were stitched up but the shards of armour that he was wearing had caused deep penetration into his veins When he saw his end near, Hari Singh Nalwa gave instructions not to disclose his death till help from Lahore arrived. Soon after, he went into eternal sleep. Although Sikhs won the battle, but it caused absolute silence. This was the last battle of Khalsa with the Pathans. India was never invaded by them after this day. The Sword of General Hari Singh Nalwa is kept at the Sikh Regimental Centre at Ramgarh. Some famous towns, gardens, fort and shrines associated with Hari Singh Nalwa include the following: • Gujranwala & Haripur (1822–23): Gujranwala - a fortified administrative hub, Haripur - named after him; first planned town in the Hazara region, laid out with straight streets and a fort at its centre. • Fort Sumergarh: Built by Nalwa after the Sikh conquest of Peshawar in 1834. Original name “Sumergarh” was later replaced by the Afghan term “Bala Hissar,” meaning “High Fort.” • Katas Havelis (Salt Range): Two grand havelis constructed beside the sacred pools of Katas Raj, blending Sikh architecture with local stonework — a mark of Nalwa’s patronage of heritage sites. • Hari Singh ka Bagh (Amritsar and Srinagar): These gardens were his personal estates and rest houses, reflecting his taste for order and aesthetics even amid frontier campaigns.

MLF 2026 54 Strategy & Heritage Youth, Our Strength (Akshita Vishal) “ कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते र् ा फलेषु कदाचन।” “You have a right to perform your prescribed duty, but you are not entitled to the fruits of action.” Bhagavad Gita, Chapter 2, Verse 47 (translated) Throughout history, the idea of duty has occupied a central place in India’s civilisational ethos. The Bhagavad Gita, in Chapter 2, Verse 47, teaches that one must remain committed to the performance of one’s duty without being attached to its fruits. While rooted in a broader philosophical understanding of righteous action, this principle finds a compelling parallel in military service, where responsibility, discipline, and commitment to a cause greater than oneself often demand courage and sacrifice. The sacrifice Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal, Param Vir Chakra, (Posthumous) brings this ideal into sharp focus. At just 21 years of age, during the Battle of Basantar in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, the Young Officer displayed exceptional courage in a fierce tank battle. Despite being seriously wounded and his tank coming under enemy fire, he continued to engage enemy armour. He ultimately made the supreme sacrifice on 16 Dec 1971 and was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra, India’s highest wartime gallantry award. His actions stand as a powerful reminder that the responsibilities of military service are not defined by age, but by the courage, conviction, and sense of duty with which they are fulfilled. His example also raises a larger question: what prepares a young individual to shoulder responsibilities of such magnitude? Beyond courage and patriotism, military service demands professional competence, sound judgement, emotional maturity, and an informed understanding of national security. These qualities make the relationship between India’s youth and its armed forces a subject of enduring strategic significance. A nation’s strength is not determined solely by the magnitude of its arsenal, the sophistication of its technology, or the extent of its territorial influence; it is equally defined by the character, competence, and convictions of the generation entrusted with its future. The Youth: A Strategic Asset Military service has traditionally represented courage, sacrifice, integrity, and devotion to the nation. Yet its significance extends beyond the battlefield. The armed forces cultivate accountability, teamwork, resilience, decisiveness, and the ability to function under demanding circumstances. These attributes are indispensable not only to military effectiveness but also to the broader development of responsible citizens and capable leaders. Nevertheless, a mature understanding of military service must transcend romanticised portrayals of the uniform. The profession demands sustained physical and intellectual preparation, emotional maturity, adherence to institutional discipline, and an unwavering acceptance of responsibility. Patriotism may inspire an individual to aspire to military service, but professional competence and character determine the capacity to fulfil its obligations. Consequently, the central challenge is to bridge the distance between aspiration and preparedness. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 55 Strategy & Heritage From Aspiration to Service: The National Cadet (NCC) occupies a particularly important position in developing familiarity with military values, collective responsibility, and national integration. According to a Ministry of Defence statement presented in Parliament in December 2025, NCC enrolment reached 1,558,199 cadets that year. Girls accounted for 633,804 enrolments, representing approximately 40.68 per cent of the total. These figures demonstrate the considerable reach of an established youth organisation and the substantial participation of girls within it. The imperative, therefore, is to strengthen the bridge between awareness and informed career choice. Schools and colleges can contribute through credible career guidance, interactions with serving personnel and veterans, leadership programmes, and greater awareness of the educational, medical, physical, and professional requirements of military careers. Such initiatives should communicate both the opportunities and the obligations associated with service. Equally important is the need to recognise that military aspiration must be accompanied by realistic preparation. An informed aspirant understands that selection is competitive, training is demanding, and service entails responsibilities that extend far beyond personal ambition. A Changing Military, A Changing Generation: The relationship between youth and the military is also being reshaped by changes in recruitment, technology, and the nature of warfare. The Agnipath scheme, approved by the Union Cabinet in June 2022, introduced a recruitment framework under which Agniveers serve for four years. Under the announced policy, eligible individuals may apply for enrolment in the regular cadre, with up to 25 per cent of each specific batch considered for retention, subject to organisational requirements, applicable policies, and prescribed selection criteria. Youth engagement must therefore be founded on informed choice rather than unexamined enthusiasm. Women and the Expanding Horizon of Service: An equally significant transformation concerns the widening participation of women in military training and leadership. The induction of women cadets into the National Defence Academy (NDA) in Aug 2022 marked an important development in the evolution of military education. In May 2025, the first batch of 17 women cadets graduated from the academy. This milestone represents more than a change in recruitment. It reflects the gradual expansion of opportunities for young women to pursue military careers through established training institutions. In June 2026, the Ministry of Defence announced that the first batch of women cadets trained at the NDA had been commissioned into the armed forces following the completion of their respective service-academy training. Such developments reinforce an essential principle: Military leadership must be cultivated through competence, professional standards, and merit. Expanding access to military education enables a wider pool of talent to contribute to national defence. The responsibility now lies in sustaining meaningful opportunities, appropriate institutional support, and professional environments in which capable personnel can fulfil their potential.

MLF 2026 56 Strategy & Heritage For young Indians, these developments also challenge outdated assumptions about who can aspire to serve. The uniform represents a professional commitment to the nation, and opportunities to undertake that commitment should be understood through the applicable standards and requirements of each service. The Technological Imperative The contemporary security environment increasingly demands expertise that extends beyond conventional military disciplines. Cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, data analysis, aerospace engineering, communications, and other advanced technological fields are becoming increasingly relevant to national defence. Young people entering these domains can contribute through scientific research, engineering, innovation, and specialised military roles. Their familiarity with emerging technologies can be valuable, provided it is complemented by rigorous training, sound judgement, ethical responsibility, and an understanding of the security implications of technological change. This evolution also calls for closer collaboration among educational institutions, research organisations, industry, and the armed forces. Greater awareness of defence-related scientific and technical careers can help young people understand that national security is supported not only by personnel in uniform but also by the wider ecosystem of research, engineering, logistics, medicine, and strategic analysis. Beyond the Uniform: A Shared Responsibility The responsibility for strengthening the youth–military relationship cannot rest exclusively upon the armed forces or aspiring recruits. Families, educational institutions, civil society, policymakers, and the media all have a role in cultivating an informed understanding of military service. Schools should encourage intellectual curiosity, physical well-being, civic responsibility, and ethical leadership. Public discourse should recognise military service without reducing it to spectacle or celebrity. Veterans can help younger generations understand the professional realities of service, while educational institutions can promote serious engagement with military history, constitutional responsibilities, international relations, and national security. Most importantly, young people must be encouraged to distinguish between admiration and preparedness. Supporting the armed forces does not require every individual to pursue a military career. National security also benefits from responsible citizens, skilled scientists, informed researchers, competent administrators, and individuals who contribute to the country’s resilience in diverse professional capacities. For those who choose military service, aspiration must be accompanied by sustained effort, intellectual preparation, physical readiness, and an appreciation of the responsibilities inherent in the profession. M L F 2 0 2 6

MLF 2026 57 Strategy & Heritage Conclusion: The armed forces require individuals who can adapt to technological transformation, exercise sound judgement, lead with integrity, and uphold their responsibilities under demanding circumstances. The younger generation, in turn, deserves accurate information, accessible pathways, credible preparation, and an honest understanding of military life. A generation does not become capable of safeguarding a nation merely by admiring its uniform. It becomes capable through learning, discipline, perseverance, and the willingness to accept responsibility for something greater than individual achievement. The future of India’s military will be shaped not only by the equipment it acquires or the strategies it formulates, but also by the quality of the young people it educates, selects, trains, and entrusts with leadership. To invest in informed, capable, and principled youth is therefore not simply to encourage military aspiration; it is to strengthen the foundations of national security itself. About the Author: Akshita Vishal is a Class XI student with a keen interest in defence affairs, geopolitics, strategic studies, and national security. She aspires to serve in the Indian Army and is currently preparing for the NDA examination. She is particularly fascinated by military strategy, emerging technologies, and the evolving character of modern warfare. An active public speaker with a strong background in sports, she also pursues her interest in analytical and strategic writing. Her work has previously been published in Strategy & Heritage, reflecting her enthusiasm for examining contemporary strategic developments.

MLF 2026 58 Strategy & Heritage MLF ASSOCIATION OUTREACH TO SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES The MLF Association remains committed to nurturing awareness among the youth about issues of national importance, strategic affairs, and our rich military heritage. Recognizing that young minds will shape the future of the nation, the Association has intensified its outreach efforts by engaging directly with students in universities, colleges, and schools through a series of educational seminars and interactive programmes. These seminars are designed to provide students with a balanced understanding of contemporary geopolitical developments, national security challenges, strategic thinking, and the historical traditions that have contributed to India's military legacy. Distinguished speakers, including veterans and subject matter experts, share their experiences and perspectives, enabling students to appreciate the complexities of an increasingly dynamic global environment. An important feature of these events is the display of military weapons and equipment. These exhibits generate immense interest among students by offering a rare opportunity to closely observe military hardware and learn about its role in national defence. Such interactions help bridge the gap between theoretical knowledge and practical understanding, while also fostering respect for the Armed Forces and their contribution to the nation. During the year, the Association successfully conducted three major seminars and weapons display programmes at Patiala, Ferozepur, and Amritsar. The events witnessed enthusiastic participation from students and faculty members alike. The response was overwhelmingly positive, with attendees expressing keen interest in strategic affairs, defence technology, and military history. Encouraged by this success, the Association plans to expand these outreach initiatives further, strengthening its engagement with the youth and inspiring, greater awareness of national security, leadership, and service to the nation.

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