View Legal Vaganza September 2026 Full with Index (1) flipbook.
2 NISPAKSHLAW Legal Vaganza – September 2026 INDEX S. No. Particulars Page No. 1 5 Landmark Supreme Court Judgments 3–7 Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab 3 Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh 4 Naval Kishore & Anr. v. State of Punjab 5 Mulla Afroz v. Union of India & Ors. 6 Sandeep S. Ghandat & Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India & Ors. 7 2 5 High Court Judgments 8–12 Kalim Isaq Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra & Anr 8 Bilal & Anr. v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors 9 X & Anr. v. Y 10 Madhabi Biswas Chakraborty v. State of Tripura & Ors. 11 A v. B (Matrimonial Appeal) 12 3 Legal Issue of the Month 13 SC Takes Suo Motu Cognizance – Seeks Accountability on Government’s Systematic Failure to Ensure Women’s Safety in Public Places 13 4 Other Major Legal Developments 14–15 Issue 1: BRICS Chief Justices’ Forum Starts in New Delhi 14 Issue 2: SIR Controversy – Public Seek Accountability from CEC 14–15 5 Other Legal News (September 2026) 16–17 CCPA Imposes ₹10 Lakh Penalty on Rapido Over Dark Patterns 16 New UPI Merchant Discount Rate Framework for High-Value Transactions 17 References / Footnotes [1]–[6] 17 Page numbers refer to the page sequence of this document (cover page = page 1).
3 5 Landmark Judgement for Supreme Court for September 2026 Landmark Case 1 Case: Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab | 2026 INSC 1022 Facts ● Registration of FIR: An FIR was registered against the appellant on May 13, 2026, under Sections 64, 65(1), and 351 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, along with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, alleging physical and sexual abuse of a minor. ● Initial Arrest and Procedural Lapse: The appellant was arrested at 7:54 AM on May 17, 2026, and produced before the Duty Magistrate around noon on May 18, 2026. The Judicial Magistrate ordered his immediate release after finding that the police failed to supply written grounds of arrest—violating Article 22(1) of the Constitution, Section 50(1) CrPC / Section 47 BNSS—and detained him beyond the 24-hour limit mandated under Article 22(2) without judicial authorization. ● Clarification & Subsequent Proceedings: The Magistrate added that this release did not prevent the police from proceeding in accordance with the law. Subsequent attempts by the police to obtain custody without properly delivering written grounds were dismissed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. ● High Court Order: The appellant approached the High Court of Punjab & Haryana seeking to restrain the police from re-arresting him or seeking fresh remand. On May 29, 2026, the High Court dismissed his petition, ruling that an illegal initial arrest does not grant blanket immunity from future lawful arrest in serious offenses. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court. Issues 1. Can an accused whose arrest and detention violated both Article 22(1) (non-furnishing of written grounds of arrest) and Article 22(2) (detention exceeding 24 hours without production before a Magistrate) be re-arrested for the same offense? 2. What legal procedure, safeguards, and judicial oversight must be satisfied by investigating agencies before attempting to re-arrest an individual released due to constitutional infractions? Judgement ● Quashing of Orders: The Supreme Court (Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar) set aside the High Court's order and quashed the observations made in the Magistrate’s initial release order. ● Mandatory Constitutional Safeguards: The Court reinforced that rights under Articles 22(1) and 22(2) are non-negotiable, fundamental guarantees. Procedural failure to supply written grounds of arrest in an understandable language, or failure to produce the arrestee within 24 hours, renders the custody void ab initio and mandates immediate release—not as bail, but as release from illegal detention. ● Protocol for Re-Arrest: 1. Prior Service & Written Application: The police cannot automatically re-arrest an individual. They must first serve the written grounds of arrest to the accused along with an explanation for the initial omission. 2. Judicial Approval: The agency must move a formal application for custody before the jurisdictional Magistrate detailing the necessity of custodial interrogation. Re-arrest can only occur after explicit judicial approval. 3. Administrative Accountability: To prevent abuse, any such application must carry the endorsement of an immediate superior officer, who must transfer the case to a new investigating officer and initiate departmental inquiries against the defaulting officials. ● Public Law Remedy: The Court held that in instances of illegal detention violating Article 22(2), High Courts may award compensation under public law remedies in addition to administrative disciplinary proceedings. Questions for Readers Should an investigating agency's procedural failure to uphold constitutional rights bar them from seeking subsequent custody, or does the gravity of an alleged crime outweigh procedural lapses? Where would you draw the line between protecting personal liberty and ensuring effective criminal justice?
4 Landmark case 2 Case: Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2026 INSC 1050 / Criminal Appeal Nos. 429-430/2020) Facts The appellant, Waris, married a widow on August 4, 2017. Her six-year-old daughter moved with her into his house in Kushalgarh, Madhya Pradesh. Over time, the appellant subjected the young girl to sexual abuse while isolating and threatening the mother. On the night of April 21, 2018, the appellant locked the mother in a separate room and sexually assaulted the child. Over the next two days, the victim's physical condition rapidly deteriorated. On April 23, 2018, after demanding to know if the child had disclosed the abuse, the appellant refused to allow medical treatment and manually choked the child to death in the mother's presence. The autopsy confirmed homicidal death caused by manual strangulation (asphyxia) and revealed a fresh genital tear, establishing recent penetrative sexual assault. The Trial Court convicted Waris under IPC Sections 376(2)(f), 376(2)(n), 376AB, 302, and 201, alongside POCSO Act Sections 5 and 6, sentencing him to death—a conviction and capital sentence subsequently confirmed by the High Court. Issues 1. Procedural Fair Trial Standards: Whether procedural infirmities arising from a hurried initial cross- examination of the primary witness (PW-1, the mother) by legal aid counsel were remedied by a subsequent curative re-cross-examination. 2. Reliability of a Solitary Eyewitness: Whether the sole testimony of a mother experiencing domestic entrapment—who delayed reporting and exhibited minor omissions—was sufficient to sustain a conviction. 3. Sentencing & Rarest of Rare Doctrine: Whether the death penalty was justified, or if the possibility of reform warranted commutation to life imprisonment. Supreme Court Ruling & Findings ● Curative Re-examination: The Supreme Court held that the exhaustive re-cross-examination of PW-1 ordered in 2025 under Sections 391/367 CrPC cured the original trial defect, safeguarding the appellant’s right to a fair trial under Article 21. ● Quality over Quantity of Evidence: Under Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, evidence must be weighed, not counted. The Court affirmed that a conviction can lawfully rest on a single credible eyewitness. Rejecting the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, the Court held that minor internal inconsistencies do not discredit the core account of murder and assault. ● Contextualizing Trauma and Control: The Court rejected defense claims that the mother’s delayed reporting was "unnatural," recognizing that victims under coercive domestic control operate under intense fear and trauma, making silence a recognized behavioral response rather than proof of fabrication. ● Corroborative and Circumstantial Proof: The eyewitness account was supported by post-mortem evidence of throttling and genital trauma, Call Detail Records (CDR), prior disclosures admissible as res gestae (Section 6) and dying declarations (Section 32(1)), and the appellant’s failure to explain a death inside his private residence (Section 106). ● Sentence Commutation: While upholding the conviction across all charges, the Supreme Court commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission. The Court ruled that the State failed to prove the appellant was beyond reformation, making the intermediate sentence of life without remission the appropriate penalty. Question for Readers Does commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment without remission truly uphold justice in heinous crimes against minors, or does it unduly prioritize the criminal's reform over the victim's retribution?
5 Landmark judgement 3 Case: Naval Kishore & Anr. v. State of Punjab | 2026 INSC 1048 | Criminal Appeal (Diary No. 56431 of 2025) Facts Pinki @ Simran and her two minor daughters (aged 8 and 5) disappeared on December 27, 2009, after leaving their residence in Ludhiana. The following morning, their bodies were discovered near railway tracks with fatal sharp- edge weapon injuries. Investigation revealed a pre-planned conspiracy orchestrated by Pinki’s husband, Ashok Kumar (Accused No. 1), who doubted her character, questioned the children's paternity, and sought insurance payouts. Ashok enlisted his brother Jyoti Kumar (Appellant No. 2) and friend Naval Kishore (Appellant No. 3) to execute the murders. Forensic evidence—including DNA matching hair recovered from Pinki’s closed fist to Jyoti, fingerprints on discarded glass tumblers, and blood-stained items recovered per disclosure statements— conclusively established their guilt. The Trial Court convicted all three accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. On April 28, 2014, it sentenced them to life imprisonment with a specific directive that they "remain in prison till rest of their life". The High Court of Punjab and Haryana affirmed the conviction on December 12, 2022, without evaluating the Trial Court's authority to order life imprisonment until natural death. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction on November 10, 2025, limiting the present appeal strictly to the legality of the sentence. Issues 1. Competence of Trial Courts: Is a Sessions Court competent, while awarding life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC, to direct that the convict remain incarcerated for the remainder of their natural life, thereby stripping statutory remission powers? 2. Determination of Appropriate Sentence: If the Trial Court lacked such authority, what is the appropriate modified sentence considering the gravity of the crime alongside mitigating circumstances like prison conduct and rehabilitation potential? Judicial Findings & Rationale ● Lack of Sessions Court Authority: Drawing upon Constitution Bench precedents (Swamy Shraddananda (2), V. Sriharan, and Kiran v. State of Karnataka), the Supreme Court held that while life imprisonment legally implies imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, the power to create a "special category sentence"—which explicitly bars statutory remission under Sections 432–435 CrPC—is exclusive to Constitutional Courts (High Courts and the Supreme Court). ● Legislative Intent: The Court highlighted that statutory provisions like Sections 376AB, 376DA, and 376DB of the IPC explicitly prescribe imprisonment for the "remainder of natural life". Parliament intentionally omitted this phrasing in Section 302 IPC. Trial courts cannot read such additions into Section 302, as doing so usurps legislative powers. ● Proportionality and Modified Sentence: Applying factors from Navas alias Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, the Court balanced aggravating factors (the premeditated, brutal murder of three individuals, including two children) against mitigating aspects (satisfactory prison conduct and over 11–12 years of actual incarceration already served). Decision The Supreme Court set aside the Trial Court's direction mandating life imprisonment until natural death. Exercising its powers as a Constitutional Court, it modified the sentence of Naval Kishore and Jyoti Kumar to 25 years of rigorous imprisonment without the benefit of statutory remission. Question for Readers Should the power to impose fixed-term life sentences without remission remain exclusive to Constitutional Courts, or should Trial Courts also be empowered to ensure uniform justice in horrific crimes?
6 Landmark judgement 4 Mulla Afroz v. Union of India & Ors. | 2026 INSC 1067 | Criminal Appeal No. 4310 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 12534 of 2026) Facts The dispute originated from a court-mandated survey of a local mosque in Sambhal, Uttar Pradesh, on November 24, 2024, which triggered severe communal clashes resulting in four deaths and property damage. Police registered multiple FIRs following the violence. Although Mulla Afroz was not named in any initial FIR, law enforcement arrested him 54 days later, alleging he was the principal architect who incited the mob. While in police custody, an extra-judicial confession was recorded, which allegedly led to the recovery of a .32 bore pistol. By September 2025, Afroz secured bail in one case and eventually obtained bail in all pending criminal cases by June 2026. However, on October 13, 2025, the District Magistrate, Sambhal, issued a preventive detention order against him under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act (NSA), 1980. His administrative representations were rejected, and the State Government confirmed his detention for 12 months. Afroz challenged the detention through a habeas corpus petition, which the Allahabad High Court dismissed. He subsequently appealed the High Court's dismissal to the Supreme Court. Issues 1. Whether an extra-judicial confessional statement made to a police officer while in custody can legally form the sole or primary basis for the subjective satisfaction required to issue a preventive detention order. 2. Whether the detaining authority complied with mandatory constitutional and statutory safeguards, and whether the remaining materials provided an independent, valid legal basis to sustain detention under the NSA. Judgment The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's ruling, quashed the detention and confirmation orders, and ordered Afroz's immediate release. 1. Evidentiary Inadmissibility of Police Confessions The Court held that an uncorroborated confessional statement made to a police officer in custody cannot serve as the foundation for preventive detention. Under Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), police confessions are inherently suspect and legally inadmissible. Relying on such statements to deprive a citizen of liberty violates constitutional guarantees against self-incrimination under Article 20(3). Crucially, the Supreme Court explicitly overruled the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Suman v. State of Tamil Nadu to the extent that it permitted executive reliance on custodial confessions. 2. Procedural Non-Compliance and Misuse of Power The Court identified severe procedural lapses that invalidated the detention order. Critical evidence cited in the grounds—including CCTV footage, video recordings, and intercepted mobile communications—was never supplied to the detenu, violating his fundamental right to make an effective representation under Article 22(5). The Bench emphasized that preventive detention cannot be weaponized to bypass judicial bail orders or convert preventive power into punitive incarceration. Observing that "the process was made the punishment," the Supreme Court quashed the order and imposed exemplary costs of ₹10 lakh on the State of Uttar Pradesh, payable to the appellant. Question for Reader Should an uncorroborated police confession, excluded as inherently suspect during a trial, ever be allowed to deprive a citizen of personal liberty through executive detention? How can courts draw a clear line between legitimate preventive security and the misuse of administrative powers to bypass judicial bail?
7 Landmark Case 5 Case: Sandeep S. Ghandat & Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India & Ors. | 2026 INSC 955 | Civil Appeal Nos. 5351–5352 of 2025 Facts Abhyudaya Co-operative Bank Limited was initially registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, and was permitted to conduct banking business in 1965. In 1988, it was recognized as a Scheduled Bank under Section 42(6)(a) of the RBI Act, 1934. Following RBI-directed amalgamations with co-operative banks in Gujarat and Karnataka, it became a Multi-State Co-operative Bank. In May 2019, the appellants were elected to the Board of Directors (BoD) for a five-year statutory term ending on May 24, 2024. On November 24, 2023, the RBI invoked Section 36AAA read with Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (BR Act) to supersede the BoD for one year and appointed an Administrator. The RBI cited severe financial deterioration, the urgent need to protect depositors, and the necessity for professional management. The appellants challenged this order before the Bombay High Court. While proceedings were pending, the BoD's elected term expired on May 24, 2024. On November 18, 2024, the RBI issued a second order extending supersession for another year. On the same day, the High Court dismissed the writ petitions, holding that Section 36AAA is not rendered ineffective by Articles 243ZL/243ZT of the Constitution, state consultation does not apply to multi-State co-operative banks, and natural justice cannot be implied into Section 36AAA. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court. During pendency, the RBI passed a third order on November 7, 2025, extending supersession through November 2026. Issues 1. Whether the RBI's power to supersede the BoD of a multi-State co-operative bank under Section 36AAA(1) of the BR Act is restricted by the six-month ceiling under Article 243ZL(1) of the Constitution. 2. Whether a supersession order under Section 36AAA(1) of the BR Act can be extended beyond the original elected tenure of the superseded BoD. Judgment The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court ruling. 1. Article 243ZL and the Scope of the BR Act The Court held that the six-month cap in Article 243ZL(1) does not limit the RBI's supersession powers under Section 36AAA of the BR Act. The third proviso to Article 243ZL(1), stating that the BR Act "shall also apply" to co-operative banks, operates as an independent provision incorporating the BR Act into Part IXB of the Constitution. Furthermore, the fourth proviso explicitly excludes multi-State co-operative banks from the one-year cap applicable to other co-operative banks, showing clear constitutional intent to preserve the BR Act's specialized regulatory regime. Banking involves public trust and depositor protection, requiring expert, uninterrupted central bank oversight up to the aggregate outer limit of five years under Section 36AAA(1). 2. Validity of Extensions Beyond the Board's Tenure The Court held that supersession orders can validly extend beyond the original tenure of the elected board. Upon supersession, the BoD ceases to function, and management powers vest in the Administrator. Under Section 36AAA(7) of the BR Act, the Administrator must call a general meeting to elect new directors only upon the expiration of the supersession period specified by the RBI, making the former board's original tenure irrelevant to extension orders. 3. Procedural Consultation Requirement The Court clarified that the proviso to Section 36AAA(1) requiring prior consultation applies solely to co-operative banks registered with a State Registrar, not to multi-State co-operative banks. Question for Readers Should regulatory authority over banking co-operatives take precedence over elected democratic governance during financial distress? How can legal frameworks better balance depositor security with the statutory tenure rights of elected board members?
8 5 HIGH COURT JUDGMENTS OF SEPTEMBER MONTHS Case Title: Kalim Isaq Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra & Anr Case Number: Criminal Writ Petition No. 4598 of 2026 Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bombay High Court) Facts of the Case The plaintiff was taken into custody at Barshi (in Solapur district) by the respondents and taken to a distance of about 380 to 400 kilometres from Barshi to Kashigaon Police Station. Thereafter, the plaintiff was not brought before any judicial magistrate at Barshi or in the neighbourhood of Barshi in spite of the arrest. However, the respondents did bring the plaintiff before a judicial magistrate at Mira Road within 24 hours, which is statutory. The respondents did not approach the nearest available judicial magistrate at the place where the plaintiff was taken into custody. In doing so, the plaintiff approached the High Court through a writ petition of Habeas Corpus. Legal Issues ● Does producing the arrestee in court within the 24-hour statutory period fulfil constitutional duties if the respondent does not produce the person in front of the closest Judicial Magistrate? ● Does fulfilling the duty of presenting the accused before the court within the 24-hour statutory period satisfy the constitutional obligations if the respondent fails to present the accused before the nearest Judicial Magistrate? Court Judgment According to the High Court, producing an arrested person within 24 hours does not satisfy the constitutional provision if the police fail to produce the person before the nearest Magistrate. The High Court stressed that the provision requiring production before the nearest judicial officer provides timely judicial review to prevent police arbitrariness and protect the individual's personal freedom. Questions ● How does the absolute requirement of presenting an arrestee before the "nearest Magistrate" act as a check against unauthorised custodial transport across judicial jurisdictions? ● Does a procedural breach under Article 22(2) automatically invalidate subsequent remand orders passed by a court of competent jurisdiction?
9 Case Title: Bilal & Anr. v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors Case No.: W.P.(Crl.) 2976/2026 | [2026: DHC: 8343] Date of Judgment: September 23, 2026 Facts of the Case Marriage: In December 2024, Petitioner No. 1 (adult male, ~28 years old) married Petitioner No. 2 (minor female, 16 years and 3 months old), through the process of Nikah with the approval of the family. Discovery of Offence: The minor got pregnant and attended an antenatal clinic at the government hospital in May 2026, whereby her age was registered and reported to the concerned authorities in accordance with statutory guidelines. Registration of FIR: Police registered an FIR against the petitioners under Section 6 of the POCSO Act (Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault) and Section 64(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). Petition before the High Court: Both the petitioners together filed a writ petition for quashing of the FIR. The arguments advanced were that she attained puberty before entering into Nikah and hence she was competent to enter into marriage under Muslim Personal Law. Legal Issues ● Does marriage under Muslim Personal Law act as an exception or immunity to prosecution under the POCSO Act and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) for sexual relations with the wife below the age of 18? ● Does the voluntary consent of the minor and her physical maturity supersede the age limits provided by law for protecting children from abuse? Court Judgment POCSO Overriding Effect: The High Court rejected the petition and refused to quash the FIR on the grounds that personal law could not override general laws that were enacted for the welfare of the child. Non- Exemptions: Judge Sanjeev Narula remarked that the ceremony of marriage cannot increase the age of a child or change the protections that criminal law affords her, as: "A marriage which is claimed to be valid according to the Muslim personal law cannot, for that reason only, confer exemption from POCSO and/or BNS for sexual intercourse with a wife who is below 18 years of age at the time of the act." It was pointed out by the Court that POCSO Section 42-A had a provision that allowed the provisions to override other laws. Also, Section 63 of BNS expressly limited marital exemption to those wives who are not below 18 years of age. Questions How does the non-obstante clause in Section 42-A of the POCSO Act reconcile the conflict between personal laws governing marriage age and secular penal statutes governing child protection?
10 Case Name: X & Anr. v. Y (filed as Revision Petition, Family Court) Neutral Citation: 2026: KHC: 42494 Date of Judgment: September 2026 Facts of the Case Plaintiff (wife) filed a suit in the Family Court for claiming monthly maintenance for herself and her minor child from the defendant (husband) in terms of Section 125 of the CrPC. Her petition was dismissed by the Family Court on the basis that the previous petition filed by the wife for claiming permanent alimony in civil proceedings was dismissed and also on the ground that she has attained a post-graduate degree (M.A.). Being aggrieved by the dismissal of her case for claiming maintenance as provided under law, she approached the High Court of Karnataka through a revision petition. Legal Issues ● Whether refusal to grant permanent maintenance to the wife in the civil suit by the Court or long delay in immediately filing a case becomes a ground for barring limitation or res judicata to claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC? ● Whether possession of an educational degree like M.A. bars the wife from claiming maintenance under Section 125 CrPC in the absence of proof of employment? Court Judgment The High Court ruled that seeking maintenance through Section 125 CrPC is a continuous statutory right intended at avoiding vagrancy, and it cannot be barred by limitation, lapse of time, or prior dismissal of permanent alimony claims in a civil court. The High Court further stated that education qualifications cannot be used as a reason for denying maintenance unless it is proven by the respondent that the applicant is earning enough to maintain herself/himself. Accordingly, the High Court quashed the order of Family Court in part and ordered the respondent to provide maintenance to the applicant along with the maintenance to the child. Questions How does the continuous nature of a maintenance cause of action under Section 125 CrPC interact with the general rules of limitation and civil res judicata?
11 Case Title: Madhabi Biswas Chakraborty v. State of Tripura & Ors. Court: High Court of Tripura Judgment: August 12, 2026 / Reported September 2026 Facts of the Case The accused was arrested on account of various FIRs filed at the East Agartala and West Agartala Police Stations. These proceedings had been instituted because of derogatory, offensive, and malicious statements which were published in videos and posts on social media regarding the Prime Minister of India, the Mayor of Agartala, and some religious gods. Subsequently, after the investigation of the case by the police, chargesheets were filed in the trial court. Thereafter, a writ petition was filed by the accused before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC/Article 226 in order to quash the FIRs and the chargesheets. Legal Issues ● Whether the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) extends constitutional protection to defamatory, abusive, or malicious content uploaded onto social media platforms? ● Whether criminal proceedings and FIRs alleging criminal defamation and offensive online posts can be quashed at the threshold when a prima facie case exists to be examined during trial? Court Judgment The High Court refused to quash the criminal proceedings and chargesheets, holding that freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) is not an absolute licence to damage personal or public reputation. The Court emphasised that while legitimate political criticism and dissent are integral to a democratic framework, constitutional speech rights are subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), which explicitly includes defamation and public order. Observing that cyber-defamation and online abuse cannot claim immunity under free speech, the Bench directed the petitioner to face trial and raise all factual defences before the competent trial court. Question Where does the legal threshold lie between legitimate democratic criticism of political office-holders and punishable criminal defamation under Article 19(2)?
12 Case Title: A v. B (Matrimonial Appeal) Case Number: FA(MAT) No. 63 of 2022 Date of Order: (Reported in High Court Law Journals, September 2026) Facts of the Case The applicant (husband) and non-applicant (wife) were involved in a long-standing matrimonial dispute resulting in a family court order directing the applicant to pay a one-time permanent alimony of ₹5 lakh to his estranged wife. Over a period of five years and six months, the applicant failed to comply with monthly maintenance orders (paying merely ₹8,000 against substantial arrears) and failed to deposit the lump-sum permanent alimony. The applicant subsequently approached the High Court of Chhattisgarh seeking modification of the alimony order, pleading that he was a manual labourer facing severe financial hardship and requesting permission to discharge the ₹5 lakh permanent alimony in small monthly instalments rather than a single payment. Legal Issues 1. Whether a general plea of financial difficulty or status as a manual labourer constitutes a valid ground to modify a final permanent alimony order or grant instalment payments after prolonged default? 2. Whether an applicant who has continuously defaulted on statutory maintenance and court-mandated alimony can seek equitable modification under matrimonial statutes without establishing a bona fide payment history? Court Judgment The High Court of Chhattisgarh dismissed the applicant’s plea for modification. The Court held that a mere assertion of financial hardship—unsupported by substantial past compliance or payments—does not warrant altering a court-mandated alimony structure. The Bench observed that in light of prolonged non-payment and default on monthly maintenance, allowing the applicant to stall or dilute the permanent alimony through small instalments would cause undue prejudice to the non-applicant. Consequently, the High Court refused modification and directed the applicant to pay the ₹5 lakh permanent alimony in one go. Question What standard of financial incapacity must an applicant prove to justify the modification or staggering of a permanent alimony order under Hindu law?
13 Legal issue : SC Takes Suo Motu Cognizance – seeks accountability on government's systematic failure to Ensure Women’s Safety in Public places Recent reports of sexual assaults across Delhi-NCR have brought back concerns about the safety of women and children. Despite various preventive measures being in place, the recurrence of serious offences raises a very important question: Are these measures actually effective in protecting women and children on the ground? Against this backdrop, a Division Bench comprising J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ., initiated suo motu proceedings on 28 September 2026, seeking to examine the safety and security of women and children in public spaces and the effectiveness of the existing institutional mechanisms. Emphasising that the right to live with dignity and without the fear of violence forms part of Article 21, the Court observed that public spaces cannot be allowed to become unsafe because of inadequate lighting, poor surveillance, insufficient patrolling or other avoidable administrative shortcomings. The Supreme Court directed the authorities to undertake vulnerability mapping of areas where women and children may be at greater risk. The exercise is to consider previous incidents, complaints and other available information. The Court further directed: * stronger police patrolling in vulnerable areas; * audits of street lighting and CCTV cameras; * greater attention to safety in public transport; * effective use of emergency helplines and women-safety mechanisms; * use of citizen complaints to identify unsafe locations; and * inspection of vehicles in light of the reported incident involving a minor in a moving sleeper bus. The Court also sought information regarding the functioning of Fast Track Special Courts and Exclusive POCSO Courts, stressing the need for timely disposal of cases involving women and children. The Court also highlighted the responsibility of the media while reporting sexual offences. It emphasised the need to protect the identity and dignity of victims and to avoid reporting that may cause further harm, particularly in cases involving children. The safety of women and girls is a fundamental responsibility of society, and no one should have to fear violence while travelling, visiting a public park or going about their daily lives. The Supreme Court’s observations highlight the need to move beyond statements of concern towards meaningful action, transparent investigations and accountability for failures in public safety systems. Authorities must ensure that public transport complies with safety standards, public spaces are adequately lit and monitored, and survivors receive timely support, dignity and justice. At the same time, communities must challenge gender-based violence, reject victim-blaming and foster an environment where survivors can seek help without fear or stigma. Building safer public spaces requires sustained cooperation between law enforcement, public administrators, transport operators and citizens.
14 Issue 1 :- BRICS Chief Justices’ Forum starts in New Delhi The Supreme Court of India hosted the BRICS Chief Justices’ Forum in New Delhi from 4 to 6 September 2026, bringing together Chief Justices, Presidents of Supreme Courts and senior judicial leaders from BRICS Member States and Partner Countries. As part of the Forum, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surya Kant, The Chief Justice of India, held a series of bilateral meetings with heads of judicial delegations. The bilateral discussions took place around the issues of:- ● MoU’s for judicial cooperation for strengthening of relation between countries. ● Importance of Mediation and Arbitration in resolving business and corporate disputes, and creating a healthy environment for commercial activities between nations. ● Requirement of efficient commercial courts to enhance trust of foreign investors. ● Possibilities of mutual recognition of judicial awards and decrees. ● Use of State Institutions like The National Judicial Academy Bhopal for professional exchange programmes. ● Exchange of best legal practices of different countries. ● Need for bilateral conferences on laws on contemporary issues. ● Technology advancement integration for increasing efficiency of judiciary specially through AI integration. ● Enhancing people-to-people ties through expeditious judicial processes. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India highlighted the importance of the role of the judiciary in constructing coordinated bilateral co-operation and enhancing bilateral ties. He also proposed the building of common platform for Arbitration and Mediation to tackle commercial disputes. The BRICS Chief Justices’ Forum 2026 reflects the growing need for judicial cooperation in addressing challenges that extend beyond national boundaries. By bringing mediation, arbitration, Artificial Intelligence and sustainable development into a common judicial dialogue, the Forum emphasised the importance of sharing experiences while respecting the distinct legal systems of participating countries. Its significance lies not in creating uniformity, but in building stronger channels of cooperation through which different judiciaries can respond to emerging legal challenges. Issue 2 :- SIR Controversy – Public Seek Accountability from CEC The Election Commission of India (ECI) is facing growing scrutiny over the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, with questions being raised over the manner in which voter records are being revised and the functioning of the Commission’s digital electoral-roll system, ECINet. SIR is an exercise undertaken by the ECI to verify and update electoral rolls. Its objective is to ensure that the voter list contains eligible voters and removes entries that are no longer valid, such as those relating to deceased or shifted voters. However, the present controversy concerns how these decisions are being taken and who ultimately exercises control over the electoral roll. The issue came into focus after reports revealed that Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi had recorded objections on at least 14 occasions over a period of ten months regarding decisions connected with the SIR process. According to The Indian Express investigation, the objections related to several areas, including the registration of new voters, deletion and restoration of names, SIR appeals and the control of the voter database. The two Commissioners reportedly stated that some decisions and orders had been issued without being brought to their notice. This has raised a larger question about the functioning of a three-member constitutional body: if two Election Commissioners objected to decisions concerning the electoral process, how were those decisions taken and what role did each member of the Commission have in them? The ECI, however, has maintained that differences of view are part of institutional deliberations and that its final decisions have been taken in accordance with the law. It has also stated that the SIR decision itself was approved unanimously by the Commission.
15 Why is ECINet at the centre of the issue? A major part of the controversy concerns ECINet, the ECI's digital platform used for managing electoral-roll functions. Under the electoral framework, the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) is responsible for preparing and revising the electoral roll. The controversy arose over whether the design and functioning of ECINet could limit the ERO's ability to exercise these statutory powers. The issue became particularly important in cases where the software flagged voter records for “logical discrepancies” or classified them as “unmapped.” These are essentially cases where a voter's present details could not be properly matched with earlier electoral records. For example, the system may identify inconsistencies in a voter's age or family details while attempting to link the voter with an earlier roll. Being flagged in this manner does not itself establish that a person is an ineligible voter. The concern is whether a technical mismatch in the database could ultimately affect a genuine citizen's inclusion in the electoral roll. The Form 6 issue The controversy also extended to Form 6, the form through which a person applies to have their name included in the electoral roll. An additional declaration related to the SIR process was added to the online version of Form 6. The requirement sought information about whether the applicant, or their parents or grandparents, appeared in an earlier electoral roll. The change attracted objections because Form 6 is a statutory form prescribed under the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. The two Election Commissioners reportedly objected to the additional requirement and sought its removal. The ECI subsequently clarified that the additional declaration would apply during the SIR process, while the forms prescribed under the Rules would be used during the non-SIR period. Measures Introduced to Address Voter Discrepancies Following the controversy, the ECI announced several measures concerning the handling of voter discrepancies. Voters who have received notices because their records are “unmapped” or contain “logical discrepancies” will generally not be required to appear personally before an Electoral Registration Officer. Booth Level Officers can instead visit their homes, collect the necessary documents and upload them to ECINet for consideration by the ERO. The Commission has also ordered a review of ECINet, including an assessment by a committee headed by a senior Deputy Election Commissioner and involving an independent expert from an IIT or IIIT. The Commission has said that any further flexibility required by field officers will also be incorporated into the system. In addition, the ECI has directed officials to undertake a special drive to facilitate the inclusion of eligible voters whose names may have been left out during SIR. The controversy has placed the ECI’s handling of electoral-roll revision under closer public scrutiny. While the Commission has begun reviewing ECINet and addressing discrepancies in voter records, the larger concern remains whether the process provides sufficient transparency and safeguards against the wrongful exclusion of eligible voters. As the SIR exercise continues, the Commission’s ability to explain its decisions, address genuine discrepancies and ensure accountability will be crucial to maintaining public confidence in the electoral process.
16 OTHER LEGAL NEWS (SEPTEMBER 2026) 1. CCPA Imposes ₹10 Lakh Penalty on Rapido Over Dark Patterns The Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA) imposed a ₹10 lakh penalty on Roppen Transportation Services Pvt. Ltd., which operates Rapido, for using misleading prompts and dark patterns on its ride-booking platform.[1] The action followed the CCPA’s examination of Rapido’s pre-ride tipping practices. The CCPA found that Rapido used prompts suggesting that paying a higher amount could improve the chances of getting a ride. It considered these practices to be “Confirm Shaming” and “Interface Interference”, which are recognised as dark patterns under the Guidelines for Prevention and Regulation of Dark Patterns, 2023.[2] The CCPA also found that the claim about higher payments improving ride availability was not properly supported.[3] Along with the penalty, Rapido was directed to stop using such misleading prompts. The development shows that consumer authorities are increasingly examining how digital platforms influence consumer choices, and not just the prices they charge.
17 2. New UPI Merchant Discount Rate Framework for High-Value Transactions The National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) introduced a new framework for Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) on certain UPI payments. Under this framework, a 0.4% MDR will apply to selected merchant UPI transactions above ₹2,000, subject to a maximum of ₹300 per transaction. The new system is scheduled to start from 15 October 2026.[4] The framework does not charge ordinary consumers for using UPI. Person-to-person payments will remain free, and merchant payments up to ₹2,000 will also remain unaffected. The government has stated that around 96% of P2M transactions will not be affected.[5] MDR is a fee related to processing merchant payments and is shared among participants in the payment system. According to NPCI, the new framework aims to support the long-term growth and sustainability of UPI, while keeping regular consumers and small merchants protected from additional charges.[6] [1] PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU, CCPA Imposed ₹10 Lakh Penalty on Rapido for Misleading Tipping Prompts and Dark Patterns, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2310526 [(last visited Sept.29, 2026)]. [2] CENTRAL CONSUMER PROTECTION AUTHORITY, Guidelines for Prevention and Regulation of Dark Patterns, 2023, https://ccpa.doca.gov.in/files/The%20Guidelines%20for%20Prevention%20and%20Regulation%20of%20Dark%20Patterns%2C%202023_ 1732707717.pdf [(last visited Sept.29, 2026)]. [3] PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU, CCPA Imposed ₹10 Lakh Penalty on Rapido for Misleading Tipping Prompts and Dark Patterns, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2310526 [(last visited Sept.29, 2026)]. [4] PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU, UPI Continues to Remain Free for Peer to Peer Transactions and 96% of Merchant Transactions, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2310586 [(last visited Oct. 1, 2026)]. [5] PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU, UPI Continues to Remain Free for Peer to Peer Transactions and 96% of Merchant Transactions, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2310586 [(last visited DC Oct. 1, 2026)]. [6] PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU, UPI Continues to Remain Free for Peer to Peer Transactions and 96% of Merchant Transactions, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2310586 [(last visited Oct. 1, 2026)].