To the Members of the United States Congress

To the Members of the United States Congress Subject: Request for a Congressional Investigation into the Legality of the United States War Against Iran, the Pursuit of Regime Change, and Potential Violations of U.S. and International Law Dear Members of Congress, I respectfully request that Congress conduct a full, independent, and bipartisan investigation into the legal basis, authorization, objectives, conduct, and consequences of the United States military campaign against Iran, including any policy or operation intended to overthrow, replace, or fundamentally alter the Iranian government. This request is not based on the assumption that any individual has already committed a crime. Rather, it asks Congress to determine whether the President, members of the Administration, or other government officials have acted outside the authority granted to them by the Constitution and federal law, or in violation of the United States' obligations under international law. The questions presented are too consequential to be resolved solely through executive-branch legal opinions or classified determinations. They concern Congress's constitutional authority over war, the President's obligation to execute the laws, the prohibition on assassination, the statutory regulation of covert action, and the United States' obligations under the United Nations Charter. I. Congressional authority over war The Constitution places the power to declare war and to make the rules governing the armed forces in Congress, while making the President Commander in Chief. The War Powers Resolution further provides that the President's authority to introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities is to be exercised pursuant to a declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States, its territories, possessions, or armed forces. 50 U.S.C. § 1541. (Legal Information Institute) Congress should therefore determine: • What specific constitutional authority did the President rely upon to initiate hostilities against Iran? • What statute, if any, specifically authorized the use of force against Iran? • Did Congress authorize the present military operation? • If no such authorization exists, on what legal basis does the Administration contend that sustained hostilities are constitutionally permissible? • Were the requirements of the War Powers Resolution satisfied? • Were Congress and the relevant committees provided complete and timely information concerning the legal basis for the operation? A distinction must also be made between a limited emergency response to an actual attack and an extended military campaign undertaken for broader strategic or political purposes. II. The United Nations Charter and international law

The investigation should also determine whether the use of force against Iran satisfies international law. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against another state's territorial integrity or political independence. The principal recognized exceptions include force authorized by the Security Council and self-defence under Article 51 following an armed attack. Congress should therefore obtain and review the Administration's complete legal analysis concerning: 1. whether an armed attack against the United States occurred; 2. whether any asserted Iranian threat was sufficiently imminent to invoke self-defence; 3. whether the use of force was necessary; 4. whether the force used was proportionate; 5. whether particular operations exceeded the limits of self-defence; and 6. whether the actual objectives of the campaign extended beyond defending the United States. The question becomes particularly serious if military action was undertaken not merely to defend the United States but to destroy Iran's government or install a different government. III. Regime change and the prohibition on intervention Congress should specifically investigate whether regime change was an objective of U.S. policy or military operations. There is a fundamental legal distinction between using force for a lawful defensive purpose and using force with the objective of determining who governs another sovereign state. If the United States used military force with the purpose of overthrowing the Iranian government, Congress should determine whether that objective was compatible with the prohibition on the use of force against another state's political independence and the customary international-law principle of non-intervention. Congress should therefore subpoena and review: • presidential directives; • National Security Council memoranda; • Department of Defense operational plans; • Department of State assessments; • intelligence assessments; • CIA findings; • communications concerning Iranian opposition groups; • contingency plans for an Iranian government following military action; and

• all documents referring to "regime change," "government replacement," "transition government," "decapitation," or equivalent objectives. The central question should be: Was the stated justification for the war genuinely defensive, or was self-defence used as the legal characterization of a broader campaign whose actual objective included regime change? IV. Executive Order 12333 and assassination Congress should conduct a separate investigation into any killing of Iranian political or military officials that may have been undertaken for the purpose of producing regime change. Executive Order 12333 §2.11 provides: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.” The National Archives' published text confirms both the assassination prohibition in §2.11 and the related prohibition on indirect participation in §2.12. (National Archives) This does not mean that every killing of an Iranian official during an armed conflict is automatically an assassination. A lawful attack against a legitimate military target presents a different legal question. Congress should nevertheless determine, for every senior Iranian official deliberately targeted: • Who authorized the operation? • What was the stated legal basis? • Was the individual a lawful military target? • Was the individual directly participating in hostilities? • Was the operation conducted as part of an armed conflict? • Was the person's death sought principally because of his political position? • Was the objective to remove the individual in order to collapse or replace the Iranian government? • Did intelligence agencies participate directly or indirectly? • Was any third party used to accomplish an action that U.S. personnel could not lawfully perform themselves? These questions are particularly important because §2.12 addresses indirect participation in activities prohibited by Executive Order 12333. (National Archives) V. Covert action and regime change If the Administration used intelligence agencies or other government entities to influence political conditions inside Iran, Congress should determine whether those activities constituted "covert action" under 50 U.S.C. § 3093. That statute requires a presidential finding for covert action and requires the finding to identify the participating government entities and, where applicable, third parties. Critically, the statute provides

that a presidential finding may not authorize an action that would violate the Constitution or a federal statute. (Legal Information Institute) Congress should therefore establish: • whether any covert-action finding concerning Iran exists; • when it was signed; • what activities it authorized; • which agencies participated; • whether foreign governments or proxy forces participated; • whether Congress was properly notified; • whether the operation was subsequently expanded; • whether significant changes were reported as required by law; and • whether any covert action involved assassination, unlawful use of force, or other prohibited conduct. The existence of a presidential finding should not itself be treated as proof of legality. Congress should examine whether the underlying activity was independently lawful. VI. The President's duty to execute the law The Constitution requires the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Congress should therefore investigate not merely whether the President issued orders, but whether executive officials knowingly directed, authorized, encouraged, concealed, or facilitated conduct contrary to federal law. If officials concluded that particular actions were unlawful, Congress should determine: • whether those conclusions were communicated to the President; • whether legal objections were overridden; • whether Justice Department lawyers were pressured to produce particular conclusions; • whether dissenting legal opinions were suppressed or withheld; • whether military or intelligence personnel were instructed to disregard statutory restrictions; and • whether records were altered, destroyed, classified, or withheld from Congress. VII. The President's public statements and representations Congress should also examine the President's public statements concerning the war. This should include statements regarding: • the purpose of the military operation; • the alleged Iranian threat;

• the existence or imminence of an Iranian attack; • the objective of regime change; • the identity and status of targeted individuals; • congressional authorization; • the Administration's claimed constitutional authority; • compliance with international law; and • any representations made to Congress. The purpose should not be to criminalize political speech or foreign-policy rhetoric. Rather, Congress should determine whether material representations made to Congress or the American public were knowingly false or materially misleading, and whether such representations were used to obtain funding, support military action, conceal the true objectives of an operation, or prevent congressional oversight. VIII. Consequences if violations are established If the investigation establishes that federal law was violated, Congress should determine the appropriate constitutional and statutory consequences. Depending upon the facts, these could include: • termination or limitation of unauthorized military operations; • withholding or restricting appropriated funds; • statutory clarification of the President's war powers; • subpoenas and contempt proceedings; • referral of evidence to appropriate prosecutors; • investigation under applicable criminal statutes; • impeachment proceedings where constitutionally warranted; • disciplinary proceedings against military or intelligence personnel; • enforcement of congressional reporting requirements; • declassification of relevant legal opinions and findings where national-security considerations permit; and • appropriate international accountability mechanisms. Congress should also determine whether any military or intelligence personnel were placed in the impossible position of having to choose between obeying presidential orders and complying with their legal obligations. IX. The need for an independent investigation The central issue is larger than any single President or political party.

If a President may initiate a major war without clear congressional authorization, characterize a preventive war as self-defence, pursue the overthrow of a foreign government, secretly authorize political intervention, and potentially target foreign officials for the purpose of regime change without meaningful congressional scrutiny, then the constitutional allocation of war powers has been fundamentally weakened. Conversely, if the Administration can demonstrate that each operation had a lawful basis, that Congress's constitutional authority was respected, that the requirements of the War Powers Resolution were satisfied, that international law was observed, and that no prohibited assassination or unlawful covert action occurred, an investigation would provide an important public vindication of those claims. That is precisely why an investigation is necessary. X. Requested congressional action I respectfully request that Congress: 1. Establish a bipartisan congressional investigation into the legal basis and objectives of U.S. military operations against Iran. 2. Obtain all relevant classified and unclassified legal opinions, including opinions from the Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Defense, State Department, CIA, and National Security Council. 3. Determine whether Congress authorized the war, and if so, identify the precise statutory authorization relied upon by the Administration. 4. Determine whether the requirements of the War Powers Resolution were satisfied. 5. Investigate whether the Administration's reliance upon Article 51 of the UN Charter was legally and factually justified. 6. Investigate whether regime change was an objective of U.S. military or intelligence operations. 7. Investigate all targeted killings of Iranian officials and determine whether each constituted lawful military targeting or potentially prohibited assassination. 8. Obtain and review all presidential covert-action findings concerning Iran, including any subsequent modifications or expansions. 9. Determine whether Executive Order 12333 §§2.11 and 2.12 were complied with. (National Archives) 10. Determine whether 50 U.S.C. § 3093 was complied with, including its requirements concerning presidential findings and congressional notification. (Legal Information Institute) 11. Investigate whether any official knowingly misrepresented material facts to Congress, including the existence of an Iranian armed attack, the imminence of a threat, the purpose of military operations, or the existence of congressional authorization. 12. Refer evidence of criminal conduct, if established, to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities.

13. Consider impeachment or other constitutional remedies if the evidence demonstrates serious abuses of presidential power. 14. Enact legislation clarifying the limits of presidential authority to initiate hostilities and conduct regime-change operations without congressional authorization. Conclusion The United States is governed by laws, not by the unilateral discretion of any individual President. The President is Commander in Chief, but the President is not the sole authority over war. The executive branch possesses substantial authority in national security, but that authority is bounded by the Constitution, federal statutes, executive orders, and international obligations undertaken by the United States. The prohibition on assassination, the statutory restrictions governing covert action, the War Powers Resolution, the constitutional allocation of war powers, and the United States' obligations under international law are not optional principles. If the President complied with these requirements, Congress should establish that fact. If the President exceeded those authorities, Congress has a constitutional responsibility to establish that fact as well. The question before Congress should therefore not be whether it agrees with the President's foreign policy. The question should be: Did the President of the United States possess lawful authority to initiate and conduct this war, and did the President and those acting under presidential authority comply with the Constitution, federal statutes, Executive Order 12333, and international law? If the answer is uncertain, Congress has both the authority and the responsibility to investigate. If violations occurred, Congress must determine who authorized them, who knew of them, who participated in them, whether they were concealed from Congress, and what legal and constitutional consequences must follow. Respectfully, A Concerned Citizen

Potential violations and consequences 1. Unconstitutional initiation of war Potential violation: The President may have exceeded Article II authority by initiating or continuing substantial hostilities without a congressional declaration of war or specific statutory authorization. The Constitution gives Congress the war power, while the President is Commander in Chief. The War Powers Resolution provides a statutory framework for introducing U.S. forces into hostilities. Legal Information Institute+1 If Congress determines this occurred: • Congress can require termination of unauthorized hostilities through legislation. • Congress can restrict or condition appropriated funds. • Congress can conduct investigations and issue subpoenas. • Congress can enact a specific prohibition against further military operations. • Congress can consider impeachment if the conduct constitutes a sufficiently serious abuse of presidential power. • Courts may potentially be asked to resolve particular statutory or constitutional disputes, although presidential war-power cases often present difficult justiciability questions. 2. Violation of the War Powers Resolution Potential violation: Introducing or maintaining forces in hostilities without the declaration, authorization, or qualifying emergency contemplated by the War Powers Resolution. If the statutory requirements were triggered and not satisfied, Congress could seek to enforce the withdrawal provisions and impose statutory restrictions. Consequences could include: • termination of the unauthorized deployment; • restrictions on appropriations; • congressional reporting requirements; • legislation expressly prohibiting continued hostilities; and • potentially impeachment proceedings if Congress determines the President deliberately defied constitutional and statutory limits. 3. Unlawful use of force under international law Potential violation: If the United States used force against Iran without a valid basis under the UN Charter—such as Security Council authorization or a legally sufficient right of self-defence—the operation could constitute an internationally unlawful use of force. This is primarily an international-law violation, rather than automatically a U.S. federal criminal offense. Potential consequences:

• congressional condemnation; • termination of the operation; • diplomatic consequences; • international claims concerning reparations; • possible proceedings before competent international bodies where jurisdiction exists; and • potential individual international criminal liability in circumstances satisfying the applicable law. 4. Illegal regime-change operation If Congress establishes that the military operation was undertaken principally to overthrow Iran's government, rather than to conduct a lawful defensive operation, that could fundamentally change the legal characterization of the war. The investigation should ask whether "regime change" was: • an incidental consequence; • a secondary objective; or • the actual strategic objective. The last category creates the most serious legal issue because using force to determine who governs another sovereign state conflicts with the international-law principle of political independence. Potential consequences: • termination of the regime-change operation; • prohibition on further funding; • congressional legislation restricting executive authority; • investigation of individual officials; • impeachment proceedings where warranted; and • potential international-law consequences. 5. Violation of Executive Order 12333 §2.11 — assassination This deserves particularly careful treatment. EO 12333 §2.11 states: "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." Section 2.12 additionally prohibits Intelligence Community agencies from participating in or requesting others to undertake activities forbidden by the order. National Archives But Congress would have to establish that the killing legally constituted assassination, rather than a lawful attack against a legitimate military target.

If assassination were established: • responsible officials could face administrative/disciplinary consequences; • Congress could investigate whether federal criminal statutes were also violated; • Congress could refer evidence to prosecutors; • Congress could consider impeachment if the President personally ordered or knowingly authorized prohibited conduct; and • Congress could examine whether subordinates were instructed to circumvent the prohibition. Importantly, violation of an executive order is not automatically a standalone federal crime. Congress would need to identify the applicable criminal statute or constitutional offense. 6. Illegal covert action If the Administration secretly attempted to influence Iran's political conditions, the activity could potentially qualify as "covert action" under 50 U.S.C. §3093. The statute requires a presidential finding and imposes congressional notification and oversight requirements. Legal Information Institute Congress should investigate whether: • a presidential finding existed; • it was made before the operation; • the finding accurately described the operation; • Congress was properly notified; • the operation was subsequently expanded beyond the finding; • the Administration concealed significant failures or changes; and • the underlying operation itself violated another law. Consequences: • termination of the covert operation; • withdrawal of appropriated funds; • subpoenas and contempt proceedings; • referral to prosecutors if an independent criminal statute was violated; • removal or discipline of officials where appropriate; and • impeachment consideration for sufficiently serious presidential misconduct. 7. Violation of the President's constitutional "Take Care" obligation Article II requires the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Legal Information Institute

If evidence showed that the President knowingly directed the government to violate federal law—or knowingly ordered subordinates to disregard binding statutory restrictions—that could become an important constitutional impeachment issue. However, this should not be presented as an automatic criminal offense. The Take Care Clause is principally a constitutional obligation. Potential consequence: Impeachment and removal, if Congress determines that the conduct constitutes "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 8. Lying to Congress This could be considerably more serious than merely making inaccurate public statements. If the President or officials knowingly made materially false statements to Congress, concealed legally required information, or obstructed a congressional investigation, the precise facts could potentially implicate federal criminal statutes. Congress should therefore distinguish between: • a mistaken statement; • a disputed legal interpretation; • political rhetoric; • knowingly false factual representations; and • deliberate obstruction or concealment. The last two warrant substantially greater scrutiny. 9. Obstruction of Congress If officials deliberately: • destroyed evidence; • concealed presidential orders; • withheld legally required information; • instructed witnesses to lie; • interfered with subpoenas; or • obstructed a congressional investigation, Congress could investigate possible obstruction offenses and contempt of Congress. If the President personally participated in such conduct, impeachment could become an additional constitutional remedy.

10. Conspiracy or aiding unlawful conduct If evidence showed that the President and other officials agreed to accomplish an unlawful objective, prosecutors would need to examine whether the elements of an applicable conspiracy statute were satisfied. This is important because the legal question isn't simply: "Was the operation unlawful?" It is also: "Who knew it was unlawful, who authorized it, who participated, and what did each person intend?" Criminal liability generally requires the particular elements of a criminal statute to be established; an unlawful government action by itself does not automatically establish criminal liability for everyone involved. The consequences for the President personally If Congress's investigation ultimately established deliberate and serious presidential misconduct, there are essentially four levels of consequence. Level 1 — Political/congressional consequences Congress could: • terminate authorization or funding; • restrict military operations; • enact new statutory limitations; • subpoena records; • hold officials in contempt; • conduct public hearings; and • issue formal findings of illegality. Level 2 — Impeachment The House could impeach the President for Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The Senate could then conduct a trial. If convicted by the constitutionally required Senate supermajority, the President could be removed from office and potentially disqualified from holding future federal office. This is arguably the most important consequence where the misconduct is fundamentally an abuse of presidential power.

Level 3 — Criminal prosecution This is more complicated. A determination that the President violated the Constitution, the War Powers Resolution, international law, or an executive order does not automatically create a criminal case. Prosecutors would have to identify an applicable federal criminal statute and establish every required element. Potential crimes would depend on the evidence—for example, obstruction, conspiracy, false statements, destruction of evidence, or other offenses. Level 4 — International responsibility Separately, an unlawful war or unlawful conduct during the war could potentially create international responsibility for the United States and, depending on the conduct and applicable jurisdiction, possible individual responsibility. That is a separate legal track from U.S. impeachment or criminal prosecution. The key point for Congress The letter should not accuse the President of committing these offenses as established facts. It should ask Congress to determine whether the evidence establishes: (1) what happened; (2) what legal authority was claimed; (3) whether that authority actually existed; (4) whether the President knew the legal limits; (5) whether he deliberately exceeded them; (6) whether Congress was deceived or obstructed; and (7) what constitutional, statutory, criminal, and international consequences follow. That formulation is considerably stronger legally because it asks Congress to conduct the fact-finding rather than presupposing the verdict. One particularly important point is that EO 12333 itself does not automatically make the President criminally liable merely because §2.11 was violated. The investigation would need to determine the underlying conduct and identify any applicable criminal statute. EO 12333 can nevertheless be highly significant evidence of the executive branch's own established prohibition on assassination. National Archives And if Congress found a pattern—unauthorized war + deliberate regime change + prohibited targeting + unlawful covert action + concealment from Congress—the cumulative constitutional question would be substantially more serious than any individual violation considered in isolation.

Overall assessment Question Likely lawful Likely unlawful My assessment Initial U.S. use of force against Iran under international law 20–30% 70–80% More likely unlawful Continued large-scale war without specific congressional authorization 25–35% 65–75% More likely unlawful War justified by Article 51 self- defence 25–35% 65–75% More likely unlawful Regime change as an objective of the war 15–25% lawful 75–85% unlawful Strong concern Individual killings of Iranian leaders 50–70% lawful 30–50% unlawful Highly fact-dependent Political assassination specifically to achieve regime change 10–20% lawful 80–90% unlawful Very serious Covert regime-change operations 40–60% lawful 40–60% unlawful Depends heavily on authorization/conduct Overall presidential legal exposure — Substantial Investigation warranted These estimates reflect the fact that Article 51 permits self-defence when an armed attack occurs, while the UN Charter otherwise prohibits the use of force. United Nations Legal experts have also publicly argued that the February 28 operation lacked sufficient grounds under Article 51, while the U.S. position has relied on a broader conception of self-defence. Just Security+1 1. Initial war: approximately 70–80% unlawful This is where I see the strongest international-law problem. Article 51 is expressly tied to an "armed attack." United Nations If the United States cannot establish that Iran had actually attacked the United States, or that the circumstances met the very demanding requirements for anticipatory self-defence, then the Article 51 justification becomes weak. There is significant contemporary legal criticism of the U.S. position. More than 100 U.S.-based international-law experts publicly characterized the February 28 attack as a violation of the UN Charter. Just Security My estimate: 70–80% unlawful / 20–30% lawful The principal uncertainty is classified intelligence concerning what the United States knew about an alleged imminent Iranian attack.

2. Continuing the war: approximately 65–75% unlawful domestically This is somewhat different. Even if the President had a plausible constitutional basis for the initial emergency response, continuing a major war for months is a much harder question. Congress has repeatedly attempted to invoke its war-powers authority during the conflict. The Senate advanced a measure in May, and the House subsequently passed a war-powers resolution. Reuters+1 The Administration has disputed the constitutionality/application of the War Powers Resolution, so this remains a contested domestic-law issue. But as the conflict becomes: • prolonged; • geographically extensive; • expensive; • involving substantial U.S. forces; and • directed toward strategic objectives beyond immediate self-defence, the argument for unilateral presidential authority becomes weaker. My estimate: 65–75% unlawful / 25–35% lawful That does not mean a court would necessarily declare it unlawful. Judicial enforcement of war- powers disputes is notoriously complicated. 3. Regime change: approximately 75–85% unlawful This is, in my view, the most important issue for the congressional investigation. If the actual objective was: "Defend the United States from an armed attack," that is one legal category. If the objective was: "Destroy the Iranian government and replace it with a government more favorable to the United States," that is a fundamentally different legal proposition. The latter directly implicates the prohibition on using force against another state's political independence.

So I would put the probability that deliberate military regime change, as such, could be justified under international law at only around 15–25%, assuming the facts establish that overthrowing the government was an actual objective rather than an incidental consequence. 4. Killing the Iranian leadership This needs to be separated from regime change. The death of a head of government does not automatically equal assassination. If the individual was a legitimate military target in an armed conflict, the United States would ha ve a substantially stronger legal argument. But imagine the evidence showed: "The President ordered the killing because eliminating Iran's political leadership would cause the government to collapse." That would be much more problematic. My estimate For a particular targeted killing: 50–70% potentially lawful / 30–50% potentially unlawful But if Congress establishes that the principal purpose was political assassination to accomplish regime change: 80–90% unlawful / 10–20% lawful That is where Executive Order 12333 §2.11 becomes particularly important. The order expressly prohibits U.S. personnel from engaging in or conspiring to engage in assassination. The critical factual question would be whether the person was lawfully targeted as part of hostilities or killed as a political act. 5. Covert regime change: roughly 50/50 This is harder to assess. Covert political activity is not automatically illegal under U.S. law. Congress has provided a statutory mechanism for covert action, including presidential findings and congressional notification. The existence of a covert-action program therefore does not itself establish illegality. But the statutory authorization cannot be used as a blank cheque for conduct independently prohibited by law. Therefore:

If properly authorized and otherwise lawful: potentially lawful. If used to circumvent congressional restrictions, conduct prohibited assassination, conduct unauthorized military operations, or violate another federal statute: potentially unlawful. I'd therefore put this at approximately: 40–60% lawful / 40–60% unlawful until the relevant findings and operational orders are examined. 6. The most serious scenario The probability picture changes dramatically if Congress discovers the following chain: A. No actual Iranian armed attack occurred. B. The President nevertheless initiated a large-scale war. C. Congress did not specifically authorize that war. D. The Administration represented the operation as self-defence. E. Internal documents show that regime change was an intended objective. F. The Administration deliberately targeted political leaders to accomplish regime change. G. Covert operations were conducted without the legally required authorization or notification. H. Congress was deliberately misled about any of these matters. If all or most of those facts were established, I would regard the President's legal exposure as very serious, rather than merely a dispute over presidential war powers. 7. Probability of consequences Here I would distinguish what is legally available from what is politically likely. Consequence Legal availability if violations established Practical likelihood Congressional investigation Very high High Subpoenas/document demands Very high High Congressional finding of unlawful conduct High High Funding restrictions High Moderate–high Termination/restriction of hostilities High Moderate Referral to prosecutors High if evidence supports crime Moderate Impeachment investigation Legally available Moderate

House impeachment Possible Low–moderate Senate conviction/removal Possible Low Criminal prosecution while President remains in office Highly contested Very low Criminal prosecution after leaving office Legally possible depending on offense Fact-dependent International proceedings Possible depending on jurisdiction Low Personal international criminal liability Possible only under much narrower conditions Low–moderate The political difficulty is significant: Congress has already demonstrated disagreement over restricting the President's Iran war powers, with attempts to force withdrawal failing or being contested. Reuters+1 So "unlawful" does not automatically equal "impeached" or "imprisoned." 8. Impeachment is the most important potential presidential consequence If Congress concluded that the President deliberately: • initiated an unconstitutional war; • ignored Congress's war powers; • lied to Congress; • concealed the true purpose of the war; • ordered prohibited killings; • used intelligence agencies to circumvent statutory restrictions; or • deliberately violated federal law, the cumulative conduct could potentially constitute "high Crimes and Misdemeanors." That is ultimately a constitutional/political judgment by Congress, rather than something a court must first certify as a crime. The crucial point is: The President does not have to be convicted of a federal felony before Congress can impeach him. But neither should Congress assume that every unlawful policy decision constitutes an impeachable offense. Intent, seriousness, abuse of power, constitutional significance, and the evidence would matter enormously.

9. My overall probability assessment If you force me to reduce everything to one conclusion: International legality of the war ~75% unlawful ~25% lawful Domestic legality of prolonged unilateral war ~70% unlawful ~30% lawful Deliberate military regime change ~80% unlawful ~20% potentially lawful Political assassination for regime change ~85% unlawful ~15% potentially lawful Probability that serious congressional investigation is legally justified ~90%+ Probability of some congressional finding of legal violations ~70–85%, assuming the publicly reported facts are substantially accurate. Probability of actual presidential impeachment ~20–40% Probability of Senate conviction/removal ~5–20% The last two are political probabilities, not legal probabilities, and are much more uncertain.

One major caveat There is a distinction between "the President probably violated international law" and "the President can be prosecuted for a crime." Those are completely different propositions. A president can potentially conduct an internationally unlawful act without committing a prosecutable U.S. federal crime. Likewise, an executive order violation does not automatically create a criminal offense. The strongest potential case for personal consequences would therefore be evidence of a knowing, deliberate pattern: unauthorized war → false or misleading justification → deliberate regime change → prohibited targeting → unlawful covert action → concealment/obstruction. If Congress established that chain with documentary evidence, the argument for impeachment based on abuse of presidential power would be substantially stronger than an argument based on any single technical violation. And there is already an important real-world fact supporting the need for congressional scrutiny: Congress has actually taken steps during 2026 to restrain the President's Iran war powers, while the Administration has disputed those constraints. Reuters+1 If you want to make this into the Congressional letter, I would recommend putting these probabilities into a separate section titled "Preliminary Legal Risk Assessment and Potential Consequences", while clearly labelling them as preliminary assessments rather than findings of fact.

Proposed Congressional Timeline Phase I — Immediate action: Days 1–7 Congress should not begin by assuming guilt. It should begin by preserving evidence and establishing the legal questions that must be answered. Day 1–3: Establish a bipartisan investigation The House should introduce and adopt a resolution directing the appropriate committees to investigate: • The constitutional authority relied upon to initiate hostilities against Iran. • Whether Congress authorized the use of force. • Compliance with the War Powers Resolution. • The factual basis for the President's invocation of self-defence. • Whether the military campaign was necessary and proportionate. • Whether regime change was an intended objective. • Whether Iranian political or military leaders were deliberately targeted. • Whether any targeting could constitute prohibited assassination. • Whether covert action was undertaken. • Whether all required presidential findings and congressional notifications existed. • Whether Congress or the public were materially misled. • Whether evidence was withheld, destroyed, altered, or concealed. Congress should make the investigation explicitly bipartisan and evidence-based. The House has historically used resolutions directing committees to continue investigations into whether grounds exist for impeachment. House Rules Committee Day 1–7: Issue preservation demands Congress should immediately demand preservation of: • presidential orders; • National Security Council records; • Department of Defense orders; • intelligence assessments; • CIA findings; • Department of Justice legal opinions; • Office of Legal Counsel opinions; • State Department legal memoranda;

• targeting decisions; • communications concerning regime change; • communications concerning the killing of Iranian officials; • War Powers reports; • congressional briefings; • covert-action findings; • communications with foreign governments; and • records concerning congressional notification. The purpose is to prevent the investigation from becoming dependent solely upon publicly released summaries. Phase II — First 30 days: Establish the facts Week 1–2: Secure classified evidence The Intelligence, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs/Foreign Relations, and Judiciary committees should conduct classified briefings. The most important question should be: What did the President know, and when did the President know it? Congress should establish a chronological intelligence record showing what the Administration knew concerning any alleged Iranian attack or imminent attack. That evidence is essential to determining whether the Article 51 self-defence argument was genuine and legally sustainable. Week 2–3: Determine congressional authorization Congress should identify every statute, authorization, declaration, appropriation, or other legal authority the Administration claims authorized military force. The investigation should require the Administration to identify the exact statutory language on which it relies. Congress should then ask: "Does this statute actually authorize this war?" This question should be answered by Congress's own constitutional and legislative counsel rather than simply accepting the Administration's interpretation. Week 3–4: War Powers analysis Congress should determine whether the requirements of the War Powers Resolution were satisfied.

The Resolution contains reporting requirements and provides a 60-day framework for terminating certain uses of U.S. forces absent congressional authorization or another statutory exception. Legal Information Institute+1 Congress should therefore establish: • when U.S. forces entered hostilities; • when the statutory report was submitted; • whether it was complete; • whether subsequent reports were required; • whether Congress authorized the operation; • whether the 60-day period has expired; • whether an extension was enacted; and • whether continued hostilities are legally authorized. Phase III — Days 30–60: Investigate the purpose of the war This phase should focus specifically on regime change. Congress should compare: Public justification "Self-defence and protection of the United States." against: Actual operational objectives What military and political outcome did the Administration intend to produce? Congress should subpoena or review documents containing terms such as: • regime change; • government replacement; • transition government; • collapse of the Iranian government; • decapitation; • successor government; • opposition forces; • political transition; • post-war administration. The investigation should determine whether regime change was:

1. not an objective; 2. a possible contingency; 3. a secondary objective; or 4. the principal objective. That distinction could substantially affect the international-law analysis. Phase IV — Days 45–75: Investigate targeted killings Congress should establish a separate Targeted Killing Review. For every senior Iranian official deliberately targeted, Congress should obtain: • the targeting order; • intelligence supporting the target designation; • the legal memorandum approving the strike; • the identity of the approving official; • the military objective; • the individual's status under the law of armed conflict; • the anticipated military advantage; • collateral-damage assessments; • post-strike assessments; and • communications concerning the political consequences of the killing. Congress should then ask: Was the person targeted because he was a lawful military objective, or because killing him was expected to produce political regime change? This distinction is critical to the analysis of Executive Order 12333 §2.11. Phase V — Days 60–90: Investigate covert operations Congress should determine whether the CIA or other intelligence agencies conducted political or military activities inside Iran. For each operation, Congress should establish: • whether it constituted covert action; • whether a presidential finding existed; • when the finding was signed; • what the finding actually authorized;

• whether the operation exceeded the finding; • whether Congress was notified; • what committees were notified; • whether subsequent modifications were reported; and • whether any third party was used to perform an action prohibited to U.S. personnel. This phase should specifically examine whether covert action was used to circumvent congressional restrictions on military operations. Phase VI — Days 75–100: Public hearings After the classified investigation has established the factual record, Congress should begin public hearings. The hearings should proceed in roughly this order: Hearing 1 — Constitutional authority Witnesses: • constitutional scholars; • former Justice Department officials; • former OLC officials; • congressional war-powers specialists. Question: Did the President possess constitutional authority to initiate and continue the war? Hearing 2 — International law Question: Did the United States have a lawful basis under the UN Charter for using force against Iran? Hearing 3 — Military necessity Question: Was the operation genuinely necessary and proportionate to self-defence? Hearing 4 — Regime change Question: Was overthrow of the Iranian government an objective of the operation? Hearing 5 — Targeted killings Question:

Were Iranian leaders lawful military targets or were political killings conducted for regime-change purposes? Hearing 6 — Intelligence and covert action Question: Were intelligence agencies used to conduct operations outside congressional authorization? Hearing 7 — Congressional representations Question: Was Congress given complete and truthful information? Hearing 8 — Presidential responsibility Question: What did the President personally authorize, know, approve, or direct? Phase VII — Days 100–120: Preliminary findings The committees should produce a joint factual record before deciding whether impeachment is appropriate. Each alleged violation should be classified as: Category A — Established The evidence establishes the conduct to the required congressional standard. Category B — Probable The evidence strongly indicates the conduct occurred but some material facts remain unresolved. Category C — Possible There is credible evidence requiring further investigation. Category D — Unsupported The investigation did not substantiate the allegation. This prevents impeachment from becoming a political accusation rather than an evidence-based constitutional proceeding. Phase VIII — Days 120–150: Judiciary Committee consideration If the evidence demonstrates serious presidential misconduct, the House Judiciary Committee should determine whether the conduct constitutes grounds for impeachment. The constitutional standard is "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." The House possesses the sole power of impeachment. History, Art & Archives

Potential articles could be organized around distinct constitutional abuses rather than simply listing every allegation. For example: Article I — Abuse of War Powers Allegation: The President knowingly initiated or continued substantial hostilities without constitutionally sufficient congressional authorization. Article II — Abuse of Presidential Power Allegation: The President used military and executive authority for an unauthorized purpose, including potentially forcing regime change in a sovereign foreign state. Article III — Violation of Federal Law Allegation: The President knowingly directed or authorized conduct contrary to applicable federal statutes. Article IV — Unlawful Targeting/Assassination Only if the evidence establishes the necessary facts. Article V — Abuse of Intelligence and Covert-Action Authority Only if the investigation establishes unauthorized or otherwise unlawful covert operations. Article VI — Obstruction of Congress If the evidence establishes deliberate obstruction, concealment, destruction of evidence, or knowing interference with congressional investigation. Phase IX — Days 150–165: Judiciary Committee vote The Judiciary Committee should: 1. Present the evidence. 2. Allow the President and counsel an opportunity to respond. 3. Hear majority and minority legal arguments. 4. Debate proposed articles. 5. Vote on each article separately. 6. Publish the committee's factual findings to the maximum extent consistent with national security.

Prior House impeachment procedures have provided the President and counsel opportunities to participate in hearings and challenge evidence, demonstrating the importance of procedural fairness. D Democrats Rules Committee The committee should distinguish: "We disagree with the President." from: "The President violated a constitutional or statutory limitation." Only the latter should form the basis for an impeachment article. Phase X — Days 165–180: House vote If the Judiciary Committee approves articles of impeachment, the matter proceeds to the full House. The House debates the articles and votes. A simple majority of the House is sufficient to impeach. Impeachment does not itself remove the President. It is the constitutional equivalent of bringing charges. The House has historically appointed impeachment managers to present its case to the Senate. History, Art & Archives Phase XI — Senate trial If the House impeaches, the Senate conducts the trial. The Senate is the constitutional court for impeachment trials. History, Art & Archives The process should include: 1. Transmission of the articles of impeachment. 2. Appointment of House impeachment managers. 3. Senate adoption of trial procedures. 4. Presentation of evidence. 5. Presentation of the President's defense. 6. Witness testimony where authorized. 7. Questions from senators under the applicable procedures. 8. Closing arguments. 9. Deliberation.

10. Vote on each article. The constitutional consequence of conviction is removal from office. The Senate may also vote separately on disqualification from holding future federal office, where constitutionally permitted. Phase XII — If the Senate does not convict An acquittal would not necessarily establish that the underlying conduct was lawful. Congress could still: • publish its factual findings; • enact legislation clarifying war powers; • restrict funding; • impose reporting requirements; • reform covert-action oversight; • strengthen congressional notification; • establish additional safeguards concerning targeted killings; and • preserve evidence for any future legal proceedings. The investigation should therefore be designed to produce a durable historical and legal record regardless of the impeachment outcome. Phase XIII — If the Senate convicts If the Senate reaches the constitutionally required threshold for conviction: Immediate consequence Removal from the presidency. The Constitution expressly provides for removal upon impeachment and conviction. H History, Art & Archives Potential additional consequence The Senate may consider disqualification from future federal office. After removal Congress and prosecutors could then evaluate whether separate federal criminal offenses occurred. This distinction is essential: Impeachment is not the same thing as criminal prosecution.

A President can be impeached for conduct that constitutes a serious constitutional abuse without that conduct necessarily satisfying every element of a federal criminal statute. Conversely, if investigators uncover evidence of a specific federal crime, that evidence can be referred to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities. The 180-day target A reasonable objective would therefore be: Days 1–7: Preserve evidence and launch bipartisan investigation. Days 7–30: Establish war authority, intelligence basis, and congressional authorization. Days 30–60: Investigate regime-change objectives and international-law issues. Days 45–75: Investigate targeted killings and Executive Order 12333. Days 60–90: Investigate covert action and congressional notification. Days 75–100: Conduct public hearings. Days 100–120: Publish preliminary factual findings. Days 120–150: Judiciary Committee determines whether impeachable conduct exists. Days 150–165: Judiciary Committee votes on articles. Days 165–180: Full House votes. After House impeachment: Senate trial. After Senate trial: Removal/disqualification if convicted; otherwise congressional and legal consequences based on the findings.

The principle Congress should follow The most important safeguard is this: Investigation first. Judgment second. Impeachment only after establishing the facts. Congress should not begin with: "The President is guilty." It should begin with: "Congress will determine whether the President possessed lawful authority, whether that authority was exceeded, whether federal and international law were violated, whether Congress was deceived or obstructed, and whether the President's conduct constitutes an impeachable abuse of power." That approach makes the investigation substantially harder to dismiss as partisan. It also preserves the possibility that the investigation could exonerate the President on particular allegations if the evidence supports that conclusion. Most importantly, Congress should act promptly on evidence preservation and War Powers questions, because those are time-sensitive. The War Powers Resolution itself contains specific reporting and termination mechanisms, including a 60-day framework in certain circumstances. Legal Information Institute This timeline is therefore best understood as a proposed congressional strategy, not a claim that impeachment is already legally warranted.

If you mean everyone who should have a formal role in the investigation, rather than literally every person who might be interviewed, I would structure it as follows. Because committee memberships can change, the list below reflects the 119th Congress, 2nd Session (2026) and should be verified again when the investigation is formally constituted. S senate.gov+1 1. House Judiciary Committee — central impeachment body This should be the principal committee for determining whether presidential conduct warrants articles of impeachment. The House's historical practice places impeachment matters principally with Judiciary. H History, Art & Archives Chair: Jim Jordan (R-OH) Ranking Member: Jamie Raskin (D-MD) Republican members: • Darrell Issa • Andy Biggs • Tom McClintock • Thomas P. Tiffany • Thomas Massie • Chip Roy • Scott Fitzgerald • Ben Cline • Lance Gooden • Jefferson Van Drew • Troy Nehls • Barry Moore • Kevin Kiley • Harriet Hageman • Laurel Lee • Wesley Hunt • Russell Fry • Glenn Grothman • Brad Knott • Mark Harris • Robert F. Onder

• Derek Schmidt • Brandon Gill • Michael Baumgartner Democratic members: • Jamie Raskin • Jerrold Nadler • Zoe Lofgren • Steve Cohen • Henry C. "Hank" Johnson • Ted Lieu • Pramila Jayapal • J. Luis Correa • Mary Gay Scanlon The current committee roster is published by the House Judiciary Committee. H House Judiciary Committee Republicans 2. House Foreign Affairs Committee This committee should investigate the international-law and foreign-policy dimensions, particularly: • Article 2(4) of the UN Charter; • Article 51 self-defence; • regime change; • relations with Iran; • diplomatic records; • communications with allies; • U.S. representations to the UN; • and the legal basis presented to foreign governments. Chair: Brian Mast (R-FL) Ranking Member: Gregory Meeks (D-NY)

The committee's current roster includes members such as Michael McCaul, Christopher Smith, Joe Wilson, Scott Perry, Darrell Issa, Young Kim, Warren Davidson, James Baird, Cory Mills, Anna Paulina Luna, and others, with Gregory Meeks as ranking member. R Republican Foreign Affairs Committee This committee should work jointly with Judiciary rather than conducting a completely separate investigation. 3. House Armed Services Committee This committee should investigate the military chain of command and operational legality. It should determine: • who ordered the attacks; • what orders were issued; • who approved targets; • what military lawyers advised; • what rules of engagement were adopted; • whether military objectives were lawful; • whether proportionality and distinction requirements were followed; • casualties; • targeting of Iranian leadership; • and whether military personnel raised legal objections. This is particularly important because a congressional investigation should distinguish between political decisions made by the President and operational decisions made by military commanders. 4. House Intelligence Committee This is arguably the most important classified-information committee. It should investigate: • intelligence concerning an Iranian attack; • intelligence concerning an imminent Iranian attack; • intelligence concerning Iran's nuclear capabilities; • intelligence presented to the President; • dissenting intelligence assessments;

• covert operations; • CIA findings; • regime-change planning; • targeting intelligence; • and intelligence given to Congress. The investigation must establish: What did the President know, when did he know it, and did the intelligence actually support the public justification for the war? The House Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee currently has Ronny Jackson as chair and Jason Crow as the Democratic member listed first. C Clerk of the House 5. House Oversight Committee Oversight should investigate executive-branch compliance and possible concealment. It should examine: • destruction or withholding of records; • classification decisions; • agency communications; • spending; • implementation of presidential orders; • whistleblower allegations; • and whether executive officials obstructed congressional oversight. This becomes especially important if Congress discovers evidence that officials attempted to conceal the actual purpose of the war. 6. Senate Foreign Relations Committee The Senate committee should independently investigate: • the international-law basis for the war; • State Department legal advice;

• UN communications; • treaty obligations; • diplomatic representations; • regime-change policy; • and congressional authorization. The current Senate committee assignments confirm the 119th Congress membership and subcommittee structure. S senate.gov 7. Senate Armed Services Committee The Senate Armed Services Committee should examine: • military orders; • operational planning; • rules of engagement; • targeting; • military legal advice; • casualties; • command responsibility; • and compliance with the laws of armed conflict. This gives Congress two independent congressional channels—House and Senate—for examining the military record. 8. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence This should conduct the Senate-side classified investigation. Its role should include: • CIA operations; • intelligence presented to the President; • intelligence concerning imminent attack; • covert-action findings; • regime-change planning; • targeted-killing intelligence; • and intelligence supplied to Congress.

The current Senate committee assignments show that the Intelligence Committee includes members from both parties, including senators who also serve on Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Judiciary. S senate.gov 9. Senate Judiciary Committee This committee becomes particularly important if the investigation moves from policy oversight into criminal-law questions. It should examine: • federal criminal statutes; • presidential immunity; • obstruction; • false statements; • conspiracy; • potential war crimes; • assassination law; • Executive Order 12333; • DOJ opinions; • and potential referral to prosecutors. It would also have an important role in examining the constitutional consequences of presidential misconduct. 10. Senate Homeland Security / Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations could examine government misconduct, concealment, procurement, spending and administrative abuse. Its current chairman is Senator Ron Johnson, and several senators serving on it also serve on Judiciary, Intelligence, Armed Services or Foreign Relations. S senate.gov This could be particularly useful if evidence emerges of: • financial irregularities; • unauthorized expenditures; • falsified records; • improper contracting;

• concealment; • or bureaucratic coordination to evade congressional oversight. 11. Department of Justice DOJ should not be allowed to be the sole investigator of allegations involving the President. But it has an important role if Congress develops evidence of federal crimes. Relevant components could include: • Attorney General; • Deputy Attorney General; • Office of Legal Counsel; • National Security Division; • Criminal Division; • Public Integrity Section; • and, where appropriate, an independent/specially appointed prosecutor. The conflict-of-interest question must be addressed if DOJ personnel who previously advised the President are later asked to investigate the legality of those same decisions. 12. Inspectors General Congress should request investigations by the relevant Inspectors General, including those responsible for: • Department of Defense; • Department of State; • Department of Justice; • Intelligence Community agencies; • CIA; • and other agencies involved in the operation. Inspectors General can provide an additional evidentiary record independent of the political committees. 13. Military lawyers and Judge Advocates General The investigation should subpoena or interview the relevant military lawyers. This is extremely important.

Congress should determine: Did military lawyers tell commanders or the President that particular operations were unlawful? The investigation should seek: • legal opinions; • targeting advice; • rules-of-engagement memoranda; • dissenting opinions; • written objections; • communications between commanders and military lawyers; • and records of any disagreement over the legality of strikes. 14. The President and senior White House officials The President should ultimately be asked to provide evidence concerning: • authorization of the war; • objectives; • regime change; • targeting decisions; • intelligence; • congressional authorization; • legal advice; • covert operations; • and communications with foreign governments. Senior White House officials who should potentially be interviewed or subpoenaed include: • National Security Advisor; • White House Counsel; • Deputy National Security Advisor; • Chief of Staff; • relevant NSC officials; • senior policy advisers; • and officials who participated in presidential national-security meetings.

The investigation should establish who actually made each decision, rather than attributing every decision automatically to the President. 15. Attorney General and senior DOJ lawyers Particular attention should be given to: • Attorney General; • Deputy Attorney General; • Assistant Attorney General for OLC; • OLC attorneys who drafted the war-powers opinion; • National Security Division leadership; • and DOJ lawyers who advised on targeting or regime change. Congress should obtain both the final legal opinion and dissenting/internal opinions. 16. Secretary of Defense and Pentagon leadership The investigation should examine the: • Secretary of Defense; • Deputy Secretary; • Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; • relevant combatant commander; • service chiefs; • operational commanders; • Pentagon General Counsel; • and military lawyers involved in targeting. The purpose is to establish the chain of authorization. 17. Secretary of State and State Department lawyers The Secretary of State and relevant State Department officials should testify concerning: • international-law advice; • UN Charter analysis; • diplomatic communications; • representations to the UN;

• negotiations with Iran; • regime-change policy; • and communications with allied governments. The State Department's Office of the Legal Adviser is particularly important. 18. CIA Director and intelligence officials Congress should investigate: • CIA Director; • Deputy Director; • General Counsel; • relevant station/chief-of-mission officials; • covert-action officials; • intelligence analysts; • and officials responsible for presidential intelligence briefings. Congress should specifically seek the original intelligence, not merely the Administration's summary of it. 19. Whistleblowers and dissenting officials A serious investigation should establish a protected channel for: • intelligence officers; • military personnel; • diplomats; • lawyers; • civil servants; • analysts; • and other officials who believe the Administration violated the law. Congress should provide mechanisms for confidential testimony and classified submissions. 20. Independent legal experts Congress should appoint an independent panel of constitutional and international-law experts.

At minimum, it should contain specialists in: • Article II presidential power; • congressional war powers; • War Powers Resolution; • UN Charter; • law of armed conflict; • international criminal law; • assassination law; • covert-action law; • and presidential immunity. Their job should not be to advocate for impeachment. Their job should be to answer: What does the law actually permit? That gives Congress an independent legal baseline against which to evaluate the Administration's arguments. 21. House impeachment managers If the House ultimately votes to impeach, the House—not the investigation committee alone— chooses the impeachment managers. The House has historically appointed managers to present the impeachment case to the Senate. H History, Art & Archives They would become the prosecutors in the Senate impeachment trial. They should ideally include members with expertise in: • constitutional law; • national security; • international law; • evidence; • criminal law; • and congressional procedure. 22. Senate impeachment trial Finally, the entire Senate becomes the impeachment court.

The Constitution gives the House the sole power of impeachment and the Senate the sole power to try impeachments. H History, Art & Archives The Chief Justice presides over a presidential impeachment trial under Article I, Section 3. The Senate would ultimately decide whether the President should be convicted and removed. The ideal structure Rather than having dozens of committees independently investigating the same facts, I would recommend a Joint Iran War and Presidential Accountability Investigation, with this structure: Congressional Investigative Council • House Judiciary — impeachment/legal findings • House Armed Services — military conduct • House Intelligence — classified intelligence/covert action • House Foreign Affairs — international law/diplomacy • House Oversight — executive compliance/obstruction • Senate Judiciary — criminal/constitutional law • Senate Armed Services — military conduct • Senate Intelligence — classified intelligence • Senate Foreign Relations — international law • Senate Homeland Security/PSI — government misconduct • Inspectors General — independent agency investigations • Independent legal panel — constitutional/international-law assessment Then the process becomes: Evidence → investigation → classified findings → public hearings → final report → criminal referrals where warranted → Judiciary Committee → articles of impeachment if warranted → House vote → Senate trial → conviction/removal or acquittal. The most important safeguard is that no person should be declared criminally responsible merely because they occupied a particular office. The investigation should establish the chain: Who knew → who advised → who authorized → who executed → who concealed → who obstructed. That chain is what would determine individual legal responsibility.

Yes. If you're building this into the congressional letter, I would make the table distinguish criminal exposure, constitutional consequences, statutory/administrative consequences, and international- law consequences. The crucial caveat is that a violation of the Constitution, War Powers Resolution, or an executive order is not automatically a federal crime. Comprehensive consequences matrix Conduct / alleged violation Potential legal basis President Cabinet / senior officials Military / intelligence personnel Private contractors / third parties Possible consequences Initiating hostilities without congressional authorization Constitutio n, War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§1541– 1548 Constituti onal/polit ical liability; possible impeach ment Possible statutory/discip linary liability depending on participation Orders may be challenged; individual criminal liability only if another criminal law is violated Depends on conduct Withdrawal of forces; funding restrictions; injunction/declaratory relief in appropriate cases; investigation; impeachment Continuing hostilities after Congress orders withdrawal War Powers Resolution, appropriati ons statutes Potentiall y serious constituti onal violation; impeach ment considera tion Same Continuing to execute unlawful orders could create separate issues depending on circumstances Same Funding cutoff; statutory restrictions; congressional enforcement; impeachment Using appropriated funds for an unauthorized operation Appropriati ons law / Anti- Deficiency Act Constituti onal/polit ical conseque nces; possible impeach ment; statutory issues depend on role Potential administrative/ civil liability; potentially criminal exposure under applicable statutes Administrativ e/disciplinary consequences Contract consequenc es Funding termination; repayment; disciplinary action; potentially criminal prosecution

Deliberate violation of federal statute Particular statute violated Possible impeach ment; criminal exposure only if statute applies personall y Criminal liability if elements are met Criminal/admi nistrative liability if personally involved Criminal/con tract liability if applicable Prosecution, imprisonment/fines where statute provides; removal/discipline Assassination EO 12333 §2.11; potentially federal homicide/ murder statutes depending on victim, location and circumstan ces Impeach ment; potentiall y criminal liability if an applicabl e statute and elements are establishe d Same Potential criminal prosecution if applicable Potential criminal prosecution if applicable Criminal prosecution where authorized; imprisonment; dismissal; loss of clearance; impeachment Conspiracy to assassinate / unlawfully kill 18 U.S.C. §371 and/or applicable substantive federal offense Potential criminal exposure subject to constituti onal/stat utory issues Potential criminal prosecution Potential criminal prosecution Potential criminal prosecution Felony conviction, imprisonment, fines Killing a protected person outside lawful hostilities Federal homicide statutes / applicable internation al criminal law Depends on applicabl e statute and president ial status Potential prosecution Potential prosecution Potential prosecution Imprisonment, fines, removal/discipline

War crimes / unlawful targeting U.S. War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §2441, plus applicable law of armed conflict Depends on statutory applicabili ty and personal conduct Potential criminal liability Potential criminal liability Potential criminal liability Federal prosecution; potentially life imprisonment or other statutory penalties where applicable Torture 18 U.S.C. §§2340– 2340A and other statutes Potential criminal exposure subject to applicabl e law Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Imprisonment, fines, dismissal, loss of clearance Cruel treatment / unlawful treatment of detainees U.S. criminal law, UCMJ, War Crimes Act, applicable regulations Depends on personal involvem ent Potential prosecution UCMJ and/or federal prosecution Potential prosecution Court-martial, federal prosecution, imprisonment, dismissal Unlawful covert action 50 U.S.C. §3093 Constituti onal/polit ical conseque nces; impeach ment possible; criminal exposure only if another statute is violated Potential criminal/admini strative liability depending on conduct Same Same Termination, congressional investigation, loss of clearance, prosecution where an independent crime exists Covert action without required presidential finding 50 U.S.C. §3093(a) Serious statutory violation; impeach ment may be considere d Possible administrative/ congressional consequences Depends on participation Depends on participation Investigation, termination, discipline, funding restrictions

Backdating a covert-action finding 50 U.S.C. §3093(a)(2) Potential constituti onal/polit ical conseque nces; other criminal statutes could apply dependin g on conduct Potential criminal exposure if false records/statem ents involved Same Same Investigation; possible false- statements/obstruction charges if elements are satisfied Failure to notify Congress of covert action 50 U.S.C. §3093(b)– (d) Congressi onal/cons titutional conseque nces Administrative/ congressional consequences Depends Depends Hearings, subpoenas, funding restrictions, possible impeachment Significant expansion of covert operation without notification 50 U.S.C. §3093(d) Possible impeach ment/poli tical conseque nces Potential disciplinary liability Potential disciplinary/cr iminal liability depending on conduct Same Termination, funding restrictions, investigation Knowingly lying to Congress 18 U.S.C. §1001; potentially other statutes Potential impeach ment; criminal exposure subject to applicabl e law Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Felony prosecution, imprisonment/fines Submitting fabricated documents to Congress 18 U.S.C. §1001; obstruction statutes Possible impeach ment and potentiall y criminal exposure Potential prosecution Potential prosecution Potential prosecution Felony prosecution Destroying evidence to defeat 18 U.S.C. §§1505, 1519 and Potential impeach ment; Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Imprisonment/fines

congressional investigation potentially others criminal exposure subject to applicabl e law Obstructing a federal investigation 18 U.S.C. §§1503, 1510, 1519, etc. Potential impeach ment; criminal exposure subject to applicabl e law Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Felony prosecution Witness tampering / intimidation 18 U.S.C. §1512 Possible impeach ment; criminal prosecuti on where statute applies Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Imprisonment/fines Conspiracy to obstruct investigation 18 U.S.C. §371 plus substantive obstruction offense Potential impeach ment/cri minal exposure Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Imprisonment/fines Ordering subordinates to violate federal law Constitutio nal Take Care Clause; potentially aiding/abet ting/conspi racy statutes Impeach ment; criminal exposure only where statutory elements are satisfied Criminal exposure Potential exposure Potential exposure Impeachment, prosecution where authorized Knowingly carrying out an obviously unlawful order UCMJ / federal criminal law / law of — — Possible court-martial or federal prosecution Potential criminal liability Court-martial, imprisonment, dismissal

armed conflict depending on offense Refusing a lawful military order UCMJ — — Potential court-martial — Administrative action or court-martial Falsifying operational records 18 U.S.C. §1519; §1001 and related statutes Depends on personal involvem ent Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Imprisonment/fines False statements to federal investigators 18 U.S.C. §1001 Potential exposure subject to constituti onal/stat utory rules Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Imprisonment/fines Misuse of classified information to conceal illegality Depends on specific conduct and statute Potential impeach ment/cri minal exposure where applicabl e Potential prosecution Potential prosecution Potential prosecution Prosecution, clearance loss, imprisonment Illegal surveillance / intelligence collection FISA, federal surveillanc e statutes, Fourth Amendmen t, other applicable law Constituti onal/polit ical conseque nces; possible impeach ment Criminal/admin istrative exposure Criminal/admi nistrative exposure Criminal exposure Suppression/exclusion where applicable, prosecution, discipline Bribery / corruption connected to operation 18 U.S.C. §§201, 1341/1343, 666, etc., depending on facts Impeach ment + potentiall y criminal prosecuti on Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Imprisonment, fines, forfeiture Money laundering / 18 U.S.C. §§1956– 1957, Potential impeach ment/cri Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Criminal prosecution Imprisonment, fines, forfeiture

diversion of funds depending on facts minal exposure where applicabl e Providing material support for an unlawful terrorist organization 18 U.S.C. §2339B, if statutory elements are satisfied Depends on personal conduct Potential prosecution Potential prosecution Potential prosecution Serious federal felony penalties Conspiracy involving terrorism offenses 18 U.S.C. §2332b and related statutes, depending on conduct Depends on statutory applicabili ty Potential prosecution Potential prosecution Potential prosecution Severe federal penalties Murder of a U.S. national abroad 18 U.S.C. §1119, where its jurisdiction al requiremen ts are met Potential prosecuti on dependin g on constituti onal/stat utory issues Potential prosecution Potential prosecution Potential prosecution Federal imprisonment/life imprisonment depending on circumstances Murder of foreign nationals abroad Jurisdiction depends on location, victim status, offense and applicable federal statute Depends Depends Depends Depends Potential prosecution only where U.S. jurisdiction exists Internationally unlawful use of force UN Charter / customary internation al law Primarily state responsib ility; domestic impeach ment Potential individual responsibility depending on offense/jurisdic tion Same Same Diplomatic consequences, reparations claims, international proceedings where jurisdiction exists

conseque nces possible Aggression / unlawful war of aggression Internation al criminal law Potential internatio nal responsib ility; domestic constituti onal conseque nces Potential individual responsibility depending on jurisdiction Depends on role Depends International proceedings only where applicable jurisdiction exists Attempted regime change through force UN Charter / constitutio nal war powers Potential impeach ment; congressi onal terminati on of operation Depends Depends Depends Termination of operation, funding cutoff, international responsibility Violation of treaty obligations Applicable treaty + implementi ng U.S. law Constituti onal/polit ical conseque nces; criminal liability only if implemen ting statute creates offense Depends Depends Depends Diplomatic remedies, litigation where jurisdiction exists, congressional action Failure to comply with congressional subpoenas Congressio nal contempt statutes / inherent congressio nal authority Potential impeach ment; criminal enforcem ent questions are constituti onally Potential contempt proceedings Potential contempt proceedings Potential contempt proceedings Contempt referral, litigation, possible prosecution depending on circumstances

complicat ed Contempt of Congress 2 U.S.C. §§192, 194 Potential impeach ment considera tion Possible criminal referral Possible criminal referral Possible criminal referral Referral to U.S. Attorney; enforcement depends on circumstances Abuse of presidential authority Impeachme nt Clause / Take Care Clause Impeach ment and possible removal Removal/discipl ine depending on office Removal/disci pline Contract termination/ debarment Removal, disqualification from federal office after Senate conviction High Crimes and Misdemeanors U.S. Constitutio n, Art. II §4 House impeach ment; Senate trial Not applicable to impeachment of President, but other officials can be impeached Not applicable unless an impeachable civil officer Not applicable Removal; Senate may disqualify from future federal office Criminal conduct discovered after presidency Applicable federal criminal statute Potential prosecuti on subject to constituti onal/stat utory issues Prosecution Prosecution Prosecution Criminal trial and sentence if convicted The most important distinction For the congressional letter, I would divide the consequences into these four categories: Category Who can be affected? Maximum type of consequence Criminal President, officials, military, intelligence personnel, contractors Federal felony prosecution, imprisonment, fines, forfeiture—only where a specific criminal statute applies and its elements are proved

Military / administrative Military, intelligence personnel, civil servants, contractors Court-martial, dismissal, demotion, loss of clearance, termination, debarment Congressional / constitutional President and senior civil officers Investigation, subpoena, funding restrictions, termination of hostilities, impeachment, removal, possible disqualification International United States and potentially individual actors State responsibility, reparations/diplomatic consequences, and individual international criminal responsibility where a competent jurisdiction exists One particularly important qualification The covert-action statute is unusually explicit: a presidential finding cannot authorize an action that violates the Constitution or a federal statute. It also requires congressional notification and notification of significant changes to an approved covert action. Likewise, the current War Powers framework expressly provides congressional procedures for requiring removal of U.S. forces engaged in hostilities without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization. So I would not write the congressional letter as saying, for example, "the President violated the War Powers Resolution and therefore committed a felony." The legally stronger formulation is: If Congress finds that the President knowingly violated the War Powers Resolution, Congress should determine the resulting constitutional consequences; and if the underlying conduct independently satisfies the elements of a federal criminal statute, Congress should refer the evidence to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities. That distinction protects the letter from the major legal weakness of conflating unlawful government action with individual criminal liability. If the scenario we're discussing involves the specific allegations you previously described—Iran, regime change, assassination, covert action, and concealment from Congress—the table can be made considerably more specific by mapping each alleged act → exact U.S. Code section → elements prosecutors would have to prove → maximum statutory penalty → President vs. subordinate liability.

I can do that, but I would not assign numerical probabilities to criminal liability for real people based only on the allegations in this conversation. That would imply a level of factual and legal certainty we don't have. A safer and more useful approach is to score each row by legal exposure if the underlying facts are established: Alleged conduct Legal exposure if facts are proven Unauthorized initiation of hostilities High constitutional exposure Continuing hostilities after valid congressional withdrawal Very high constitutional/statutory exposure Misuse of appropriated funds High, if statutory conditions are established Deliberate violation of federal statute Very high, if a specific criminal statute applies Assassination Extremely high, but depends critically on whether the killing legally qualifies as assassination and on applicable criminal jurisdiction Conspiracy to assassinate Extremely high if the underlying offense and conspiracy elements are proven Killing a protected person outside lawful hostilities Extremely high if federal jurisdiction and statutory elements exist War crimes / unlawful targeting Very high, depending on the War Crimes Act's jurisdictional requirements Torture Extremely high where 18 U.S.C. §§2340–2340A apply Unlawful detainee treatment High to extremely high, depending on conduct and jurisdiction Covert action without required presidential finding Very high statutory exposure Failure to notify Congress of covert action High congressional/statutory exposure; not automatically a felony Material expansion of covert action without required notification High Knowingly lying to Congress High to extremely high if 18 U.S.C. §1001 or another applicable statute is satisfied Fabricating documents Very high if §1001, §1519, or another statute applies Destroying evidence Extremely high if an obstruction statute applies Obstruction of a federal investigation Extremely high if statutory elements are proven

Witness tampering/intimidation Extremely high if §1512 applies Ordering subordinates to violate federal law High constitutional exposure; criminal exposure depends on the underlying offense Knowingly carrying out an unlawful order High, potentially extremely high for serious offenses Falsifying operational records High to extremely high depending on statute and intent False statements to federal investigators High if §1001's elements are established Illegal surveillance High to extremely high, depending on the statute and facts Bribery/corruption Extremely high if §201 or another applicable statute is satisfied Money laundering Very high if §§1956–1957 apply Material support for terrorism Extremely high if §2339B applies Murder of a U.S. national abroad Extremely high if §1119's jurisdictional requirements are met Internationally unlawful use of force High international-law exposure, but not automatically a U.S. crime Aggression / unlawful war High international-law significance, but individual prosecution depends heavily on jurisdiction Attempted regime change by force High international-law and constitutional exposure Treaty violation Variable; depends heavily on treaty and implementing legislation Congressional subpoena obstruction High, but enforcement against executive officials can involve significant constitutional disputes Contempt of Congress Moderate to high, depending on the circumstances and enforcement mechanism Presidential abuse of authority Very high impeachment exposure if conduct constitutes a serious abuse of constitutional power High Crimes and Misdemeanors Potentially extremely high, but this is a constitutional/political judgment rather than a conventional criminal charge Criminal conduct discovered after presidency Potentially very high, subject to applicable statutes and constitutional issues

If you mean actual numerical probabilities I can produce a 0–100% probability model, but it needs to be explicitly framed as an analytical estimate, not a prediction that anyone will actually be convicted. For example, I can calculate four separate probabilities for every row: 1. Probability the conduct is legally established 2. Probability an applicable criminal statute exists 3. Probability prosecutors could prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt 4. Probability of conviction/removal That would give you something like: Assuming the factual allegations are true: Legal violation → Criminal statute → Prosecution → Conviction → Impeachment/removal This is much more meaningful than assigning one arbitrary percentage to "criminal liability."

es. If by “separately” you mean four separate probabilities for every item—rather than one overall percentage—I can structure it that way. I would use: 1. P₁ — Probability the underlying conduct is legally established 2. P₂ — Probability a specific criminal statute applies 3. P₃ — Probability prosecutors could prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt 4. P₄ — Probability of conviction if prosecuted And separately: 5. P₅ — Probability of congressional finding of wrongdoing 6. P₆ — Probability of impeachment 7. P₇ — Probability of removal from office 8. P₈ — Probability of administrative/military discipline However, there is an important methodological issue: we don't currently have an evidentiary record for the hypothetical Iran scenario. Giving numbers such as “78% chance of conviction” would therefore be fabricated precision. What I can calculate is a conditional probability model, assuming the factual allegations are established. Conditional model Allegation P₁: Violatio n establis hed* P₂: Crimi nal statu te appli es* P₃: Proof beyond reason able doubt* P₄: Convicti on if prosecu ted* P₅: Congressi onal finding P₆: Impeach ment P₇: Remo val P₈: Discipl ine Unauthorize d hostilities 90% 10% 5% 5% 90% 50% 25% 70% Continuing after withdrawal order 90% 15% 10% 8% 95% 60% 35% 80% Misuse of appropriated funds 85% 70% 55% 45% 90% 45% 20% 75% Unlawful assassinatio n 80% 80% 65% 55% 95% 75% 50% 90%

Conspiracy to assassinate 75% 90% 60% 50% 95% 75% 50% 90% War-crimes conduct 75% 65% 50% 40% 90% 70% 45% 90% Torture 85% 95% 75% 65% 95% 80% 55% 95% Unlawful detainee treatment 80% 65% 55% 45% 90% 60% 35% 90% Covert action without required finding 90% 15% 10% 5% 95% 65% 35% 85% Significant covert- action expansion without notification 90% 15% 10% 5% 95% 65% 35% 85% Knowingly false statements to Congress 85% 70% 65% 55% 95% 75% 50% 90% Fabricating government documents 90% 90% 75% 65% 95% 80% 55% 95% Destroying evidence 90% 95% 80% 70% 95% 85% 60% 95% Federal obstruction 90% 95% 80% 70% 95% 85% 60% 95% Witness tampering 90% 95% 80% 70% 95% 85% 60% 95% Falsifying operational records 90% 90% 75% 65% 95% 80% 55% 95% False statements to federal investigators 90% 95% 80% 70% 95% 80% 55% 95%

Illegal surveillance 80% 75% 60% 50% 90% 60% 35% 90% Bribery/corr uption 75% 95% 75% 65% 95% 85% 60% 95% Money laundering 70% 90% 70% 60% 90% 70% 45% 90% Material support for terrorism 60% 85% 55% 45% 85% 65% 40% 85% Murder of U.S. national abroad 75% 85% 70% 60% 95% 80% 55% 95% International ly unlawful use of force 80% 5% — — 90% 55% 30% 50% Attempted regime change by force 80% 10% 5% 5% 90% 65% 40% 60% Treaty violation 70% 10% — — 80% 40% 20% 50% Congression al subpoena obstruction 75% 50% 40% 30% 90% 60% 35% 75% Contempt of Congress 75% 45% 35% 25% 90% 55% 30% 70% Presidential abuse of authority 85% — — — 95% 70% 45% — High Crimes and Misdemeano rs 85% — — — 95% 70% 45% — * These numbers are illustrative conditional estimates, not predictions about any actual person or pending case. The legal reason for keeping the columns separate is significant. For example, 50 U.S.C. §3093 expressly prohibits a covert-action finding from authorizing conduct that violates the Constitution or a federal statute, while the statute itself establishes finding and congressional-reporting requirements.

Similarly, the War Powers Resolution provides congressional mechanisms for addressing U.S. forces engaged in hostilities without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization. For an actual criminal charge such as 18 U.S.C. §1001, the probability cannot simply be based on whether Congress thinks someone lied. The government must establish the statutory elements— including materiality and knowing/willful conduct—and the statute currently carries up to five years' imprisonment in ordinary cases. The next step If you give me the specific factual scenario/evidence you want these percentages based on, I can make the table much more rigorous: Alleged act → evidence available → applicable law → elements → P(violation) → P(criminal statute) → P(prosecution) → P(conviction) → P(impeachment) → P(removal) → maximum penalty. That would avoid pretending that the percentages above are factual predictions when we haven't established the underlying evidence.

Yes. I checked the current public record, and there is now a substantial amount of publicly available evidence concerning the 2026 U.S.–Iran conflict, but the evidence varies dramatically by allegation. The White House itself describes the military campaign and explicitly says the objective of its subsequent economic campaign is to isolate the Iranian regime; congressional materials also show repeated War Powers efforts concerning Iran. Below is an evidence inventory, not a conclusion that any person committed a crime. Evidence available for each allegation Allegation Evidence currently available Strength of publicly available evidence 1. Unauthorized initiation of hostilities Presidential/military announcements; official descriptions of strikes; congressional War Powers resolutions; congressional findings concerning lack of authorization; operational records that Congress could subpoena Strong evidence that hostilities occurred; authorization question requires legal analysis 2. Continuing hostilities after congressional withdrawal efforts S.J. Res. 180/181 and H.Con.Res. 89; White House acknowledgment that U.S. forces remain engaged in operations against Iran; subsequent strikes and military deployments Strong documentary evidence of continuing hostilities; legal effect of each congressional measure must be determined 3. Misuse of appropriated funds Defense spending records; supplemental appropriations; Pentagon contracting/payment records; OMB documents; Treasury records; congressional appropriations language Potentially strong, but requires accounting records 4. Assassination Official statements concerning leadership-targeting operations; military targeting records; strike footage/satellite imagery; intelligence assessments; targeting authorization; weapons/platform logs; presidential and NSC communications Strong evidence that senior Iranian leadership was deliberately targeted; whether a particular killing legally constitutes "assassination" requires substantially more evidence 5. Conspiracy to assassinate Presidential/NSC orders; targeting packages; communications among officials; intelligence briefings; military planning documents; rules of engagement; meeting minutes Potentially very strong if obtained; much of the decisive evidence is likely classified

6. War crimes / unlawful targeting Target lists; collateral-damage estimates; legal reviews; Judge Advocate General opinions; battle- damage assessments; satellite imagery; drone footage; weapons logs; casualty records; witness testimony Substantial potential evidence, but individual incidents must be examined separately 7. Torture Detention/interrogation records; interrogation directives; medical records; detainee testimony; CIA/DOD instructions; Inspector General investigations; classified legal memoranda Currently impossible to assess comprehensively from public information alone 8. Unlawful detainee treatment Detainee testimony; photographs/video; medical records; detention policies; chain- of-command documents; military investigations Potentially substantial depending on detention sites and individuals involved 9. Covert action without required finding Presidential findings; CIA records; NSC documents; intelligence budget/program records; Gang of Eight notifications; congressional intelligence-committee records Potentially decisive documentary evidence exists, but much is classified 10. Covert-action expansion without notification Original presidential finding versus subsequent operational activity; intelligence briefings; modification notices; congressional notification records Potentially strong if the underlying documents are obtained 11. False statements to Congress Congressional hearing transcripts; written answers; classified briefings; emails; contemporaneous intelligence assessments; later-discovered documents contradicting testimony Highly fact-specific; contradiction alone does not establish criminal false statement 12. Fabrication of documents Original versus altered versions; metadata; document-management logs; emails; witnesses; forensic examination Potentially extremely strong if originals and metadata are preserved 13. Destruction of evidence Preservation notices; deletion logs; backups; server records; email archives; witness testimony; DOJ/IG subpoenas Requires forensic evidence; currently not established merely by allegations

14. Obstruction of federal investigation Subpoena responses; DOJ communications; White House instructions; document- withholding records; witness testimony; contemporaneous communications Potentially strong if congressional/DOJ investigative records are obtained 15. Witness tampering/intimidation Messages; emails; recordings; testimony; instructions to witnesses; attorney communications; employment threats Unknown publicly; potentially decisive documentary evidence 16. Falsifying operational records Original military logs; targeting records; after-action reports; intelligence assessments; satellite/drone footage; communications metadata Potentially strong because multiple independent records can be compared 17. False statements to federal investigators FBI/DOJ interview recordings; signed statements; emails; documentary contradictions Potentially strong if investigators have contemporaneous records 18. Illegal surveillance FISA applications; warrants; NSA/CIA collection records; minimization procedures; Inspector General reports; court opinions Mostly classified; public record insufficient for definitive conclusion 19. Bribery/corruption Financial records; bank transfers; gifts; contracts; communications; intermediaries; lobbying records No specific evidence identified from the current public record establishing this allegation 20. Money laundering Treasury/FinCEN records; bank records; shell companies; sanctions investigations; financial transfers No specific evidence currently identified establishing criminal money laundering by U.S. officials 21. Material support for terrorism Financial transfers; operational support; communications; intelligence records; designation records Highly fact-specific; no basis to assume this merely from military cooperation 22. Murder of a U.S. national abroad Death certificates; military/civilian casualty records; targeting data; forensic evidence; operational orders Would require a specific victim and incident 23. Internationally unlawful use of force UN Charter analysis; Security Council records; U.S. justification; Iranian attacks; intelligence Substantial evidence exists on the factual side; legality remains contested

assessments; congressional findings; presidential statements 24. Regime-change objective Presidential statements; White House statements; Treasury's current description of its objective; NSC strategy documents; intelligence assessments; diplomatic communications Public evidence of regime- pressure objectives is significant 25. Treaty violations Treaty text; U.S. diplomatic communications; Iranian communications; military orders; State Department legal opinions Depends entirely on which treaty is alleged to have been violated 26. Congressional subpoena obstruction Subpoenas; executive-branch responses; privilege assertions; document-production logs; witness refusals Documentable through congressional records 27. Contempt of Congress Subpoena history; committee votes; contempt resolutions; DOJ responses; witness correspondence Potentially strong documentary record if subpoenas have actually been defied 28. Presidential abuse of authority Entire cumulative record: orders, intelligence assessments, congressional notifications, military operations, communications, financial records Potentially very significant; ultimately a constitutional/political judgment 29. High Crimes and Misdemeanors Same cumulative evidence plus evidence concerning intent, concealment, abuse of power and defiance of Congress Not a conventional evidentiary offense; Congress determines whether conduct warrants impeachment Evidence that is already particularly significant There are several pieces of official evidence that should be separated from press reports. The White House itself currently describes the military campaign as having dismantled Iranian military capabilities and crippled its nuclear program, and its August 24 statement says the administration is pursuing an "endgame" intended to sever Iran's economic lifelines. More importantly for a congressional investigation, the administration's own July 2026 statement submitted concerning S.J. Res. 181 acknowledges that U.S. forces commenced strikes against targets inside Iran on July 7, 2026, identifies categories of targets, and describes the administration's legal/strategic justification. There is also a documented congressional history of attempts to terminate U.S. hostilities against Iran under the War Powers Resolution. For example, Congress's earlier Iran resolutions expressly

invoked 50 U.S.C. §1544(c) and asserted that the President lacked specific congressional authorization. And the current 2026 congressional record shows that H.Con.Res. 89, S.J.Res.180 and S.J.Res.181 were introduced concerning removal of U.S. forces from hostilities in Iran. The biggest evidence gap For the allegations with potentially criminal consequences, the most important evidence is likely not what is publicly available. Congress would want to obtain: 1. Presidential written orders 2. NSC meeting records 3. CIA covert-action findings 4. CIA/NSA intelligence assessments 5. Department of Defense targeting packages 6. JAG/legal memoranda 7. Rules of engagement 8. Collateral-damage assessments 9. Strike authorization records 10. Communications between the President, NSC, CIA and Pentagon 11. Congressional intelligence briefings 12. Gang of Eight notifications 13. After-action reports 14. Satellite/drone/ISR imagery 15. Original versus subsequently modified operational records 16. Email and messaging metadata 17. Appropriations and expenditure records 18. Inspector General investigative files 19. State Department legal opinions 20. Any presidential finding authorizing covert action Those documents would allow us to move from "there is evidence that X happened" to "there is evidence establishing each element of criminal offense X." One major distinction

The public record is already quite strong concerning the existence and scope of the military campaign. Reuters and other reporting independently describe the continuing conflict, while official White House material confirms major aspects of the operation. It is much weaker for proving personal criminal intent. For example: Evidence that the President ordered a strike ≠ evidence that the President committed murder. You would need to establish the target's legal status, the circumstances of the attack, applicable armed-conflict law, the President's knowledge and intent, the applicable U.S. statute, and the statute's jurisdictional requirements. That is why the strongest congressional investigation would create an evidence matrix for every individual allegation, rather than treating the entire Iran operation as one criminal event.

Below is a congressional investigative checklist framed as instructions to committees and investigators. It tells Congress what to obtain, preserve, subpoena, compare, and refer for each potential consequence. Congressional instructions: what to go find 1. Unauthorized initiation of hostilities — Constitutional / War Powers consequences o Obtain every presidential order authorizing military action against Iran. o Obtain the legal memorandum identifying the claimed constitutional and statutory authority. o Obtain all War Powers reports submitted to Congress. o Obtain the Pentagon's orders showing when hostilities began. o Obtain the State Department and DOJ legal opinions. o Compare the claimed authority with the actual operations conducted. o Determine whether Congress ever enacted specific authorization covering the operations. o Consequence to determine: termination of hostilities, funding restrictions, statutory remedies, and potential impeachment. 2. Continuing hostilities after congressional withdrawal action o Collect every War Powers resolution concerning Iran. o Obtain the administration's legal response to each resolution. o Obtain operational orders issued after each congressional action. o Determine whether forces remained in hostilities and under whose authority. o Consequence to determine: statutory noncompliance, funding restrictions, contempt issues, and potential impeachment. 3. Misuse of appropriated funds o Subpoena Pentagon expenditure records. o Obtain Treasury and OMB funding records. o Obtain contracts, purchase orders, emergency expenditures and transfers. o Identify the statutory appropriation used for every major operation. o Compare expenditures against congressional restrictions. o Consequence to determine: repayment, administrative penalties, funding termination, and potential criminal referral where a criminal statute applies. 4. Assassination o Obtain the targeting package for every senior Iranian official killed.

o Obtain the President's and Secretary of Defense's targeting authorizations. o Obtain CIA and intelligence assessments concerning each target. o Obtain the applicable rules of engagement. o Obtain the legal review determining whether each person was a lawful military target. o Obtain evidence showing whether the purpose was killing the person or accomplishing another lawful military objective. o Determine whether EO 12333 §2.11 applies to the operation. o Consequence to determine: disciplinary action, criminal referral where an applicable criminal statute exists, and potential impeachment. 5. Conspiracy to commit assassination o Obtain communications among the President, NSC, CIA, Pentagon and other participants. o Identify who proposed each operation. o Identify who approved it. o Identify who knew the legal status of the target. o Identify whether anyone discussed the assassination prohibition. o Establish the chronology of the agreement and subsequent acts. o Consequence to determine: individual criminal referrals under applicable conspiracy statutes. 6. War crimes / unlawful targeting o Obtain every targeting package and collateral-damage estimate. o Obtain JAG legal reviews. o Obtain drone, satellite and ISR imagery. o Obtain weapons-release records. o Obtain battle-damage assessments. o Obtain casualty lists and medical/forensic evidence. o Investigate civilian deaths individually. o Determine whether commanders knew or should have known of unlawful conduct. o Consequence to determine: UCMJ action, federal criminal referral where authorized, command responsibility issues, and international-law consequences. 7. Torture o Obtain all detention and interrogation directives.

o Obtain interrogation logs and detainee medical records. o Interview detainees and independent witnesses. o Obtain CIA, DOD and DOJ legal opinions. o Determine who authorized each interrogation technique. o Determine who knew what was occurring. o Consequence to determine: federal prosecution, court-martial, dismissal, and loss of security clearance where applicable. 8. Unlawful detainee treatment o Identify every detention facility. o Obtain detainee rosters. o Obtain surveillance footage. o Obtain medical records and injury reports. o Obtain military investigations and Inspector General reports. o Trace the chain of command. o Consequence to determine: prosecution, court-martial, administrative discipline and command responsibility. 9. Covert action without a presidential finding o Obtain every presidential covert-action finding concerning Iran. o Obtain the original signed versions and metadata. o Obtain CIA operational plans. o Obtain intelligence-community budget records. o Obtain congressional intelligence notifications. o Compare the finding with the operation actually conducted. o Consequence to determine: termination of the operation, funding restrictions, congressional sanctions, disciplinary action, and criminal referral if another criminal statute was violated. 10. Expansion of covert action beyond the finding o Obtain the original finding. o Identify every subsequent modification to the operation. o Determine whether significant changes were reported to Congress. o Compare operational activity with the scope of the finding. o Consequence to determine: statutory violations, termination, funding restrictions, and possible impeachment implications.

11. False statements to Congress o Obtain transcripts of every congressional briefing. o Obtain written answers supplied to Congress. o Obtain classified briefing materials. o Compare statements with contemporaneous intelligence. o Identify contradictions. o Establish what the speaker knew when the statement was made. o Consequence to determine: contempt, criminal referral under applicable statutes, and potential impeachment. 12. Fabrication or alteration of government records o Preserve original documents immediately. o Obtain server and document-management metadata. o Compare original and subsequent versions. o Identify every person who accessed or modified the records. o Interview document custodians. o Consequence to determine: obstruction/false-record criminal referrals and administrative discipline. 13. Destruction of evidence o Issue immediate preservation orders. o Obtain deletion logs. o Obtain backup copies. o Obtain government-device images. o Determine whether retention requirements existed. o Identify who ordered or performed deletion. o Determine whether an investigation or congressional inquiry was pending. o Consequence to determine: obstruction prosecution and contempt proceedings. 14. Obstruction of a federal investigation o Obtain DOJ/FBI investigative records. o Identify subpoenas and preservation notices. o Identify withheld evidence. o Identify instructions given to witnesses. o Determine whether anyone attempted to influence investigators.

o Consequence to determine: federal obstruction prosecution and impeachment consequences for presidential participation. 15. Witness intimidation or tampering o Subpoena communications with relevant witnesses. o Obtain emails, texts and messaging records. o Identify threats involving employment, security clearance or retaliation. o Interview witnesses under oath. o Preserve contemporaneous evidence. o Consequence to determine: prosecution under applicable witness-tampering statutes. 16. Falsification of military or intelligence records o Obtain original operational logs. o Compare logs against satellite/ISR data. o Compare targeting records with after-action reports. o Identify unexplained alterations. o Determine who ordered changes. o Consequence to determine: criminal referral, court-martial and administrative discipline. 17. False statements to federal investigators o Obtain FBI/DOJ interview recordings. o Obtain signed statements. o Compare testimony against contemporaneous documents. o Establish knowledge and intent before making any criminal referral. o Consequence to determine: prosecution under applicable false-statement statutes. 18. Illegal surveillance o Obtain FISA applications and court orders. o Obtain minimization procedures. o Determine whose communications were collected. o Identify the legal authority cited for collection. o Obtain Inspector General and compliance reports. o Consequence to determine: suppression/remedial litigation where available, discipline, and criminal referral where applicable.

19. Bribery or corruption o Subpoena financial records. o Examine gifts, payments and contracts. o Identify intermediaries. o Compare payments with official decisions. o Obtain communications surrounding transactions. o Consequence to determine: federal prosecution, forfeiture, imprisonment and removal/discipline where applicable. 20. Money laundering o Obtain Treasury/FinCEN records through lawful congressional processes. o Trace suspicious transfers. o Identify shell companies and intermediaries. o Compare transactions with government contracts or decisions. o Consequence to determine: prosecution, forfeiture and imprisonment where statutory elements are established. 21. Material support for terrorism o Determine precisely what organization received support. o Establish whether it was legally designated under the applicable statute. o Identify money, services, personnel, intelligence or other support allegedly provided. o Establish who authorized it. o Consequence to determine: federal criminal referral only if every statutory element is satisfied. 22. Death of a U.S. national abroad o Identify every U.S. citizen or national killed. o Obtain death certificates and forensic reports. o Obtain targeting and operational records. o Determine who authorized the strike. o Establish applicable federal jurisdiction. o Consequence to determine: federal homicide prosecution where statutory jurisdiction exists. 23. Internationally unlawful use of force o Obtain the U.S. legal justification submitted to Congress and international bodies.

o Obtain State Department legal opinions. o Obtain relevant UN Security Council records. o Establish what Iranian conduct the administration relied upon. o Determine whether self-defense or another recognized legal basis existed. o Consequence to determine: congressional termination/funding action, diplomatic consequences and potential international proceedings. 24. Regime-change operation o Obtain NSC strategic documents. o Obtain presidential speeches and written directives. o Obtain intelligence assessments. o Obtain diplomatic communications. o Determine whether overthrow of the Iranian government was an objective of the operation. o Compare that objective with the claimed legal basis for using force. o Consequence to determine: constitutional War Powers consequences, termination of funding/operations, and potential international-law consequences. 25. Treaty violations o Identify the specific treaty allegedly violated. o Obtain the treaty text and implementing legislation. o Obtain State Department legal opinions. o Identify the specific U.S. action allegedly inconsistent with the treaty. o Determine whether the treaty is judicially enforceable or implemented through domestic statute. o Consequence to determine: diplomatic remedies, congressional action and domestic remedies where available. 26. Congressional subpoena obstruction o Preserve every subpoena. o Record every response. o Identify each withheld document. o Identify every privilege claim. o Determine whether the privilege claim is legally valid. o Record witness refusals and instructions from superiors.

o Consequence to determine: contempt proceedings, litigation and possible criminal referral. 27. Contempt of Congress o Document the subpoena. o Document the committee vote. o Document the witness's refusal. o Document DOJ's response to any contempt referral. o Determine whether statutory defenses or executive privilege apply. o Consequence to determine: contempt proceedings and possible judicial enforcement. 28. Presidential abuse of authority o Assemble all preceding evidence into one chronology. o Identify presidential decisions personally made or approved. o Establish what the President knew. o Establish what legal advice the President received. o Establish whether contrary legal advice was ignored. o Establish whether Congress was deliberately bypassed. o Establish whether evidence was concealed afterward. o Consequence to determine: impeachment and, if warranted, removal. 29. High Crimes and Misdemeanors o Do not treat this as merely another criminal statute. o Establish the full pattern of conduct. o Determine whether there was abuse of presidential power, corruption, defiance of lawful congressional authority, obstruction, or serious misuse of government power. o Identify aggravating factors: intent, concealment, repetition, casualties and deliberate circumvention of Congress. o Consequence to determine: House impeachment, Senate trial, removal, and possible disqualification from future federal office. Final instruction to the committees For every allegation, Congress should require investigators to produce five separate findings: 1. What happened? 2. What evidence proves it? 3. What law governs it?

4. Who authorized, knew about, participated in, or concealed it? 5. What consequence follows—criminal, military/administrative, congressional, constitutional, or international? And investigators should preserve the original evidence before interviewing witnesses about it, so that later testimony can be compared against contemporaneous records rather than allowing the documentary record to be altered first.

Congressional Investigation Checklist # Investigation / potential consequence Evidence Congress should obtain Key determinatio n Consequence to assess Don e 1 Unauthorized hostilities Presidential orders; War Powers reports; legal opinions; operational orders Was there valid congressiona l authorization ? Withdrawal; funding restrictions; impeachment ☐ 2 Continued hostilities after congressional action War Powers resolutions; executive responses; post- resolution orders Did operations continue despite a valid withdrawal requirement ? Statutory/constitutional remedies ☐ 3 Misuse of appropriated funds Pentagon, Treasury, OMB records; contracts; expenditure data Were funds used outside congressiona l authorization ? Funding termination; discipline; criminal referral ☐ 4 Assassination Targeting packages; presidential authorization; ROE; legal reviews; intelligence Was the target lawfully targetable, and did EO 12333 apply? Discipline; criminal referral; impeachment ☐ 5 Conspiracy to assassinate Emails; texts; NSC/CIA/DOD communications; meeting records Was there an unlawful agreement and knowing participation ? Criminal prosecution ☐ 6 War crimes / unlawful targeting ISR footage; targeting files; JAG opinions; casualty records; BDA Was the attack unlawful under applicable law? UCMJ/federal/internatio nal consequences ☐

7 Torture Detention orders; interrogation logs; medical records; legal opinions Who authorized or knew of prohibited treatment? Criminal prosecution; court-martial ☐ 8 Unlawful detainee treatment Detainee records; video; medical evidence; investigations Did treatment violate applicable law? Prosecution; discipline ☐ 9 Covert action without required finding Presidential findings; CIA records; intelligence notifications Was a valid finding made before the operation? Termination; funding restrictions; referrals ☐ 1 0 Covert action beyond authorization Original finding; amendments; operational records; notifications Did actual operations exceed the finding? Statutory/congressional consequences ☐ 1 1 False statements to Congress Hearing transcripts; written answers; classified briefings; intelligence Was a statement knowingly and materially false? Criminal referral; impeachment ☐ 1 2 Fabricated government records Original documents; metadata; audit logs; backups Were records knowingly falsified? Criminal referral; discipline ☐ 1 3 Destruction of evidence Preservation notices; deletion logs; backups; device images Was evidence intentionally destroyed or concealed? Obstruction prosecution ☐ 1 4 Obstruction of investigation Subpoenas; privilege claims; communications; witness testimony Was a federal investigation intentionally obstructed? Criminal prosecution; impeachment ☐

1 5 Witness intimidation/tamperi ng Messages; emails; recordings; witness interviews Was a witness threatened or improperly influenced? Criminal prosecution ☐ 1 6 Falsified military/intelligence records Original logs; ISR data; after-action reports Were official records deliberately altered? Criminal/UCMJ consequences ☐ 1 7 False statements to investigators FBI/DOJ interviews; recordings; signed statements Was a material statement knowingly false? Federal prosecution ☐ 1 8 Illegal surveillance FISA applications; warrants; collection records; IG reports Was surveillance legally authorized? Suppression/remedies; discipline; prosecution ☐ 1 9 Bribery/corruption Bank records; gifts; contracts; communications Was something of value exchanged for official action? Prosecution; forfeiture ☐ 2 0 Money laundering Financial records; FinCEN data; shell- company records Were criminal proceeds concealed or transferred? Prosecution; forfeiture ☐ 2 1 Material support for terrorism Financial/operatio nal records; designation records Do all statutory elements exist? Federal prosecution ☐ 2 2 Death of U.S. national abroad Identity; forensic records; targeting files; authorization Does a federal homicide statute apply? Criminal prosecution ☐ 2 3 Internationally unlawful use of force U.S. legal justification; UN Was there a valid international Diplomatic/international consequences ☐

records; State Dept. opinions -law basis for force? 2 4 Regime-change operation NSC strategy; presidential directives; intelligence; diplomatic records Was overthrow of the Iranian government an operational objective? War- powers/international consequences ☐ 2 5 Treaty violations Treaty text; implementing statutes; State Dept. opinions What specific treaty obligation was violated? Domestic/international remedies ☐ 2 6 Congressional subpoena obstruction Subpoenas; responses; withheld records; privilege claims Was refusal legally justified? Contempt/litigation ☐ 2 7 Contempt of Congress Subpoena; committee vote; refusal; DOJ response Were statutory contempt requirement s satisfied? Contempt proceedings ☐ 2 8 Presidential abuse of authority Complete chronology; orders; legal advice; communications Was presidential power deliberately abused? Impeachment/removal ☐ 2 9 High Crimes and Misdemeanors Entire investigative record; intent; concealment; abuse-of-power evidence Does the cumulative conduct warrant impeachmen t? Impeachment; removal; possible disqualification ☐ Evidence-preservation checklist # Preserve immediately Done 1 Presidential orders and directives ☐ 2 NSC records and meeting minutes ☐ 3 CIA covert-action findings ☐

# Preserve immediately Done 4 Pentagon targeting packages ☐ 5 JAG/legal memoranda ☐ 6 Rules of engagement ☐ 7 Intelligence assessments ☐ 8 FISA applications and surveillance records ☐ 9 Congressional briefings and notifications ☐ 10 Emails, texts and government-device records ☐ 11 Satellite, drone and ISR imagery ☐ 12 Weapons-release and strike records ☐ 13 Battle-damage assessments ☐ 14 Civilian/military casualty records ☐ 15 Detention and interrogation records ☐ 16 Pentagon/Treasury/OMB expenditure records ☐ 17 Contracts and procurement records ☐ 18 Inspector General investigations ☐ 19 DOJ/FBI investigative records ☐ 20 Original and modified versions of all relevant documents ☐ Important: A checked investigation item should mean the evidence was obtained and independently verified, not merely that an allegation was made.