COMMUNIST STATES in the twentieth century ROBIN BUNCE ANDREW FLINT PETER CLEMENTS HISTORY + FOR EDEXCEL A LEVEL
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iii CONTENTS Introduction v Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1917–85 2 1a: Establishing Communist Party control, 1917–24 4 1b: Stalin in power, 1928–53 15 1c: Reform, stability and stagnation, 1953–85 28 Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 40 2a: Towards a command economy, 1917–28 42 2b: Industry and agriculture in the Stalin era 50 2c: Changing economic priorities, 1953–85 60 Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 70 3a: Media, propaganda and religion 71 3b: The secret police 82 3c: The state and cultural change 95 Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 108 4a: Social security 109 4b: Women and the family 120 4c: Education and young people 132 Historical interpretations 144 What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? 144 Paper 2 Mao’s China, 1949–76 The Big Picture Key Topic 1 Establishing communist rule, 1949–57 200 Section 1: China in 1949 201 Section 2: The new power structure 207 Section 3: Defeating the CCP’s opponents 211 Section 4: China and the Korean War 219 Key Topic 2 Agriculture and industry, 1949–65 231 Section 1: Early changes in agriculture, 1949–57 232 Section 2: The communes 236 Section 3: The First Five-Year Plan, 1952–56 239 Section 4: The Second Five-Year Plan, 1958– 62 242
iv Contents Key Topic 3 The Cultural Revolution and its aftermath, 1966–76 258 Section 1: Mao’s reasons for launching the Cultural Revolution 258 Section 2: The Red Guards and Red Terror 263 Section 3: Attacks on Mao’s political and class enemies 273 Section 4: Winding down the Cultural Revolution, 1968–76 277 Key Topic 4 Social and cultural changes, 1949–76 286 Section 1: The changing status of women 287 Section 2: Education and health provision 295 Section 3: Cultural change 301 Section 4: Religion 304 Paper 2 The German Democratic Republic, 1949–90 The Big Picture Key Topic 1 Establishing and consolidating communist rule in the GDR, 1949–61 322 Section 1: The post-war division of Germany 323 Section 2: The system of government 332 Section 3: Economic developments, 1949–61 337 Section 4: Defending the GDR, 1949–61 343 Key Topic 2 The development of the East German state, 1961–85 355 Section 1: Economic stabilisation after 1961 356 Section 2: The development of a GDR identity 361 Section 3: Relations with West Germany 365 Section 4: Growing international prestige 369 Key Topic 3 Life in East Germany, 1949–85 382 Section 1: Social change and welfare programmes 382 Section 2: Repression and control 391 Section 3: The SED and the Protestant Churches 398 Section 4: Western influences on the GDR 402 Key Topic 4 Growing crises and the collapse of communist rule in the GDR, 1985–90 410 Section 1: Economic stagnation in the 1980s 411 Section 2: Gorbachev’s influence 416 Section 3: The events of 1989 422 Section 4: The end of the GDR, 1989–90 426 Glossary 441 Acknowledgments 449 Answers 454 Index 455
v INTRODUCTION History+ for Edexcel A Level: Communist states in the twentieth century supports Edexcel’s Route E. Specifically, it supports the following papers: ● Paper 1E: Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin ● Paper 2E.1: Mao’s China, 1949–76 ● Paper 2E.2: The Germa n Democratic Republic, 1949–90 About the course Your overall A level Histor y course for the Edexcel specification includes three externa lly exam ined papers and coursework. If you are studying AS History, there are two externally examined papers. The papers are: ● Paper 1: Breadth study with interpretations (AS and A level) ● Paper 2: Depth study (AS and A level) ● Paper 3: Themes in breadth with aspects in depth (A level only). This book covers the breadth study with interpretations ‘Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin’ and two depth studies of which you must study one: ‘Mao’s China, 1949–76’ or ‘The Germ an Democratic Republic, 1949–90’. How to use this book This book had been designed to help you develop the knowledge and skills necessary to succeed in Paper 1 and Paper 2. The book divides into three main parts, dealing w ith Paper 1, Paper 2.1 and Paper 2.2 respectively. The structure of each part parallels the structure of the specification. Therefore: ● Paper 1 has four themes, each divided into three chapters, and a final section dealing with the historical interpretation, again divided into four chapters. Each theme and historical interpretation begins with a Big Picture, setting the scene for the material which follows. ● Paper 2 starts with a Big Picture overview of the whole period and then is divided into four chapters dealing with the four key topics of the specification. Each chapter begins with an overview of the theme, topic or interpretation discussed to set it in context, and ends with a chapter summary to help with revision of the key points included in the chapter. Summary d iagrams at the end of chapters should also help with revision. There are a series of other features throughout the book to aid your understanding of the period and develop your essay writing skills. Essay writing skills There are features throughout the book to help develop your essay writing ski lls. The ski lls developed by the book will directly relate to the skills necessary to do well in the AS and A level exams. Essay technique sections at the end of chapters develop essay skills. These include how to: ● focus on the question ● structure your answer ● deploy detail ● analyse ● create and sustain a balanced argument and, where necessary, how to approach the sources and extracts that accompany some exam questions. Practice questions provide exam-style questions so that you can practise answering questions related to the different topics and themes that you study. Help with note making On page ix there is a series of note-making styles, which you can use as you work through the book. These are designed to ensure that your note making is clear, and sets you up to revise for the exam. Note it down activities appear throughout the book to guide your note taking. They sometimes refer back to the note-making styles outlined at the beginning of the book. Work together The book also contains work together activities. These consist of activities designed to help you work together to check your understanding of the topics as you go along.
vi Introduction Extended reading In addition to the traditional textbook narrative, this book contains four specially comm issioned essays from practising academic historians. These address the historical interpretation and are designed to introduce you to the historical debate in a way that is directly related to the exam. Recommended reading You can find recommended reading sections throughout the book. These are designed to point you in the direction of both classic works on the subject and examples of more recent historical writing. About the exam The A level exam The A level comprises three papers and coursework. Papers 1 and 2 are examined at the same time as part of the same route. Paper 1 is worth 30 per cent of the total A level and Paper 2 is worth 20 per cent. Paper 3 is examined separately and is worth 30 per cent, with the coursework making up the f inal 20 per cent of marks. This section looks at Paper 1 and Paper 2, as these are the papers this book supports. Paper 1 The Paper 1 exam paper is divided into three parts: Section A, Section B and Section C. The different sections will test different skills and a spects of the history you have studied. Sections A and B test your knowledge of the period 1917–85. The questions test your breadth of knowledge of four key themes: ● Communist government in the USSR, 1917–85 ● Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 ● Control of the people, 1917–85 ● Social developments, 1917–85. Section C tests your depth of knowledge regarding a historical interpretation. Sections A and B Sections A and B test the breadth of your knowledge, and each section requires you to write an essay. In both Sections A and B you have to answer one question from a choice of two. Section A of the exam paper contains two questions, of which you are required to complete one. Questions in Section A will test the breadth of your knowledge by focusing on at least ten years. Section B of the exam paper also contains two questions, of which you are required to complete one. Questions in Section B will test the breadth of your knowledge by focusing on at least one-third of the period you have studied: c.23 years. Neither Section A nor Section B requires you to read or analyse either sources or extracts from the work of historians. Section A and B questions require you to deploy a variety of skills. The most important are focus on the question, selection and deployment of relevant detail, analysis and, at the highest level, prioritisation. Questions in Sections A and B will focus on one of the following concepts: ● cause ● consequence ● change/continuity ● similarity/difference ● significance. Therefore the questions will t ypically begin w ith one of the following stems: ● How far … ● How accurate is it to say … ● To what extent … ● How signif icant … ● How successfu l … Section C Section C of the exam paper is different to Sections A and B. While Sections A and B test your own knowledge, Section C tests your own knowledge and your ability to analyse and evaluate interpretations of the past in the work of historians. Therefore Section C contains two extracts from the work of historians. Section C of the exam contains one compulsory question. Section C focuses on an interpretation related to the following controversy: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? It looks at the following aspects of the potential crisis: ● The signif icance of the economic weaknesses of the USSR and the failure of reform ● The effects of Gorbachev’s failure to reform the Communist Party and the Soviet Government ● The impact of the national resurgence in the late 1980s in the Soviet republics and in the communist states of Eastern Europe ● How far Gorbachev and Yeltsin can be seen as responsible for the collapse of the USSR in 1991.
viiIntroduction Section C tests your ability to analyse and evaluate different historical interpretations in the light of your own knowledge. Therefore it tests a variety of skills including: ● identifying the interpretation ● writing a well-structured essay ● integrating own extracts with own knowledge ● reaching an overall judgement. Paper 2 Paper 2 is a depth paper. This means that the questions will test your knowledge of short periods of history. The key topics of Mao’s China, 1949–76 are: ● Establishing communist rule, 1949–57 ● Agriculture and industry, 1949–65 ● The Cultural Revolution and its after math, 1966–76 ● Social and cultural changes, 1949–76. The key topics of The German Democratic Republic, 1949–90 are: ● Establishing and consolidating communist rule in the GDR, 1949–61 ● The development of the East German state, 1961–85 ● Life in East Germany, 1949–85 ● Growing crises and the collapse of communist rule in the GDR, 1985–90. The Paper 2 exam is divided into two sections. Section A is a source question while Section B requires you to write an essay from your own knowledge. Section A In the A level paper questions in Section A require you to analyse two primary sources. They will typically be phrased in the following way: How far could the historian make use of Sources 1 and 2 to investigate [x]? You are required to use the sources, your own knowledge and the information given about the sources. You might consider the following: ● what the sources would tell the historian about the topic ● how nature, origin and purpose of the sources could give the historian more information about the critical stance of the author, as well as some evidence about usefulness ● how you can use your knowledge of the historical context to support or develop inferences made from the sources, and to either confir m the accuracy or limitations of information within them or to note limitations and challenge the accuracy of the source ● what you could say about the two sources in combination. Section B You should answer questions in Section B in the form of an essay. The questions can focus on the following concepts: ● cause ● consequence ● change/continuity ● similarity/difference ● significance. The questions can begin with the following question stems: ● How far … ● How accurate is it to say … ● To what extent … The AS level exam The AS level exam comprises t wo papers. Paper 1 is worth 60 per cent of the tot al A level and Paper 2 is worth 40 per cent. Paper 1 The AS level exam tests all of the same content as the A level exam and is structured in exactly the same way. However, there are differences between the two exams: Sections A and B There are three key differences between A level and AS level in Sections A and B: ● Wording: The wording of AS level questions will be less complex than the wording of A level questions. Specifically, there are likely to be fewer adjectives or qualifying phrases in the question. For example: A level -s tyle que st ion AS l evel -st yle que sti on How accurate is it to say that in the years 1928– 1980, the government of the USSR relied wholly on repression? Was repression the main reason for the survival of the Communist government in the USSR in the years 1928–1980? Explain your answer. ● Focus: Section A questions can focus on a more limited range of concepts at AS than at A level. Specifically, at AS level Section A questions can only focus on cause and consequences (including success and failure), whereas A level questions can focus on a wider variety of concepts. ● Mark scheme: The A level mark scheme has five levels, whereas the AS level mark scheme only has four. This means that full marks a re available at AS for an analytical essay, whereas sustained analysis is necessary for full marks at A level.
viii Introduction Section C Section C of the AS level exam focuses on the same aspects of the same debate: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? As in the A level exam you have to answer one compulsory question based on two extracts. The AS level exam is dif ferent from the A level exam in the following ways: ● The question: The AS level question is worded in a less complex way than the A level question. For example: A level -s tyle que st ion AS level -s tyle que st ion In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed because ‘rather than strengthen the Soviet state, glasnost eventually suggested that the Soviet Government was no longer sustainable’. To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts, using your own knowledge of the issues. Historians have different views about the reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union. Analyse and evaluate the extracts and use your knowledge of the issues to explain your answer to the following question. How far do you agree with the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because of Gorbachev’s political reforms? ● The extracts: At AS level the extracts will be slightly shorter and you may get extracts taken from textbooks as well as the work of historians. In this sense the extracts at AS should be slightly easier to read and understand. ● The mark scheme: The A level mark scheme has five levels, whereas the AS level mark scheme only has four. This means that full marks a re available at AS for an analytical essay, whereas sustained analysis is necessary for full m arks at A level. Paper 2 The AS level exam tests all of the same content as the A level exam and is structured in a similar way. However, there are differences between the two exams: Section A Section A of the AS level exam is structured in a different way to the A level exam. In essence, Section A at AS tests the same skills as Section A at A level, but over two questions rather than one. The AS level Section A is divided into Part (a) and Part (b). Part (a) contains one compulsory question related to a single source. Part (a) asks you to consider how the source is of value to a historian who is engaged in a specified enquiry. The question requires you to reach a judgement about the ways in which Source 1 is valuable. In that sense the question is not primarily about looking for the ways in which the source is unreliable. Examiners are looking for the following skills: ● detailed contextual knowledge that explains the meaning of relevant points made by the source ● valid inferences ● an overall judgement about the value of the source related to valid criteria. Part (b) contains one compulsory question related to a single source. Part (b) asks you to consider how much weight to a source for a specified enquiry. Therefore Part (b) requires you to consider the value and the limits of the source. Part (b) tests your ability to: ● comprehend and analyse source material ● use historical knowledge to weigh the value of the source ● reach a judgement, based on valid criteria, about the value of the source. Section B Section B of the AS level exam tests the same content knowledge as Section B of the A level exam. Section B comprises three questions, of which you must complete one. Paper 2 Section B questions are very similar to Paper 1 Section B questions (see page vii). The key difference relates to the period on which the question focuses. Paper 2 examines your knowledge of depth. Therefore Section B questions can focus on a single event or a single year. Alternatively they might focus on the whole chronology of the course.
ix Note taking Good note taking is really important. Your notes are an essential revision resource. What is more, the process of making notes will help you understand and remember what you are reading. How books work Most books are written as clearly as possible. Therefore writers use a variety of techniques to help you learn. Authors often break up their work into key points (the most important ideas and themes) and supporting evidence (the details that support the key points). Key points are usually general statements. For example, a key point might be ‘During the Civil War the government increasingly became a party-state based on the Communist Party.’ The supporting evidence might be a list of detailed examples that indicate the key point is correct. How to make notes Most note-making styles ref lect the distinction between key points and supporting evidence. Below is advice on a variety of different note-making styles. Throughout each section in the book are note-making activities for you to carry out. Hints and tips The important thing is that you understand your notes. Therefore you don’t have to write everything down, and you don’t have to write in full sentences. While ma king notes you can use abbreviations: Full text Abbreviation Communist Part y New Economic Policy Civil War Lenin First World War CP NEP CW L WW1 You can use arrows instead of words: Full text Arrow Increased Decreased ↑ ↓ You can use mathematical notation: Full text Mathematical notation Equals = Plus, and + Because ∴ Therefore ∴ Here is an example: Text Notes The Crisis of 1921, which included rebellion among the peasants, workers’ strikes and military mutiny, showed the extent of opposition to Lenin’s government and therefore forced Lenin to reform. Crisis 1921 = ↑ opposition ∴ L made reforms Note-making styles There are a large number of note-making styles. You can find examples of four popular styles below. All of them have their strengths. It is a good idea to try them all and work out which style suits you. The examples below are of notes taken from Chapter 1 on page 4. Style 1: Bullet points Bullet points can be a useful method of making notes because: ● they encourage you to write in note form, rather than in full sentences ● they help you to organise your ideas in a systematic fashion ● they are easy to skim read later ● you can show relative importance visually by indenting less important, or supporting points. 1 Scan the section before you read it in depth. Identify headings ( points of explanation). Significantly, you should try looking for the key points in the first sentence of each paragraph. On your page of notes, set the key points out in sections.
x Introduction 2 Now read carefully through the section. Write supporting points or points of evidence under the relevant headings. The end result should look like this: Key features of Russia before 1917 • Empire ruled by all-powerful Tsars • Repression widespread • Weak rural economy: poverty + little industry • Underground opposition (RSDLP) (SRs) • Impact of WW1 – economic chaos = 1 Feb Rev. = Prov. gov 2 Oct. Rev = L + Bolsheviks take power Style 2: The 1:2 method The 1:2 method is a variation on bullet points. The method is based on dividing your page into two columns: the first for the main point, the second for supporting detail. This allows you to see the structure of the information clearly. 1 Divide your page like in the example below: 1 third 2 thirds 2 Write the key points in the left-hand section. 3 Write the supporting detail in the right-hand section. The end result should look like this: Key p oint s Supp orting d etail Russia before 1914 ● Powerful Tsars ruled; 1884–1917 = Nicholas II ● Empire – Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Finland, Estonia ● Repression widespread – e.g. Lena Goldmine massacre 1912 ● Little modern industry: 2.4m/140m industrial workers ● Opposition – underground; aim to overthrow Tsar + end poverty, e.g. RSDLP and SRs Style 3: Spider diagrams Spider diagrams or mind maps can be a useful method of making notes because: ● they will help you to categorise factors; each of the main branches coming from the centre should be a new category ● they can help you see what is most important; often the most important factors will be close to the centre of the diagram ● they can help you see connections between different aspects of what you are studying; it is useful to draw lines between different parts of your diagram to show links ● they can also help you with essay planning; you can use them to quickly get down the main points and develop a clear structure in response to an essay question. 1 Draw a circle in the middle of your piece of paper. It should be large enough to contain the section title. 2 Scan the section and identify headings. Draw lines out from your central circle – remember to leave plenty of room between them so that you can fit in all of your notes. 3 Read through the section carefully. Write supporting points or points of evidence under the relevant headings.
xiIntroduction The end result should look like this: Russia before 1914 Politics: Tsarism NII 1884-1917 Empire: Ukraine, Georgia, Finland, EstoniaRepression: Lena Goldmine (1912) Economics: Little Industry Opposition Goals Overthrow Tsar End poverty RSDLP SR’s Style 4: Index cards Index cards are particularly useful when you are revising for your exam, or when you are planning your essays. Revision Index cards are small and therefore they encourage you to prioritise by forcing you to note down only the most important information. Essay planning You can use index cards to help plan essays in the following way. First, select all of the cards that are relevant to your essay. Arrange the cards in order to develop a structure for your essay. Rearranging the cards can also help work out the best structure for your essay. 1 Scan through the section. Identify either themes or important sub-sections. Use a different index card for each sub-section. On one side of each index card write: – the title of the main section in the top left corner in one colour – the title of the sub-sect ion that you are currently reading about in the middle of the index card in another colour. Key Point Subtitle Russia Before 1917 Key Features Pre-WW1 Key Point Subtitle 2 Now read the section careful ly. On the back of each index card bullet point the relevant notes. • Empire ruled by all-powerful Tsars: 1884–1917 = Nicholas II • Repression widespread: Lena Goldmine massacre 1914 • Weak rural economy: poverty + little modern industry • Underground opposition to Tsar (RSDLP) (SRs) 3 You can punch a hole in the corner of the cards and tag- tie the cards for each section together.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin2 The Big Picture Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1917–85 The story of communist government in Russia is one of rise, transformation and decline. At first, under Lenin, the new government was radical, uncompromising and revolutionary. Lenin overthrew the existing government, fought a bitter civil war, and created a wholly new type of government. Lenin claimed he was establishing a government of the workers. However, Lenin’s Russia was a mix of a utopian vision and skilful political compromise. Therefore, in order to ensure the survival of the new government at all costs, Lenin’s government was based much more on administrators and bureaucrats than it was on working people. Fundamentally, Lenin’s government was based on the Communist Party. In fact Lenin established a one-party state which guaranteed the supremacy of the Communist Part y within Russian Government. Stalin started a revolution of his own. His ‘revolution from above’ was designed to build on Lenin’s achievement. Lenin had ended capitalism, but Stalin would begin the world’s first serious attempt to create a socialist society. Stalin’s revolution made Russia an economic giant. But it also created a totalitarian state: a government based on terror, propaganda and a cult of personality. After Stalin’s death Khrushchev attempted to reform the Russian Government. Communism in Russia became more humane – people were no longer sent to labour camps or executed in such large numbers. After the horrors of Stalinism, Khrushchev wanted to revive popular faith in Communism. But Khrushchev’s reforms had the potential to destabilise communist rule in Russia. Consequently, in order to protect the power of the Party, Khrushchev was replaced by Brezhnev, a leader that the Communist Party could rely on to protect its position. Under Brezhnev, Communism in Russia lost its revolutionary energy and f inally completed its journey from revolutionary movement to party of government. Brezhnev’s greatest strength was also his greatest weakness: his ability to g uarantee stability meant that he was unable to reform. Between 1982 and 1985, Russia’s final leaders struggled with the same problems that had faced Khrushchev and Brezhnev: how could the Communist Party reform w ithout abandoning the one-party state created by Lenin?
3Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 In this theme you will consider the following. ➜ How Lenin and the Communist Party won and consolidated power, 1917–24: The changing nature of Lenin’s government from the October Revolution, through the Civil War to Lenin’s death. ➜ Russia under Stalin, 1928–53: The elimination of Stalin’s opponents, the Great Terror and the creation of a personal dictatorship. ➜ Communist government, 1953–85: Khrushchev’s attempts to reform the Communist Government, Brezhnev’s attempts to stabilise communist rule, and the growing political difficulties of the Communist Government under Andropov and Chernenko. TIMELINE 1914 Russia enters the First World War 1917 February The February Revolution overthrows the Tsar 1917 March a Provisional Government is established 1917 October The October Revolution overthrows the Provisional Government. Lenin establishes Sovnarkom. 1918–1921 Increasing political centralisation during the Russian Civil War. Lenin disbands Constituent Assembly 1921 Opposition political parties banned. The Communists triumph in the Civil War. Russia becomes a one-party state 1921 March Party Congress bans factions. 1924 January Lenin dies 1928 Stalin emerges as leader of Russia 1934 January Private criticism of Stalin expressed at the Congress of Victors 1934 December Kirov is murdered in Leningrad 1935 The Great Terror begins with a purge of the Leningrad Communist Party 1936 August Stalin removes high profile opponents in the first of Moscow show- trials 1936 September Yezhov becomes head of the secret police. The Great Terror intensifies 1953 March Stalin dies 1956 February Khrushchev’s secret speech – beginning of widespread de-Stalinisation 1957 July Greater freedom of expression is permitted following the World Festival of Youth and Students 1964 October Khrushchev removed from office. Brezhnev begins to reverse Khrushchev’s reforms 1966 December New criminal code tightens laws on political dissent 1975 Brezhnev becomes increasingly ill and unable to govern effec tively 1976 February Brezhnev fails to introduce reforms at the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress, in spite of growing economic, social and political problems 1982 November Andropov initiates reforms to tackle corruption 1984 February Andropov dies and is replaced by Chernenko before his reforms had taken effect
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin4 1a: Establishing Communist Party control, 1917–24 Overview Russia experienced two revolutions in 1917. The first led to the downfall of the Tsar – the head of the royal family. The second led to the creation of a radical new form of government which promised freedom and equality for Russia’s working people. In order to achieve this, revolutionary leader Lenin constructed a new government. At first, Lenin promised a democratic government, which would be based on the support of all working people. Lenin’s first actions were truly popular, reflecting long- standing desires of Russia’s workers, peasants and soldiers. However, Lenin’s new government was also ruthless, and from the very start it terrorised its opponents. Moreover, for Lenin, democracy was less important than his desire to maintain control. Therefore, when his party lost elections Lenin disregarded the results. Lenin abandoned democracy altogether during Russia’s Civil War, and the new government became increasingly centralised and authoritarian. Lenin’s victory in the Civil War did not lead to the restoration of democracy. Rather, Lenin outlawed rival political parties and by 1921 had created a radically new kind of government: a one-party state. However, it was highly centralised and authoritarian, and therefore nothing like the free and democratic society that he had promised in 1917. This chapter examines the creation of the communist one- party state through the following sections: 1 Background to the Bolshevik Revolution 2 Lenin’s state, 1917–18 3 The impact of the Civil War, 1918–21 4 1921: Crisis and reform 5 Conclusion: Lenin’s legacy. 1 Background to the Bolshevik Revolution Before the revolutions of 1917 Russia was ruled by a series of all-powerfu l emperors. Tsar Nicholas II, Russian Emperor from 1894 until 1917, was widely regarded as more repressive than other European rulers. Repression was widespread and the vast majority of the Tsar’s subjects were impoverished and had no political rights. For example, hundreds of miners who protested for higher wages at the Lena goldmine in 1912 were brutally massacred by the Tsar’s troops. The Tsar’s empire extended beyond Russia and included the Ukraine, Georgia, Finland and Estonia. While the government was strong, the economy was weak compared to that of Britain, Germany, the USA and other major powers. Russia had very l ittle modern industry. Indeed, by 1913 only 2.4 million of Russia’s 140 mill ion people worked in large factories. Nicholas II’s government tried to encourage economic growth, but it was only partly successful. What is more, even in periods of economic growth, the population as a whole remained extremely poor. Political repression and massive economic inequality led to the growth of underground opposition to the Tsar. Around 1900 the two large st opposition parties were the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party ( RSDLP) and the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), both of which were committed to overthrowing the Tsar, liberating the people of the Russian Empire a nd ending poverty. However, neither group were able to organise ef fectively due to the Tsar’s political police, who routi nely spied on these groups and arrested and exiled their leaders. Inspite of repression, Tsarism was rocked by the 1905 Revolution, a series of revolts that almost led to the overthrow of the Tsar. Political compromise and renewed repression ensured the survival of the regime until the First World War. The First World War Russia entered the First World War in 1914. Russia’s economy was incapable of providing the food and equipment necessary to fight the war. Additionally, the Tsar was an incompetent wartime leader. By early 1917 economic chaos, military defeat and political mismanagement led to the February Revolution: a popular uprising in Petrograd, Russia’s capital city that overthrew the Tsar and set up a Provisional Government. The Provisional Government Following the Februar y Revolution, the Provisional Government introduced a series of reforms. The Tsar’s despotism was replaced by a liberal system,
5Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 which included freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of religion. Additionally, the Provisional Government promised democratic elections to form a new government. However, the Provisional Government continued to fight the First World War. Lenin, a radical member of the RSDLP, argued for a second revolution. Following his return from exile in April 1917, he demanded an immediate end to the First World War and the redistribution of land to the peasants. These demands were summarised in the slogan ‘Peace, Land and Bread’. As the Provisional Government continued to fight in the war and Russia’s economic problems grew worse, Lenin’s message became increasingly popular. By October 1917 Lenin and his followers the Bolsheviks had enough support to overthrow the Provisional Government. Lenin and Trotsky (see page 7) seized the moment and organised a coup d’état, which allowed the Bolsheviks to take power. Note it down Using bullet points (see page ix), make notes on the key features of Russia prior to 1917. As this is background you do not need a great deal of detail. Rather write a single bullet point on the key political, economic and social features of the period. Additionally, summarise the impact of the First World War on the Russian Government in a single bullet point. Lenin’s ideology Lenin seized power because he believed that a global revolution was necessary to replace capitalism and imperialism with socialism: a new social system that would allow all people to be genuinely free and equal. This view was based on a Marxist view of history. The Marxist view of history Karl Marx was a German philosopher and revolutionary, who lived in the nineteenth century. He became famous Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1870–1924 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin is one of the most famous revolutionaries of all time. Born in the late nineteenth century, he is remembered as the man who led the first successful communist revolution. Lenin’s early life was troubled by radical politics. Aleksandr, his older brother, was executed in 1887 for the attempted assassination of Tsar Alexander III. Following this, Lenin’s family were shunned by their community. As a student Lenin joined a radical socialist movement; this led to his expulsion from university for protesting in favour of student rights. In spite of this he continued to be involved in revolutionary politics. Even as a young man, Lenin was a natural leader and therefore tended to play a leading role in the underground radical groups he joined. As a result he was targeted by the police and in 1897, like many Russian revolutionaries, he was arrested and exiled. Between 1899 and 1903, Lenin played a leading role in the foundation of the RSDLP – which became Russia’s most influential Marxist party. Lenin became leader of the Bolshevik faction of the RSDLP. Lenin, like many Russian radicals, wanted to transform Russia. He wanted to destroy the royal family, end the power of the Russian Church and create a modern nation, which embraced cutting-edge science and industry. In so doing, Lenin hoped to improve the lives of millions of working Russians who lived in poverty. Between 1903 and 1917 Lenin spent a great deal of time in exile. He was a brilliant writer and organiser, but he also had a reputation for being manipulative and for getting his way by scheming within the RSDLP. Lenin’s personality affected his approach to politics. He could be extremely pragmatic and therefore willing to sacrifice important principles in order to safeguard his power. He enjoyed arguing with his colleagues and getting his own way. He also had a reputation for experiencing fits of rage – in fact his outbursts were so frequent towards the end of his life that his colleagues suspected he was mentally unstable. Finally, Lenin despised ‘sentimentality’; therefore he felt little sympathy for the suffering of others and was prepared to use violence and terror to achieve his goals.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin6 for arguing that the workers should rise up and destroy capitalism in a revolution. Marx’s view of revolution was based on his theory of history. Marx argued that history had progressed through a series of stages, as Table 1 shows. Table 1: Marx’s four stage s of histor y. Primitive Communism Humans lived in a simple society where they hunted and gathered. There was no government and all people were essentially equal. Classical slavery In ancient Greece and Rome society was divided into masters and slaves. Society became more sophisticated, but was deeply unequal. Feudalism During the Middle Ages, society was controlled by noble families who owned the land and controlled the lives of the peasants who worked for them. Capitalism Following the Industrial Revolution, power passed to people who owned the new factories. Workers, the proletariat, were essentially powerless due to their extreme poverty. Marx argued that progress from one stage to another occurred due to class conflict. For example, at the end of feudalism the new capitalist class overthrew the old feudal lords and established a new kind of society based on industry rather than on the control of land. Marx a rgued that the English, American and French Revolutions were examples of the victory of capitalism over feudalism. Marx believed that capitalism would also come to an end. He argued that, following a workers’ revolution, capitalism would be replaced by socialism in Europe’s most advanced economies. Lenin believed that the chaos produced by the First World War provided an opportunity to overthrow capitalism across Europe. The state and revolution Marx’s writings did not contain a clear indication of how a revolution would be carried out, or what socialism would look like. Indeed, Marx’s writings were contradictory. In some places, Marx argued that a revolutionary government would be more democratic than a capitalist government; however, he also famously wrote about the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, which would use its power ruthlessly to destroy the power of capitalists. Lenin seems to have taken both of these ideas seriously. 2 Lenin’s state, 1917–18 Lenin’s new state changed over time. Initia lly, he embraced a radical ly democratic state. However, by the summer of 1918, the revolutionary state was much more authoritarian. Note it down Using the 1:2 method (see page x) make notes on the following topics: ● How did Lenin justify his new state? ● How was Lenin’s new state structured? ● How powerful was Lenin’s state between 1917 and 1918? ● How democratic was Lenin’s state between 1917 and 1918? Creating a ‘soviet-state’ In October 1917, Lenin seized power on behalf of the soviets – small democratic councils that had emerged spontaneously in every town and village acros s Russia after the February Revolution. Between Februar y and October 1917, the soviets played a key role in governing Russia. Additionally, the local soviets sent representatives to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which met in June 1917 to discuss Russia’s future. Lenin and other senior Bolsheviks argued that the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which met for a second time in October, should become the basis of the new Russian Government. Indeed, the October Revolution formally handed power to the All-Russian Congress. However, as the All-Russian Congress was too big to meet regularly they elected the Council of People’s Commissa rs (Sovnarkom) to govern Russia on a day-to-day basis. Sovnarkom Sovnarkom was essentially the new Russian cabinet. The first Sovnarkom was made up of 13 People’s Commissars. Lenin was elected Chairman of Sovnarkom, and other Commissars included Leon Trotsky (see page 7), who was head of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and Joseph Stalin (see page 8), who was head of the People’s Commissariat of Nationality Affa irs. All of the new Commissars were revolutionaries. The vast majority had supported Lenin since 1903. Many had worked with him in exile, and all had supported the Bolshevik seizure of power.
7Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 Leon Trotsky, 1879–1940 Before 1917 Trotsky was already a revolutionary hero due to his role in the failed 1905 Revolution. Trotsky and Lenin disagreed violently about politics before 1917. However, following the February Revolution they worked closely together until Lenin’s death. Trotsky played a leading role in the October Revolution and in the first years of Russia’s Communist Government. He also led the Communist’s Red Army to victory in the Civil War (see page 9). In spite of his brilliance, he was not univer sally popular among Lenin’s followers. He was viewed as arrogant and unreliable. Additionally, he was viewed as a threat, and therefore other senior members of the Party plotted successfully to expel him from the Party and from Russia. Lenin’s first government passed a series of decrees that were genuinely popular. Immediately following the October Revolution, Lenin gave a speech to the Al l- Russian Congress of Soviets. He proposed a series of decrees which the Congress of Soviets voted to approve: ● the Decree on Land (October 1917), which gave peasants the right to seize land from the nobility and the Church ● the Decree of Peace (October 1917), which committed the new government to withdrawing from the First World War and seek ing peace. Lenin continued to publish popular decrees for the first few months of the government, including: ● Workers’ Decrees (November 1917), which established an eight-hour maximum working day and a minimum wage ● the Decree of Workers’ Control (April 1918), which allowed workers to elect committees to run factories. These early measures al lowed Lenin to establish control over Russia in two main ways. First, the decrees won popular support for the regime from workers, peasants and soldiers. Second, ending the First World War gave the revolution what Lenin ca lled ‘breathing space’ in which to begin to rebuild the economy and to start constr ucting a new government. For the first few months, Sovnarkom had little real power. The October Revolution had occurred in Russia’s capital city, Petrograd. At first, it did not give Lenin control of Russia’s other major cities or the vast rural areas that made up the majority of Russia’s territory. Senior figures from the former government still had a great deal of power and refused to recognise Bolshevik authority. For example, in late November General Dukhonin, Chief of Staff of the Russian army, refused a direct order from Lenin to stop fighting and begin peace negotiations. Equally, the Russian State Bank and State Treasury went on strike immediately after the revolution, denying Lenin’s new government the funds that it needed to operate. Initially, Sovnarkom was also extremely disorganised. This is ev ident from Lenin’s early appointments of People’s Commissar s. For example, in the f irst few days of the new government, Stalin’s Commissariat for Nationalities was, in reality, just a desk in the corner of a room at the Smolny Institute, the building where Sovnarkom was originally based. Equally, Vyacheslav Menzhinsky’s Commissariat of Finance was initially nothing more than a sofa with a large piece of paper pinned to it bearing the words ‘Commissariat of Finance’. Lenin’s government would need to fight a civil war before it had genuine control of the whole of Russia. How democratic was Russia in 1918? Lenin and the Bolsheviks claimed that the new government was truly democratic. Lenin argued that the new state was based on committees of working people who participated in government on a day-to-day basis. He claimed the soviet-state was more democratic than the systems in Britain, the USA and France where people merely voted once every four or five years. This commitment to people power was also reflected in the title of the new leaders, who were known as People’s Commissars. Trotsky suggested this title in order to demonstrate the revolutionary nature of the new government. In so doing, he deliberately used the terms that were associated with the government that took power after the French Revolution. Broad-based support There is clear evidence that the new government was genuinely democratic. For example, the first decrees were genuinely popular and reflected what the majority of the workers, peasants and soldiers wanted. Equally, in 1918 Russia was not yet a one-party state. According to the Constitution of 1918, Sovnarkom was responsible to the Congress of Soviets – which contained representatives
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin8 of many political parties including the Bolshevik’s main rivals, the Mensheviks, and the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs). What is more, a faction of the SRs supported the new government and some SRs initially had junior roles in the new government. One of the reasons that there was broad-based support for the new government in Petrograd and Moscow was the belief that it would become a coalition government representing all of Russia’s main socialist parties. Indeed, moderates within the Bolshevik Party, such as Zinoviev and Kamenev, argued that Lenin should form a coalition government and work with other political parties. However, when Bolshevik moderates were unable to persuade Lenin to compromise they resigned in protest. As a result, by November, Lenin’s new government was dominated by people who wanted the Bolshevik Part y to govern alone. Additionally, there was genuine support for a Bolshevik- dominated government among the workers of Petrograd in the early days of the revolution. For example, the Petrograd Trades Union Council, which met on 31 October, and the First Conference of Female Factory Workers, which met on 5 November 1917, both gave their full support to the new Bolshevik Government. They supported Lenin’s early decrees and the courage the Bolsheviks had shown by overthrowing the Provisional Government in the October Revolution. The Constituent Assembly In January 1918, there was a clear indication that Lenin was turni ng against democracy. Specifically, Lenin refused to recognise the results of a nationwide election held in November 1917. The election created a Constituent Assembly with a Bolshevik minority, which met for the first time in January 1918. Lenin closed the Constituent Assembly by force after only one day, claiming that it posed a threat to the power of the soviets. However, Lenin was also willing to disregard the soviets. In March 1918, Lenin approved the Treaty of Brest- Litovsk, which gave away a signif icant proportion of Russian territory to the Central Powers in order to end Russia’s involvement in the First World War. The treaty was extremely unpopular and therefore the Bolsheviks lost the soviet elections across Russia in Apri l and May 1918. In order to retain power, Lenin refused to recognise the results, arguing that the elections had not been fair. Moreover, Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries were expelled from the soviets. Lenin demanded new elections, but quickly postponed them due to the outbreak of the Civil War. Nikolai Bukharin, the official Bolshevik Party theorist, argued that ‘formal democracy’, by which he meant elections to the soviets, had to be abandoned in order to win the Civil War. As a result of the abolition of the Constituent Assembly and Lenin’s refusal to recognise the results of new soviet elections, Lenin was able to consolidate Bolshevik power. However, it became more difficult to argue that the new government was democratic. How democratic were the early decrees? Many of Lenin’s early decrees were extremely popular. However, it could be argued that Lenin was forced to be democratic, because, in the early days, the new government had very limited power. Therefore Lenin was forced to allow the peasants to seize land, and the workers to take control of their factories. In this sense, rather than extending the rights of Russian people, the early decrees merely authorised what was already taking place. Joseph Stalin, 1878–1953 Prior to the October Revolution Stalin was one of a number of dedicated revolutionaries who spent long periods in exile due to their political beliefs. Born in Gori, Georgia, then part of the Russian Empire, the young Stalin trained as a Christian priest. However, after reading the work of Marx, he abandoned the Church in favour of revolution. Stalin was one of the first members of the revolutionary RSDLP in Georgia and from 1906 was a regular at RSDLP Party Congresses, becoming known to Lenin. Stalin was not regarded as an outstanding speaker or as a gif ted intellectual, but was respected as a capable administrator. Lenin valued his loyalty. Consequently, he became part of Lenin’s inner circle and played small but important roles in the October Revolution and the Civil War (see page 9). Stalin was highly ambitious and once in power his desire to dominate the Party and punish his opponents became evident.
9Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 3 The impact of the Civil War, 1918–21 The Russian Civil War (1918–21) allowed Lenin to establish communist control over the whole of Russia. Moreover, it radically changed the nature of the Bolshevik Party (renamed the Communist Party in 1918), and the new government. The Civil War led to the creation of a ‘party-state’ and, as a result of the Civil War, the state became increasingly authoritarian and centralised. Note it down This section focuses on the transformation of Lenin’s government during the Civil War. Using a mind map (see page x), make notes on the following topics: ● Changes to the government ● Reasons for government changes ● Nature of the government by 1921. The Russian Civil War From the start, Lenin’s revolutionary government faced serious opposition. Lenin described the war as a battle between the Communist Reds and the reactionary Whites, but in reality the war was more complex. The Bolsheviks had opponents on all sides. Senior members of the Russian army wanted to re-establish Tsarist rule, while others wanted a military dictatorship or a democratic system like France or America. The new government had radical opponents too. The SRs and Mensheviks wanted a more democratic type of socialist government, and anarchists wanted to abolish government altogether. Britain, France, the USA and Japan also sent troops to fight the new government. Some countries feared that a successful revolution might spread, while others wanted to gain territory. The first signs of m ilitary conf lict emerged in January 1918 as General Kornilov organised an anti-Bolshevik army in the Don region. SRs and liberals set up a rival government in Omsk, Siberia, while other SRs based in the city of Ufa tried to revive the Constituent Assembly. A full-scale civil war broke out in the summer of 1918, with the enemies of the Bolsheviks gaining significant ground in the first six months of 1919. Following the failure of anti-Bolshevik forces to capture Petrograd and Moscow, Russia’s new capital city, in the summer of 1919, the Red Army began to win the war. The Red Army extended communist power by winning victories against Nestor Makhno’s anarchist army in the Ukraine, a gainst A lexander Kolchak’s authoritarian government in Siberia, and against Anton Denikin’s army in the Crimea (see Figure 1). Government during the Civil War Lenin’s primary objective during the Civil War was to ensure the survival of the new government. Lenin was willing to do whatever was necessary in order to win. As a result of the Civil War, government changed in two ways: ● Lenin’s government became increasingly centralised. ● The Communist Party became increasingly powerful. Murmansk Archangel Ekaterinburg Omsk Kronstadt Kazan Samara Vladivostok Petrograd Moscow Odessa Tsaritsyn Crimean Peninsula Baltic Sea BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA RUSSIA CHINA Black Sea Caspian Sea BRITISH FRENCH BRITISH, FRENCH, AMERICANS General Makhno AMERICANS, JAPANESEBRITISH General Denikin Admiral Kolchak Trans-Siberian Railway Foreign armies of intervention Key BRITISH White armies and their leaders Land under Bolshevik control, 1919 Czech Legion N 0 1000 km BRITISH, FRENCH General Kornilov Figure 1: The Civil War, 1918–21.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin10 Lenin’s prime method of ensuring victory was to centralise power. ● He centralised control of the economy with the policy of War Communism (see page 43). ● He also relied on political centralisation, working through the loyal Party nomenklatura rather than the more democratic soviets, and using terror to suppress opposition. ● Trotsky, leader of the Red Army, made the Red Army more authoritarian. He introduced conscription, harsh punishments and relied on former Tsarist generals to lead the army. Centralisation ensured that the government, the economy and the army were able to win the war. However, it also took power away from the workers, peasants and soldiers who the communists claimed to represent. The emergence of a ‘party-state’ At first, the new regime described itself as a ‘soviet- state’ (see page 6); however, during the Civil War the government increasingly became a part y-state, based on the Communist Party. Civil war meant that the new government often had to act quickly to achieve victory. Consequently, Lenin tended to rely on the Politburo. Lenin preferred working with the Politburo to Sovnarkom as it was smaller – between five and seven members – and therefore could reach decisions more quickly. Additionally, he preferred working with the Politburo because it contained his most loyal supporters, people such as Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev. Lenin did not abolish Sovnarkom. Rather, it simply ceased to function as the mai n centre of government. From 1920, the Politburo effectively became the government of Russia. Sovnarkom played a much smaller role, merely approving the decisions that had already been made by the Politburo. The Politburo clearly provided clear and ef fective leadership during the Civil War. However, the rise of the Politburo indicated that the new government was based on the Communist Party rather than the soviets. This pattern of Communist Party dominance also emerged at a local level. Senior Communists preferred to work through the Communist Party, which had branches all over the country. They did not trust the local soviets, as SRs and Mensheviks were stil l present on many of them. Therefore the soviets were often bypassed in favour of the communist nomenklatura: Party members who senior officia ls trusted to implement government policy without question. By 1921, the new government was based on two parallel structures: the Communist Part y and the soviet-state. As the Civil War continued and other political parties were increasingly excluded from the government, the soviet-state lost power to the Communist Party. Due to increasing Party dominance the new form of government became known as the ‘party-state’. Red Terror In December 1917 Lenin created the A ll-Russian Emergency Commission for Combating Counter- Revolution and Sabotage (Cheka), a political police force tasked with defending the revolution. During the Civil War Chekists were responsible for raiding anarchist organisations, closing down opposition newspapers and expelling Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries from the soviets. The Cheka was willing to i mprison, torture or ki ll anyone who the communists viewed as a threat. For example, in Kremenchuk in the U kraine, Church leaders were impaled on spikes, while in the city of Oryol victi ms were frozen and put on display as ice statues. Women captured by the Cheka were routinely raped. Lenin argued that dur ing a revolution, civil war and terror were necessary to protect the new government from its enemies. Building the Red Army In order to fight and win the Civil War, Lenin reformed the army. Following the February Revolution, the Russian army had been democratised: soldiers’ committees were empowered to elect senior officers. Lenin abolished this system and Trotsky put Tsarist generals back in charge of the army. This created outrage among idealists in the Party, who accused Lenin and Trotsky of betraying the principles of the revolution. Nonetheless, abolishing democracy and putting highly trained experts in charge of the army paid off, and the Red Army became a disciplined and successful fighting force. The changing nature of the Communist Party By 1921, the Communist Government was no longer a government of the workers, peasants and soldiers. While the soviets had been made up of working people, the communist nomenklatura, who administered the policies of War Communism, were largely educated members of the former middle class – economists, statisticians and engineers – who had worked for the pre-revolutionary government. The communists needed their adm inistrative and technical expertise to help run industries and supply the army during the war.
11Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 4 1921: Crisis and reform The communists had won the Civil War due to their ability to control the whole Russian economy and their willi ngness to dominate the government. However, this had made the new government extremely unpopular. The Crisis of 1921, which included rebellion among the peasants, workers’ strikes and military mutiny, showed the extent of opposition to Lenin’s government and therefore forced Lenin to reform. Note it down This section focuses on the impact of the Crisis of 1921 on Lenin’s government. Using a spider diagram (see page x), make notes on the impact of the Crisis. Popular unrest By early 1921, the communists had won the Civil War. However, the Civil War had ruined Russia’s economy. Droughts in 1920 and 1921 made the situation worse, threatening famine. Peasants in Tambov, led by Aleksandr Antonov, began a rebellion against communist grain requisitioning and Cheka brutality. By January 1921 Antonov had a force of 50,000 anti-communist fighters. Antonov’s revolt was not the only challenge to the Bolsheviks in the countryside. In March 1921 there were peasant attacks on government grain stores all along the Volga River. In the major cities there were strikes against communist policies in early 1921. In Petrograd the Red Army responded by opening fire on unarmed workers. Sailors at the Kronstadt naval base, horrif ied by the communists’ suppression of the Petrograd strikes, rebelled. The Kronstadt sailors demanded a series of reforms, including: ● the immediate free and fair election of new soviets ● release of all anarchist, Menshevik and SR political prisoners ● a restoration of freedom of speech and the press ● the abolition of the Cheka ● an end to War Communism (see page 43). In essence, the Kronstadt sailors wanted a return to soviet democracy. This demand was summed up in their slogan ‘Soviets without Communists’. Even some communists felt that Lenin had gone too far and that the time was right to revive soviet democracy. Lenin responded swiftly to these challenges. By mid- March the Red Army had crushed the Kronstadt uprising. The Red Army was equally ruthless in Tambov. In May they suppressed the rebellion by deporting 100,000 people to labour camps and attacking peasant village s with poisoned gas. One-party state Lenin responded to the unrest by suppressing opposition political parties. In so doing he created a one-party state. During the Civil War, opposition political parties were often persecuted by the Cheka. In spite of this they had survived the Civil War and therefore were able to play a key role in the strikes of early 1921. From February 1921 Lenin authorised the Cheka to destroy opposition political parties. At the end of February 1921, all Mensheviks in Petrograd and Moscow, including one of the Mensheviks’ leaders, Fyodor Dan, were arrested and sent to the Butyrka Prison. Similar steps were taken against the SRs. Twenty-two leading SRs were put on trial in early 1922 and sentenced to prison or exile. Consequently, between 1921 and 1922, the communists’ dominance of Russia was consolidated by crushing opposition political parties. The 1921 Party Congress Lenin recognised that the unrest in Tambov, Petrograd and Kronstadt ref lected the fact that Russian workers and peasants were deeply dissatisfied with the regime. As a result, Lenin pushed through a series of reforms in the 1921 Party Congress. The New Economic Policy (see page 45) liberalised the economy, while the ban on factions tightened Lenin’s political control. Lenin faced opposition from several factions within the Bolshevik Party, including: ● the Workers’ Opposition: a group who wanted to reintroduce workers’ control of industry ● the Democratic Centralists: a group who wanted to make the Communist Party more democratic. Lenin introduced a resolution, entitled ‘On Party Unity’, which banned factions inside the Party. Party members found guilty of form ing factions could be expelled from the Party as punishment. The ban on factions helped strengthen Lenin’s position within the Party by making opposition to his policies more diff icult to organise. The Soviet Union The Soviet Union was created in 1922. In theory the Union was made up of independent republics. By 1940 there were fifteen Soviet republics including the Ukraine, Georgia, Estonia, and the Uzbek, Kazakh and Tajik Republics. Each republic had its own Soviet system, and each republic, apart from Russia, had its own Communist Party.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin12 5 Conclusion: Lenin’s legacy Between 1917 and the time of Lenin’s death in 1924, Russia was transformed. Lenin succeeded in creating a Dictatorship of the Proletariat to defend the revolution. However, he destroyed soviet democracy and replaced it with a one-party state. The original institutions that had been created after the October Revolution had lost their power to Party institutions that had emerged during the Civil War. For example, Sovnarkom ceased to play an important role in government, while the Politburo made all of the important decisions that affected Russia. During the Civil War Russia became extremely centralised. The creation of a one-party state and the ban on factions meant that political centralisation increased after the Civil War. Lenin argued that the ban on factions, the ban on other parties and the decreased role of the soviets were temporary. However, there was no sign before Lenin’s death that the government had plans to m ake Russia more democratic. Lenin also created a system in which the political police played a significant role. Again, the Cheka were introduced in 1917 as a temporar y measure. But after the Civil War they still played a significant role, persecuting opposition political parties. In this sense, Lenin created a system in which individuals had no rights as the Cheka were free to persecute anyone that the government perceived as a threat. Indeed, Lenin established the principle that violence was justified in order to protect the revolution. Finally, Lenin replaced a workers’ government with a highly bureaucratic one. Soviets ful l of workers, peasants and soldiers were replaced by specialists and administrators, few of whom were from the working class. Work together Having made notes on this chapter, swap them with a partner. Consider the following questions: 1 Has your partner taken all of the key points down? 2 Has your partner got enough supporting detail points to support the key points? 3 Has your partner missed anything? 4 Have you missed anything that your partner has noted down? 5 Could you revise from your partner’s notes? 6 How could you both improve your note-making style? Use these questions to feed back to each other and improve your note making. Chapter summary ● Lenin seized power in Russia in the October Revolution of 1917, proclaiming ‘All power to the Soviets’. ● Initially, Lenin’s government was based on the soviets. ● Bolshevik popularity declined between October 1917 and April 1918. ● Lenin refused to recognise the results of new elections to the soviets in mid-1918. ● During the Russian Civil War, 1918–21, the Russian Government became increasingly centralised and dominated by the communists. ● During the Civil War the Politburo replaced Sovnarkom as the effective government of Russia. ● The communists won the Civil War using a combination of political and economic centralisation, military discipline and terror. ● Following the Civil War Lenin banned opposition political parties and created a one-party state. ● Following the Civil War Lenin banned factions within the Communist Party, further centralising the Party. ● The Communist Government continued to use political centralisation and terror to govern Russia after the Civil War.
13Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 Russian workers, peasants and soldiers Local soviet Local soviet Local soviet Local soviet Sovnarkom Elect Elects All-Russian Congress of Soviets Send delegates Russian Government in October 1917 Russian workers, peasants and soldiers Local soviet Local soviet Local soviet Local soviet Sovnarkom Elections are postponed Elects All-Russian Congress of Soviets Send delegates Russian Government in 1921 Sovnarkom governs Russia and is accountable to the Congress The Congress passes major laws Local soviets govern local areas Sovnarkom approves decisions made by the Politburo The Congress is dominated by the Communist Party Opposition: political parties are excluded from the soviets Politburo Local Party Branch Is s u e s o r d e r s t o Summary diagram: Establishing Communist Party control, 1917–24. Recommended reading G.L. Freeze (ed.), Russia: A History (Oxford University Press, 2002), especially pages 253–262 on the political consequences of the Russian Civil War. R. Service, Lenin: A Biography (Pan Macmillan, 2010), especially the Introduction which provides an overview of Lenin’s life, ideas and legacy. R. Service, The Penguin History of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-first Centur y (Penguin, 2009), especially Chapter 1 which deals with Russia prior to the First World War. R.G. Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume III (Cambridge University Press, 2006), especially Chapter 4 which deals with the revolutionary period of 1917–18.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin14 Essay technique: Understanding the question How accurate is it to say that Russia was a totalitarian state in the years 1928–41? ‘How accurate’, like other stems such as ‘How far’, indicates that you are required to evaluate the extent of something, rather than giving a yes or no answer. This set s out the subject that you must address. The dates define the period that you should consider. Overall, all Section A and B questions ask you to make a judgement about the extent of something, in a specific period. In order to focus on the question you must address all three elements. The most common mistakes come from misunderstanding or ignoring one of these three elements. Section A and B questions require you to deploy a variety of skills. The most important are focus on the question, selection and deployment of relevant detail, analysis and, at the highest level, prioritisation. The introduction to this book gives more detail about Section A and B questions (see pages vi-vii). Section A and B questions for AS level are different from those for A level, and some guidance about this is given on pages vii– viii. However, you will need to develop very similar skills for the AS exam, therefore the activities will help with the AS exams as well. There are also some AS-style questions to practise at the end of chapters. In order to answer the question successfully you must understand how the question works. The question below is written precisely in order to make sure that you understand the task. Each part of the question has a specific meaning. Activity: What should a good answer look like? Having read the advice on essay questions on this page and in the introduction (page v), complete the following activity: 1 Make a bullet-point list of the skills that you need to do well in this type of es say. 2 Number the skills in order of their diff iculty, so the easiest skill to demonstrate is 1, and the hardest 4. 3 Try to work out what a good essay would look like. Specifica lly, note down your thoughts about: – roughly how many paragraphs the essay should have – which ski lls you shou ld deploy in which sections of the essay – how you should structure the different types of paragraph. TIP: Don’t just guess; use the advice in this section and in the introduction to try to f igure out what a good essay should look li ke. Work together Having completed these activities, swap them with a partner. Consider the following questions: 1 Did you agree on which skills were easiest to demonstrate and which skills were hardest? How did each of you make this judgement? 2 Did you agree on the number of paragraphs in the essay? 3 How did you and your partner make the judgement about the number of paragraphs you should write? 4 If you had different reasons for the judgement, whose reasons were better and why? 5 Did you agree on where the different skills should be used? 6 Were your reasons for locating skills in different parts or throughout the essay as good as your partner’s reasons? 7 Did you agree on how to structure each paragraph? 8 Can your partner justify their thoughts on how to structure a paragraph? Use this discussion as a basis for further notes on how to approach the question. For advice on the structure of the essay see page 26.
15Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 1b: Stalin in power, 1928–53 Overview Between 1928 and 1953 the Soviet Union was transformed from a Part y dictatorship to a personal dictatorship. This process went through a series of stages. By 1928, Stalin had changed the nature of the Party in a way that allowed him to emerge as the Soviet Union’s undisputed leader. This proces s went further in the 1930s. Through a series of v iolent purges, known as the Gr eat Terror, Stalin destroyed the generation of Communist leaders who had known Lenin, fought in the revolution and therefore had authority that was independent of Stalin. In this sense, during the 1930s Stalin reduced the power of the Party and made himself supreme. By 1938, the essential features of Stalin’s Communist Government were in place. In his final years he made small changes to the Party and the state in order to safeguard his power. His effort s were successful. He died in 1953 the master of a totalitarian superpower. This chapter considers: 1 The elimination of Stalin’s opponents 2 The purges of the 1930s 3 Stalin’s power over party and state. 1 The elimination of Stalin’s opponents Between 1923 and 1928 the leadership struggle transformed the nature of the Communist Party. Between 1917 and 1922 Lenin’s government had been quite pluralistic. There were a number of powerful people in the government and various different views about the future of communist society. The 1921 Ban on Factions (see page 11) had reduced the scope of party pluralism, but it had not destroyed it. However, by 1928 Stalin had transformed the Party in four ways: ● He had established an ideological orthodoxy. ● He had destroyed the authority of the other main contenders. ● He changed the nature of Party membership. ● He had created the patronage system. In so doing he ensured his victory and destroyed the political authority of his key rivals. Note it down Make an index card (see page xi) for each of the main contenders for power. On each, note: ● their relationship with Lenin ● Lenin’s comments on them in his Testament ● their key strengths ● their key weaknesses. Leadership in the Soviet Union Lenin’s leadership was based on his personality and his authority. He was able to lead because he had the respect of all his senior colleagues. They knew that he had masterminded the revolution, and that the government that emerged reflected his vision. In that sense, he was leader of the Soviet Union because he was Lenin, not because he held official positions. This created problems on Lenin’s death. Specifically, replacing Lenin was not a matter of winning a post in the government. Rather, each of the contenders had to persuade the Communist Party that they were a true Leninist. Nonetheless, the Politburo had emerged as the most powerful part of the government. Therefore gaining a majority in the Politburo was the key to power in the Soviet Union. Winning a majority in the Politburo meant winning votes at the Party Congress as the Party Congress elected the Central Committee, which in turn elected the Politburo. The battle for leadership was a battle for support within the Party, not a battle for support within the Soviet Union, which was not a democracy. Stalin’s rivals for power in 1923 The leadership struggle was prompted by Lenin’s declining hea lth. Lenin had become unwell towards the end of 1921, and in May 1922 he had the first of a series of strokes that left him unable to work. By mid-1923 it was obvious that Lenin would never return to government. Therefore a struggle began at the top of the Party which had a profound impact on the government of the Soviet Union. From 1923 there were four key contenders who had a realistic chance of emerging as leader of Russia: Zinoviev, Bukhar in, Trotsky and Stalin. None of them rivalled Lenin, but all of them had a significant degree of authority in the Party. Gregory Zinoviev Zinoviev emerged as the front-runner to lead the Soviet Union in 1923. Zinoviev could claim to be a true Leninist
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin16 as he was Lenin’s closest friend. The two spent so much time together that Zinoviev’s handwriting became like that of Lenin. Additionally, Zinoviev had supported Lenin since the beginning of the Bolshevik movement in 1903. Between 1903 and 1917 Zinoviev had been Lenin’s right- hand man. Between 1923 and 1925 Zinoviev led the Triumvirate, an alliance of himself, his friend Lev Kamenev and Stalin, which formed a majority in the Politburo.The alliance kept Trotsky out of power and laid the foundation for Stalin’s emergence as leader. Specifically, Zinoviev and Kamenev persuaded the Central Committee to ignore Lenin’s Testament, which contained an instruction to sack Stalin. Consequently, Stalin retained his position at the top of government. Zinoviev also created an extremely effective political strategy which denied Trotsky power. He made a series of speeches about the differences between Leninism and Trotskyism. The purpose of these speeches and these two new categories was to demonstrate that Trotsky was not a Leninist and therefore should not lead the government. Nikolai Bukharin From 1925 to early 1928 Bukharin was the most prominent figure in the Soviet Government. In 1925 he formed an alliance with Stal in, known as the Duumvirate. The alliance gave Bukharin and Stalin a majority in the Politburo due to the support of more junior members who were allies of Bukharin. Bukharin could claim to be a true Leninist for a number of reasons: ● He joined the Bolshevik faction in 1906 and supported Lenin consistently until Lenin’s death in 1924. ● Lenin and Bukharin were close and had a father-and- son relationship. ● Lenin entrusted Bukharin with a series of important jobs, including the editorship of the Soviet newspaper Pravda. However, it was widely known that Buk harin and Lenin had d isagreed over a series of issues. For example, in 1918 they disagreed over ending the First World War, and in 1921 over the introduction of the NEP. Moreover, as he was the youngest of the contenders for power, some in the Party thought he was too young and inexperienced to be the new leader. Trotsky Trotsky was the most famous member of the government other than Lenin. He was well known as a revolutionary hero due to the role he played in the October Revolution and the Civil War. Moreover, from 1917 he had been Lenin’s right- hand man and closest political collaborator. However, he was not popular within the Communist Party. Many communists remembered that between 1903 and 1917 he had opposed Lenin. Trotsky had joined the Bolsheviks in mid-1917, and therefore many Bolsheviks believed that he joined the Party to gain power rather than because he was a true Leninist. Moreover,Trotsky had disagreements with Lenin in 1917 over the timing of the October Revolution and in 1922 over the NEP (see page 45). There was a great deal of evidence that Zinoviev was right and Trotsky was not a true Leninist and therefore did not deserve to lead the Party. Trotsky retained his position in the Politburo until 1927, but he was unable to influence the direction of policy. He was continually in opposition to the ruling all iances. Stalin Stalin was continually part of the Politburo majority between 1923 and 1928. However, he played a supporting role, letting Zinoviev and then Bukharin play the leading roles in the Triumvirate and then the Duumvirate. Lenin’s Testament In late 1922 and early 1923 Lenin was too ill to play an active part in government. Nonetheless, he was able to dictate essays and notes which set out his ideas for the future of the Soviet Union. Lenin’s Testament refers to a series of notes that he dictated about leading members of the Party. The notes were addressed to the Central Committee and were highly critical of the main contenders for power. The Testament: ● accused Trotsky of arrogance and in coded language of being too willing to use violence ● accused Stalin of impatience and rudeness ● reminded the Central Committee that Zinoviev and Kamenev had been disloyal to the Party immediately before the October Revolution ● argued that Bukharin did not fully understand Lenin’s ideology. The first part of the Testament advocated a collective leadership based on an alliance between Trotsky and Stalin. However, following an angry phone call between Stalin and Lenin’s wife, the second part of the note instructed the Central Committee to sack Stalin. All of the five contenders voted to keep the Testament secret at a 1923 meeting of the Central Committee, as it was damaging to all of them.
17Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 Stalin could claim to be a true Leninist for a variety of reasons. He had joined the Bolsheviks at the very beginni ng in 1903 and had been loyal to Lenin throughout the whole period from 1903 to 1921. Stalin began being disloyal to Lenin in 1922 when Lenin was too ill to fight back. Moreover, this disloyalty was kept secret from the majority of the Party. Lenin held Stalin in high regard, referring to him as ‘that wonderful Georgian’. Lenin trusted Stalin with important administrative tasks and supported his promotion to the position of General Secretary in 1921. The Communist Party in 1928 The leadership struggle led to a series of important changes in the Communist Party. In general terms the Party became more centralised and disciplined as a result of the leadership struggle as the contenders tried to gain greater control of the Party. Ideological orthodoxy First, in order to win the leadership struggle, Stalin had to establish that he, rather tha n the other contenders, was a true Leninist. This changed the nature of the Party by establishing a new ideological orthodoxy. Between 1917 and 1928 the Communist Party included members who believed a variety of different things. During the leadership struggle Stalin and his allies discredited a number of ideas, which became known as Trotskyite. By 1928 the Communist Party was committed to two ideas which Stalin advocated: ● Socialism in one countr y: From 1924 Stalin and Bukharin had advocated the idea that the Soviet Union could construct socialism. Traditionally, Marxists had assumed that socialism could only be achieved following a global revolution. In that sense, constructing socialism was believed to be a global project, not something that could be done in one countr y. However, from 1924 Bukharin a nd Stalin argued that the Soviet Union could build socialism without waiting for a global revolution. They argued that socialism in one country was the correct Leninist idea, and that Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev were Trotskyites, rather than Leninists, because they wanted to wait for a global revolution before constructing socialism. ● Collectivisation and industrial isation: In 1928, Stalin argued that the time was right to abandon the NEP and transform the Soviet economy. Lenin had argued that the NEP would ‘last a long time but not forever’. While this statement was vague, Stalin argued that Lenin’s commitment to the NEP was pragmatic. When the economy under the NEP stopped growing in the late 1920s, Stalin argued that the correct Leninist policy was to abandon the NEP and introduce a more radical policy. From 1928 Stalin argued that peasa nts should be forced to work on state-owned farms, and that the profit they produced should be used to industrialise the Soviet Union at a rapid pace. He argued that Buk harin’s desire to continue the NEP indicated that Bukharin was no longer a true Leninist. This new ideological orthodoxy was a significant change in the nature of the Party. Lenin had tolerated differences of view at the top of the government and was prepared to 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 Leadership struggle: OverviewG o v e rn in g F a c tio n O p p o s itio n F a c tio n Triumvirate Zinoviev, Kamenev & Stalin Duumvirate Bukharin & Stalin Trotsky Left Opposition Zinoviev, Kamenev & Trotsky Stalin The Right Opposition 1925: Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin defeat Trotsky, and then Stalin stabs Zinoviev and Kamenev in the back Late 1927: the Duumvirate defeat the United Opposition then Stalin stabs Bukharin in the back 1929 Bukharin and the Right Opposition are defeated in the Central Committee. Stalin becomes undisputed leader. United Opposition Bukharin
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin18 work with people he disagreed with. Stalin, by contrast, argued that Trotskyites and Bukhar in’s followers posed a real th reat to the Party. Therefore he had Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky arrested and Trotsky expelled from the Party and the Soviet Union. Authority at the top of the Party Under Lenin there were many people who had authority within the Part y. Stalin, Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev and Kamenev all enjoyed the respect of significant parts of the Party, and therefore all had power bases within the Party. Stalin’s strategy for emerging as undisputed leader was to destroy the authority of his opponents. He undermined the authority of his opponents by: ● establishing a new ideological orthodoxy and branding his opponents enemies of Leninism ● demanding that Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev apologise to the Party for the errors when they lost votes at the Party Congress ● accusing Bukharin, Zinoviev and Kamenev of plotting against the Party and forming a faction; these were serious crimes, as Lenin had banned factions in 1921. By 1928, the Party had been transformed from an organisation in which there were a large number of people who had a degree of authority to an organisation in which Stalin had a near monopoly of authority. Significantly, Stalin did not succeed in completely destroying Bukharin’s authority by 1928. Bukharin was sti ll highly regarded by most of the Party, even though his policies were rejected. Party membership Another change in the Party introduced by Stalin to help win the leadership struggle was an increase in Party membership. In 1924, Stalin initiated the Lenin Enrolment. From May 1924, the Lenin Enrolment allowed 128,000 people to join the Communist Party. Stalin justif ied this by arguing that the Party needed new working-class members. However, in practice the new members were poorly educated people who wanted well-paid jobs within the Party. Due to their lack of education, the new members were suspicious of Trotsky and Bukharin, the Party’s leading intellectuals. Moreover, because they were interested in getting well-paid Party jobs they tended to support Stalin, who was able to promote them within the Party. Therefore by 1928 the Party was quite different to the Party of 1921. The new recruits were less interested in ideas or the goals of the revolution and more interested in their careers. Stalin’s patronage system Party democracy also weakened between 1921 and 1928. In 1921, the Party was based on Democratic Centralism. All Party members voted for delegates who attended the Party Cong ress, which elected the Central Comm ittee. However, from 1923 Stalin began to issue an ‘approved list’. Rather than having a free choice, local parties were encouraged to send delegates to the Part y Congress from the approved list. In 1923 approximately one-third of the delegates at the Party Congress were selected from Stalin’s list. As the 1920s went on this fig ure grew, giving Stalin a greater degree of control over the Congress. Additionally, Stalin had a number of positions in the Party which al lowed him to win support by acting as patron. As General Secret ary, he could give well-paid and powerful jobs to lower-ranking Par ty members. Equally as head of the Central Control Commission and the Rabkrin he had the power to investigate and, if necessary, sack Party members and government off icials. Stalin’s power to promote and sack Party members meant that he could count on the loyalty of Party members who wanted to retain their positions or get a promotion. Changes in the Par ty increased Sta lin’s power. They also led to a change in the nature of the Part y. First, from the mid-1920s the Part y increasingly had the role of administering and implementing the decisions of the Politburo and the leader. Party members became known as ‘apparatchiks’, people who worked in the Party ‘apparatus’, implementing orders rather than think ing creatively about politics. Secondly, the Party became increasingly privi leged. People with full-time positions in the Party were known as the ‘nomenklatura’, people who enjoyed power and status due to their Party position, and ultimately to patronage. In this sense, under Stali n the Party ceased to be full of dedicated revolutionary rad icals and became full of professional administrators dedicated to their own careers. Conclusion The struggle for leadership in the 1920s transformed the Party by 1928. Stalin emerged as leader of the Party by creating an ideological orthodoxy, by destroying the authority of his opponents, by transforming the Communist Party and by the extensive use of patronage. In so doing, he changed the Communist Party from a relatively pluralistic organisation to a party in which Stalin alone was dominant.
19Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 ‘Long live the Stalinist Order of Heroes and Stakhanovites’ by Gustav Klutsis (1935). In what ways does this poster from 1935 emphasise Stalin’s authority? 2 The purges of the 1930s By 1928, Stalin was u ndisputed leader of the Communist Par ty a nd the Soviet Union. However, in some ways his power was insecure. In essence, Stalin feared that he would lose power, just as Trotsky, Zinoviev and Bukhar in had in the 1920s. He was concerned that: ● his own supporters were prepared to challenge his authority ● his old rivals could conspire against him and overthrow him. Stalin responded to these perceived threats by launching the Great Terror, or Great Purge, a campaign of arrests, torture, mass imprisonments and executions that finally removed his opponents. The Great Terror was at its height from 1935 to 1938. It was responsible for the deaths of around 10 million Soviet citizens, approximately ten per cent of the population. Note it down Using a spider diagram (see page x), make notes on the causes of the Great Terror. Use the sub-headings as your main topics and make sure you get down the key details, including dates and names. Under every heading, highlight the reason why each of these factors led Stalin to launch the Great Terror. Finally, make a judgement about whether the factors were long- or short-term causes – and note these judgements down on the diagram. Causes of the purges The Great Terror had several causes. However, they were all related to Stalin’s desire to safeguard his own position. Opposition Opposition from the Politburo was one of the causes of the Great Terror. By 1932 there was a group of moderates in the Politburo associated with Sergei Kirov, head of the
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin20 Communist Party in Leningrad. Kirov and the moderates were able to force some changes in policy in the early 1930s: ● In 1932, Kirov defended Martemyan Ryutin. Ryutin had circulated a document that was highly critical of Stalin’s policies. He also formed the Union of Marxist Leninists, an opposition group, which included supporters of Bukharin, Zinoviev and Trotsky. Stalin demanded his execution. However, Kirov, with the support of Politburo moderates, argued successfully that he should be sent to prison. ● In 1933 Kirov and the moderates argued for more realistic targets in the Second Five-Year Plan and for a greater emphasis on the production of consumer goods (see page 53). Kirov’s growing authority w ithin the Party was clearly a challenge to Stalin. Economic problems Economic problems were also a cause of the Great Terror. First, senior figures within government were aware of the problems with Stali n’s industrial a nd agricultural policies, which undermined Stalin’s authority in government 53–54. Secondly, by accusing workers and managers of being ‘wreckers’ and ‘saboteurs’ Stalin could blame them for the problems, rather than accepting responsibility for the failure of his policies. Finally, Stalin sent ‘wreckers’ and ‘saboteurs’ to Gulags, huge labour camps. In this sense, the terror created an army of slave labour, which he could use to build factories or mine resources. The Congress of Victors Events during the Congress of Victors, held in February 1934, also indicated that Stalin’s position was under threat. Stalin came second to Kirov in the vote at the end of the Congress which elected the new Central Committee; Kirov received 1225 votes compared to Stalin’s 927. Senior members of the Party approached Kirov, urging him to stand aga inst Stalin as General Secretary. Kirov refused, and the vote was kept secret. Nonetheless, the Congress demonstrated that Stalin had a rival in the Communist Party. Kirov’s murder Finally, Kirov’s murder was a useful pretext for launching the terror. Kirov was murdered in December 1934. Some historians have speculated that Stalin ordered the attack, but conclusive proof has never been found. Certainly, the murder removed Stalin’s main rival. Additionally, the murder allowed Stalin to claim that there was a dangerous conspiracy that aimed to overthrow the Communist Government. In that sense, it gave Stalin a reason to arrest his rivals and launch a mass campaign to hunt down his enemies. The Great Terror, 1934–38 The Great Terror started in Leningrad in December 1934. Immediately after Kirov’s murder, Stalin arrested Zinoviev and Kamenev and organised an investigation into the Communist Party in Leningrad. The Great Terror spread throughout the Soviet Union in 1936 and reached its height in 1937. Show trials The most public aspect of the terror were three show trials that took place in 1936, 1937 and 1938. These fina lly removed Stalin’s rivals from the 1920s: ● The Trial of the 16, 1936, led to the execution of Zinoviev, Kamenev and 14 of their supporters. ● The Trial of the 17, 1937, led to the execution and imprisonment of 17 of Trotsky’s former supporters. ● The Trial of the 21, 1938, led to the execution of Bukharin a nd many of his closest supporters. Not only did the trials lead to the deaths of Stalin’s former rivals, they also destroyed the reputations of the key defendants. All of the defendants confessed to plotting to murder Kirov and working with capitali st nations to overthrow the Soviet Union. The show trials were only a tiny fraction of the Great Terror. The terror affected all aspects of the Party and the government. Indeed, 95 per cent of those affected by the terror were men between the ages of 30 and 45 who held senior positions in the Party or played an important role in the economy. Secret trials In addition to the public trials, Stalin organised a trial of the Red Army’s leaders. In 1937 eight senior generals were tried Sergei Kirov, 1886–1934 Born in 1886 into a poor family, Kirov became a leading member of the Communist Party in the 1920s. In 1925 he was appointed leader of the Communist Party in Leningrad. He was a Stalinist, who supported collectivisation, the Five-Year Plans and the use of political terror. Although he was a Stalinist, he had a reputation for being more pragmatic than Stalin. Indeed, he used his influence to ensure that the Second Five-Year Plan was more realistic and more focused on consumer goods than the First. Additionally, he was a good orator, he was considered handsome and he was a Russian – whereas Stalin was a Georgian – and therefore popular within the Party. In 1933 he was nominated Stalin’s deputy, and therefore Stalin saw him as a potential rival. There is considerable debate surrounding the extent of Stalin’s involvement in his murder.
21Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 for plotting to overthrow the government. The eight leaders had worked with Trotsky when he was head of the Red Army, and therefore Stalin did not trust them. All were executed. Following the trial more than 37,000 officers were purged from the a rmy (see Table 2). Consequences of the Great Terror The Great Terror led to significant change in government: ● It finally eliminated Stalin’s rivals from the 1920s. ● It also led to the death or imprisonment of a whole generation of communists who had known and worked with Lenin. In this sense, it removed all Party members who could claim authority that was independent from Stalin. ● It led to the emergence of a new generation of Communist Party leaders who owed their positions to Stalin, and who were therefore loyal. ● It established the principle that Stalin had the right to use terror against anyone who was disloyal. ● Stalin’s political police, the NKV D, became a powerful organisation within the regime. Consequently, Lavrentiy Beria, Stalin’s NKVD chief from 1938, also became a powerful figure within the government. In sum, the Great Terror established that Stalin was the only source of authority in the Soviet Union. Other politicians and the Party itself could not be trusted. Only Stalin could be trusted to defend the Soviet Union. Totalitarianism Stalin’s form of government has often been described as totalitarian. In essence, many historians and political scientists argue that Stalin constructed a new kind of dictatorship. Unlike previous dictators, Stalin: ● had complete control of the economy (see pages 50–51) ● used widespread political terror to eliminate his opponents ● had complete control of the media ● used extensive propaganda to win the hearts and minds of his people (see page 75–76). Stalin’s dictatorship also had different aims from previous dictatorships. Whereas dictators such as the Tsar had been content with the absence of opposition, Stalin demanded heartfelt enthusiasm from his people. In that sense, Stalin did not simply want obedience; he wanted the full commitment of his people. Table 2: The victims of the purges . Date Victims Accused of Punishment 1928 Engineers at Shakhty Treason and sabotage Shot or sent to labour camps 1934 Supporters of Ryutin Treason and plotting against Stalin Expelled from the Party 1936 Zinoviev and Kamenev Being Trotskyists and being involved in the murder of Kirov Shot 1937 Pyatakov and Serebryakov Espionage and being German agents Shot Yagoda, head of the NKVD Treason and murder Shot Marshal Tukhachevsky and the majority of the army’s senior officers Treason Shot The junior army officers – an estimated 35,000 Treason Shot or sent to labour camps All the admirals of the Soviet navy Treason Shot Radek and Sokolnikov Espionage and being German agents Shot 1938 Bukharin, Rykov, numerous other Party leaders and members of the soviets of other republics Various crimes including treason Shot or sent to labour camps 1939 Yezhov, head of the NKVD Treason – being a British agent Shot 1929 –39 An estimated 24 millio n p eop le Tr eason, bein g kulaks, havin g bourgeois views and many other crimes Sent to labour camps where some 13 million died 1940 Trotsky Long time critic of Stalin Killed at his home in Mexico City
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin22 3 Stalin’s power over party and state Stalin dominated both party and state. The relationship between the Party and the state in the Soviet Union was complicated and changed over time. Crucially, Stalin used the changing relationship between the two organisations to his advantage. Note it down Between 1928 and 1953 Stalin established his dominance of the Party and the Soviet state. Using a large piece of paper draw a timeline beginning in January 1928 and ending in March 1953. Add the different strategies that Stalin used during these years to the timeline. In each case, make a note of the methods that Stalin used and his goals. Also, make sure you add events to the timeline, such as the Great Terror and the Second World War. The party and state’s relationship Stalin inherited the Communist Party and the Soviet state from Lenin. Lenin had created both, but had failed to define the relationship between the two organisations. In 1917, Lenin established a state based on the soviets. However, as non-Commun ist political parties were outlawed, the Communist Party, rather than the state, became the most powerful organisation in the Soviet Union. However, the exact relationship between the Part y and the state was never def ined. Moreover, the relationship changed in the period 1928 to 1953. Stalin used the vagueness of the relationship between the Party and the state to his advantage throughout the 1940s and the early 1950s. The Second World War The Second World War began in western Europe in 1939 between nations including Germany, Britain and France. Initially, the Soviet Union was neutral, but supplied materials to the Nazis. However, Hitler invaded the S oviet Union in 1941. Subsequently, the Soviet Union all ied with Britain and the USA formi ng the Grand Alliance aga inst Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The war in Europe ended with an A llied victory in May 1945. The Second World War led to a change in the relationship between party and state, a change that emphasised Stalin’s power. From 1928, Stalin had been the most powerful man in the Communist Party. However, it was only in 1941 that Stalin became Chair of Sovnarkom – the most senior committee in the state. This change ref lected the need for an eff icient government during wartime. Stalin’s government in the 1930s had been grossly inefficient. Indeed, by purging the senior levels of the state, the Party and the military he had sabotaged the effectiveness of all aspects of the government. Nonetheless, the government needed to run effectively in order to win the war. Therefore from 1941 Stalin took the leading position in the state, as well as the Party, in order to ensure better co-ordination of government. In addition to becoming Chair of the Council of Ministers, Stalin promoted effective government during the war in the following ways: ● He ended mass terror. During the Great Terror thousands of effective administrators had been purged. During the war, Stalin allowed state and Party officials to continue working in order to ensure that government could run more smoothly. Stalin believed that administrators should be allowed to work without the threat of violence during the war, as they could always be shot once the war was won. ● He allowed state power to grow. During the war there was a shift in power within the government from the Party to the state. State Ministers, rather than Party bosses, made important decisions. ● He changed the composition of the Politburo. As the power of the state g rew, Min isters joined the Politburo, and members of the Politburo were given important ministeria l jobs. This meant that the Politburo increasingly co-ordinated state activity as well as Party activity. ● He created the State Defence Committee (GKO). The GKO was responsible for economic co- ordination and military production and defence during the war. Titles in the Soviet Union Between 1928 and 1966 there were regular changes in the titles of senior posts in government. Under Lenin senior government officials were known as Commissars. However, Stalin changed this to Ministers. Similarly, under Lenin the most senior committee in government was called Sovnarkom (the Council of People’s Commissars). Under Stalin this became the Council of Ministers and later the Presidium. Brezhnev, Soviet leader from around 1964 to 1982, reverted to the names used in the 1920s.
23Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 Competition between party and state Following the war Stalin used the party–state relationship to his advantage by encouraging competition between the two organisations. First, he did this by appointing rival personnel to key positions in the Party and state. For example, he placed Andrei Zhdanov, Beria’s key rival, in charge of Party supervision of Beria’s political police. Encouraging competition between Party and state off icials meant that senior officials in the Soviet Government competed with each other and not with Stalin. Secondly, Stalin shifted power from the Party to the state and back again. In 1938 the Politburo was the most senior committee in government. By 1942, the GKO was the most powerful committee, and after the war the Council of Ministers became more powerful. By shifting the centre of power within the government, Stalin was able to ensure that none of these senior committees grew to rival him. Post-war terror A final way in which Stalin held on to power was the continued use of terror. Stalin did not use terror to the same extent after the war as he had in the 1930s. Nonetheless, by purging hundreds of Part y and state officials in his last years he inspired fear in thousands more. The Soviet Constitution of 1936 The Sovie t Constitution o f 1936, somet imes called t he ‘Stalin Constitution’, set out the structure of the Soviet Government and the right s of citizens (see Figure 2). Western socialists who studied the constitution described it as the most democratic in the world. Indeed, the government was based on the electi on of local soviets, which elected higher bodies such as the Supreme Soviets, which, in turn, elected the Council of Ministers. In addition, the constitution guaranteed rights to freedom of speech, freedom of movement and freedom of religion. In reality, the constitution had little to do with the government of the Soviet Union. The soviets, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers were dominated by the Communist Party. The Party held power, rather than the constitutional bodies. Additionally, there was no rule of law in the Soviet Union. Therefore legal rights were meaningless, as the government did not have to obey the law. In the 1980s, Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, tried to revive the power of the soviets and other aspects of the constitution (see pages 157–164). However, between 1936 and 1988 they were largely irrelevant. The Government of the Soviet Union (based on 1936 Constitution) Council of Ministers elected by the Supreme Soviet The Presidium of The Supreme Soviet Comprising of The Soviet of the Union Deputies elected by the people–1 deputy for every 300000 voters The Soviet of Nationalities Deputies representing the various non-Russian peoples from the fifteen republics of the USSR as well as other autonomus districts such as Oblasts Figure 2: The Government of the Soviet Union (based on the 1936 Constitution).
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin24 The Leningrad Affair, 1949 During 1949 Stalin launched a purge against the Leningrad Party. Stalin was concerned that Leningrad, Russia’s second city, was developing a degree of independence from his powerbase in Moscow. Around 100 officials were shot and around 2000 arrested and dismissed. Significantly, the Leningrad Affair may also have been part of the struggle to replace Stalin that emerged in the late 1940s. In 1948, Stalin celebrated his 70th birthday. Clearly, his life was coming to an end. Two of the main rivals for his position were Beria and Zhdanov. Beria’s powerbase was in the MVD (the Soviet political police – see page 30), whereas Zhdanov was the chief of the Leningrad Party. The Leningrad Affair followed Zhdanov’s death in 1949, and one explanation was that Beria encouraged Stalin to purge Leningrad because it contained a group of senior officials who had been his rivals. Testing loyalty A final technique that Stalin used was to test the loyalty of his closest allies. One way in which he did this was to imprison or sack the wives and daughters of senior figures in government. One example concerns Vyacheslav Molotov, one of Stalin’s closest allies. Molotov had been a member of the Politburo since 1926 and Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1939. In 1948 Stalin demanded that the Politburo vote to expel Molotov’s wife from the Party. Molotov abstained from the vote and later apologised to Stalin for this disloyalty. In 1949, Stalin had Molotov’s wife arrested and imprisoned. Having learned from his previous mistake, Molotov made no effort to stop the arrest or end the imprisonment. Vyacheslav Molotov, 1890–1986 Molotov was born into a relatively poor family in 1890. He was a committed Bolshevik, dedicated to overthrowing the Tsar and liberating the working class. In the 1920s he became close to Stalin. He supported Stalin’s key policies in the late 1920s and early 1930s. He was incredibly hard working. Winston Churchill, who met Molotov during the Second World War, claimed he had ‘never seen a human being who more perfectly represented the modern conception of a robot’. Conclusion The struggle for power and the Great Terror transformed the Soviet Government. Under Lenin various politicians, and the Communist Party itself, had an authority that was independent of Lenin. Moreover, Lenin established the convention that political terror should never be used against Communist Party members. Therefore under Lenin and for much of the 1920s there was room for debate and discussion within the Communist Part y. By 1938 this had changed. During the 1920s Stalin established a single ideological orthodoxy and a party which rewarded loyalty rather than free discussion. The 1920s also saw the authority of Lenin’s closest allies destroyed. By 1928 Stalin and his allies were in control of the Party. The Great Terror took this process further. Many of Stalin’s allies were purged; he believed that people were more likely to obey him out of fear than loyalty and therefore he even attacked his supporters. Moreover, Stalin was prepared to rule through terror, and therefore organised opposition and widespread public debate in the Party d isappeared. As a result, Stalin, rather than the Communist Party, ruled. The Communist Party and the state had very limited authority. Certainly, they could not oppose Stalin. In Stalin’s last years, he fostered competition in government and used limited political terror to ensure that his dominance of party and state continued. Therefore on Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet Union faced a new problem. Stalin’s heirs would have to revive the Party and state in order to create an effective Soviet government. Work together Having read this chapter, write a list of the ways in which Stalin transformed Soviet politics. Make sure the list has at least four statements. Each statement should include: ● a specific aspect of government that changed ● the reason it changed ● the impact of the change. For example, you could write: ‘Stalin centralised the Party to ensure his dominance and this increased his control of the Party.’ Having completed the list swap lists with a partner. Compare the lists and ensure that you note down any statements that you missed. Discuss which of the changes was the most significant, and then write a sentence together explaining which change was most significant and why.
25Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 1917–21 1921–28 1928–34 1934–53 Competing Factions Competitive elections to the Congress Several senior figures within the Party Genuine debate within the Party Regular Congresses Limited elections to the Congress Several senior figures within the Party Genuine debate within the Party Regular Congresses Limited elections to the Congress Several senior figures within the Party Limited debate within the Party leadership Limited debate within the Party leadership Summary diagram: Creating a monolithic party – changes to the Communist Party 1917–53. Recommended reading A. Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism (Random House, 2010), pages 71–72. Brown considers the extent to which Stalin established a personal dictatorship. P. Kenez, A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End (Cambridge, 2006), pages 75–79. Kenez discusses the events of the power struggle. R. Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective (Routledge, 1998), pages 45–48. Sakwa provides an overview of the key features and important dynamics of the Stalin era. Chapter summary Between 1928 and 1953 Stalin’s control of the government went through a series of phases: ● Phase 1: 1928–34: Stalin dominated the government, but key rivals remained in the Party. ● Phase 2: 1934–38: Stalin’s Great Terror removed his rivals, consolidating his dominance of party and state. ● Phase 3: 1938–53: Stalin used the relationship between the Party and the state to his advantage, in order to stop new rivals emerging.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin26 Essay technique: Focus and structure All of your examined essays will be judged on how far they focus on the question and on the quality of their structure; the better your focus and the clearer your structure, the better your chance of exam success. Focus of the question First, you must identify the focus of the question. Imagine you are answering the following question: How far do the policy changes of 1921 explain Stalin’s increasing domination of the Communist Party in the period 1928–53? The question has two parts: ● the policy changes of 1921 ● Stalin’s increasing domination of the Communist Party in the period 1928–53. Essentially, the question asks you to explain Stalin’s increasing domination of the Communist Party; therefore that is the primary focus of the question. However, you must evaluate the role played by the policy changes of 1921; this is the secondary focus of your essay. Structuring your essay Your essay should be made up of three or four paragraphs, each addressing a dif ferent factor which helps to explain Stalin’s increasing domination of the Communist Party. One of these paragraphs has to explain the factor stated in the question: the policy changes of 1921. Therefore your essay plan should look something like this: • Paragraph 1: (Stated factor) The policy changes of 1921 • Paragraph 2: Stalin’s personality • Paragraph 3: Communist ideology • Paragraph 4: Stalin’s successes It is a good idea to deal with the stated factor first, otherwise you may run out of time and then miss the opportunity to deal with this important part of the question. Once you have dealt with the stated factor, deal with the other factors in order of their importance. Write about the most important factor first. In addition to your three or four main points, you should begin your essay with a clear introduction and end with a conclusion (see page 68–69) that contains a focused summary of your essay. The example above is a causation question, which asks you to consider how far a stated factor caused a specific process. Significantly, not all questions deal with cause, and not all questions have an obvious stated factor. Nonetheless, you will need to consider a range of themes in any essay you write. Therefore you should always begin by thinking of the three or four main topics you want to discuss, and these should be the basis of your essay.
27Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 Writing a focused introduction Having made your plan, it is important you write a focused essay. One way of doing this is to use the wording of the question to help write your answer. For example, the first sentence of your essay could look like this This sentence begins with a clear focus on the question by addressing ‘how far’ the policy changes of 1921 explain Stalin’s increasing domination of the Communist Party. In this sense, the first sentence provides a focused answer to the whole question. Communist ideology was another reason for Stalin’s increasing domination of the Communist Party. Introduces a new factor. Maintains focus on the question. Activity: Question practice Having read the advice on how to write a str uctured and focused essay, using your notes, plan and write the f irst sentence of the following que stions: 1 How far was Stalinism a continuation of Leninism? AS 2 Were Stal in’s purges of the 1930s the main reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928–53? Explain your answer. This sentence clearly introduces a new factor: communist ideology, while maintaining focus on the question. Summary ● Work out the primary and secondary focus of the question. ● Plan your essay with a series of factors that focus on the question. ● Use the words in the question to formulate your answer. ● Return to the primary focus of the question at the beginning of every paragraph. The policy changes of 1921 clearly explain Stalin’s increasing domination of the Communist Party in the period 1928–53 to a small extent. Clear focus. Answers ‘How far’. Focus throughout the essay A second way of maintaining focus is to begin each paragraph with a clear point, which both refers to the primary focus of the question and links it to a factor. For example, you could begin your third paragraph with the following point:
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin28 1c: Reform, stability and stagnation, 1953–85 Overview From 1953 to 1985 Khrushchev, and then Brezhnev attempted to deal with the legacy of Lenin and Stalin. Lenin had created a revolutionary government dedicated to transforming Russia. Stalin had turned the Soviet Union into a superpower. Both of these legacies posed problems. Russia’s new leaders struggled to keep Lenin’s revolution alive, while also attempting to create a stable and successful government. Equally, Stalin’s superpower was in fact a weak state. Stalin’s dominance meant that the government itself had little power independent of Stalin. Khrushchev attempted to reform the system. He wanted to build on what he viewed as the positive aspects of Lenin and Stalin’s system, while ending the use of terror and improving the lives of Soviet citizens. Moreover, he wanted to keep the revolutionary vision alive. However, reform destabilised communist rule – threatening to end the Party’s hold on power. Khrushchev was continually caught between the desire to reform and the need to ensure the Party’s power. Khrushchev’s personality was also problematic. He was often overconfident, he was prepared to take big risks, and his impulsive leadership style caused a series of crises during his time in power. Khrushchev’s attempts to reform and his rashness led to his fall from power in 1964. Senior Communists replaced Khrushchev with new leaders who were more cautious and wanted stability rather than reform. Brezhnev’s great success was the establishment of a stable government. However, Brezhnev’s government abandoned Lenin’s goal of revolutionary transformation in favour of maintaining the status quo. This created problems of its own as an increasingly old, ill and corrupt government attempted to run a struggling superpower. His immediate successors Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko were unwilling and unable to deal with the problems that Brezhnev left behind. This chapter considers: 1 Khrushchev’s reforms and de-Stalinisation 2 Brezhnev and stability, 1964–82 3 Political stagnation, 1970–85. 1 Khrushchev’s reforms and de-Stalinisation From 1955 to 1964 Soviet leaders tried to reform the government. The reforms were radical, but did not alter the fundamental politics or economics of the Soviet Union. Specifically, while Soviet leaders recognised there were problems with the system, they accepted the foundations of a single-party state and central economic planning laid by Lenin and Stalin. Within this framework, Khrushchev wanted to regenerate the Soviet Union. He believed in the revolutionary goals of Lenin and wanted to create a society of plenty, in which there was no poverty and no inequality. Moreover, he believed that mass commitment to the revolution was central to the future of Communism. Therefore he wanted to encourage greater public participation in politics and greater dynamism within the Party. He also wanted to create a humane form of socialism in which people were free from the threat of arbitrary terror. In this sense he rejected Stalin’s belief that terror was central to revolutionary transformation. While K hrushchev had clear aim s, he lacked a coherent plan. He was natural ly impulsive and therefore had a habit of announcing bold plans without think ing them through and making unrealistic promises. Consequently, he often announced major change s and then backtracked. Kh rushchev’s repeated retreats also ref lected the fact that his authority was never as complete as that of Lenin or Stali n. Other Soviet leaders were willing to chal lenge his authority and force him, on occasion, to back down. His impulsiveness, inconsistency and his relative weakness within government were all factors that contributed to his fall in 1964. Note it down Using the 1:2 method, make notes on the stages by which reforms were introduced in the years from 1953 to 1964. You can use different coloured pens to distinguish the goals of reform, the methods used and the outcomes of reform.
29Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 Leadership struggle Stalin’s death led to a struggle for power. The power struggle from 1953 to 1955 was the context in which the first reforms and the first steps to de-Stalinisation took place. Stalin dominated the Soviet Government. His authority was unique. Although he had many positions in the Party and government, his power was based on his reputation and his willingness to use terror. In that sense, his power was personal; it was not based on his positions either in the Party or in the government. Although new people fi lled his positions in the Party and the government, none of them could claim to be the undisputed leader of the Soviet Union. Unlike Lenin, Stalin left no ‘Testament’: no indication of who he wanted to replace him as leader. Contenders for power Immediately following Stalin’s death there were three main contenders for power, each with their own powerbase. ● Georgy Malenkov was rumoured to be Stalin’s choice for successor. Following Stalin’s death Malenkov replaced Stalin as Premier of the Soviet Union, the head of the Soviet Government. Malenkov’s powerbase was the Soviet state, which he assumed was superior to the Communist Party. ● Lavrentiy Beria (see page 86) was the head of Stalin’s political police. He was responsible for implementing Stalin’s terror and was deputy Prem ier in Stalin’s last years. His powerbase was the MVD: the Soviet political police. ● Nikita Khrushchev became Secretary of the Central Committee on Stalin’s death. He had no state role. The Party was his powerbase; he was a popular member of the Politburo with a reputation for being the ‘apparatchik’s apparatchik’. Early government reforms Stalin’s heirs were faced with a series of problems, which prompted discussion of reform. Stalin had successfully turned the Soviet Union into a military and industria l superpower. However, he left a major political problem: Stalin’s power was personal; it was independent of the Nikita Khrushchev, 1894–1971 Khrushchev was born in t he Ukraine in 1894. He worked as a miner in the Ukraine, joining the Bolsheviks in 1918, and served as a Political C ommissar in the Red Army during the Russian Civil War. In the early 1920s there is evidence that he supported Trotsky in debates over economic policy. Nonetheless, in the early 1930s he developed a good relationship with Stalin. He was elected to t he Central Committee in 1934 and became the leader of the Communist Par ty in the Ukraine in 1935. In the mid-1930s he publicly supported the terror. He had little formal education, but had great faith in the communist system. In fact, he believed that his rise from pover ty to the leadership of a global superpower was evidence of the superiority of the Soviet system. His poor background made him popular with ordinary Russians. While working for Stalin he came to believe that reform was essential to ensure a good standard of living and freedom from terror. He remained committed to Soviet socialism, believing it to be a superior system to capitalism and democracy until his death in 1971. Georgy Malenkov, 1902–1988 Born in 1902 into a relatively wealthy farming family, Malenkov joined the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War. He served in the Red Army and became an ally of Stalin in the 1920s. He played an important role in the fall of Yezhov in 1938 (see page 85) and was promoted to the Politburo in 1941. After Stalin’s death he and Khrushchev were the leading contenders to succeed Stalin. Malenkov was eclipsed by Khrushchev by the end of 1955. He was expelled from the Party and forced into internal exile for his role in the Great Terror in 1961.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin30 Party or the state. Therefore on his death there was a power vacuum, which threatened to cause chaos within the government. Malenkov and Khrushchev attempted to address this by shifting the balance of power away from the leader, and in so doing ensuring that the state and the Party had independent power. Beria’s reforms: the MVD One way in which the new generation of leaders attempted to empower the Party and state was to reduce and restrict the power of the MVD, Stalin’s weapon against the power of the Party and the state. Initially, Beria led the reform of the MVD. This was partly to calm the fears of his rivals who assumed that he would use the MVD against them, as Stalin had used the MVD against his rivals. Beria informed the Presidium that the Gulag system had become inefficient and difficult to manage. Indeed, from the late 1940s there were an increasing number of uprisings in the Gulag, including the camps at Steplag, Kolyma and Ozerlag. Beria reformed the system in the following ways: ● In March 1953 he introduced an amnesty for non- political prisoners who were serving short sentences. ● The amnesty was extended in April to some ‘counter- revolutionaries’. ● A Party commission was set up in May to investigate past executions. The Commission rehabilitated 4620 communists who had been executed on the basis of forced confessions. ● Finally, the MVD lost a great deal of its economic power. The MVD had used Gulag labour to construct factories and power stations, as well as to mine precious metals including gold. These projects were terminated. Prison labour was no longer used in this way and responsibility for m ining and construction was passed from the MVD to Soviet economic ministr ies. As a result of the reforms introduced by Beria the Gulag population dropped from 2.4 million in 1953 to 1.6 million in 1956. Together these measures significantly undermined the power and authority of the MVD. Beria’s reforms: the republics Under Stalin the republics had been dominated by central Soviet institutions. In June 1953 Beria introduced two measures that were designed to make republican governments more representative: ● He introduced a measure that required all senior Party officials to speak the language of the republic that they worked in. ● He ordered that all official publications should be available in the languages of the republics as well as in Russian. Beria’s fall Beria’s reforms had significantly weakened the MVD. However, his rivals still feared that he would use the secret police to terrorise and eventually execute them. Therefore Khrushchev and Malenkov organised a plot to arrest and execute Beria. At a meeting of the Presidium in June 1953, Khrushchev accused Beria of handing Soviet secrets to the British government and of crimes against the Soviet people. Beria was arrested, tried and executed. At his trial Malenkov accused Beria of using the MVD against the Party. In this sense the trial and execution of Beria was another way of restricting the power of the MVD and restoring the power of the Party. Beria’s arrest removed one of the main contenders for power. From mid-1953 to the end of 1954 Khrushchev and Malenkov effectively ruled as a duumvirate. Khrushchev’s early government reforms Although Khrushchev and Malenkov worked together after Beria’s arrest, they were still engaged in a competition for power. Therefore Khrushchev’s reforms were designed to achieve two related goals: he wanted to enhance his own power and also the power of the Party at the expense of Malenkov and the state. Personnel changes One of Khrushchev’s first attempts at reform involved replacing Stalin’s supporters with his own. Khrushchev used his position as Secretary of the Central Committee to replace senior officials throughout the Party. Between 1953 and 1956 Khrushchev replaced around half of the regional Party secretaries and 44 per cent of the Central Committee. In so doing, he secured his position within the Party by filling the top levels of the Party with people who were loyal to him and people who were prepared to back reform. Khrushchev’s anti-bureaucracy campaign Having secured his position within the Party, Khrushchev’s second initiative was designed to weaken the state. Khrushchev proposed cutting bureaucracy by devolving power from the Soviet Government to republican governments. This was a direct attack on Malenkov’s powerbase.
31Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 In mid-1954 Khrushchev restructured government, cutting the number of central Soviet ministries from 55 to 25. The amount of economic power exercised by the republics increased. The reforms meant that the proportion of Soviet industry controlled by central government dropped from 68 per cent to just 44 per cent. Khrushchev’s reforms, a nd the apparent success of his agr icultural Virgin Land s Scheme (see page 61), meant that Malenkov lost the Premiership in Februar y 1955. Nikolai Bulganin, the new Premier, was one of Khrushchev’s key allies. De-Stalinisation Khrushchev and Malenkov were united in the desire to end important aspects of Stalin’s rule. Both men wanted to ‘humanise’ Communism. They wanted to end Stalin’s use of terror and enhance the lives of Soviet citizens by improving their standard of living, ending widespread terror and enriching Soviet culture with new novels, plays and other art forms. Equally, both men were Leninists. Therefore they rejected the ‘cult of personality’ that had g rown up around Stalin. Both men wanted to shift the focus from Stalin as a heroic leader to the achievements of the Communist Party and the Soviet people. The process of ending the ‘cult of personality’ a nd the widespread use of terror started im mediately after Stal in’s death. The first steps towards ending the cult of Stal in were small. Plans to tur n Stalin’s dacha into a museum celebrating his life were scrapped. Additionally, the annual Stalin prizes were cancelled and, for the fi rst time since the 1930s, there were no official celebrations of Stalin’s birthday. Newspapers, which had traditionally been f ull of quotes from Stalin’s works, started quoting from Mar x and Lenin. The cult of Stalin – cult of personality The cult of Stalin refers to the use of art, photography, books, newspaper articles and speeches to stress Stalin’s genius. According to the culture of the 1930s, Stalin was responsible for every major Soviet victory since Lenin’s death. The cult of Stalin was an attempt to win the loyalty of the Soviet people. It was also one of Stalin’s methods for ensuring his authority was independent of the Party and state. The cult of personality was a different concept. Khrushchev used the phrase to criticise Stalin’s style of government: the abandonment of collective leadership and the introduction of personal rule. The Secret Speech The first wave of de-Stalinisation focused on ending the cult of Stalin. K hrushchev wanted to go further and formally cr iticise Stalin. However, criticising Stalin was a huge risk. Stalin was widely respected as a founder of the Soviet system – criticising Stalin risked undermining the authority of the Soviet Union and Communism. It also risked outraging the Part y, since many senior Communists still respected Stalin. Equally, many feared that criticisms of Stalin would ref lect badly on them as they had helped implement Stalin’s policies. Khrushchev negotiated with the Presidium to present his criticisms of Stalin at a secret session of the Twentieth Party Congress of 1956 – the first Congress since Stalin’s death. The Congress started on 14 February. On the night of 25 February, a day after the Congress officially finished, delegates were summoned to an unscheduled late night meeting. Khrushchev spoke for four hours, setting out a profound critique of Stalin’s rule. Khrushchev focused on the cult of personality. He argued that Stalin had abandoned collective leadership and set himself up as dictator. In so doing, Khrushchev argued, Stalin had placed himself above the Party and robbed the Party of its leading role. Without the wisdom of the Party, Stalin made serious mista kes, such as purging the Red Army immediately prior to the Second World War (see page 19). Moreover, he claimed that Stalin committed enormous crimes, particularly during the terror when he ordered the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent people. Khrushchev revealed the scale of the terror, which Stalin had concealed from the Party, and quoted the criticism of Stalin in Lenin’s Testament, which had also been kept secret. Significantly, Khr ushchev did not criticise Stalin’s policy of industrialisation or collectivisation (see page 17), or any aspect of communist ideology. Indeed, Khrushchev consistently argued that the foundations of the Soviet system were sound. Stalin was widely loved and respected in the Party and therefore many of the delegates were profoundly shocked. Some accounts indicate that some delegates were so horrified that they suffered heart attacks during Khrushchev’s speech. Others apparently took their own lives after learning the tr ue scale of Stalin’s crimes. The speech was kept secret. However, printed copies were sent to senior Communists across the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. One of these was leaked to the West, and with the help of the CIA it was printed in the New York
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin32 Times. Nonetheless, while the content of the Secret Speech became well known in the West, it was not fully published in the Soviet Union until 1989. Ending terror Another important aspect of de-Stalinisation was further steps to deal with the legacy of the terror. In May 1954 Khrushchev and Malenkov set up a special commission to review the cases of political prisoners who had been sent to the Gulags. In the first year, progress was slow and only 4620 of the 113,739 political prisoners were released. However, following the Secret Speech the process escalated. In June 1956, 51,439 prisoners, i ncluding 26,155 political prisoners, were released. The cases of political prisoners who had been executed were also reviewed. By 1961 half of those who had been executed by Stalin had been rehabilitated. The problems of de-Stalinisation Khrushchev’s criticisms of Sta lin caused a series of problems. Communist Parties in Hungary a nd Poland began their own process of de-Stalinisation. In Hungary students and artists seized the opportunity, initiated a revolution and elected a new pri me minister. After the new government ended its militar y alliance with the Soviet Union, Khrushchev ordered Soviet troops to cr ush the revolution. There was also unrest in the Soviet Union. Leaked information about Stalin’s crimes was shocking and caused some to question the legitimacy of communist rule. Indeed, there were student demonstrations in favour of multi-party democracy at Moscow State University in 1957. Again, they were supressed by the communist authorities. Khrushchev’s retreat Stalinists in the Party argued that de-Stalinisation had destabilised the government. Some moderates also accused Khrushchev of reforming too fast. Khrushchev responded by backtracking, agreeing with his critics that the Soviet people were ‘not ready’ to know the truth about Stalin. In June the Central Comm ittee issued a statement to the Party revising Khrushchev’s speech. In October the editors of the Soviet magazine Questions of History were disciplined for publishing revelations about Stalin’s terror. In mid-December Khrushchev secretly authorised the establishment of a Special Commission, headed by Leonid Brezhnev, to supress anti-communist activities. Finally, Khrushchev’s New Year’s Eve speech acknowledged that all communists were ‘Stalinists’. Clearly, by the end of 1957 radical de-Stalinisation had come to a halt. Democratisation and decentralisation Khrushchev continued with political reform in 1957 introducing measures to reduce the size and power of the central party. Democratisation was designed to increase the participation of workers in the government. It did not, however, involve new elections. Rather, Khrushchev introduced two measures: ● He allowed an expansion of Part y membership. Membership grew from 6.9 million in 1954 to 11 million in 1964. This made it more democratic as a greater proportion of its members, 60 per cent by 1964, were workers of peasants. ● He introduced fixed terms for senior Communists to ensure that they were replaced regularly. As a result, two-thirds of regional Secretaries and the Presidium were replaced between 1957 and 1961. In order to decentralise the Party he abolished some of the central min istries that oversaw the economy and devolved power to 105 newly created economic councils (see page 64). He moved the Ministry of A griculture away from Moscow to make it ‘closer to the fields’. Khrushchev’s reforms meant that many Communist officials were demoted, lost their jobs, or were forced to move away from Moscow. Consequently, there was renewed criticism of Khrushchev within the Party. The Anti-Party Group Discontent over Khrushchev’s reforms and the problems created by de-Stalinisation led to an attempt to overthrow Khrushchev. In June 1957 a majority of the Presidium, led by Malenkov, voted to replace Khrushchev. Khrushchev argued that the decision to replace him could only be taken by the Central Committee – where Khrushchev had a majority of support. As a result, Khrushchev survived the attempt to oust him and sacked his opponents. Khrushchev consolidated his position in March 1958 by taking over the position of Prime Minister in addition to his existing offices. The attempted coup of 1957 was significant for the evolution of Soviet government for two main reasons: ● It demonstrated that senior Communists would no longer use political terror against each other. ● It recognised that the power of the Party leader depended on the support of the Central Committee.
33Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 Khrushchev’s final reforms The Twenty-Second Party Congress of October 1961 introduced Khrushchev’s f inal major political reforms. The main focus of the Congress was economic. However, Khrushchev also used the Congress to restart the process of de-Stalinisation. He accused Stalin of being involved in Kirov’s murder (see page 20). Additionally, the Congress voted to remove Stalin’s body from public display. Khrushchev also introduced a radical Party reform. He built on his earlier democratisation measures by introducing fixed terms for all jobs within the Party, including a fixed 16-year term for Central Committee members. Khrushchev’s 1962 Party reforms effectively split the Party in two. According to the new structure, one half of the Party was put in charge of ag riculture and the other of industry. This new division went right to the top of the Party: the Central Comm ittee was divided into industrial and agricultura l bureaus. Khrushchev hoped that this reform would boost economic growth. Khrushchev’s fall Khrushchev’s political reform s created discontent in the Party, and his economic reforms fa iled to boost economic growth (see page 64). From the late 1950s, the economy slowed. Consequently, there was no possibility of fulfilling Khrushchev’s rash promises. Finally, there were concerns that Khrushchev’s foreign policy was rash and dangerous. As a result, in June 1964 senior fig ures in the Presidium began plotting Khrushchev’s overthrow. In October Khrushchev was summoned to a special meeting. He was criticised for mishandling the economy, foreign policy and creating his own cult of personality. On this occasion the plotters had the backing of the majority of the Central Committee. Consequently, Khrushchev retired, and the Soviet media put out the story that he had stepped down due to ill health. Khrushchev was given a pension and lived under guard for the remaining seven years of his life. The extent of de-Stalinisation Khrushchev’s biggest political achievement was ending the use of political terror against party officials. Khrushchev’s enemies were sacked, but not tortured or killed. Similarly, Khrushchev himself was allowed to retire, with a pension, a car and various luxur ies, rather than being shot or publicly humiliated. In this sense he achieved a significant degree of de-Stalinisation. He also ended Stal in’s system of persona l rule. Under Khrushchev the Party gained a new authority. Unlike Stalin, K hrushchev was forced to work with other senior fig ures in the Party. The Secret Speech, for example, had to gain the approval of the Presidium, and the Central Committee forced Khrushchev to accept revisions to the Speech several months after it was given. Unlike Stalin, Khrushchev’s power depended on retain ing a m ajority of support on the Central Committee. Indeed, Khrushchev’s overthrow in 1964 demonstrated the extent to which the Party’s power was independent of the leader by 1964. However, some aspects of Stalin ism lived on. The government never publicly rejected his legacy or adm itted the extent of Stalin’s crimes. Therefore, under Brezhnev, the government was able to revive the cult of Stali n. The adoration of Stalin was never as widespread as it had been between 1930 and 1953, but Brezhnev authorised articles celebrating Stalin on important anniversaries between 1964 and 1982. Clearly, Khrushchev was able to achieve a significant degree of de-Stalinisation in the sense that political terror was never used on a mas s scale agai n. However, de-Stalinisation was never completed as he refused to publicly denounce the former leader and therefore left his reputation intact. Khrushchev’s foreign policy Khrushchev was leader of the Soviet Union during a crucial phase in the Cold War. Many of his decisions and policies were designed to try to win an advantage over the USA. One of the key areas of conflict during the Cold War was Germany, which was divided between the communist East and capitalist West. Khrushchev gave President Kennedy an ultimatum to withdraw his forces from West Berlin and give control of the whole city to the communists. Kennedy refused and forced Khrushchev to back down – humiliating the Soviet Union. Khrushchev also sent nuclear weapons to Cuba, around 100 miles from the USA. This created an international crisis that almost ended in nuclear war. Again, Khrushchev was forced to back down. The repeated policy failures leading to the Soviet Union’s humiliation were crucial to Khrushchev’s fall because senior Communists wanted a foreign policy that emphasised Soviet strength.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin34 2 Brezhnev and stability, 1964–82 Khrushchev’s government was associated with ‘reform’. Leonid Brezhnev’s government, by contrast, focused on ‘stability’ and ‘restoration’. Brezhnev’s first acts were to reverse Khrushchev’s most unpopular Party reforms. He also reversed aspects of de-Sta linisation and ended economic change. Nonetheless, the restoration was not complete. Brezhnev, like Khrushchev, rejected the use of mass terror. The emphasis on stability created new problems. Brezhnev’s policies led to stagnation, and the last years of Brezhnev’s rule were characterised by ever growing problems and corruption which Brezhnev failed to address. Under Brezhnev the revolutionary aspects of Soviet society became less obvious. He believed that the revolutionary transformation of society had been achieved between 1917 and 1930. Therefore the Communist Party merely needed to keep going on the course set out by Lenin and Stalin. In this sense, under Brezhnev the Party became the defenders of the status quo rather than a revolutionary force for change. Note it down Using bullet points, or the 1:2 method, make notes on Brezhnev’s goals, his methods and the outcomes of his reforms in the period 1964–82. Make sure to note down specific phrases such as ‘stability of cadres’ with their meanings. Restoration The post-Khrushchev leadership was keen to undo Khrushchev’s governmental reforms. During 1964 and 1965, the new leadership was based on an i nform al pact between Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin, who together had a great dea l of support in the Politburo and Central Committee. The pact was designed to ensure government stability. In general terms, Brezhnev and Kosygin committed themselves as follows: Leonid Brezhnev, 1906–81 Brezhnev was born in the Ukraine to a Russian family. From 1923 he worked as a metal worker. He studied at a technical school in 1927 and 1928, joining the Part y in 1929. From 1929 to 1937 he had a succession of minor roles in the Party. His big break came during the Great Terror, when he received a series of promotions as his superiors were purged. He was also promoted during the Second World War. By 1950 he was First Secretary of the Communist Party of Moldova, and in 1952 Stalin promoted him to the Politburo. He backed Khrushchev against the Anti-Party Group in 1957, but he was no reformer. His notes from the period show that he was critical of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation. Following 1962 he became increasingly critical of Khrushchev, and was central to the plot to remove him from mid-1964. Brezhnev was known for his vanity. He encouraged journalists to praise his genius and regularly awarded himself medals. Indeed, during the 1970s he encouraged the creation of his own cult of personality. Brezhnev, a lifelong smoker, suffered his first heart attack in 1975 and was in poor health for the rest of his life. Alexei Kosygin, 1904–1980 Kosygin was born in 1904 into a working-class family. He fought for the Red Army during the Russian Civil War before becoming an industrial manager. He joined the Party around 1930 and gained important economic posts during the Second World War. He played a prominent international role under Khrushchev and continued to play an important role in government after his fall. Kosygin was an advocate of economic reform in the 1960s (see page 65), but his reforms were short lived. He was eclipsed by Brezhnev in the early 1970s. Kosygin remained a senior member of the government until he resigned due to ill health in 1980.
35Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 ● They ensured that the two top jobs in government were not occupied by the same person – in order to stop the emergence of an a ll-powerful leader. Brezhnev led the Party as General Secretary; Kosygin was Premier and therefore had the most important job in the Soviet state. ● They divided key posts in government roughly equally between supporters of Brezhnev and Kosygin. ● They ensured that Party and state off icials kept their jobs for long periods to li mit the opportun ities for patronage. This pact held from 1964 to 1970 when Kosygin lost his job as Premier and Brezhnev emerged as the most powerful person within the Soviet leadership. ‘Stability of cadres’ Brezhnev’s government was based on the policy of ‘stability of cadres’, or ‘trust in cadres’. In essence the policy discouraged promotions or demotions within government. This was part of the Brezhnev–Kosygin pact and ensured that there would be few battles over patronage. ‘Stability of cadres’ replaced Khrushchev’s 1961 policy of limited terms, which had been very unpopular with the Party. In this sense the policy ensured support for the new leaders from government officials because it gave them job security. Restoration of the Party Brezhnev reformed the Party, reversing Khrushchev’s key reforms: ● Centralisation: Khrushchev had repeatedly tried to break up central ministr ies and decentralise government by giving more power to the republics. Brezhnev reversed this, re-establishing the all-union ministries that Khr ushchev had abolished. ● Brezhnev ended the split between industrial and agricultura l wings of the Party. ● Article 6 of the new 1977 Soviet Constitution, known as the ‘Brezhnev Constitution’, officially recognised the Party’s leading role in Soviet society. In this sense, it established the superiority of the Party over the state. Leonid Brezhnev at the podium. Why has Brezhnev chosen to be photographed in front of a pictur e of Lenin rather than any of the other Soviet leaders? 3 Political stagnation, 1970–85 Brezhnev’s government reforms led to a period of stagnation at the top of government. His policies meant that change in government was slow, or in many cases non-existent.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin36 Gerontocracy Brezhnev’s ‘stability of cadres’ policy led to an increasingly static government, in which there was little change: ● Between 1964 and 1971, only two people were promoted to the Politburo. ● Between 1966 and 1971, between 80 and 90 per cent of Central Committee members retained their jobs following Party Congresses. Consequently, the government aged. Brezhnev’s style of government was nicknamed a gerontocracy: rule of old people. During the late 1960s and 1970s the average age of senior officials kept rising (see Tables 3 and 4). Table 3: Average age of members of the Po litburo. Politburo Date Average Age 1966 58 1972 62 1982 75 Table 4: Average age of members of the C entral Committee. Central Committee Date Average Age 1961 52 1981 62 As the government aged it became less effective: ● Brezhnev’s critics argued that his style of government created a generation gap between the government and society. In this sense, Brezhnev’s government no longer understood the society they governed. ● Senior off icials became increasingly ill and therefore unable to perform their jobs. ● ‘Stability of cadres’ meant that there were extremely limited opportunities for promotion. As a result, middle-ranking off icials were effectively stuck in dead-end jobs with no prospect of promotion. ● The system provided no incentives to work hard because there were so few opportunities for promotion. Corruption Under Brezhnev sackings were rare. Opportunities for advancement were also extremely limited. This created the context for huge corruption. Soviet officials, who could not grow rich through hard work and promotion, used their positions to grow rich, knowing they were unlikely to be disciplined. One form of corruption was to sell goods on the black market. For example, Yury Sokolov, the director of a major Moscow food store, took bribes from rich customers for passing on luxury food. Brezhnev was implicated in the corruption. His daughter Galina Brezhneva was able to get access to diamonds. One of her lovers smuggled millions of pounds worth of diamonds out of the USSR. He was eventually prosecuted after Brezhnev’s death. Andropov and Chernenko Between Brezhnev’s death in 1982 and Gorbachev’s appointment as General Secretary in 1985, Russia was led by Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. Both men were old and part of the gerontocracy that had emerged under Brezhnev. Andropov recognised that there were problems with the system, and both men attempted cautious reforms. However, neither was prepared to introduce fundamental reforms. Note it down Using bullet points or the 1:2 method, (see page x) make notes on Andropov and Chernenko. Note down the extent to which they wanted reform, the extent to which they changed the Soviet system and the obstacles to their rule. Andropov, November 1982–February 1984 Andropov became Soviet leader at the age of 68. He believed that the Soviet system was fundamentally stable but that minor reforms were necessary. Specifically, he believed that the Soviet Union needed to become a more disciplined nation. In order to achieve this he introduced three main reforms: ● He abandoned the ‘stability of cadres’ policy, replacing a quarter of senior officials. ● He introduced small-scale economic reforms focusing on labour discipline (see pages 66). ● His most important initiative was an anti-corruption campaign. The campaign: ● attacked senior figures, for example he prosecuted Red Army General and Minister of the Interior Nikolai Shchelokov and investigated Galina Brezhneva’s lover ‘Boris the Gypsy’ ● included media exposés of corrupt officials. He died just over a year after his appointment as Soviet leader. His biggest achievement was removing old and
37Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 corrupt officials and allowing a younger generation to rise within the Soviet Government. Chernenko, February 1984–March 1985 Chernenko was also unwill ing to consider major reform. Indeed, he was 72 years old and already extremely il l at the time he became leader. Poor health meant that he could not play much of a role in the government for much of his 13-month period as leader. Due to Chernenko’s ill health Gorbachev routinely led meetings on his behalf. The brevity of his rule and his ill health meant that he achieved very little as Soviet leader. Konstantin Chernenko, 1911–1985 Born in 1911 into a working- class family, Chernenko joined Komsomol (Communist Youth League) in 1929 and the Party in 1931. He completed military training and later worked for a Party propaganda department. He became friends with Brezhnev in the late 1940s. He gained high office following Khrushchev’s fall, and due to his continued friendship with Brezhnev became a senior figure in the Party during the 1970s. He was one of the front-runners to replace Brezhnev on his death in 1982. Despite being extremely ill, he became leader of the Soviet Union in 1984, and was the first Soviet leader to use a stairlif t to get to the top of Lenin’s tomb. Conclusion The period 1953–85 was dominated by two attempts to create a stable revolutionary government. Khrushchev wanted to maintain revolutionary dynamism by introducing decentralisation, a degree of democratisation and keeping the leadership of the Party constantly changing. This was part of his broader vision to keep the focus of the Communist Party on building socialism, fulfilling the goal that Lenin had set out in 1917. Khrushchev was also determined to end the Stalinist terror and create a humane form of socialism. Khrushchev’s style of government led to a series of problems, most obviously instability, which played a part in his downfall. Brezhnev stressed stability. From 1964 to Brezhnev’s death in 1982 revolutionary transformation was largely forgotten. Brezhnev believed that the fundamental transformation had already taken place under Lenin and Stalin and that the Part y merely had to administer their legacy. This approach created problems of its own. Reform stopped, the leadership became increasingly old and out of touch, and the revolutionary goals of Lenin were largely forgotten. Brezhnev died in 1982 leaving his successor huge economic and political problems. Andropov and Chernenko continued to govern in a way that reflected Brezhnev’s essential style. Both in itiated small-scale economic reforms (see pages 65–66), but neither was prepared to address the Soviet Union’s fundamental problems or reform the foundations of the regime. Work together Working with a partner, write a list of the problems facing the Soviet Government in 1953. On separate pieces of paper list the solutions to these problems – one of you should list the solutions tried by Khrushchev, the other the solutions tried by Brezhnev. Check each other’s lists. Is it clear which solution relates to which problem? Has your partner missed anything? Add additional items to the list where necessary. Discuss which approach to the problems of the Soviet Union was more successful. Having done so, you should both write two paragraphs explaining the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches and evaluating which approach was better. Chapter summary ● With the death of Stalin in 1953 the Soviet Union lost a strong leader. ● Stalin’s heirs tried to deal with the problems that they had inherited. ● They succeeded in ending the use of political terror against the government. ● Khrushchev’s reforms threatened to destabilise the Soviet system. ● Brezhnev’s more stable approach to government led to stagnation. ● Between 1982 and 1985 Andropov and Chernenko proved unable to revive the system.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin38 KHRUSHCHEV GOALS METHODS OUTCOME End mass terror Fulfil Lenin’s mission Rebuild the Party De-Stalinisation Democratisation and decentralisation Party reform Instability BREZHNEV Recreate stability Political stagnation The rise of the Gerontocracy Corruption Restoration ‘Stability of cadres’ GOALS METHODS OUTCOME Summary diagram: Reform, stability and stagnation. Recommended reading E. Bacon and M.A. Sandle (eds.), Brezhnev Reconsidered (Macmillan, 2002), pages 25–32. Bacon and Sandle consider Brezhnev’s style as Soviet leader. G.L. Freeze (ed.), Russia: a History (Oxford, 2002), pages 347–53. Freeze provides an overview of the Khruschev years. R.G. Suny, The Soviet Experiment, (Oxford, 1998), pages 449–50. Suny discusses the problems facing Soviet leaders after Stalin’s death.
39Theme 1 Communist government in the USSR, 1 917–85 Essay technique: Deploying detail So far we have looked at how to structure your answers with a clear line of argument (see page 93–4). This is essential, but you also need to ensure that your paragraphs are sufficiently detailed. Vague or imprecise statements will weaken your essay. What is detail? Essentially, correct dates, proper names and statistics are all examples of detail. You can also increase the level of detail in your essays by using correct technical vocabulary: words or phrases like ‘Marxism’ or ‘Politburo’ that you have learned while studying this unit. How to use detail You should use detail to support the points that you are making. The main points provide the overall structure for the essay; the details help prove the points that you are making. Imagine you are answering the following question: How far did the Rus sian economy improve in the years 1921–64? You might want to make the point that heavy industr y improved. You could support this by referring to the achievement of the Five-Year Plans. Specifically, you could quote statistics for the production of iron, steel, coal and oil showing how they improved from 1921 to 1964. Activity: Adding detail Here is a plan in answer to the question above: • Paragraph 1: Agriculture improved from 1921 to 1964. • Paragraph 2: Industry production increased from 1921 to 1964. • Paragraph 3: Collectivisation created significant problems for agriculture, 1928–64. • Paragraph 4: The Five-Year Plans led to significant problems in industry, 1928–64. Using your notes, find at lea st three pieces of detail to support each of these points. Try to use a variety of types of detail. If possible make sure you use statistics, dates, the na mes of people and organisations and technical vocabulary. Activity: Question practice 1 Was political stagnation the main consequence of Brezhnev’s rejection of reform? Ex plain your answer. AS 2 To what extent were Khrushchev’s reform s successful in the years 1953– 64? AS 3 How far did de-Stali nisation change the nature of Soviet politics in the years 1955–85? 4 How far do you agree that Soviet politics were transformed in the years 1953–85?
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin40 The Big Picture The Soviet economy changed radically from 1917 to 1985. Initially, Soviet leaders faced a fundamental problem: how would a socialist economy work? Socialists had produced extensive criticisms of capitalism, but there were no blueprints or detailed plans for a socialist economy. Between 1917 and 1921 Lenin improvised, coming up with a series of economic alternatives to traditional capitalism. All of his policies created political and economic problems. Stalin was also forced to improvise in order to solve the problem of a socialist economy. He introduced ‘the Great Turn’, massive industrial and agricultural change, ending capitalism in agr iculture and industry. Stalin’s model of state-run farms and state-planned industry was the foundation on which successive Soviet leaders built, at least until 1985. All accepted the essential system that Stalin had created. Nonetheless, Stalin’s system was problematic. It was inefficient, wasteful and economic growth did not lead to higher standards of living. Moreover, Stalin’s ‘Revolution from Above’ ruined agriculture. Therefore Soviet farms were never able to provide the food that the nation needed. However, Stalin’s industrial policies did lead to some successes; they helped the Soviet Union fight and win the Second World War. Moreover, his economic methods helped rebuild the Soviet Union after the war. After Stalin, economic priorities changed. Khrushchev and Brezhnev both accepted the need for a socialist economy to provide a comfortable standard of living for the Soviet people. Khrushchev introduced economic reforms to try to ensure that the Soviet economy outperformed the West and that Soviet citizens enjoyed a higher standard of living than people in capitalist nations. This required a massive expansion of agriculture, including the cultivation of large areas of land known as the Virgin Lands. His vision also required investment in light industry. After initial success Khrushchev’s policies fai led. Khrushchev’s fai lures discouraged f uture leaders from initiating signif icant reforms. As a result, the essential problems of the system remained unsolved. Under Brezhnev economic growth declined. Nonetheless, due to international trade and international loans l iving standards improved. In this sense the growing crisis was hidden from Soviet citizens and even many in the government. Ultimately, the Soviet economy was an attempt to do away with the problems of capitalism and produce a fairer and more efficient system. By 1985 it was clear that the Soviet economic experiment had failed. Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85
41Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 In this theme you will consider the following: ➜ Lenin’s economic policies including War Communism and the New Economic Policy ➜ Stalin’s economic revolution: the Five-Year Plans in industry and the collectivisation of agriculture ➜ Economic change 1953–85, reform, modernisation and decline. TIMELINE 1917 October Decree on Land 1918 March to June Lenin introduces state capitalism 1918 July–December Lenin introduces War Communism 1921 March Lenin introduces the New Economic Policy 1923 The Soviet Economy experiences the ‘scissors crisis’ 1928 July Stalin introduces emergency economic measures ending the NEP 1928 October Stalin introduces the First Five-Year Plan 1929 December Stalin orders compulsory collectivisation of Soviet farms 1932 Beginning of the Great Famine 1941 June German invasion leads to Soviet entry into the Second World War 1945 December Introduction of the Fourth Five-Year Plan 1953 September Khrushchev launches the Virgin Lands Scheme 1957 February Khrushchev launches the sovnarkhoz reforms 1958 September Khrushchev launches the Corn Campaign 1959 January Khrushchev launches the Seven-Year Plan 1962 February Khrushchev divides the Party between agriculture and industry 1968 January–August ‘Kosygin reforms’ are introduced and scrapped 1982 November Andropov initiates anti-corruption campaign
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin42 2a: Towards a command economy, 1917–28 Overview Lenin knew that a political revolution alone would never destroy capitalism. Socialism and Communism entailed profound economic changes, changes that would end the economic exploitation that was essential to capitalism. Additionally, socialism and Communism required the construction of a highly advanced economy. However, Lenin also had other objectives. In the early stages of his regime he needed to win the Civil War, and after 1921 he needed to rebuild and stabilise the regime. Lenin’s economic policies reflected all of these concerns: his desire to destroy capitalism, his need to supply his troops and his need to compromise to retain power. As a result, Lenin’s policies changed, as he replaced one policy with another, often in ways that reflected radically different values. This chapter considers: 1 The nationalisation of industry 2 War Communism 3 New Economic Policy 4 State control of industry and agriculture. 1 The nationalisation of industry Lenin’s economic policy in the period 1917–21 went through a series of radically dif ferent phases. These reflected the problems that Russia faced, Lenin’s hopes about the future and his fundamental beliefs about economics and politics. In short, the nationalisation of industry was a revolutionary response to an unprecedented set of problems. Note it down As you read this section make two spider diagrams (see page x) on the same large sheet. The first should deal with the problems facing Lenin in the early months of the revolution. The second should focus on the economic measures that Lenin introduced in the first phase of the revolution. Having completed both, draw links between the two spider diagrams to show how the problems of 1917–18 and Lenin’s ideas led to the creation of Lenin’s first economic policy. Capitalism and Communism One of the key problems facing Lenin was uncertainty about what a communist economy would entail. Marx had produced a detailed ana lysis of the strengths and weaknesses of capitalism. However, he had been deliberately vague about the nature of a future communist society. He argued that once capitalism was abolished, the economy would be organised according to ‘a common plan’, but he refused to speculate about the future, arguing that it was impossible to describe the future in detail. Marx was clear, however, that a communist society would have an extremely advanced economy. Indeed, most communists in the early twentieth century believed that a revolution would take place in Britain, the USA, Germany or France, as these were the most advanced economies in the world at the time. Problems facing Russia Russia had serious economic problems in the early twentieth century. Specifically, compared to Western European nations and the USA, Russia’s economy was unsophisticated and backward. Russia had begun to industrialise and between 1890 and 1914 the economy grew signif icantly. Even so, Russia was still far behind more developed nations in terms of industrialisation. Therefore the majority of Marxists and socialists in Russia at the time of the February Revolution expected the revolution to lead to capitalism, and that a socialist revolution was many years away. Not only was the Russian economy generally less developed than that of the West in 1917, it was also shattered during the First World War. Any new government would need a policy to help reconstruct the economy and promote economic growth. Lenin’s early ideas Unlike many Marxists, Lenin believed that socialism was possible in Russia in 1917. He argued that as the revolution spread across Europe, advanced countries would send aid to developing countries and therefore the Russian economy would develop rapidly without the need for capitalism. However, while Lenin was waiting for the revolution to spread, he needed to begin rebuilding the Russian economy to ensure that people had food and that the economy was strong enough to provide the materials necessary to defend the revolution.
43Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 Lenin in itially a rgued that the October Revolution had created a society between capitalism and socia lism. The revolution, he argued, had destroyed capitalism, but the economy was not strong enough to start building socialism. Lenin ca lled the new phase ‘state capitalism’. Lenin’s vision of a socialist economy Lenin believed that a socialist economy would be highly efficient. He believed that it required modern technology, expert management and well-educated and high ly discipli ned workers. Workers would be free, in the sense that t hey would no longer be working for capitalists. This would mean that workers were better paid and better treated , and therefore they would no longer resent the work th at they did. However, Lenin’s vision of socialism had little time for leisure, and Lenin had no sympathy for laziness. Rather, he assumed that af ter the revolution people would find their work extremely fulf illing and therefore large amounts of leisure time would be unnecessary. Lenin’s various economic policies reflected his faith in expertise, his desire for efficiency and discipline, and his disregard for leisure. State capitalism In essence, Lenin’s state capitalist economy was based on the nationalisation of industry. Nationalisation ended capitalism by taking industry away from middle-class owners. All nationalised industries were run by the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy, or Vesenkha – a group of economic experts. The Vesenkha was designed to: ● ensure factories were properly managed by placing them under the control of well-paid specialists ● co-ordinate economic production to meet the needs of new society. Only large industries were nationalised. Small factories and workshops were either controlled by workers or handed back to capitalists. State capitalism was extremely unpopular. In many ways, there was very little difference between state capitalism and life before the revolution. Therefore many workers and radicals like Bukharin (see page 16) rejected state capitalism in favour of workers’ control. Nonetheless, Lenin ignored this opposition and state capitalism was the official policy of the new government from March to June 1918, when policy had to change due to the outbreak of civil war. Land reform Nationalisation of industry was only one part of Lenin’s initial policy. In order to win support and stimulate agriculture, Lenin introduced land reform. Following Lenin’s 1917 Decree on Land, large estates belonging to the Church or to aristocratic landowners were broken up and peasants were allowed to own the land they worked. Land reform was extremely popular w ith the peasants. 2 War Communism War Communism was created as a series of emergency economic measures to ensure communist victory in the Civil War. However, at the same time it embodied some aspects of communist ideology and therefore some radicals believed that War Communism was a step towards a truly communist economic policy. War Communism was designed to ensure: ● high levels of industrial production of war goods ● an efficient allocation of workers ● food production to feed soldiers, workers and the civilian population. Note it down Using a spider diagram, make notes on the key measures that made up War Communism. Make sure you make notes on the specific nature of the measures. Pay particular attention to technical terms and the detail. Measures War Communism evolved over time as Lenin introduced new economic measures. ‘Food dictatorship’ Lenin introduced a series of measures to ensure food was available to soldiers and workers. Lenin’s ‘food dictatorship’ consisted of the following: ● Grain requisitioning: Cheka squads were authorised to seize grain and other forms of food from peasants without payment. ● Rationing: The Supply Commissariat rationed the seized foods. The largest rations went to workers and soldiers, the smallest rations were given to members of the bourgeoisie.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin44 Labour discipline War Communism also entailed intense labour discipline: ● In 1918 the working day was extended to eleven hours. ● In 1919 work was made compulsory for all able-bodied people between 16 and 50 years of age. ● Harsh punishments were given to workers who were late or were caught slacking. The abolition of the market The chaotic conditions of the Civil War led to a breakdown of the existing market. The following measures were introduced to try to abolish the market: ● The abolition of money: In the short term, the government simply printed more money, which led to hyperinflation. Money became worthless, workers were paid through their rations and many public services, such as tram services, were provided freely. ● The abolition of trade: Private trade was made illegal. ● Complete nationalisation: All businesses were taken over by the state. ● Conscription: Workers were assigned either to work in factories or fight in the army. Lenin argued that the abolition of money was also a step away from capitalism towards a socialist economy in which economic production and distribution were centrally planned. Bukharin too argued that the abolition of the capitalist market was a major revolutionary achievement. Both agreed that these measures destroyed the power of the capitalist class. Consequences War Communism succeeded in keeping the Red Army supplied and allowing them to win the Civil War. However, it led to economic collapse, and failed to abolish the market. Economic collapse Firstly, grain requisitioning led to lower rates of agricultura l production. The peasants were not paid for their grain or their labour and therefore the policy provided no incentive to work. Secondly, industrial production declined significantly. Again, there were few incentives to work hard. Hunger also led many workers to leave the cities and seek work on farms where there was more chance of being fed. In total, the industrial workforce declined from 3 million workers in 1917 to 1.2 million in 1922 (see Figure 1), partly due to the war and partly due to workers escaping the cities. 0 500,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 2,500,000 3,000,000 3,500,000 1917 N u m b e r (0 0 0 s ) 1918 3,024,000 2,486,000 2,035,000 1,480,000 1,243,000 1919 Year 19 20 –21 192 2 Figure 1: Numbers in the industrial workforce, 1917–22. The extent of economic collapse is clear from Table 1. Table 1: Economic decline in Russia, 1913–20. Commodity 1913 index Production 1920 Gross output of all industry 100 31 Large-scale industry 100 21 Agricultural production 100 60 Growth of the black market Lenin’s extensive economic controls fai led to abolish the market. Historians estimate that only 40 per cent of the food consumed in Russia’s cities came through rationing during the Civil War. Around 60 per cent of the food came from the black market. Moreover, workers were forced to steal government resources in order to make goods that could be bartered for food. For example, metal workers would steal scrap metal and fuel to make cigarette lighters. Mass poverty By 1921 the Russian economy was near collapse. There were shortages of all kinds of commodities. By late 1920 workshops in the major cities were closing due to a lack of fuel. Indeed, fuel was in such short supply that the government ordered the destruction of wooden buildings in Petrograd in order to use the wood for fuel. Unemployment rose and harvests declined further. The 1921 harvest was only 46 per cent of the 1913 harvest, and in rura l areas a fam ine began, which led to the deaths of around 6 million people. Political crisis Mass starvation and the deepening economic crisis led to a political crisis. Between August 1920 and June
45Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 1921 peasants in the Tambov region rebelled against the Communist Government (see page 11). In Kronstadt, too, sailors who had supported the communists unquestioningly in 1917 turned against the government, demanding a return to free trade and new multiparty elections to the soviets. In March 1921 the sailors mutinied (see page 11). The communists responded with extreme force, defending their government with military action. Although both rebellions were crushed, Lenin realised that the political crisis meant the end of War Communism. Conclusion War Communism led to military victory but economic ruin. It was also an ideological victory. The abolition of money and of the capitalist market led many communists, including Lenin himself, to believe that War Communism was the foundation on which the new society would be built. Bukharin even welcomed the economic crisis, arguing that the destruction of capitalism needed to be complete before building socialism could start. In that sense, senior Communists did not see the economic crisis as a reason to stop the policy. However, the political crisis was more worryi ng. Further rebellions risked the end of the Communist Government. In order to save the revolution Lenin was forced to accept an economic compromise. 3 New Economic Policy Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) for a series of reasons: ● To retain political power: Lenin described the NEP as an economic retreat, which was designed to stop a political defeat. In that sense, Lenin made economic compromises in order to retain political power. ● To revive the economy: Lenin needed a policy that would stimulate grain production and end the famine. ● To build socialism: By 1921 it was clear that a European revolution would not happen. Therefore Lenin needed an economic policy that would allow Russia to build socialism without foreign aid. As 1921 went on, Lenin began to argue that the NEP, rather than War Communism, was the correct economic foundation on which to build socialism. He argued that the Communist Party must learn to trade and use capitalist methods to achieve communist goals. He also emphasised that the NEP would create peace with the peasants, and allow peasants and workers to build socialism together. Note it down Using bullet points, make notes on: ● the reasons why the NEP was introduced ● the measures that made up the NEP ● the successes and failures of the NEP. When dealing with the extent to which the NEP succeeded you might organise your notes in two lists, one for the ways in which it succeeded, the other for the ways in which it failed. Measures The NEP ended War Communism. It created a mixed economy, which had capitalist and socialist elements: ● Agricultura l production was left to the free market. Peasants could buy, sell and produce freely. Grain requisitioning ended and was replaced by a tax in kind. ● Small factories and workshops employing fewer than 20 people were denationalised. Small factories were allowed to trade freely. Many were returned to their former capitalist owners. ● Large factories and major industries remained nationalised. ● Money was reintroduced. The NEP was a major economic compromise. Lenin emphasised the need for a stable currency and for all factories and workshops to make a profit. Even government-run industries were expected to make money, and therefore people were expected to pay for services, such as transport, which had been available free of charge during the Civil War. Consequences The NEP led to political and economic stability. However, it did not lead to rapid industrial growth; nor was it wholly popular within the Part y. Political and economic stability Ending grain requisitioning was extremely popular a mong the peasants. Free trade also encouraged peasants to grow more food. Therefore the famine ended, and food of all kinds became widely available in country and city markets. The growth in grain production is evident from Table 2 (see page 46). The end of grain requisitioning led to a return of political and economic stability by ending the fam ine and ending a policy that was extremely unpopular with the peasants, who made up 80 per cent of Russia’s population.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin46 Industrial growth The NEP also led to industria l growth. The market stimulated production, and the government invested the money gained from taxing the peasants in reopening factories that had been closed duri ng the Civil War. Lenin authorised a major electrification campaign which revived an industry that had effectively been destroyed by the Civil War. By the end of 1921, Lenin argued that the NEP was not merely the right policy for creating economic growth. He claimed that the NEP was the best way to industrialise the Soviet Union and therefore lay the foundation for socialism. Lenin argued that the NEP was a form of state capitalism, the policy that the government had adopted in early 1918. In essence, Lenin argued that the NEP would allow the communists to ‘build socialism with capitalist hands’. By 1926, industrial production, with the exception of pig iron and steel, had recovered to 1913 levels (see Figure 2). Figure 2: Production under the New Economic Policy, 1921–25. 0 1913 First world war Revolution War communism New economic policy 19171918 1921 1925 20 40 60 In d e x 80 100 Levels of production under the Tsàr Electricity Cattle Pigs Coal Steel 120 140 160Grain Crucially, while taxing the peasants provided sufficient funds to reopen and modernise existing factories, it failed to provide the money necessary to build new large-scale factories. Therefore from 1926 to 1928, the industrial economy plateaued. Scissors crisis The NEP led to uneven economic growth. Agriculture recovered quickly. Greater food supplies led to a drop in agricultural prices. Industry recovered much more slowly, therefore industrial prices, which had been low during the fami ne, grew steadily. A gap opened up between farmers’ incomes and industrial prices. Trotsky nicknamed the crisis the ‘scissors crisis’, as the lines on the g raph illustrati ng the problem looked like the blades of a pair of scissors (see Figure 3). By 1923 the gap between farmers’ incomes and industrial prices had reached crisis point. The rise in industrial prices meant that farmers could not afford to buy industrial goods and therefore there was no incentive for farmers to keep producing large quantities of grain. The government intervened and subsidised the prices of industrial products, making them affordable to the peasants. However, this meant that there was less money available to improve the economy. In this sense the scissors crisis indicated to radicals like Trotsky that the NEP was not capable of industrialising the economy. 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 July September November January March May July September November Industrial retail prices Industrial wholesale prices Agricultural retail prices Agricultural wholesale prices Figure 3: The ‘scissors crisis’ – industrial and agricultural prices in the Soviet Union, July 1922 to November 1923. Inequality and corruption The NEP led to the re-emergence of inequality and widespread corruption. First the NEP led to the emergence of ‘Nepmen’ traders who made money by spotting gaps in the ma rket. Nepmen would travel the country, transporting highly desirable goods from Table 2: Grain production 1913–26. Grain harvest Million tons 1913 80.11 1920 46.10 1921 37.61 1922 50.30 1923 56.60 1924 51.40 1925 72.50 1926 76.80
47Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 factories or farm s to the markets. The Communist Government regarded Nepmen as parasites, because they produced nothing, and made money from selling luxury goods. From time to time Nepmen were arrested by the Cheka for profiteering. However, they continued to operate until the end of the NEP. Nepmen grew rich by trading, while ordinary peasants and industrial workers stayed relatively poor in spite of their hard work. Corruption also grew. Gambling, prostitution and drug dealing a ll took place under the NEP. Prostitution was the result of wider socia l and economic problems, which led to widespread poverty among women in the 1920s (see pages 126–127). Conclusion The NEP stabilised the economy, replaced an extremely unpopular policy and therefore ended widespread rebellion. In that sense, the NEP achieved Lenin’s key goal of ensuring the Communists’ hold on power. However, the NEP led to various problems, including slow industrial growth, a n unbalanced economy, a return of inequality and the growth of various kinds of cr ime. Finally, the NEP was deeply unpopular with some sections of the Communist Party. Indeed, the NEP led to a bitter debate over state control of industry and agriculture which raged during the 1920s. 4 State control of industry and agriculture The NEP led to great debate within the Communist Party. All communists agreed that the Soviet Union must industria lise. However, there was d ispute over the correct policy. Broadly, there were three positions within the Party: ● On the left Trotsky and his followers wanted to adopt a radical socialist policy: the Dictatorship of Industry. ● On the right Bukharin and his supporters advocated continuing with the NEP in order to ensure social peace. ● In the centre Stalin and his followers were prepared to back which ever policy worked. Note it down Divide your page into three and make notes on: ● what the different parts of the Party advocated ● their reasons for advocating these policies. Bullet points would work well for this kind of activity. You could use different coloured pens for the two parts of the note-making task. Nepmen in Smolensk market, 1921. What would right-wing communists approve of in this scene? What would left-wing communists disapprove of in this s cene?
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin48 The Left: the Dictatorship of Industry Left-wingers, like Trotsky, favoured a policy of forced agricultura l collectivisation. Merging far ms together and placing them under state control would, Trotsky argued, allow the state to take all of the profit generated by farming and use the money to industrialise quickly. Trotsky argued that this scheme would end all private property, end the capitalist market and therefore end inequality. However, he acknowledged that it would lead to massive discontent among the peasants. The Right: building socialism with capitalist hands Right-wingers, such as Bukharin, argued that the NEP was the best way of industrialising the Soviet Union. He argued that the NEP was slowly allowing the economy to grow and therefore industrialisation would happen eventually. Importantly, Bukharin argued that the NEP allowed the Soviet Union to remain a harmonious society. The NEP allowed peasants to own and work their own farms, which kept them satisfied. Bukharin argued that the slow pace of economic growth was necessary in order to keep the peasants happy. The Left, however, argued that this policy of ‘riding the peasant nag’ to socialism, was highly dangerous. They argued that it could lead to the re-emergence of a capitalist class determined to overthrow Communism. The Centre: whatever works Centrists or pragmatists, like Stalin, argued that the correct policy was the one that worked. In that sense, Stalin a rgued that economic policy was not an ideological issue, but a practical issue. Until 1927 Stalin supported the NEP as it was clearly leadi ng to economic growth. However, when growth rates declined, Stalin shifted position. The legacy of War Communism In a sense, the Left wanted to return to policies similar to War Communism. For Trotsky and the L eft, War Communism was a heroic period in which the government implemented a tr uly social ist policy, whereas the NEP was a period of compromise which lost sight of true social ism. The Right, however, argued that War Communism had proved that extreme measures caused chaos and rebellion. Economic debate and the leadership struggle The ‘Great Industrialisation Debate’ was a central part of the leadership struggle. Contenders presented their rival economic plans to the Party Congress. During the 1920s, again and aga in, the Right won the debates at Congress. Consequently, the leaders associated with the NEP held on to power, while the leaders who advocated radical left- wing solutions were unable to win power. Nonetheless, most communists were centrists and supported the NEP for pragmatic reasons. Therefore when the NEP started to fail, Stalin started to advocate a new more left-wing policy which attracted a great deal of support from the Left and the Centre of the Party. Conclusion Lenin’s economic policy went through a series of phases. The radical changes in policy reflected the fact that Lenin did not have a detailed plan, that the revolution did not proceed as he expected and that he was prepared to compromise. Lenin adopted War Communism due to the crisis of the Civil War, a crisis that required state control of the whole industrial economy. Nonetheless, he quickly saw War Communism’s potential for destroying capitalism and creating an economy built on socialist foundations. By 1921 War Communism had created a political and economic crisis. It was clear by 1921 that the European revolution that Lenin had expected would not happen. The Soviet Union would have to build socialism without outside help. Once again, Lenin was forced to improvise, instituting the NEP, a compromise with the peasants and a compromise with capitalism. Again, Lenin saw the potential of the new system and by the end of his life he argued that the NEP was a form of state capitalism that would allow the Communist Party to build socialism in the Soviet Union. However, the NEP was controversial within the Party. The Left wanted radical change, a return to a policy much closer to War Communism. The Right wanted to maintain the peace between the government and the peasants and move to socialism slowly. The majority backed the NEP while it worked. However, even in the good years the NEP was unable to create signif icant industrial growth. As the NEP plateaued at the end of the 1920s Stalin abandoned the policy and initiated a new economic revolution.
49Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 Major industries nationalised Small industries run by capitalists Land reform State capitalism Civil War: military and economic crisis All industries nationalised Grain requisitioning Rationing Labour discipline War Communism Economic and political crisis Agricultural free market Tax in kind Major industries nationalised Small industries run by capitalists NEP Summary diagram: Towards a command economy, 1917–28. Work together Having read this chapter, look over your notes from Chapter 1a, and write a paragraph answering the question: What was Leninism? Your paragraph should deal with the political and economic aspects of Lenin’s government. Having written the paragraph, swap it with a partner and consider the following questions: ● Did your partner miss anything obvious? ● Did your partner consider both the political and economic aspects of Leninism? ● Did your partner consider the ways in which Lenin’s policies changed over time? Discuss both paragraphs and work out which paragraph is best and why. Note down three things that you could do to improve your written style. Activity: Question practice 1 How accurate is it to say that Lenin’s economic policies failed to improve Soviet industry groups in the period 1918–28? AS 2 To what extent were there changes in Soviet government in the years 1928–64? AS 3 How far do you agree that the Communist Government faced severe economic and political challenges in the years 1917–28? 4 How signif icant was the creation of a one-party state in the establishment of communist power in the years 1921–53? Recommended reading S. Malle, The Economic Organization of War Communism, 1918–1921 (Cambridge, 2002), pages 495–515. Malle considers the successes fa ilures and impact of War Communism. R. Service, Comrades! A history of world Communism (Harvard, 2010), pages 70–81. Service gives an account of the early years of the Communism in Russia including Lenin’s economic policy. L. H. Siegelbaum, Soviet state and society between revolutions, 1918–1929 (Cambridge, 1992), pages 63–6. Siegelbaum analyses the nature and consequences of War Communism. Chapter summary ● Between 1917 and 1928 Lenin and his successors experimented with a series of economic policies: — State capitalism, 1918 — War Communism, 1918–21 — The New Economic Policy, 1921–28 ● These policies reflected the needs of the country, the political circumstances and the long-term goals of the regime. ● However, none of these policies delivered the economic results that the communists wanted.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin50 2b: Industry and agriculture in the Stalin era Overview Between 1928 and 1929, Stalin initiated the ‘Revolution from Above’ or ‘Great Turn’, a series of radical policies which transformed the Soviet economy. State planning of industry and the collectivisation of agriculture were designed to end the NEP’s semi-capitalist market economy and transform the Soviet Union from a backward agricultural economy into a modern industrial state. In short the ‘Revolution from Above’ was Stalin’s plan for building socialism in the Soviet Union. Stalin’s policies succeeded in turning the Soviet Union into an industrial giant. Moreover, they laid the foundation for Stalin’s war economy, which was crucial to the Soviet victory over Germany in the Second World War. Nonetheless, Stalin’s economic model created profound problems, particularly in agriculture, which were proved impossible to solve within the context of state planning that Stalin had established. Even so, the ‘Revolution from Above’ created a new type of economy, which became essential to the Soviet system. Collectivisation and the industrial planning endured from the late 1920s through to the 1980s as an essential feature of the Soviet economy. This chapter considers: 1 The Five-Year Plans and industrial change, 1928–41 2 Agricultural collectivisation and its impact 3 Recovery from war after 1945. 1 The Five-Year Plans and industrial change, 1928–41 Centralised economic planning of industry was one of the key features of Stalin’s industrial policy. Under the NEP state-owned industries had a considerable amount of autonomy. NEP m anagers could organise production levels and choose which goods they produced. However, in 1928, Stalin introduced the First Five-Year Plan, the first of a series of plans that were designed to replace the market with a more efficient and truly socialist economic system. Note it down On a large sheet of paper draw a spider diagram and make notes on the aims of Stalin’s industrial policy. Make sure you put his aims into appropriate categories, such as ideological aims, economic aims and political aims. The aims of the Five-Year Plans Stalin introduced the Five-Year Plans for a series of reasons. His primary objective was to i ndustrialise Russia by combining centralised planning with large-scale investment. His industrialisation goals were extremely ambitious. He claimed that the Soviet Union was 100 years behind Britain and the USA, but that through planning the Soviet Union could catch up in 15 years. Soviet economists hoped to eliminate the inefficacies of the NEP. Specifically, they wanted to eliminate Nepmen, who made money through trade rather than production. Socialist economics During the nineteenth century, socialists and communists were largely critical of capitalism. Karl Marx, for example, recognised that capitalism created large amounts of wealth and huge technological innovations. However, he was critical of the inequality and exploitation that capitalism created. Socialists argued that the key problem with capitalism was private property, because property was the key to growing rich. People who owned property, including factories and shops, could grow rich. People who owned little or no property by contrast would remain poor. A second problem that socialists identified with private property was that it led to competition. Companies competed with each other in the market. They argued that this competition was inefficient, because it led to a duplication of production. Consequently, socialists argued that abolishing private property was the key to equality and efficiency. Socialists disagreed over how private property could be abolished, but by the early twentieth century many socialists argued that the state should own all property and plan production for the good of all people. Finally, although socialists spent a great deal of time in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries speculating about how a socialist economy might work, prior to 1917 there had been no large-scale attempt to create a socialist economy. Therefore neither Lenin nor Stalin had a model for their economic policy. Both were forced to improvise.
51Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 They believed that government-controlled production and distribution would be much more efficient than small-scale disorganised NEP-style trading. Stalin argued that the Plans were necessary because of the failings of the NEP. The NEP had helped to revive existing Soviet industry, but had not led to the development of new factories. The Plans also reflected Soviet military concerns. Stalin, and many in the government, feared that Germany would invade the Soviet Union. Defending Soviet territory would require modern industry which could produce the weapons necessary to fight a modern war. Finally, Stalin wanted to assert his own authority. The Five-Year Plans were more ambitious than any of Lenin’s schemes for transforming the Soviet Union. In this sense, they would demonstrate that Stalin was initiating a new phase of building socialism. Five-Year Plans 1928–41 Between 1928 and 1941, there were three Five-Year Pla ns: ● First Five-Year Plan (October 1928–December 1932) ● Second Five-Year Plan (January 1933–December 1937) ● Third Five-Year Plan (Januar y 1938–June 1941). The first was cut short due to problems with the Plan, and the third ended prematurely due to the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The nature of the Plans The Five-Year Plans were a government initiative designed to increase production. Gosplan, the Soviet Union’s central economic agency, formulated production targets for every factory, mine and workshop in the Soviet Union, and Soviet workers and managers were responsible for meeting these targets. At the same time, there was a massive propaganda campaign designed to inspire workers to fulfi l the Plans. These campaigns: ● focused on the heroic objectives of the Plans ● celebrated the successes of the Plans ● claimed that the Plans had led to the destruction of capitalism ● described the modern, industrial future that the Plans would create. However, the Five-Year Plans were not plans in the strict sense. They were merely a list of targets backed by a propaganda campaign. There was no attempt to ensure that factories had the resources they needed to reach their targets, nor were there any clear ideas about what the goods would be used for once they were produced. Therefore Stalin’s economy is better understood as a command economy rather than a planned economy. Achievements 1928–41 Overall, Stalin’s first three Five-Year Plans succeeded in industrialising the Soviet Union. Broadly, Stalin’s economic policy was successful in terms of heavy industry, transport, labour productivity and rearmament. Heavy industry Heavy industry was the biggest success of the first three Five-Year Plans. Production of iron, steel, coal, oil and electricity all increased massively (see Table 3). A propaganda poster showing Stalin marching alongside miners, made during the first Five-Year Plan. What does this poster suggest about Stalin’s economic and political priorities?
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin52 Table 3: Industrial produc tion, 1927–40. 1927 1940 Electricity (milliard kWhs) 5.05 48.30 Coal (million tons) 35.4 0 165.9 0 Oil (million tons) 11.70 31.10 Pig iron (million tons) 3.30 14.90 Steel (million tons) 4.00 18.30 This was achieved, in part, by building new factories to exploit the Soviet Union’s natural resources (see Figure 4). Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk, Zaporozhye, Tula and Lipetsk metallurgical works were all built between 1929 and 1936, and contributed to the huge increase in the amount of iron and steel produced. Transport Transport was another success of the Plans. The Moscow Metro’s first train lines opened in 1935. Additionally, the Moscow–Volga Canal was constructed between 1932 and 1937. The Metro a llowed people to travel around Moscow more easily, and the Moscow–Volga Canal made the transportation of goods more eff icient. Labour productivity Labour productivity in the Soviet Union was extremely low. Indeed, Soviet workers were significantly less productive than workers in Britain, the USA or Western Europe. Low productivity can be explained by the long hours, low pay and lack of incentives in the system, at least during the first Five-Year Plan. Low productivity was addressed through a nationwide initiative introduced in 1935. Stalin authorised higher payments and a system of rewards for the most productive workers. Additionally, Stakhanovites, workers who had proved themselves to be exceptionally productive, were able to reorganise their workplaces to ensure that they were efficient. The campaign took off in 1936 and in the late 1930s productivity rose significantly across industry as Stakhanovites educated other workers in the most effective ways of working (see Table 4). Table 4: Productivi ty gains, 1936 –40. Industry Estimated productivity gains Chemicals 34 per cent Electricity production 51 per cent Coal mining 26 per cent Oil production 25 per cent Nonetheless, the Stakhanovite movement created problems of its own. Stakhanovite workers were often resented by their colleagues or their management because they got higher pay. Rearmament The Five-Year Plans were very successful in terms of rearmament. As war approached, economic planners increasingly prioritised arms production. By 1940 one- third of government spending was devoted to rearmament. Moreover, the Plans led to the successful construction of nine military aircraft factories between 1939 and 1941. However, shortages of quality materials such as steel held up arms production. Coal mining Oil field Textiles Chemicals Non-ferrous metals Beet-sugar processing Iron-ore mining Metal-processing Machine-building Power station Traditional industrial areasNew industrial areas Irkutsk Sakhalin Vladivostock Key Leningrad 0 1000km Sea of Okhotsk Kiev Moscow Donbass Batumi Baku Perm SverdlovskR.volga Chelyabinsk Magnitogorsk Fergana Valley Novosibirsk Kuzbass Leninsk-Kuznetski Ural Mountains Figure 4: The new industrial centres.
53Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 Alexei Stakhanov, 1906–1977 Alexei Stakhanov was the first of a new movement. According to the Soviet media, in August 1935 he mined 102 tons of coal in six hours – 14 times the output of an average miner. In September he mined 227 tons of coal in a single shift. As a result he was rewarded with one month’s wages, a new apartment, a telephone and holiday tickets. He was held up as an example to all Soviet workers of the kind of superhuman effort that they should aspire to. Stakhanov also became a celebrity, even featuring on the cover of Time Magazine. Notably, Stakhanov’s amazing records were achieved with the help of assistants and the latest technology. Even so, the publicity value of his achievement was huge. Problems with the Plans While Sta lin’s Plans did lead to the industrialisation of the economy, they proved to be a very inefficient way of industrialising. In addition to problems in specific areas of the economy there were also systemic problems with the Stalinist model of economic planning. Production problems The command economy was plagued by problems. First, production qualit y was often low. The Plans set targets for production, not for qual ity. Therefore factory ma nagers were rewarded for producing large quantities of material, regard less of the quality of what was produced. Secondly, the Plans did not specify what materials should be used for, and there was little co-ordination between different factories. Materials that were produced were often stored at the factory and allowed to decay rather than being used. This problem was made worse due to the lack of transport in the first years of the Plan. Indeed, in some industries as much as 40 per cent of what was produced was wasted. Finally, the Plans themselves were disorganised and undermined by Stal in’s other policies. In terms of disorganisation, the First Five-Year Plan was launched in October 1928, and yet the Plan itself was only published in April 1929. Equally, Stalin’s terror led to the purge of industrial ma nagers and economic planners – the very people necessary to maki ng the Plan work. Stali n’s terror attacked officials at Gosplan to such an extent that the third Five-Year Plan was never f inished. Therefore, for periods during the First a nd Third Five-Year Plans, the Soviet Union had a planned economy, but no Plan. The effectiveness of the Plans was also undermined by unrealistic targets set by Gosplan. Industrial mana gers were under enormous pressure to ensure high levels of production and they would therefore lie about their production levels and falsif y figures. Falsif ied data made economic management even harder, as effective planning relies in accurate data. Historian Donald Fi ltzer argues that these problems meant that Soviet economic growth was ‘self-consuming’: the process of economic growth was so ineff icient that it consumed extremely high levels of resources that could otherwise have been used to improve the quality of life of Soviet citizens. Consumer goods Between 1928 and 1941 there were continual shortages of consumer goods, such as clothes, shoes and furniture. Shortages were the result of the following: ● Stalin’s priorities: He prioritised heavy industry and defence rather than consumer production. ● Poor planning: Planners underestimated the needs of consumers. ● Production techniques: By the mid-1930s the Soviet economy was good at producing large quantities of raw materials such as iron, steel and coal. However, producing more complex consumer goods required more sophisticated techniques, which the economy still lacked. The scarcity of consumer goods was managed by rationing. Between 1928 and 1941, most consumer goods were rationed. However, in the early and late 1930s there were often such severe shortages that the government could not even supply the minimum level of rations. For example, shoe queues in Moscow in the early 1930s often exceeded 1000 people. Some reports suggest queues for clothes and shoes in Leningrad numbered over 6000 during 1938.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin54 Housing and living conditions Housing was a significant problem between 1928 and 1941. The Plans required a huge increase in the urban workforce. However, the necessary housing was never built. Most houses built during the Plans did not have running water. Moreover, bathhouses were scarce. For example, there was not a single bathhouse available for the 650,000 people living in the Liubertsy district of Moscow. The industrial centre of Mag nitogorsk was planned with state-of-the-art housing for the workers who would build the factory. A small village was built to house the American specialists who were employed to supervise the construction of the factories. Once the American specialists had returned to the USA, Magnitogorsk’s managers moved into these houses. However, the majority of the workers lived in wooden shacks, tents and mud huts. Living conditions between 1928 and 1941 were poorer than they had been under the best years of the NEP. A better standard of living was never one of Stalin’s key objectives and this was a genuine failure of the Plan. Food rationing continued for most of the Plan, except for a period known as the ‘three good years’ in the middle of the 1930s. Working conditions were harsh. Workers were forced to work seven days a week, and long hours were common. Lateness and absenteeism was criminalised. Towards the end of the period, internal passports were introduced to stop workers moving from town to town in search of better-paid jobs. Black market The Five-Year Plans also failed to end the free market. Shortages of materials led to the growth of a thriving black market. The black market was possible due to the inefficiencies of the Plan. Workers would steal goods and material from their workplaces and sell them to the highest bidders. The thefts would be covered up by falsifying paperwork. Conclusion In spite of the problems, Stalin’s Five-Year Plans transformed the Soviet economy. In 1928, the Soviet Union was a largely capitalist agricultural economy with a small working class. By 1941 the Soviet Union was a powerful, urban i ndustrial economy that was able to produce the resources necessary to defeat the German army. However, the Soviet economy was profoundly unbalanced. Arms production was only possible at the expense of consumer goods. Moreover, the wastefulness of the Soviet economy was another reason why economic growth did not lead to higher standards of living. 2 Agricultural collectivisation and its impact Between 1928 and 1941 Soviet agriculture was collectivised. Collectivisation was a process by which small farms were merged into large farms of anything between 20 and 150 families. At the sa me time ownership of the farmland and all of the far m’s resources was taken over by the state. Note it down On a large sheet of paper draw a spider diagram, and make notes on the aims of Stalin’s agricultural policy. Make sure you put his aims into appropriate categories, such as ideological aims, economic aims and political aims. The causes of collectivisation Collectivisation had a series of causes. Communist ideology set the general direction. However, the specific failings of the NEP and the nature of the leadership struggle also shaped the way that the policy developed. Communist ideology Communists believed that private property was one of the foundations of capitalism and one of the causes of inequality (see page 50). During the period of the NEP, peasants with large farms had been able to grow rich, while peasants with small farms had done much less well. Therefore all communists wanted to abolish private property and replace private farming with state-run farming to end capitalism and inequality. Communists were also suspicious of peasant farming. Historically, Russian peasants had wanted to own the land they worked. This implied an individualistic desire to make money which was closer to capitalism than socialism. By collectivising farms, communists hoped that peasants would see the superiority of socialist methods and embrace Communism wholeheartedly. Communists also wanted to create an efficient economy. They believed that large farms were likely to be more efficient than smal l farms, a s expertise and equipment could be shared to increase production. In sum, communists believed that collectivisation would create a fairer and more efficient society and would win over the peasants by abolishing private property and sharing resources.
55Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 The failure of the NEP By 1928 there were clear signs that the NEP was failing. Until 1926 the NEP led to rising agricultural production. However, in 1927 and 1928 agricultural production was lower than it had been in 1926. Agricultura l production fell because there was no market for additional farmed goods. In essence there was a l imit to the amount of food that Soviet consumers wanted. Increased production in 1926 led to a fall in prices as farmers produced more than consumers wanted. Therefore in 1927 farmers decreased production to push up grain prices. This led to what the right wing described as ‘the grain procurement crisis’: food supplies decreased, leading to shortages in the cities and higher profits for farmers. Left-wing communists descr ibed this reduction of production as the ‘Kulak grain strike’. They claimed that kulaks, rich farmers, were putting their own profits ahead of the Soviet Union’s need to industrialise. In essence, radical communists viewed this as the re-emergence of class war: rich, capitalist peasa nts deliberately holding back the construction of socialism. The NEP’s economic problems and the threat of Kulak capitalists holding the government to ransom led many communists to believe that the NEP had run its course and needed to be replaced by a more radical policy that dealt with the kulaks and restored economic growth. The leadership struggle Stalin a lso had political reasons for wanting to end the NEP and collectivise a griculture. At the end of 1927, Stalin and Bukharin had defeated Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky, expelling them from the Party. Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky, the United Opposition, had advocated a radical left-wing policy of collectivisation and rapid industrialisation. Their defeat and expulsion meant that the left wing of the Part y, a signif icant minority, had no leader. By moving to the left, Sta lin hoped to retain h is supporters, pick up supporters of the United Opposition and in so doing gain more support than Bukharin. Stalin’s strategy worked. As he moved to the left he gained a majority of support in the Central Committee and was therefore able to become the undisputed leader of the Communist Party. Introducing collectivisation Collectivisation was introduced in a series of phases. In 1928, Stalin did not propose the f ull-scale collectivisation of agriculture. However, as his new policies won support within the Communist Party he became bolder. In late 1929 Stalin ordered full-scale collectivisation (see Figure 5). By 1930 he claimed 100 per cent success. Emergency measures, 1928 In July 1928, Stalin effectively ended the NEP. To end the ‘Kulak grain strike’, Stalin ordered the Red Army and the Cheka to requisition grain from the peasants. The requisitioned grain would then be used to feed workers and to sell overseas in order to raise money for industrialisation. Introducing requisitioning effectively ended the NEP. The NEP had been based on free trade and taxation. In the cities, Stalin reintroduced rationing – another aspect of War Communism. Rationing and requisitioning did not necessarily indicate that collectivisation was beginning, but they did signal the end of the NEP. Dekulakisation Peasants responded to the introduction of requisitioning with violence. Requisitioning was the most hated aspect of War Communism. Peasants resisted requisitioning by hiding or even destroying grain. Stalin claimed that this resistance was an attack on socialism by the capitalist kulaks. Therefore he initiated the ‘liquidation of the kulaks as a class’, or dekulakisation. In theory this was meant to take farms and equipment from the richest peasants. However, in practice it meant mass deportations and killi ngs of a ll peasants who resisted government policies. Around 1.5 million peasants were sent to labour camps as a result of the dekulakisation campaign. Collectivisation Collectivisation was introduced in late 1929. Farms were forcibly merged, and equipment was taken from richer peasants and given to the poorer peasants. Peasants who worked on collective farms were allowed to keep a small amount of grain to live on. The rest was used to feed workers in the cities or sold abroad to provide money to fund industrialisation. The consequences of collectivisation, 1929–34 Collectivisation devastated Soviet agriculture, but released much more money to fund industrialisation. Between 1929 and 1930 there was a drive to ensure that all farms were collectivised. However, this led to chaos, and therefore Stalin halted the collectivisation drive temporarily in 1930. Collectivisation was reinstated in 1931. By 1941 almost all Soviet farms were collectivised (see Figure 6).
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin56 Destruction of Soviet farming The peasants responded to requisitioning and collectivisation by destroying their crops, animals and machinery. Many peasants would rather destroy their farms than hand them over to the government. Therefore, between 1928 and 1934, Stalin’s policies led to the destruction of: ● 17 million horses ● 26 million cattle ● 11 million pigs ● 60 million sheep and goats. At the same time, gra in production also decreased (see Table 5). Table 5: Grain production, 1928–34. Grain harvest Million tons 1928 73.3 1929 71.7 1930 83.5 1931 69.5 1932 69.6* 1933 68.4 1934 67.6 The reduction of agricultural production was due to: ● the execution or deportation of kulaks who were often the most experienced and successful farmers ● the absence of incentives as farmers were no longer able to make a profit. Year 1930 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1941 Figure 6: Cumulative percentage of peasant holdings collectivised in the US SR, 1930–41. Famine Collectivisation also led to famine in the Ukra ine. Ukrainian farmers were unable to meet government targets for farm production. Moreover, resistance to collectivisation had been at it fiercest in the Ukraine. Therefore Stalin punished them by seizing their grain and livestock. The result was a government-created famine between 1932 and 1933 which resulted in 5 million deaths. Stalin refused to accept international offers of aid to help the starving farmers. He wanted to use the famine to destroy the resistance of the Ukrain ian farmers. Mechanisation Collectivisation was accompanied by mechanisation. The government allowed farms to hire tractors from machine tractor stations, which were set up across the country. The 75,000 tractors that they provided had a limited impact on Soviet farming. At best, they made up for all of the horses that were lost due to collectivisation. Grain procurement Collectivisation allowed the government to procure much more grain than the NEP. In 1928, the government procured 10.8 million tons of grain f rom the peasants. This had risen to 22.6 million tons in 1933. Grain exports also rose from less than 1 million tons in 1928 to 4.7 million tons in 1930 and 5 million tons in 1931. The long-term consequences of collectivisation Collectivisation caused long term-problems that Sta lin and his successors were never able to fully solve. Agriculture, 1934–41 Soviet agriculture recovered slowly from the disruption of collectivisation. Grain harvests were regularly sma ller than they had been in the best years of the NEP. Although there was a record harvest in 1937, grain production declined again from 1938 to 1940. Low grain harvests were, in part, a result of the fact that collective farms were less productive than private farms. On average private farms produced around 410 kilos of grain per hectare, whereas collective farms produced about 320 kilos per hectare. In short, prior to the Second World War collective farms were less productive than farms under the NEP. Private farming continued on a small scale until 1941. Around seven per cent of farmers stayed independent of the collective system. However, they made a major contribution to Soviet agriculture. Indeed, the private farms produced double the amount of meat and milk produced by the state farms.
57Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 Agriculture during the Second World War The failings of the collective system were obvious during the Second World War. Farming was consistently unable to meet the needs of the citizens and the ar my. During the war: ● the Soviet Government relied on US imports to provide almost a fifth of the calories consumed by the Red Army ● harvests declined from a pre-war high of 95.5 million tonnes to 46.8 million tonnes in 1945 ● bread rations fell by 40 per cent ● potato rations fell by 80 per cent. 3 Recovery from war after 1945 The Second World War led to widespread devastation. In general terms, the war destroyed almost all of the economic progress that had been made dur ing the f irst three Five-Year Plans. In 1945, 25 million people were homeless; Soviet industry was producing two-thirds less than it had in 1940. Stalin planned full-scale reconstruction over the course of three more Five-Year Plans. Note it down Using the 1 : 2 method (see page x), make notes on the success of economic reconstruction following the Second World War. Make sure you distinguish between different aspects of the economy, for example you should have headings on the success of agricultural reconstruction, industrial reconstruction as well as recovery of living standards. The Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1945–50 The Fourth Five-Year Plan led to extremely high levels of industrial growth. Around 88 per cent of investment during the Fourth Five-Year Plan went into heavy industry. As a result, industrial output increased by 80 per cent from 1945 to 1950. Indeed, some factories and mines, particularly the metal producing regions of the Ukraine and Siberia, were able to achieve or exceed pre-war production rates by 1950 (see Table 6). Table 6: Industrial outpu t 1940–50. 1940 1945 1950 Coal (million tons) 165.9 119.3 261.1 Electricity (milliard kWhs) 48.3 43.2 91.2 Oil (million tons) 30.1 19.4 37.9 Pig iron (million tons) 14.9 8.8 19.2 Steel (million tons) 18.3 12.3 27.30 Cement (million tons) 5.7 1.8 10.2 Soviet post-war Plans continued to focus on military spending. The emergence of the Cold War in 1946 led to the expansion of the Soviet militar y and an increase in militar y spending. By 1952, total military expenditure was almost a quarter of the government’s budget. Military spending meant that there was less money available for other sectors of the economy (see Table 7). Table 7: Military expendi ture, 1950–52. 1950 1951 1952 Total expenditure (milliard roubles) 427.9 451.5 476.9 Military expenditure (milliard roubles) 79.4 96.4 113.8 Production of consumer goods increased too, doubling during the course of the Pan. However, like the pre-war Plans, the Fourth F ive-Year Plan focused prim arily on heavy industry. Only 12 per cent of investment went into food production and consumer goods. Therefore although the production of consumer good s doubled, they continued to be scarce. Reconstruction focused on factories rather than homes. Equally, reconstruction of h istoric cities was given priority over more remote towns. Therefore, while Kiev was reconstructed quickly, towns in Dnieper were neglected until the late 1950s. Wages were kept low. This had two benefits. First, it meant that there was more money available for reconstruction. Secondly, it meant that women were forced to go out to work because families needed their income. Stalin recognised that women had a vital role to play in rebuilding Soviet industry. Like previous Plans, the Fourth Five-Year Plan was plagued with ineff iciencies and problems. Nonetheless, between 1945 and 1950 the Soviet economy was the fastest growing economy in the world. By the time of Stalin’s death in 1953 economic recovery was well underway, even if there were still major shortages of consumer goods and housing. Post-war agriculture Soviet agriculture recovered slowly from the devastation of war. Stalin’s top economic priority after the war was industrial reconstruction. As a result, agriculture suffered severe shortages of resources and workers from 1946 to 1949. Additionally, as soon as the war was over Stalin re-imposed strict discipline over Soviet farms. During the war there had been a small increase in private farming. Stalin ordered an end to private farming and therefore production dropped. Nonetheless, production grew between 1947 and 1953. By 1952 grain production had reached its pre-war levels (see Table 8).
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin58 Table 8: Grain harvest, millions of tonne s. 1940 95.6 1941 56.3 1942 30.0 1943 30.0 1944 48.7 1945 46.8 1946 39.6 1947 65.9 1948 67.2 1949 70.2 1950 81.2 1951 78.7 1952 92.2 Conclusion Stalin’s ‘Great-Turn’ transformed the Soviet economy and the Soviet Union. While his policies were harsh, ineff icient and wasteful, the Five-Year Plans transformed the Soviet Union into an industrial g iant. Equally, collectivisation placed farming firmly under state control. Stalin’s ‘Revolution from Above’ had long-lasting consequences. It established the basic nature of the Soviet economy from 1928/29 to the 1980s. Indeed, between 1928 and 1990 there would be 11 Five-Year Plans. Crucially, Stalin’s legacy also determined the basic problems that later Soviet leaders would have to face. Low labour productivity, an unproductive agricultura l sector, ineff icient industry, scarce consumer goods and a massive militar y budget would continue to trouble Soviet leaders until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Recommended reading D. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II (Cambridge, 2004), pages 1–12. Filtzer’s book deals with Stalin’s economy in the last years of his reign. S. Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism – Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (Cambridge, 2000), pages 40–66. Fitzpatrick analyses the way in which the Soviet people lived during the f irst Five Year Plans. R. Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, 2nd edition (Routledge, 1998), pages 38–40. Sakwa considers the impact of Stalin’s command economy on Soviet society. Work together Having read this chapter write a paragraph in answer to the following question: In what ways were Stalin’s economic policies socialist? Try to think of at least three ways. Swap your paragraph with a partner, and discuss: ● Which paragraph demonstrates the clearest focus on the meaning of socialism? ● Which paragraph links its three points to socialism most clearly? ● Which paragraph provides a better answer to the question, and why? Make a note of at least two ways in which you could improve your writing. Chapter summary ● From 1928 to 1953 Stalin established the economic model that the Soviet Union would follow until the 1980s. ● The key features of the economic model included: — collectivised farming — ‘planned’ economic production and development. ● This model led to the industrialisation of the Soviet Union ● It also led to a series of persistent economic problems: — low levels of agricultural production — poor-quality production — inefficient production. Heavy industry Military Transport Farming Housing Consumer goods Summary diagram: Stalin’s economic priorities.
59Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 Essay technique: Analysis Activity: Claim and justification Here is a plan in answer to the question above: • Paragraph 1: Five-Year Plans: radical transformation of industry • Paragraph 2: Collectivisation– radical transformation of agriculture • Paragraph 3: Persistence of black market– limited transformation • Paragraph 4: Limited modernisation– limited transformation Using your notes from this chapter: 1 Write a paragraph about how far agriculture was transformed by collectivi sation. Make sure your paragraph: ● begins with a clear point that focuses on the question ● develops the point with at least three pieces of accurate detail ● concludes with an explanation: a claim and a justification. 2 Write a conclusion to the essay in which you weigh up at least two f actors and reach a judgement about how far the Soviet economy was transformed in the years 1928–53. Therefore the Soviet economy was transformed radically following 1928 due to the introduction of the Five-Year Plans because the planned economy abolished the free market in industry. Claim Relationship Justif ication The first part of this sentence is the claim, the second part justifies the claim. ‘Because’ is a very important word to use when writing an explanation, as it shows the relationship between the claim and the justification. In Sections A and B of the exam your essays are judged on their focus and structure (see pages 26–27), the extent to which they include relevant detail (see page 39) and the extent to which they are analytical. Therefore having made a relevant point, and supported it with accurate detail, you should conclude each paragraph with analysis. Analysis is a term that covers a variety of high-level skills including explanation and evaluation. In essence, analysis means breaking down something complex into smaller parts. Therefore a clear structure, which breaks down a complex question into a series of paragraphs, is the first step towards writing an analytical essay. The purpose of explanation is to account for why something happened or why something is true or false. Therefore an explanatory statement requires two parts: a claim and a justification. For example, imagine you are answering the following question: How far do you agree that the Soviet economy was transformed in the years 1928–53? You might want to argue that the Soviet economy was transformed radically due to the introduction of the Five-Year Plans. Having made this point, and supported it with relevant detail, you can then explain how this answers the question. For example, you could conclude your paragraph like this:
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin60 2c: Changing economic priorities, 1953–85 Overview From 1953 to 1985 Soviet leaders struggled with a series of economic problems. Khrushchev recognised that collectivisation and central planning under Stalin had failed to improve the standard of living for Soviet citizens. Moreover, he recognised that large military budgets starved other areas of the economy of the resources necessary to grow. Nonetheless, Khrushchev was convinced that the basic model of agricultural collectivisation and industrial planning was the best economic system. What is more, initially Khrushchev’s reforms led to an economic golden age in which the economy sustained high rates of growth, the standard of living improved and over taking the US economy seemed possible. Khrushchev was confident that the Soviet system was essentially sound and that small- scale reforms rather than fundamental change was the solution to Soviet economic difficulties. More serious economic problems emerged at the end of the 1950s. Growth rates slowed and by the mid-1960s the economy began to stagnate. Even so, Brezhnev was unwilling to authorise reform, let alone wholesale economic change. Therefore problems of stagnation and low growth continued. By 1985 the economy was in crisis. Slow growth through the 1970s had turned into economic decline in the early 1980s, and yet the burden of military expenditure continued to rise. This chapter considers: 1 Investment in agriculture, 1953–64 2 Industrial modernisation, 1953–64 3 Economic reform and decline after 1964. 1 Investment in agriculture, 1953–64 Khrushchev broke with tradition in 1953 by acknowledging that Soviet agr iculture was ineff icient and less productive than it had been under the NEP. He argued that reforms were necessary to increase productivity and to ensure a better standard of living for agricultural workers. In order to revive the Soviet economy, Stalin’s heirs introduced a series of reforms. Note it down Divide a large sheet of paper into three equal columns. Under the headings Goals, Policies and Success/Failure, make notes on Khrushchev’s investment in agriculture. Bullet points or the 1 : 2 method (see page x) would suit this activity well. Remember to note down specific information that will help you demonstrate how far his policies succeeded. The politics of agriculture Khrushchev’s rise and fall as Soviet leader was bound up with agriculture. Malenkov’s early policies had focused on agriculture. Having promised much higher agricultural production in 1953, and having failed to deliver in 1954, Malenkov was eclipsed by Khrushchev. Khrushchev too promised great improvements, and his success in delivering larger harvests between 1954 and 1958 was crucial to the consolidation of his power. However, Khrushchev’s promises to produce more than the USA by 1960 led to an embarrassing failure. Some of his policies, such as maize cultivation, were extremely ineffective. Indeed, they led to Khrushchev gaining a reputation for introducing ‘hare-brained’ schemes rather than effective policies. The slow growth of agricultural production between 1960 and 1964 persuaded many in the Party that Khrushchev’s reforms were unnecessary and counterproductive, and therefore he should be replaced by a more cautious leader.
61Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 Improved incentives In 1954, Khrushchev changed the relationship between collective farms and the government in order to incentivise higher production rates. In essence, Khrushchev wanted to invest in farming by offering farmers higher prices for their produce. Under Stalin, each farm had to produce a quota of goods, which was bought directly by the state at extremely low prices. Khrushchev reduced the quota and introduced higher prices for everything that was produced in addition to the quota. This led to a 250 per cent rise in farm incomes between 1952 and 1956. Investment in resources Khrushchev also invested in farm equipment and fertilisers. In 1954 Khrushchev announced the construction of new fertiliser factories and an increase in the production of tractors. By 1955 this resulted in a 30 per cent increase in the number of tractors available and a 40 per cent increase in the amount of fertiliser produced. Virgin Lands Scheme The Virgin Lands Scheme was Khrushchev’s most ambitious agr icultural policy. Khrushchev hoped to increase Soviet agricultural production by turning unfarmed lands in the northern Caucasus, Kazakhstan, and western Siberia into new farms. Launched in September 1953, it required a significant investment, so agricultural investment grew from under 3 per cent a year to 12.8 per cent of the Soviet budget between 1954 and 1959. Between 1953 and 1964 this led to a significant increase in the amount of farmed land in the Soviet Union (see Table 9). Table 9: Expansion of farmland, 1953– 64. 1953 1956 1964 Total area sown (million hectares) 18.2 35.3 97.4 Total labour employed (million workers) 2.6 2.9 8.6 The Corn Campaign In addition to the Virgin Lands Scheme, Khrushchev introduced the Corn Campaign. From September 1958 Khrushchev encouraged farmers in the Ukraine to g row maize. His plan was to shift wheat production to the newly created Virgin Lands farms while ma ize would be produced in the traditional farm s of the Ukraine. The maize would be used to feed animals and would therefore increase the amount of meat available to Soviet consumers. The Corn Campaign was a failure. Khrushchev’s initiative was based on the success of US farms. However, Soviet farms were only able to produce 50 per cent of the corn per hectare that US farms mana ged due to differences in climate, lower labour productivity and the inferiority of Soviet tractors and fertilisers. At the same time, growing more corn meant that Soviet farms produced less hay. As a result the amount of animal feed produced by Soviet farms dropped by 30 per cent between 1958 and 1964. Agricultural successes, 1954–58 Initially, the Virgin Lands Scheme was extremely successful. Grain harvests, meat and milk production all rose significantly between 1953 and 1958. Overall, agricultural production increased by around 35.3 per cent in this period (see Table 10). Table 10: Early impact of the Vir gin Lands Scheme. 1953 1958 Grain harvest (million tons) 82.5 134.7 Meat (million tons) 5.8 7.7 Milk (million tons) 36.5 58.9 The scheme led to greater availability of food in Soviet shops and therefore a better standard of living for Soviet citizens. Greater production also led to a 400 per cent rise in the income of farm workers. Additionally, the success of the scheme allowed Khrushchev to consolidate his position and led him to advocate even more ambitious schemes. In 1956, Khrushchev introduced a new commitment to produce more food than the US by 1960. This required a 300 per cent increase in production in four years. Problems in agriculture, 1954–64 Even during the successful period of 1954 to 1958, Soviet agriculture remained extremely ineff icient. First, the Virgin Lands Scheme was expensive. Kazakhstan is naturally dry and therefore the farms needed sophisticated irrigation systems, which were expensive to run and maintain. Moreover, Soviet agriculture was labour intensive. During the 1950s and 1960s, between 54 and 44 per cent of the Soviet population worked on farms. By comparison only 5 per cent of the American population worked on farms, which produced more than twice as much food. Clearly, Soviet agriculture was deeply inefficient in comparison with US farms. After initial success, the Virgin Lands Scheme failed to lead to further growth. Harvests in 1959 and 1960 were slightly below the 1958 levels. Between 1960 and 1964 production slowly increased, so that overall a gricultura l production was around 15 per cent higher in 1964 than it had been in 1958. These figures were historically h igh, but they
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin62 were nothing compared to the targets that K hrushchev had proposed in 1956. Therefore his policy was judged a failure. There were various problems with Khrushchev’s policy which led to the slower growth rates between 1958 and 1964: ● Machine and tractor stations (MTS) were abolished; therefore farm workers were less able to obtain modern farming equipment. ● Centrally directed campaigns were ineffective because they did not reflect local conditions. For example, Khrushchev advocated maize production, which was inappropriate to the climate of many Soviet farms. Therefore labour, fertilisers and farmland was wasted. ● Soviet planners did not always deliver the correct fertiliser to the farms or deliver it when it was needed. ● Khrushchev repeatedly reformed the ministries dealing with agriculture. Contradictory reforms led to administrative confusion. ● Soviet farms often had inadequate storage facilities, and therefore some of the food produced was wasted. ● Pay for agricultural workers increased, but remained inadequate. ● Khrushchev cut investment in agriculture from 12.8 per cent a year from 1954 to 1959 to 2 per cent a year in 1960. ● Khrushchev’s investment failed to make Soviet farms more efficient, therefore long-term problems of inefficiency and waste continued. In sum, Khrushchev’s reforms did much to improve Soviet agriculture. However, further improvement was hampered by problems with the system. Specifically, central direction of agriculture meant that local conditions were not taken into account and therefore farming could never be truly effective. Additionally, Khrushchev’s reforms did not address the inefficiencies in the system. Finally, reorganisations also created problems, but even without them, Soviet agriculture was too inefficient to meet his ambitious targets. Khrushchev on a visit to the Institute of Genetics of the Academy of Sciences. W hy was Khrushchev so concerned about agriculture?
63Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 2 Industrial modernisation, 1953–64 The most significant difference between Stalin and the new leadership who took over in 1953 was the emphasis on the need to modernise the Soviet economy. Stalin’s Plans created an economy dominated by heavy industr y. They were based on the kinds of economy that developed in Britain and Europe in the nineteenth centur y. However, during the twentieth centur y, advanced economies had moved away from heavy industry towards light industry which produced more high-tech goods and consumer goods. The Soviet Union’s new leadership were aware of this trend and wanted to modernise the Soviet economy in order to make it more consumer oriented and more high- tech. However, the planning methods that had been so successful in creating heavy industry were less effective at creating a modern economy. Note it down Divide a large sheet of paper into three equal columns. Under the headings Goals, Policies and Success/Failure, make notes on Khrushchev’s industrial modernisation. Bullet points or the two-thirds one-third method would suit this activity well. Remember to note down specific information that will help you demonstrate how far his policies succeeded. Military spending High levels of military spending were a continual problem for Soviet leaders after 1953. Stalin had deliberately kept living sta ndards at a very basic level in order to ensure that there was enough money available for the militar y. However, Stalin’s heirs were committed to raising the standard of livi ng for the Soviet people. The fundamental problem was that the Soviet economy did not produce enough wealth to continue high levels of military spending and improve living sta ndards. Khrushchev initiated cuts in militar y spending in 1955. As a result, military spending fell from 12.1 per cent of GDP in 1955 to 9.1 per cent in 1958. However, between 1958 and 1962 there was a series of nuclear stand-offs between the Soviet Union and the USA, and therefore in 1962 Khrushchev increased military spending. By 1964, military spending was around 11 per cent of GDP. Significantly, the rise in military spending coincided with a fall i n economic growth, indicating that increased militar y spending led to a reduction in economic growth. The Seven-Year Plan: Light industry Khrushchev’s economic ambitions were set out in the Seven- Year Plan launched in January 1959. The Plan was designed to boost agricultural production and the production of consumer goods by investing in light industry. Khrushchev hoped that more chemical production would lead to better fertilisers and therefore increased production of crops as well as synthetic fibres, which could be used to make clothes. He believed that chemical production through light industry would encourage growth in the two sections of the economy that needed to be stimulated in order to raise the standard of living in the Soviet Union. The shift in focus also ref lected the view that the construction of heavy industry had been largely completed and therefore further investment in heavy industry was unnecessary. Khrushchev’s vision For Khrushchev, the purpose of the Soviet economy was to build Communism. Khrushchev and all Communist Party members believed that by the time of Stalin’s death the Soviet Union had ended capitalism and entered a new historical stage, the stage of socialism. Khrushchev believed that continued economic growth would lead to the next and final stage of human history: Communism. In 1962, Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Union would achieve Communism by 1980, at which stage housing, transport and food would all be available freely, and consumer goods would be cheap and widely available. Years of maximum danger The Cold War had a major impact on the Soviet economy. Initially, Khrushchev had hoped that the USA and the Soviet Union could compete peacefully. However, between 1958 and 1962 the two superpowers came to the brink of nuclear war on three occasions. The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 led to a stand-off between the USA and the Soviet Union in Asia. The Berlin Crisis of 1961 led to superpower conflict over Germany that was only ended by the erection of the Berlin Wall. Finally, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 led to a raised level of nuclear alert and predictions that the world was days away from nuclear apocalypse. The period between 1958 and 1962, which historian Gerard J. DeGroot describes as years of maximum danger, led Khrushchev to abandon his hopes of peaceful competition and falling military spending. Indeed, the repeated military stand-offs led to a sharp increase in military spending in the USA and the Soviet Union.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin64 Khrushchev’s optimistic plan, which he hoped would lay the foundation for the Soviet Union overtaking the USA by 1970 and building Communism by 1980, was based on a wave of optimism about Soviet economic and technical performance that took place in the late 1950s. This optimism was based on several factors: ● the apparent success of the Virgin Lands Scheme until 1958 ● continuing high rates of economic growth ● Soviet technica l success in the space race: the Soviet Union launched the f irst arti ficial satellite in 1957 and the satellite to the moon in 1959. These achievements suggested to Khrushchev that the Soviet economy was capable of strong rates of growth and technical sophistication. Success of the Plan Production of chemicals and consumer goods certainly increased between 1959 and 1965. However, the increases were not as significant as planners had hoped. There was a 60 per cent increase in the production of consumer goods (see Figure 7), 5 per cent below Khrushchev’s target. Fertiliser production increased by 19 million tons, 3.5 million tons short of the target, and synthetic fibre production also increased by 241,000 tons, around 200,000 tons below target. 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 1955 1966 Cars Radios Refrigerators Washing machines Sewing machines Television sets Figure 7: The increase in the availability of consumer goods in the Soviet Union, 1955–66 (ownership per thousand of the population). Problems with the Plan The Plan was undermined by Khrushchev’s continual economic reforms and by the nature of the Soviet economy. First, Khrushchev continually introduced economic re- organisation. The reforms were often counterproductive, or at least so short lived that they did not have time to work. ● The Februar y 1957 sovnarkhoz reforms decentralised power from Gosplan to 105 sovnarkhoz: regional planning agencies. The reforms hampered economic growth by destroying the central co-ordination of the Plan. Moreover, the decentralisation did not solve the problem that planners had too little information about the factories they were directing. ● Between 1958 and 1964 Khrushchev introduced increased centralisation in order to solve the problems created by the sovnarkhoz reforms. However, the responsibilities of the sovnarkhoz and the new central bodies were not clear, therefore there was confusion in the planning system. ● In February 1962 Khr ushchev divided the Party in two: one half of the Party was responsible for agriculture, one half for industry. These reforms were deeply unpopular and took place mid-way through the Seven- Year Plan. ● Khrushchev changed the targets of the Plan in 1962, setting more ambitious goals. Khrushchev’s continual meddling led to a joke that Khrushchev had replaced the Five-Year Plan not with a Seven-Year Plan, but with ‘three plans a year’. Secondly, the Soviet economy itself was not designed to produce consumer goods; the economy was designed to meet targets. Soviet factories produced thick sheet steel, for example, because it made it easier for the factor ies to meet their production targets: thick sheet steel weighed more than thin sheet steel and production targets were set in weights. However, light industry required th in sheet steel to turn into lamps and watches. The lighting industry also set targets in weight. Therefore factories produced light fittings that were too heavy to hang on walls or ceilings. Similarly, consumer industries were set targets for the value of the goods that they made. Therefore it made sense for factories to produce a small number of expensive goods rather than large quantities of cheap goods. As a result, Soviet furnitu re factories, for example, produced large expensive sofas that consumers could not afford in order to fulfi l the Plan. The fundamental problem with the command economy was that it focused on production rather than consumption. Indeed, planners had to guess at consumer needs. Thus, although the economy did have a greater focus on consumer goods after Sta lin’s death, the consumer goods that were produced were often useless, undesirable or unaffordable.
65Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 3 Economic reform and decline after 1964 The failure of Khrushchev’s reforms discredited the idea of reform at least until the end of the 1970s. Brezhnev and subsequent Soviet leaders even abandoned the word ‘reform’. Nonetheless, there were changes in priorities and small economic changes between Khrushchev’s fall in 1964 and Chernenko’s death in 1985. Note it down Using bullet points or the 1: 2 method (see page x), make notes on the following topics: ● policy change after 1964 ● economic success, 1964–85 ● economic decline, 1964–85 ● causes of Soviet economic decline. Make sure you note down enough detail to demonstrate both the extent of the success and the extent of the failure during this period. Restoration of the economy Khrushchev’s fall led to a rejection of many of his reforms: ● The Party was reunited; the division between the agricultura l and industrial sections was ended. ● Seven-Year Plans were abandoned. From 1966, the economy continued to fol low Five-Year Plans. In essence, Brezhnev was content to manage the system that Stalin had set up. Like Khrushchev, he too hoped to be able to provide more consumer goods. However, Brezhnev was far less ambitious than Khrushchev in terms of the quality and quantity of consumer goods he expected from the Soviet economy. The ‘Kosygin reforms’ Khrushchev’s successors continued the attempt to stimulate light industry. Kosygin (see page 34) advocated reforms that were designed to cut investment in the most inefficient collective farms and divert the money to light industry. Additionally, he proposed giving power over production to factory managers and judging their success not by production levels, but by the profit they made. This was designed to force factories to produce goods that consumers wanted. The ‘Kosygin reforms’ were introduced in January 1968, but ended in August. Similar reforms in Czechoslovakia had been part of a series of reforms that led to a Czechoslovakian rebellion against the Soviet Union. This rebellion discredited Kosygin’s programme, and therefore the reforms were halted in August. Authority was returned to central planners. Increased military investment Brezhnev increased military investment. His goal was to achieve parity with the USA in terms of their nuclear firepower. During the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 Khrushchev had been forced to back down because he knew that the USA had much larger nuclear arsenals and therefore could wipe out the Soviet Union in a nuclear war. Brezhnev wanted to achieve parity with the USA so that the Soviet Union would never be forced to back down by the USA again. Military spending increased from around 11 per cent of GDP in 1964 to 13 per cent in 1970. The policy was a success; nuclear parity was achieved by 1970. However, achieving and maintaining nuclear parity was a significant drain on the Soviet economy, which led to growing economic problems (see page 147). ‘Developed socialism’ Brezhnev dropped Khrushchev’s commitment to bui lding Communism by 1980. Slower economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s and increased military spending meant that there was no possibility of transformi ng the Soviet Union into a land of plenty. Nonetheless, Brezhnev argued that the Soviet Union should deliver a rising standard of livi ng for the majority, of its citizens. This meant abandoning Khrushchev’s promise of Communism by 1980 and replacing it with ‘developed socialism’: an economy in which there was job secur ity and low prices. Low food prices were achieved by importing large amounts of gra in from the West, rather than by expanding the Virgin La nds Scheme or by initiating economic reform. Second economy and the black market From 1928 and the beginning of Stalin’s economic transformation of the Soviet Union a black market developed in the Soviet Union. However, the black market remained relatively small due to Stalin’s willingness to punish black marketers with death or long-term imprisonment in labour camps. With the death of Stalin and more limited use of terror the black market grew. Consequently, after Stalin’s death it became known as a ‘second economy’ or ‘black economy’, indicating its scale.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin66 The second economy Brezhnev also accepted the second economy, or black economy, as a necessary evi l. Rather than trying to stamp out illegal trading Brezhnev allowed it to continue as it increased access to consumer goods and food, and therefore aided his goal of raising living standards. Andropov’s ‘reforms’, 1982–84 Andropov, like Brezhnev, refused to talk of reforms. However, his approach to the economy was important because, unlike Brezhnev, he was wil ling to admit that there were considerable economic problems that needed to be f ixed. Nonetheless, Andropov was not willing to change the fundamental nature of the economy. For Andropov, the key issue was labour discipline. To improve productivity he in itiated three campaigns: ● Anti-corruption campaign: In November 1982 Andropov investigated senior Party off icials and industrial managers who were using Soviet resources to make themselves rich. For example, Brezhnev’s Minister of the Interior Nikolai Shchelokov was sacked and put on trial for corruption. He took his own life before the end of his trial. ● Anti-alcohol campaign: Workers could be sacked for drunkenness and could be fined for damaging machinery or products if they were drunk at work. ● Operation Trawl, an anti-drunkenness and anti- absenteeism campaign: KGB officers visited parks, restaurants and train stations arresting people who were drunk or who were absent from work. Andropov’s campaigns did lead to a reduction in the consumption of traditional vodk a. However, the consumption of ‘Andropovka’, a lower-qua lity cheaper vodka, increased. Additionally, Andropov’s campaigns were poorly enforced and therefore drunkenne ss and poor discipline conti nued. Andropov’s reforms did not lead to the end of the Soviet Union, nor did they stop economic decline. Soviet economic decline Soviet economic decline became evident in the 1970s. However, its roots were much deeper. Fundamentally, neither Khrushchev’s reforms nor Brezhnev’s management were able to address the fundamental issues of the Soviet economy which led to its decline. Declining growth In 1945 the Soviet economy was the fastest growing economy in the world. Bet ween 1950 and 1958 the economy grew at a n average rate of 7.1 per cent a year. The USA, by contrast grew by an average of about 2.9 per cent a year during the same period. Therefore the Soviet economy seemed to be outperforming the US economy. However, Soviet growth rates declined to an average of 5.3 per cent between 1958 and 1964 and to around 2 per cent in the 1970s. This shift ref lected some of the fundamental problems in the Soviet economy. In general terms, the command economy was good at producing ‘extensive growth’: growth that was based on building new factories, workshops or opening new mines. However, it was unable to create ‘intensive growth’: growth that is based on improving the eff iciency of existing factories, workshops or mines. Intensive growth relies on good information about how individual factories work. Central planning agencies, even at a regional level did not have the information to improve the efficiency of individual factories. The problems with central planning meant that the Soviet system was never able to conquer the inefficiencies that had emerged in the system in the 1930s. The impact of oil prices One of the features of t he Soviet economy in the 1970s was declining growth and yet rising standards of living. The general rise in the international price of oil in the early 1970s masked the problems of the Soviet economy. Risin g prices ensured t he Soviet Union could make more money from selling oil. Oil production increased from 243 million tons in 1965 to 603 million tons in 1980 in order to supply international demand. This allowed the Soviet economy to keep importing grain from the West. Additionally, the Soviet Government was able to borrow money from Western governments based on their income from oil. As a result, standards of living continued to improve in spite of lower growth rates. The Soviet economy, 1964–85 Economic reforms after 1964 were minor. In essence, Brezhnev accepted the Soviet economy as it was, and rather than try to improve the economy he attempted to lower expectations. Andropov’s reforms did try to address the problem of Soviet economic decline that had become evident in the 1970s. Nonetheless, he too remained committed to the essential features of the system: central planning of industry and collectivisation of agriculture.
67Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 Conclusion Between 1953 and 1985 the successive leaders failed to solve the economic problems of the Soviet economy. Khrushchev and Brezhnev both had some success in raising the standard of living. But Soviet citizens still had less to eat and fewer consumer comforts than citizens of the USA or Western Europe. The golden age of the 1950s, with high levels of economic growth, large har vests, declining defence spending and technical successes in the space race, gave way to a period of economic stagnation from 1964 to 1985. During this period growth rates declined, military spending increased and the government was forced to import large amounts of grain to feed its own citizens. Inefficiencies in the economy were never solved. Khrushchev’s reforms were largely counterproductive, and Brezhnev’s economic management did nothing to stop the decline. However, while oil prices remained high, Brezhnev was able to allow growth rates to fa ll and still see a gradual rise in the standard of living. In short, the Soviet Union remained a dysfunctional economic giant that was able to produce a massive nuclear arsenal but was unable to grow enough food to feed its own people. Politics: Lenin’s single-party state Economics: Stalin’s Great Turn: • Centrally planned industry • Collectivisation of agriculture Reform: Khrushchev's attempts to perfect the Soviet System: • Political de-Stalinisation • Economic modernisation Stagnation: Brezhnev attempts to manage the existing system without major reform 1954–85: Maintenance – Soviet leaders try to mai ntain the system first by reform, later by continuing the same policies as previous leaders 1917–1953: Foundations – Lenin and Stalin lay the political and economic foundations of the Soviet system Summary diagram: Changing economic priorities, 1953–85. Work together Using your notes from this chapter and previous chapters, discuss with a partner which of the Soviet leaders was most successful in the period 1917–82. In order to do this draw four spider diagrams on a sheet of paper – one for each of the major leaders in this period. Make notes on each diagram about the political and economic success of each leader. Having completed the diagrams, discuss which was the most successful. Remember you will have to consider what ‘success’ means in this context. Moreover, ‘success’ may not have meant the same for each leader. Having done this write a paragraph together evaluating the success of the four leaders. The paragraph should contain the following features: ● an opening sentence that clearly indicates which leader was most successful ● details of the leader’s successes ● comparisons to all three other leaders ● a criterion for success ● a concluding sentence that explains why one leader, rather than the others, was the most successful. Chapter summary ● Economic policy under Stalin’s successors essentially went through two phases: — reform, 1954–64 — restoration, 1964–85. ● The economic policy failed to solve the fundamental problems of the economy. ● As a result growth rates slowed and by the mid-1970s the economy had begun to stagnate. Recommended reading E. Bacon and M. Sandle (eds.), Brezhnev Reconsidered (Palgrave McMillan, 2002), pages 38-67. Bacon and Sandle consider the nature of the Soviet economy under Brezhnev. R.G. Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia Volume III (Cambridge, 2006), pages 278-280. Suny analyses the successes and failures of Khrushchev’s economic policy. W. Taubman, S. Khrushchev, and A. Gleason (eds.), Nikita Khrushchev (Yale University Press, 2000), pages 138-159. Taubman, Khrushchev and Gleason consider Khrushchev’s economic policy in the context of his wider vision of Soviet society.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin68 Essay technique: Overall judgement In addition to focus and structure (see page 26–27), the level of relevant detail (see page 39) and analysis (see page 59), your exam essays will be assessed on how far you reach a supported overall judgement. The clearer and better supported your judgement, the better your mark is likely to be. The mark scheme distinguishes between five levels of judgement. (This is a summary – the full mark scheme can be found on Edexcel’s website.) Level 1 No overall judgement. Level 2 Stated overall judgement, but no support. Level 3 Overall judgement is reached, with weak support. Level 4 Overall judgement is reached, and supported. Level 5 (HIGH) Overall judgement is reached, and supported by consideration of the relative significance of key factors. This section looks at reaching and supporting an overall judgement. Dealing with the relative significance of key factors is discussed at the end of Chapter 4c (see page 142–143). Reaching an overall judgement The conclusion of your essay should reach an overall judgement. This judgement should reflect the overall argument of your essay. Imagine you are answering the following question: How far did the economic priorities of the Russian Government change in the period 1928–64? Your essay plan might look like this: • Paragraph 1: Key priority: industry • Paragraph 2: Preparation for war • Paragraph 3: Consumer goods • Paragraph 4: Economic innovation Your essay might argue that in the period 1928–64 the Russian Government’s key priority was always industry. However, the government’s focus on other prior ities such as war, consumer goods and innovation, changed. This argument should be reflected in your overall judgement. Therefore your conclusion might look like the one below: In conclusion, the main economic priority of the Russian Government changed very little in the period 1928–64. However, other aspects of economic policy changed more significantly. Establishes that you are reaching your overall judgement. The words of the question are used to answer the question – ensuring a clear focus. The judgemen t distinguishes between ‘the main economic priorities’ and ‘other aspects’ and therefore creates a sophisticated and balanced judgement. This is a good start, because an overall judgement has been reached that reflects the argument of the essay. But so far the overall judgement only has weak support.
69Theme 2 Industrial and agricultural change, 1917–85 Supporting your overall judgement In order to reach the higher levels it is important to support your overall judgement. This can be achieved by backing up your judgement with a summary of the key points of your essay. For example, the overall judgement you have just read could be improved by adding the following summaries of your argument: Activity: Writing an overall judgement Here is a plan in answer to the question: How successfully did Soviet economic policy meet its aims in the years 1928–85? • Paragraph 1: Military – very successful • Paragraph 2: Heavy industry – broadly successful • Paragraph 3: Consumer goods – moderately successful • Paragraph 4: Agriculture – partially successful Using your notes: ● Write two summary sentences that state an overall judgement about how far Soviet economic policy succeeded in meeting its aim. ● Support these with a summary overview of the successes and failures. ● Write a final sentence that summarises your judgement. In conclusion, the main economic priority of the Russian Government changed very little in the period 1928–64. Indeed, Stalin and Khrushchev both agreed that industrialisation was an essential part of socialism. Therefore the Five-Year Plans and Seven-Year Plan reflect a continuing commitment to building industry in the USSR. However, other aspects of economic policy changed more significantly. For example, there was little focus on rearmament before 1936, and consumer goods were less important to Stalin than they were under Khrushchev. Therefore, in spite of changing policies, it is clear that economic priorities of the Russian Government were broadly consistent, although the shifting focus on rearmament and consumer goods indicates that there was some change in the period 1928–64. This summary suppor ts the judgement about the main economic priority. This summary suppor ts the judgement about other aspects of t he economy. The final sentence provide s a summary overall judgement. This conclusion is an example of high-level work because it reaches an overall judgement and supports it with material that reflects the rest of the essay.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin70 The Big Picture Lenin’s one-party state gave the Communists control of the government, and Stalin’s policies of collectivisation and central industrial planning gave him control of the economy. However, Communist leaders aspired to even greater levels of control. The Communist project was not simply to remake politics and economics. Communists dreamed of remaking humanity, of replacing Homo sapiens with Homo Sovieticus: Soviet man. This new kind of human being would live for the good of the whole of society having been purged of selfish ambition. The total transformation of humanity required total control – control of the media, control of religion, control of art, and control of human behaviour through the use of a terroristic secret police. The extent to which the different Soviet leaders achieved total control, or even tried to achieve total control, varied. Lenin’s government, for example, worked with radical artists rather than i mposing its own artistic vision. Stalin’s government, particularly in the late 1930s, was broadly successful at controlling the whole of Soviet life and has therefore been described as totalitarian by some historians. However, even under Stalin there were spontaneous initiatives from below that Stalin did not control. Khrushchev and Brezhnev abandoned the use of widespread terror and were prepared to tolerate some degree of independence on the part of Soviet citizens. TIMELINE 1917 October Decree on Land 1917 November Decree on the Press 1917 December Cheka established 1918 January Decree Concerning Separation of Church and State 1918 January First photograph of Lenin published 1920 Department of Agitation Propaganda (Agitprop) set up 1920 Commissar of Enlightenment established Glavpolitprosvet 1922 Glavlit, a new organisation which oversaw a more systematic censorship regime, introduced 1932 Union of Soviet Writers established 1934 Yagoda appointed head of the NKVD 1938 Beria became the head of the NKVD 1938 Two histories of the Communist Party, both edited by Stalin, published 1949 Leningrad Affair 1953 Beria arrested and executed 1954 Doctor Zhivago refused publication in the Soviet Union 1966 Sinyavsky-Daniel trial 1967 Yuri Andropov promoted to head of the KGB 1968 Prague Spring 1968 Sakharov circulated his essay, Reflections on Progress, criticising the Soviet Union’s stance on human rights 1973 Solzhenitsyn forced into exile 1975 Helsinki Agreement on human rights Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 In this theme you will consider the following: ➜ Soviet control of the media, use of propaganda and suppression of religion ➜ The secret police: its changing role under Yagoda, Yezhov, Beria and Andropov ➜ Communism and cultural change: the avant-garde, Socialist Realism, non- conformity and dissident artists.
71Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 3a: Media, propaganda and religion Overview In 1917 Lenin seized power in the name of the Russian workers. He wanted to end capitalism and exploitation. However, he had little time for what he considered ‘bourgeois freedoms’, such as freedom of the press or freedom of religion. Therefore in the extraordinary situation of the revolution and the Civil War he permitted press censorship and the persecution of religion. By 1921 it was clear that the Communists had won the war, but they had not won the hearts of the people. Therefore censorship and religious persecution, which had been introduced as temporary measures, became permanent features of Soviet rule, at least until Stalin’s death in 1953. Nonetheless, the government’s approach to both issues changed over time. There was more press freedom for ordinary people under Khrushchev and Brezhnev than there had been in earlier years, and the government’s policy on religion swayed between repression and toleration as leaders came and went. Even though Communists rejected religion, they understood its power. Stalin and Felix Dzerzhinsky (see page 83), for example, had considered becoming priests, and many of the leaders had religious upbringings. Therefore senior Communists often used religious language and imagery. On a deeper level, senior Communists believed that ordinary Soviet citizens were not well educated enough to understand the truths of Mar xism. Consequently, they developed art, culture, political rituals and even political cults which used religious imagery in order to appeal to ordinary people in a way that the leaders believed would help them embrace the government. Cults of personality, first of Stalin and Lenin, then of Khrushchev and finally of Brezhnev, were designed, in part, to give the Soviet people an alternative to religion. They also helped foster support for the regime. This chapter considers: 1 State control of mass media and propaganda 2 Personality cults 3 Communism and religion. 1 State control of mass media and propaganda Lenin viewed the press and the media as central to advancing the revolution and ensuring the Communists retained power. Prior to the revolution Lenin had announced his intention to close down ‘bourgeois newspapers’. However, this was only part of the revolutionary strategy. Lenin believed that revolutionary success required control of all communications in Russia. The new government established control of the press and media by: ● announcing the Decree on the Press in November 1917, which gave the government the emergency powers to close any newspapers which supported a counter- revolution ● creating a state monopoly of advertising in November 1917, which ensured that only the government could publish adverts ● nationalising the Petrograd Telegraph Agency in November 1917, which gave the new government control of electronic means of communication ● establishing a Revolutionary Tribunal of the Press in January 1918, with the power to censor the press; journa lists and editors who committed ‘crimes agai nst the people’ could be punished by the Cheka (see page 10), who were empowered to impose fines or prison sentences, confiscate property or exile offending wr iters ● establishing the All-Russia Telegraph Agency (ROSTA), which was solely responsible for distributing news. Initially, Lenin closed down papers that supported the Tsar or the Provisional Government. However, by mid-1918 he had outlawed opposition socialist papers as well. By 1921 the Communists had closed 2000 newspapers and 575 printing presses. Control of the press was also aided by the economic controls introduced under War Communism, as they allowed the government to control all printing presses and stocks of paper. As a result of these policies Pravda, the newspaper of the Communist Party, gained a much higher circulation, and by the early 1920’s it was one of the best selling publications in the Soviet Union. Communist control of Sovnarkum also gave them control over the official newspaper of the Soviets, Izvestia.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin72 Note it down On a large sheet of paper, draw a timeline of the period 1917–85. Next divide it into periods that correspond to the rule of the different leaders. Make notes on Communist control of the media from 1917 to 1985. Use different coloured pens to distinguish aspects of policy that change and aspects of policy that stay the same. Early propaganda Propaganda was as important to Lenin as censorship. Early propaganda took various forms. The initial cult of Lenin Initially, the Communist regi me was quite pluralistic. Equally, before 1928 there was a relatively high degree of debate and disagreement about how Communist principles should be put into practice. This pluralism was reflected in the kind of propaganda that was produced in the first years of the revolution. Significantly, Lenin did not approve of all of the images, or approaches used by those working for the new government. The cult of Lenin was one example of a type of propaganda that emerged early in the regime that Lenin did not approve of. Pictures of Lenin were a form of propaganda used to promote the government from the beginning of 1918. January 1918 saw the publication of the first photograph of Lenin. The focus on Lenin increased in August. Following an assassination attempt, Lenin was described in essentially religious terms. His survival was described as ‘miraculous’, and the emphasis on his willingness to suffer and sacrifice his life for his people made Lenin into a modern day Christ. The cult flourished, in spite of Lenin’s disapproval. Many senior Communists believed that ordinary workers and peasants needed a very simple message that they could understand. Others believed that the Communists should use techniques similar to those used by the Orthodox Church and the Tsar to support the new regime. These included a focus on a good and kind leader. In 1919, during the Civil War, even though resources were scarce, busts and statues of Lenin were produced. Lenin’s photograph also appeared with various titles, such as ‘Leader of the Revolutionary Proletariat’. Significantly, the new cult had a socialist edge. During 1919 and 1920, a new style of writing about Lenin emerged. Increasingly, Lenin was depicted as being humane, a man of the people, a man who refused luxury, a visionary and a man of great power. At the same time, from 1919 Lenin was often photographed wearing a cap, as the cap implied that Lenin was approachable and down to earth. Lenin was aware of these trends and was uncomfortable with them, but he understood their importance and therefore allowed the cult to grow. The media and propaganda focus on Lenin gave the revolution and the Communist Party a face, someone the Russian people could identify with and support. A spectre is haunting Europe, 1920. How does the poster reflect the goals and values of Communism?
73Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 Karl Marx and Communist propaganda Communist propaganda made use of Marx and his works in a variety of ways. For example, Communists took phrases from Marx’s work and incorporated them into posters. The phrase ‘A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of Communism’, for example, comes from the Communist Manifesto. Marx’s face was also used in posters, often in a line with the faces of Lenin and Stalin, implying that Lenin and Stalin were his revolutionary heirs. Cartoons and photomontage In the first years of the revolution, the government collaborated with avant-garde artists to produce posters promoting the revolution (see page 72). Many of these featured Lenin. ‘A Spectre is Haunting Europe – the Spectre of Communism’ was one early poster which showed a grim and determined Lenin standing in front of a red banner pointing to the west. Gustav Klutsis used photomontage to create posters advertising Lenin’s electrif ication plan, which was unveiled on his fiftieth birthday. Media and the NEP Lenin’s initial press censorship regime continued throughout the Civil War. Military victory did not, however, lead to increased press freedom. Rather, in 1922, Felix Dzerzhinsky, leader of the Soviet political police (see page 83), introduced Glavlit, a new organisation which oversaw a more systematic censorship regime. Glavlit ’s censorship worked on the following principles: ● The GPU was put in charge of policing every publication available in the Soviet Union. ● New professional censors were employed. ● All books were investigated for anti-Communist bias. ● The GPU compiled a list of banned books. As a result of Glavlit ’s work, Soviet libraries were purged of politically dangerous books. New special holding libraries, or ‘book Gulags’, were set up to house the banned books. Access was restricted to senior Party members. Stalin’s media Under Stalin, censorship was tightened still further. In the mid-1930s the works of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky and other leading revolutionaries from the 1920s had to be purged from Soviet libraries. Lenin’s own works were ‘edited’ to remove complimentary statements about Stalin’s opponents. Even Stalin’s works were edited to remove any indication that he had once been close to those he purged. Soviet history was rewritten, too, to remove the contributions of Stalin’s opponents and to emphasise Stalin’s role in the revolution (see page 75). From 1928, Glavlit controlled access to economic data. Additionally, restrictions were placed on all kinds of ‘bad news’. The Soviet medi a were forbidden from publishing stories about natural disasters, suicides, industrial accidents or even bad weather in order to create the impression that the Soviet Union was a place i n which good thing s happened. Those bad news stories that did get reported were attributed to the work of saboteurs. Stali n was given the credit for all the achievements of the regime. Propaganda in the Stalin period focused on the leader. The cult of Stalin tur ned him into a semi-divine figure, whose unique vision and unique wisdom would lead the nation to socialism. Propaganda also focused on archetypal Soviet workers. Socialist Realist art (see pages 99–100), including sculptures such as ‘The Worker and the Collective Farm Woman’ (1937), depicted Soviet people as muscu lar, heroic, dedicated and beautiful, the perfect embodiment of the society that Stali n was trying to build. Growing media pluralism Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev the media changed. As part of their attempts to create a new consumer society magazines proliferated, as did radios and television sets. Consumer magazines Popular ma gazines changed the Soviet media in the 1950s and 1960s. As part of the drive to create a consumer society, magazines were encouraged to publish readers’ letters. However, rather than praising the achievements of socialism, readers’ letters often exposed long-term problems with Soviet society. In consumer magazines, readers complained about the quality and scarcity of consumer goods. Letters to women’s magazines, like Rabotnitsa (the Woman Worker), exposed more profound problems. Readers complained about male alcoholism, inequalities in the home relating to childcare and housework, as well as domestic violence. Rather than suppressing the letters, Khr ushchev’s media responded with its own campaigns against worthless men. Instead of focusing on the domestic failure of men, they focused on male hypocrisy and lack of devotion to Communism. Cartoons in Krokodil, a satirical maga zine, poked fun at men who arrived at parades drun k, late or not at all.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin74 Soviet cinema and television Soviet cinema also changed under Khrushchev as part of a broader cultura l ‘thaw’, or liberalis ation (see page 100). Many of the films of this era focused on traditional themes such as the Soviet victor y in the Second World War or the Communist victory in the Civil War. Yet, rather than focusing on the contribution of Stalin, films such as The Forty-First (1956), The Cranes are Flying (1957) and Ballad of a Soldier (1959) focused on the role played by ordinary people. Television also took off in Khrushchev’s last years. Between 1960 and 1964 Soviet television was broadly successful in supporting the regime. First, it played a major role in celebrating the Soviet Union’s triumphs in the space race. In 1961 millions of viewers watched a five- hour programme celebrating Yuri Gagari n’s space f light. Similar shows in 1963 focused on Valentina Tereshkova, the first woman in space. Television coverage stressed her ordinariness: she was born on a collective farm and then became a textile worker in a Soviet factory. Also in 1961, Soviet television broadcast the nation’s first television news show, Estafeta Novosteo (News and Mail). The programme contained regular features about model workers on farms and in factories as part of Khrushchev’s drive to increase labour productivity. Under Brezhnev film and television culture changed. There were traditional elements such as films celebrating Soviet victory in the Second World War (see page 105). However, during the same period there were more films dealing with working people and their daily lives. Significantly Soviet film makers tended to focus on fashionable citizens living in luxurious apartments. In so doing they stoked public desire for consumer goods and fashion. Brezhnev attempted to use television to his advantage. In some ways this was successful. For example, the Soviet Government was able to keep tight control of the footage of the war in Afghan istan, and in so doing could keep the truth about the scale and horrors of the war hidden. Soviet off icials also ensured that Brezhnev’s speeches were transmitted in f ull, and t hat he was at the centre of a great deal of domestic media coverage. However, by the late 1970s this tactic backfired. The cameras showed a man who was clearly physically and mentally incapacitated, who struggled to make speeches, became confused mid-sentence and had diff iculty walking. Television coverage of Brezhnev continued until the last week of his life; his last television appearance shows him str uggling to walk up the steps of the Lenin Mausoleum. Television voice-overs praised Brezhnev, but viewers could see his physical and mental decline for themselves. Soviet War in Afghanistan The Soviet War in Afghanis tan lasted from December 1979 to February 1989. The Soviet Union intervened to aid a pro-Soviet government at the outbreak of a civil war. China, Pakistan, Britain and the USA provided support for insurgent forces. The war dragged on for almost a decade. During that time, mounting losses and the seemingly endless nature of the war led many Soviet citizens to lose faith in the war and in their government. The war is sometimes called the ‘Soviet Union’s Vietnam War’ due to its impact on the prestige of the nation. Under Brezhnev, Soviet leaders a lso lost control of the print media. T he KGB continued to police political publications, particula rly the work of dissidents (see page 104). However, Western magazines became increasingly available in Soviet cities as part of the second economy. These tended to be consumer magazi nes such as Vogue. While not overtly political , these magazines under mined faith in the Soviet system by showing the quality of Western goods and the luxur y of Western life styles. Conclusion Control of the media was an essential par t of Lenin’s vision for consolidating power. For many years Soviet media control was extremely ef fective. The Soviet media turned Len in into the f irst hero of the revolution and a man t hat people could identify with. Under Stalin , propaganda focused on the Sov iet Union’s god- like leader and his heroic nation of per fect workers. However, with the advent of consumerism and increasing emphasis on consu mer choice, the system changed. Consumer choice led to increased magazine circulat ion, the availability of television sets and even a black market in Western magazines. All of these changed the nature of t he media. Under Khrushchev there was an increasing emphasis on ordin ary people. Television showed ordinar y people who h ad travelled into space, ordinar y people who worked well on collective farms, while magazines carried letters about ordinar y people’s lives, and fil ms focused on ordinary people who fought in the Second World War. Finally, television exposed Brezhnev’s frai lty and Western magazi nes revealed the gap between the r ich West and the relatively poor Soviet Union, trends w
75Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 2 Personality cults Between 1918 and 1924 the Soviet media had created a cult of Lenin’s personality. It led to public trust in Lenin, and Soviet leaders appealed to Lenin’s legacy throughout the 1920s in an attempt to legitimise their actions and keep the Soviet Government stable. Stalin’s emergence as leader led to a new cult of personality, which projected Stalin as a second Lenin, ‘the Lenin of today’. The cult served a similar purpose: media techniques turned Stalin into the face of the regime, a person the Soviet people could have complete faith in. Propaganda turned Stalin into a n all-powerful, infallible semi-divine fig ure, the Soviet people’s ‘leader, teacher and fr iend’. De-Stalinisation led to a rejection of Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’. Even so, Khrushchev and Brezhnev both became the subjects of personality cults. Personality cults after 1953 were much smaller affairs. Khrushchev’s was dogged by failure and Brezhnev’s inspired cynicism rather than respect. The cult of Stalin The cult of Stalin was much more extensive than the cult of Lenin (see page 72). It also required more elaborate techniques in order to make the past fit with the myth created around Stalin. The purpose of the cult Stalin’s cult, like Lenin’s before it, served a specific political purpose. First, it emphasised Stalin’s legitimacy to take over leadership of the Party. Stalin was fit to rule because he was carrying on Lenin’s work and because he was a heroic genius. Equally, the cult created a figure that Soviet citizens could trust, respect and even worship. Moreover, dissatisfaction with daily life could be blamed on local leaders while citizens could trust Stalin to make a better future. Note it down On a large sheet of paper draw three spider diagrams, one for each of the leaders covered in this section. On each make notes about the nature of the personality cult and the ways in which it helped support the regime. The last two personality cults were less effective than the cult of Stalin. Using a different coloured pen, make notes on the ways in which the cult of Khrushchev and the cult of Brezhnev undermined the regime. The Myth of Two Leaders Stalin’s cult was bound up in the ‘Myth of Two Leaders’. This myth led Soviet people to believe that the October Revolution, victory in the Civil War and the foundation of the Soviet Union had been masterminded by a duumvirate consisting of Lenin and Stalin. The myth required Soviet history to be extensively rewritten, to place Stalin at the centre of events and to remove Trotsky and other leaders from the story. This was achieved by: ● the publication in 1938 of two histories of the Communist Party, both edited by Stalin ● Socialist Realist paintings which were created showing Stalin working closely with Lenin ● altering photographs – Trotsky and other former leaders were taken out of pictures with Lenin. Lenin’s heir As well as recreating the past, the cult of Stalin implied that Stalin was continui ng on the path created by Lenin. Painters used a variety of tech niques to show that Stalin wa s Lenin’s true heir. Grigor y Shegal’s Leader, Teacher, Friend shows Stalin standing immediately in front of a bust of Len in. Gustav Klutsis’ photomontages use a different techn ique. They show a row of figures running from Marx, through Lenin to Stalin, implying that Stalin is the latest in a tradition of revolutionary leaders. The vozhd The cult of Stalin also turned Stalin into an infallible and celebrated figure. He was routinely known as ‘the vozhd’, which simply means leader. The term is significant, because unlike words like President or Prime Min ister, vozhd has no legal significance. Therefore while the powers of a President or a Prime Minister are limited by law, the powers of the vozhd have no obvious limit. Pravda and other Communist newspapers praised the vozhd ’s wisdom daily. Stalin’s birthday became a national celebration with parades. Generalissimo The Stalin Cult changed following the Second World War. From 1945, Stalin’s role as Generali ssimo, or war leader, became the focus of much Soviet propaganda. While Stalin preferred the title Marshal to Generalissimo, both titles ref lected an increasing emphasis on Stalin as a mil itary f igure. Before the Second World War Stalin was presented as a revolutionary and a thinker. However, as Generalissimo he was presented as a militar y genius, as the man who
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin76 defeated Hitler and as the saviour of the nation. This change in presentation was accompanied by a change in the way Stalin was depicted in pictures. Up until 1945 Stalin tended to be pictured wearing blue-grey or g reen military tops. However, in his last years he tended to be painted wearing a white uniform. Stalin designed the uniform himself and the militar y rank of Generalissimo was created specif ically for Stalin. Cults of personality under Khrushchev After Stalin’s death cults of personality were less grand. Khrushchev criticised Stalin’s cult, but established two of his own. First, Khrushchev revived the cult of Lenin. However, whereas the cult of Len in in the 1930s had stressed Leni n’s death, the cult of Leni n in the 1950s was based on the slogan ‘Lenin l ives!’ Under Khrushchev, Lenin was depicted as fun, approachable, humane, a person who loved children, fami ly and lived a simple life. In many ways Khrushchev’s Lenin resembled Khrushchev himself. The purpose of the cult was to move away from Stalinism. For Khrushchev, this meant rediscovering Leninism. It also reminded Soviet citizens that the government was founded on Leni n’s revolution rather than Stalin’s terror. Secondly, by 1958 Khrushchev had a personality cult of his own. According to Soviet propaganda Khrushchev was: ● a disciple of Lenin who was completing the journey that Lenin had started ● responsible for new successes such as the Soviet space programme and rising harvests in the Virgin Lands ● a respected statesma n who negotiated with the US President as an equal ● a hero of the Second World War ● an authority on literature, art, science, industry and agriculture ● the great reformer who was perfecting the Soviet system. The Khr ushchev Cult became more problematic in the early 1960s. By associating h imself so strongly with the success of the Virgin Lands Scheme, he was seriously damaged by its failure. The claim to experti se became less credible following the disastrous results of his Corn Campaign. His embarrassing foreign policy climb- downs (see page 33) and his fai lure to deliver on his wildly optim istic promises about out-producing the USA led to a collapse in con fidence in K hrushchev’s fitness to govern. The Cult of Brezhnev Brezhnev’s personality cult was a shadow of Stalin’s. Brezhnev adopted a cult of personality for pragmatic reasons. By 1964, a cult of the leader was well established as an essential feature of Soviet politics. Brezhnev decided to adopt a leadership cult to consolidate his position and help stabilise the regime. The Brezhnev Cult had four key aspects. According to Soviet propaganda Brezhnev was ideally suited to rule because he was: ● a great Leninist: Brezhnev had not known Lenin, but he claimed to be continuing the work started by Lenin, particularly working for world peace ● a military hero: Brezhnev attempted to present himself as a military leader and off icial publications stressed his military prowess in the Second World War; he was promoted to the position of Marshal of the Red Army and received 60 medals ● dedicated to ensuring world peace: Brezhnev stressed his foreign policy successes in developing détente with the USA ● a true man of the people: Brezhnev biographies told of his humble origins and how he worked as an engineer in the steel industry. Brezhnev constructed his image th rough a series of public festivals mark ing important ann iversaries, such as the f iftieth ann iversary of the October Revolution in 1967, the twentieth and thirtieth anniversaries of the victor y in the Second World War in 1965 and 1975, and Brezhnev’s major birthdays. Speeches by Brezhnev dominated these occasions, and photographs of the leader were an important part of the press coverage of the celebrations. However, the Brezhnev Cult was counterproductive. Brezhnev was mocked for his claims to greatness. Veterans of the Second World War resented the inf lation of Brezhnev’s role in the war. Young people, aware of the size of the Soviet milita ry, were not taken in by his clai ms to be an advocate of peace. Also the lavish The Cult of Impersonality Khrushchev described the Stalin cult as a cult of personality. Stalin’s biographer, Robert Service, argues that it is better understood as a Cult of Impersonality. The cult, he argues, gave very little away about Stalin’s history and character. Rather, the Stalin Cult centred on the successes of the Soviet regime. Stalin was regularly photographed with heroes of the Soviet air force and Russian explorers who had returned from the North and South Poles. In this sense, the Stalin Cult associated Stalin with the heroic side of the regime, rather than focusing on Stalin as an individual.
77Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 and luxurious lifestyle of Brezhnev’s family undercut the claim s that he was a m an of the people. Brezhnev’s Cult was simply not plausible. Whereas Stali n had been respected and feared, Brezhnev became the butt of numerous jokes that focused on his vanity and his hollow claims. Whereas Stalin’s cult inspired loyalty and respect, the Brezhnev Cult inspired cynicism. Conclusion In the early years of the regime the cult of Lenin had been an important factor in winning and retaining power. While the Lenin Cult had helped the Party control the Soviet Union, the Stalin Cult helped Stalin gain control of the Party a nd the country. In that sense, the cult of Stalin was a method of creating and sustaining personal rule. Later cults were much less impressive. Stalin had ensured that the gap between the myth and reality was never exposed. Khrushchev was caught out by claimi ng credit for policies that later became public failures. Brezhnev’s Cult was implausible from the beginning. Whereas people had believed that Stalin was an all- conquering genius, the Soviet people were not taken in by Brezhnev’s military awards. 3 Communism and religion The Communist regime’s attitude to religion changed over time. Lenin and Khrushchev, for example, were dedicated to the destruction of religion for ideological reasons. Stali n was more pragmatic, at least from 1941, and Brezhnev was prepared to rethink the relationship between Communism and Islam. Marxism and religion Lenin, and most Marxist revolutionaries of his generation, believed that Marx was an enemy of religion. Marx famously claimed that religion was the ‘opium of the masses’. Therefore Lenin and other Marxist radicals believed that their revolution would liberate working people from capitalist exploitation and from the delusions of religion. Note it down On a large sheet of paper draw a timeline of the period 1917 to 1985. Next divide it into periods that correspond to the rule of the different leaders. Make notes on Communist religious policy from 1917 to 1985. Use different coloured pens to distinguish aspects of policy that changed and aspects of policy that stayed the same. Lenin was also critical of the Russian Orthodox Church, the dominant organised religion in Russia. For Lenin, the Russian Orthodox Church was an essential ally of the Tsar. Moreover, the Church was an extremely rich institution, and some Russian Orthodox priests led lives of immense privilege while working people were poor. Finally, the new Communist Government was suspicious of organised religion for two reasons: ● Because religions stood for values that were sometimes opposed to Communist values ● Because religious groups were organisations that were independent of the Communist Government and therefore could organise in opposition to the government. For these reasons, successive Communist governments tended to persecute the Russian Orthodox Church as well as other faiths, including Islam. Religious groups in the Soviet Union The Soviet Union was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious nation with large religious minority groups. There were sizeable Muslim communities in Central Asia, the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. Lithuania had a large Roman Catholic Community and there was a significant Baptist minority in the Ukraine. Soviet leaders approached different groups in different ways. Moreover, religious policies changed as the leadership changed and as government policies shifted. Early campaign Lenin’s early religious policies reflected two different motives. The first Communist laws reflected a commitment to legal equality of all people regardless of their beliefs. However, at the same time there was a terror campaign against the Orthodox Church. Legal reforms In the first months of the revolution, Lenin introduced a series of decrees that def ined the relationship of the government and religion: ● The October 1917 Decree on Land gave peasants the right to seize land belonging to the Church. ● The January 1918 Decree Concerning Separation of Church and State, and of School and Church meant the Church lost its privileged position in society. Church land, buildings a nd property were nationalised, state subsidies for the Church were ended, and religious education was banned in schools. ● The 1922 Soviet Constitution guaranteed freedom of conscience for all Soviet people.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin78 In practice, religious freedom, which had been guaranteed after the February Revolution, was seriously compromised by Lenin’s measures. Although the right existed in law, Soviet courts lacked the power to force the government to obey the law or respect citizens’ legal rights. The Church and the terror Lenin was convinced that the Church was an enemy of the revolution, and therefore he used terror to try to undermine the Church. In the first year of the revolution senior priests in the Orthodox Church were terrorised: ● In November 1917 Archpriest Ivan Kochurov was murdered outside Petrograd. ● In Januar y 1918 Metropolitan Vladimir was tortured and shot in Kiev. ● Orthodox priests in Moscow were massacred in January following a Church decree excommunicating the Bolsheviks. More extreme measures were sanctioned in November 1918 when the Politburo issued a secret order to the Cheka sanctioning the mass execution of priests. Within two years most of the most popular Orthodox priests had been killed. Roman Catholic priests were treated differently because they had traditionally been a persecuted minority rather than part of the Church that backed the Tsar. In the first half of 1918 they were deported and executions only started when the Civil War began. In addition to executions and deportations, the new government also used propaganda against the Church and seized Church property. These two policies operated together during the 1921 famine. Soviet authorities seized Church assets to fund famine relief and blamed priests who resisted for sabotaging relief efforts. The government’s policy regarding Islam was contradictory. Initially Communist forces used the Decree Concerning Separation of Church and State to justify seizing the property of waqfs – Islamic foundations and charities. However, this policy was quickly reversed, waqfs continued to fund schools in Muslim areas and the Communist leaders encouraged local Muslims to join the Party. Communists were less antagonistic towards Islam than Russian Orthodox Christianity because there had been no official link between Islam and Tsarism. Religion in the 1920s Communist policy regarding religion changed after the Civil War. Mass executions, violence and deportations stopped. They were replaced by more subtle techniques. The new strategy emerged in 1921 and early 1922. The Living Church One strategy used against the Orthodox Church was the establishment of the Living Church. The Living Church claimed to be a reformed version of the old Orthodox Church in which ordinary people had power. The Living Church, aided by the GPU, organised a national congress in April 1923 which deposed Patriarch Tikhon and introduced a new decentralised structure. This was part of a government-backed strategy to split the Church, take away its central leader and weaken its national structure. However, the leader of the Living Church, Archbishop Vedenskii, was not prepared to support the Communists. In 1923 he publicly debated science and religion with Anatoly Lunacharsky (see page 95–96), gaining widespread support for his argument that science could not disprove the existence of God. Public debates proved counterproductive and therefore in 1925 the Central Committee stopped public debates with the Church. Their policy of splitting the Church by backing the Living Church was more successful, but the Church split did not diminish Church growth, nor faith in saints and miracles which continued through the 1920s. Islam During the 1920s Soviet authorities initiated campaigns against Islam ic groups. Communists objected to Islam for two main reasons. First, they claimed that Islam encouraged ‘crimes based on custom’, particularly those infringing women’s rights. Secondly, they recognised that Islamic organisations had the loyalty of many people in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and therefore they wanted to destroy the religion in order to extend their own power. In order to weaken Islam the Soviet authorities: ● closed mosques, turning them into sports clubs or storage depots ● discouraged pilgrimages ● attacked Islamic shrines ● started campaigns against women wearing the chador, a traditional form of dress which sometimes included a veil ● opened anti-Islamic museums in the midst of recognised holy places. Patriarch Tikhon, 1865–1925 Born in 1865, Patriarch Tikhon became head of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1917. He regularly clashed with the Communist Government, criticising their use of violence, their seizure of land and their role in creating the famine of 1921. He was placed under house arrest in 1922 and remained a prisoner of the Communists until his death in 1925.
79Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 Media, religion and totalitarianism Some historians have described the Soviet Union as a totalitarian regime (see page 21). Totalitarianism has been defined in a variety of ways, but broadly the phrase describes a form of modern dictatorship which attempts to control all areas of life. Control of the media and suppression of religion are often considered to be important aspects of totalitarianism. Media control allowed the government to control the information that Soviet citizens were exposed to, and the suppression of religion meant that Soviet citizens were less likely to be influenced by alternative views. Stalin, religion and terror Stalin’s policies often had religious implications. His religious policies tended to be driven by his other priorities. In that sense, he was often quite pragmatic when dealing with religion. During the collectivisation drive, Stalin ordered the closure of many churches in the country largely because they were aiding resistance to his policies. Outside of Russia, Stalin set targets for the number of people from different ethnic groups that he wanted purged. In the Central Asian republics, where Islam was the dominant religion, the NKVD attacked local priests and intellectuals. The NKVD also attacked groups that had been set up to defend Islam in the 1920s from Soviet attacks. This included attacking Jadids and Sufi groups who were dedicated to ‘saving Islam from Marxist pollution’. By the end of 1936, Sufi groups, even those in former Islamic strongholds of the Ferghana Valley of Turkestan, had been destroyed. Nonetheless, in spite of the claims of Soviet propaganda, Islam survived and Sufi groups, often led by women, kept the traditions alive and growing, particularly in Kazakhstan. Religion and war During the Second World War Stalin made a pragmatic alliance with the Church. One of his strategies for winning the war was to appeal to the patriotism of the Russian people to boost morale and inspire them to fight. This appeal to patriotism was combined with a new understanding between the government and the Church. Stalin reached out to the Church during the war for a number of reasons: ● The Russian Orthodox Church was linked to Russian national identity. Therefore as patriotism re-awoke, it was natural for Russians to look to the Church. ● The war was a time of continual crisis when all fami lies faced losing loved ones. The Church provided comfort for bereaved families. ● Soldiers also found comfort in the thought that God would welcome them into heaven. When facing death in battle, one soldier commented that there was more comfort and inspiration in a few of Jesus’s words than there was in the entire works of Marx and Lenin. Early in the war Stalin reached an understanding with leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church. Metropolitan Sergey, the Russian Orthodox Church’s most senior figure, urged Christians to fight for the motherland, proclaiming Stalin ‘God’s chosen leader’. In return, the government changed its policy towards the Church: ● From the outset of war anti-religious propaganda ceased. Communist publications, such as Bezbozhnik (‘The Godless’), were officially closed. ● Stalin granted Metropolitan Sergey an official residence in Moscow. ● Stalin promised to end the censorship of religious magazines following the war. ● Stalin promised that churches that had been closed by the government would re-open; 414 churches re-opened during the final year of the war. The easing of restrictions on the Church led to growth. Indeed, the Orthodox Church grew and the priesthood expanded from 9254 in 1946 to 11,827 in 1948. The Orthodox Church was not the only denomination to benefit. Numbers of Baptists, Pentecostalists, Methodists and Jehovah’s Witnesses increased following 1945. Khrushchev and religion Khrushchev’s approach to religion was more hard line than that of Stalin. Kh rushchev saw it as part of h is mission to revive the anti-religious campaign of the 1920s in order to liberate Soviet society from the last vestiges of religion. Moreover, the government realised that church attendance was a form of resistance. This awareness was heightened by the fact that from the mid-1950s certain Protestant Churches began to prophesy that the Soviet regime would end within a generation. Khrushchev’s major anti-religious campaign star ted in 1958. It included the following measures: ● Churches re-opened during and after the Second World War were closed. ● Anti-religious propaganda was reintroduced. ● Anti-religious magazines were reintroduced, for example Science and Religion was published regularly from 1960. ● Roman Catholic monasteries were closed in 1959.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin80 ● Orthodox convents were placed under surveillance. ● Patrols refused to let believers have access to holy sites. Khrushchev also used the Soviet space programme to attack religion. Yuri Gagarin famously commented that having travelled up to the heavens he had found no God. Valentina Tereshkova, the first woman in space, also argued that her trip into space had led to the victory of atheism over ‘the mysterious heavens that used to mystif y the imagination’. Khrushchev’s campaigns particularly targeted female believers, as government figures showed that two-thirds of Orthodox churchgoers were women and over 80 per cent of Protestant Christians were women. Moreover, he was concerned that women were passing on religious beliefs to their children. Therefore from 1960 a propaganda campaign encouraged men to take the leading role in the education of their children. There were also campaigns against nuns, which accused them of being ‘unnatural women’ for refusing to do their ‘natural duty’ by becoming wives and mothers. Churches and Islamic groups were banned from running special events for women, such as women-only prayer meetings. Khrushchev’s campaign also targeted Islamic women, reviving the 1920s campaign to ‘liberate’ women from Islam. School teachers were also expected to deliver an anti-religious message. Aspects of Khrushchev’s campaign succeeded. For example, the KGB successfully closed thousands of churches, reducing the number of Orthodox Church buildings from 8000 in 1958 to 5000 in 1964. However, he failed to win the battle for the ‘soul of the Soviet people’. Women organised their own campaigns to protect their religious freedoms. Some marched, others circulated pamphlets defending Christianity or Islam, while others took their children out of schools in order to counter the anti-religious propaganda. In short, Khrushchev’s anti- religious campaign led to the birth of a new dissident campaign that flourished in the 1960s and 1970s. Religion in the Soviet Union, 1964–85 Brezhnev ended Khrushchev’s overt campaign against religion. Church closures stopped and so did the poster campaigns. Brezhnev advocated spreading the philosophy of atheism rather than attacking religious organisations or practices. In 1968 he opened the Institute for Scientific Atheism, which published articles in newspapers and advised teachers how to spread atheism in the classroom. Brezhnev’s foreign policy of seeking allies in the Middle East led to a change in policy towards Islam. Previous leaders had described Islam as a ‘backward and barbarian’ religion. Under Brezhnev, the government started supporting anti-American Islamic groups. As a result, from the late 1960s the Soviet Government described Islam as a ‘progressive, anticolonial and revolutionary creed’ that was compatible with socialism. Moreover, Brezhnev established the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, which allowed Soviet Islamic leaders and scholars to have limited contact with fellow Muslims in other countries. Brezhnev’s attempt to promote atheism did not lead to a reduction in the numbers of people professing religious faith. No more churches or mosques closed. Moreover, the proportion of people professing a religious faith remained stable at 20 per cent from 1960 through to 1985. Conclusion Successive Communist governments attempted to neutralise religion. In some cases this meant d irect attacks on religious leaders; in others it meant working with religious groups and leaders to ensure support for the regime. Notably, while the regime could close churches and convert mosques into storage depots, they could not kill the faith of Soviet citizens who looked beyond politics for life’s ultimate meaning. Work together Write a paragraph in answer to the following question: How far did the Soviet Government control media and religion in the years 1917–85? Make sure your answer focuses clearly on the question, considers both sides of the question, considers media and religion, covers the whole time period and concludes with some genuine evaluation. Having written the paragraph, swap it with a partner. Discuss which paragraph: ● focuses more clearly on the question ● uses the most appropriate evidence to support its points ● most effectively covers both religion and the media ● most effectively covers the whole period ● contains the most effective evaluation. Having discussed these different aspects of your paragraphs, note down three things you could do to improve or maintain your essay technique.
81Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 Soviet government Media Religion Repression Co-operationCensorship Editorial control Summary diagram: Media and religion – methods of control. Recommended reading J. Anderson, Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and Successor States (Cambridge, 1994), pages 102–36. V. Brovkin, Russia After Lenin: Politics, Culture and Society, 1921–1929 (Routledge, 1998), pages 26–9. Brovkin’s work provides a detailed account of life in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, including the government’s attitude to religion K.B. Eaton, Daily Life in the Soviet Union (Greenwood Publishing, 2004), pages 270–7. Activity: Question practice 1 Was economic decline the main consequence of Brezhnev’s economic policy in the years 1964–85? AS 2 How signif icant was control of the media in the achievement of Communist political domi nance in the years 1917–41? AS 3 How accurate is it to say that Soviet Governments were consistently hostile to religious groups in the period 1921–64? 4 How far did the fundamental features of Stalin’s government of the USSR remai n in place f rom 1953 to 1985? Chapter summary ● Between 1917 and 1985 Soviet governments tried dif ferent ways of controlling the media and religion. ● Lenin established the pattern of state control that continued throughout the period. ● However, Stalin and Brezhnev were both prepared to co-operate with religious groups when it suited them. ● Under Kruschev and Brezhnev there was greater freedom to contribute to magazines through letters pages. This reflected the fact that personal freedom was more important following Stalin’s death than it had been in the early years of the revolution.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin82 3b: The secret police Overview The secret police were a constant feature of Communist rule. Communist leaders tended to think of the Soviet Union as a regime beset by enemies. Capitalists, imperialists, other socialists, frivolous women and hooligans were all a threat in the view of Soviet leaders. Most of the leaders viewed the regime as extremely fragile – vulnerable to an uprising from the people and therefore in need of defence by a ruthless police force. Initially, Lenin argued that his terroristic Cheka, who had the power to torture and kill at will, were an emergency measure necessary to protect the revolution in its early stages. However, by 1924 it was clear that they had become a permanent feature of the regime. Their role changed between 1917 and 1928. In the early days they had fought organised political groups who opposed Lenin’s government. However, a decade later they were employed to enforce a Communist moral code on people who had become too rich under the NEP, experts who disagreed with the government and young people who enjoyed Western music like Jazz. Under Stalin the political police attacked the Communist Party, the only organisation left in the Soviet Union that could rival Stalin’s power. Terror reached new heights during the mid-1930s, establishing Stalin as the only authoritative figure in the government. Following Stalin’s death, mass terror against the Party was renounced by the new leaders, and for a decade under Khrushchev the secret police became a much less prominent part of the government. Under Brezhnev, the political police became important again. However, there was no return to mass terror. Andropov, Brezhnev’s police chief, attempted to use more subtle techniques to achieve maximum repression with minimum violence. Nonetheless, the new techniques did not stop widespread disillusionment with the regime by the early 1980s. This chapter considers: 1 Attacks on opponents of the government, 1917–28 2 Stalin’s terror 3 Andropov’s suppression of dissidents, 1967–82 4 Monitoring of popular discontent, 1982–85. 1 Attacks on opponents of the government, 1917–28 Terror was an essential part of Lenin’s strategy for staying in power. Lenin was willing, from the earliest phase of the revolution, to use terror against his political opponents. Lenin and other Communist leaders had studied the French Revolution and knew that terror was one of the weapons used by the new rulers against the old rulers. In that sense, Lenin believed that revolutionary terror was a legitimate part of a revolution. Significantly, Lenin repeatedly stated that he hoped the Red Terror would be less severe than the French Revolutionary terror. Moreover, Lenin believed that political terror was a temporary measure, which should be abandoned once the revolution was secure. Note it down Using bullet points, make notes on: ● Lenin’s initial vision of the Cheka ● the Cheka’s role during the Civil War ● the role of the secret police in the 1920s ● the reasons for the change in the role of the secret police over time. The Cheka and the Red Terror The Cheka, Lenin’s first secret police, embodied Lenin’s views on revolutionary violence. Established in December 1917, the Cheka, or Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage, were a political police. Their target were the counter-revolutionaries: those who tried to overthrow the revolution. Felix Dzerzhinsky served as the head of the Cheka from 1917–26. Felix Dzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky was born into an aristocratic Polish family. Prior to the revolution he had the right to call himself Prince. He became head of the Cheka shortly after the October Revolution and quickly gained a reputation for efficiency. Dzerzhinsky was ideologically committed to the use of terror against counter-revolutionaries, and was an advocate of swift and harsh revolutionary justice. During the 1920s Dzerzhinsky continued to head the political police. He sided with the Duumvirate against Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev. He died of heart failure in 1926.
83Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 The role of the Cheka, 1917–21 During the Civil War, the Cheka’s role was to protect Communist rule in areas held by the Communists. The Red Army, by contrast, was responsible for defending and enlarging Communist-held territory. Significantly, from the early days of the revolution, the Cheka attacked not only the Communists’ capitalist enemies, but also other socialists. For example, in Januar y 1918, the Cheka and the Red Army closed down the Constituent Assembly, a democratically elected parliament that was dominated by the Communists’ rivals, the Socialist Revolutionaries. Additionally, the Cheka did not enforce laws. Nor were they bound by laws. Rather they dispensed ‘revolutionary justice’, which allowed them to act arbitrarily. Between 1917 and 1921 Lenin’s secret police used terror in a variety of ways. The Cheka: ● helped the Red Army requisition grain from the peasants as part of War Communism (see page 43) ● closed down opposition newspapers and imprisoned, tortured and executed socialist opponents of the new government ● used extreme violence against the enemies of the Communist Party in recently captured areas; priests were crucified, members of the white army were allowed to freeze to death and turned into ice statues, others were scalped or buried alive ● supported the Red Army’s attack on the Kronstadt Naval base; Cheka agents with machine guns were positioned behind Red Army soldiers and instructed to shoot any soldiers who retreated or refused to fight ● ran concentration camps that housed the Communists’ enemies ● stopped private tradi ng, which was outlawed under War Communism. The secret police and the NEP The end of the Civil War led to a change in Lenin’s policy. The Red Terror was brought to an end. However, as socialism had not been wholly victorious, Lenin still believed that there was a need for a political police. During the period of the New Economic Policy the Cheka, and later the GPU, continued to attack the government’s political opponents. Nonetheless, terror was on a much smaller scale than duri ng the Civil War. Surveillance and deportations In 1922 Lenin instructed Dzerzhinsky to set up an agency within the GPU to monitor the press. In addition to this, the GPU kept former Tsarist officers, who now served in the Red Army, under surveillance. Lenin was also suspicious of intellectuals a nd experts who did not support the government fully. Again, in 1922 he instructed Dzerzhinsky to supervise the deportation of professors and engineers that he suspected of anti- Communist sympathies. More generally, the GPU kept public opinion under close scrutiny during the 1920s. The GPU had the power to intercept post and other forms of communication. The GPU kept intellectuals and students under close scrutiny, fearing that these groups were unlikely to support the new government because of their privileged, almost bourgeois position in Soviet society. GPU surveillance reports were sent directly to the Central Committee. The GPU also reported to the Central Committee about moral problems, such as drunkenness, gambling and other signs of inequality that were developing during the period of the NEP. The secret police In many ways the phrase ‘secret police’ is misleading. Under Lenin and Stalin there was little secret about the political police. Indeed, arrests and executions were often carried out publicly in order to intimidate potential opponents and create an atmosphere of fear. The Soviet secret police had a series of names between 1917 and 1991: ● Cheka 1917–22 ● GPU 1922 ● OGPU 1922–34 ● NKVD 1934–41 ● NKGB 1941–46 ● MGB 1946–54 ● KGB 1954–91.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin84 Political trials Lenin was profoundly insecure about the future of the revolution. He feared that the economic compromise of the NEP (see pages 47–48) would lead to political overthrow. Therefore he ordered Dzerzhinsky to set up political trials of his leading socialist opponents. In 1922 Dzerzhinsky organised the trial of Socialist Revolutionary leaders. They were accused of treason, sabotage and plotti ng to overthrow the Soviet state. At the end of the trial in Aug ust 1922 all of the defendants were sentenced to death. Most were, however, imprisoned and only executed in the Stalinist terror of the m id-1930s. Religious, moral and economic crimes The GPU also policed the semi-capitalist marketplace established by the NEP. This included: ● imprisoning Nepmen who had grown too rich (see page 46–47) ● harassing women who dressed in Western styles (see page 102) ● persecuting young people who danced to jazz (see page 98) ● persecuting priests (see page 78). There were no laws against these activities, but the GPU defended the interest of the revolution and therefore could act arbitrarily against perceived class enemies. 2 Stalin’s terror The Soviet secret police was transformed under Stalin. Lenin had used the Cheka, GPU and OGPU to attack the enemies of the Party. Stalin used the secret police against that Party. Moreover, he used terror much more widely, sending millions to his Gulags. In order to justify the radical extension of terror, he developed a new doctrine that led to a change in the culture of the secret police. Note it down Using the 1 : 2 method (see page x), make notes about the role of the secret police under Stalin: ● how Stalin changed the role of the secret police ● how Yezhov changed the workings of the secret police ● how Stalin justified the terror ● the scale of the terror ● the impact of the terror. The NKVD under Genrikh Yagoda Genrikh Yagoda was appointed head of the NKVD in July 1934. Following Kirov’s death he was responsible for leading the hunt for enemies of the Party. However, Yagoda proved to be a disappointment. Although Yagoda organised the arrest, interrogation and trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev, Stali n expected more. He wanted to use the opportunity created by Kirov’s murder to move against Buk harin and Trotsky’s supporters. Moreover, the scale of the terror in 1935 and 1936 was not unusual by Soviet standards. In that sense, too, Yagoda disappointed Stalin. Yagod a did, however, play an impor tant role i n the Great Terror: he collaborated with Stalin in t urning the NKVD ag ainst the Communist Part y. In that sense, his appointment as NKVD chief was a turn ing point in Soviet politics. Terror under Nikolai Yezhov Yezhov played an important role rad icalisi ng the NKV D. Under Yezhov the Great Terror spread to engulf the whole of the Soviet Government. Genrikh Yagoda, 1895–1940 Born in 1891, Yagoda joined the Bolsheviks in 1907. He joined the Cheka soon after its creation, being promoted to deputy chief in 1923. During the 1920s he was close to Bukharin and the Right of the Party. Between 1921 and 1933 he supervised the construction of the Moscow–Volga Canal. The project was completed by labourers from the Gulags. Over 20,000 prisoners died during the project. Yagoda became close to Stalin in the early 1930s. Allegedly, Stalin confided in Yagoda that he preferred people to be loyal through fear rather than conviction as convictions could change whereas fear was constant. Yagoda was also responsible for ensuring the starvation of victims of the Great Famine in the Ukraine. Stalin was unhappy with Yagoda as NKVD head, blaming him for the slow progress in the first years of the terror. Yagoda was eventually arrested and tried as part of the Trial of the 21 in 1938.
85Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 Sharpening class struggle In order to justify more extensive terror, Stalin put forward a new theory: the doctrine of sharpening class struggle. Stalin argued that as socialism advanced, the class struggle intensif ied. Capitalists, he argued, fought harder as socialism succeeded. This theory tur ned Lenin’s assumptions on their head and provided the justification for ever increasing terror. Yezhov and the new NKVD Yezhov transformed the NKV D. His reforms ref lected the doctrine of sharpening class struggle by turning the secret police into a ruthless organisation capable of enforcing ever growing terror. Under Yezhov, terror was accelerated through a series of changes: ● Stalin set targets for arrests, executions and deportations. ● In 1937, the NKV D was purged. Many NKVD agents had been Communists since 1918. Therefore they were loyal to the Party and sometimes loyal to Stalin’s opponents. They were also opposed to the use of mass terror in a socialist society for ideological reasons. Removing these old agents allowed Stalin to speed up the pace of the terror. ● New NKV D agents were recruited. The new agents had no loyalty to the Party and no ideological opposition to terror. Many simply enjoyed the power and the violence, or wanted a promotion. Yezhov also introduced the ‘conveyor belt system’ to speed up the process of getting confessions from the NKVD’s victims. The system involved groups of NKVD agents working in shifts around the clock. This meant torture and interrogation could continue relentlessly until prisoners confessed. The new methods bore fruit, leading to the Trial of the 17 and the Trial of the 21 (see page 20). Yezhovshchina Under Yezhov the terror attacked all aspects of Soviet life: the Party, the army, industry and collective farms. The result, between 1937 and 1938, was what historian Donald Rayfield describes as the ‘Yezhov bloodbath’. During this period, around 1.5 million, approximately ten per cent of the male adult population, were arrested by the NKVD. Of these around 635,000 were deported, often to Siberia, and over 680,000 were executed. This period became known a s ‘Yezhovshchina’, meaning that the whole of Soviet society was engulfed in Yezhov’s terror. Yezhovshchina tra nsformed the government districts of Moscow and Leningrad into ghost towns. Mass arrests of government officials left entire apartment blocks empty. The terror focused on the social group that was most likely to oppose Stalin. Urban educated men between the ages of 30 and 45 holding senior positions in the government were therefore targeted. Manual workers and women were much less likely to be arrested as they were not in a position to threaten Stalin. Indeed, 95 per cent of those targeted were men; only 5 per cent were women. Local initiatives The terror was not solely directed from above. The terror expanded and accelerated in part due to popular participation. For example, NKVD agents demanded higher targets. Additionally, at a local level, workers and peasants organised their own show trials. Government employees, Party officials and factory managers were arrested by groups of citizens and tried for their crimes. In Kazan, for example, Communist officials were publicly tried for misusing government funds. They were accused of living luxurious lifestyles and falsifying figures. Having been found guilty, the officials were handed over to the NKVD. Nikolai Yezhov, 1895–1940 Nikolai Yezhov was born in 1895 and joined the Communist Party in October 1917. Yezhov was head of Stalin’s secret police during the worst phase of the terror. In the mid-1930s he was one of Stalin’s most trusted ministers. In addition to being head of the NKVD he was a member of the Politburo and had various senior positions in the Soviet Union’s economic ministries. He was a committed Communist and very skilled at manipulating the system to gain promotion. For most of his time in the government he was considered an efficient and hardworking minister. However, when it became clear that Stalin was planning to arrest him he became depressed and turned to drink. Unable to cope with the pressure of his position as head of the NKVD, he resigned in 1938 and was arrested in 1939. His execution was kept secret for a decade as Stalin did not want to draw attention to Yezhov’s work at the NKVD.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin86 The consequences of the terror Stalin emerged from the terror stronger than ever. The terror removed almost everyone from government who had fought in the Civil War or who had worked with Lenin, and therefore could claim to have authority independent from Stalin. Moreover, Stalin replaced these officials with his own supporters, people who owed loyalty to him alone. The terror also caused massive economic problems. Deporting and executing factory managers, economic planners and government officials removed the experts needed to run Stalin’s command economy. Therefore during the first years of the Third Five-Year Plan production rates either declined or stagnated. Finally, the terror claimed the lives of Yagoda and Yezhov. Yagoda was tried as part of the Trial of the 21. Yezhov and over 300 of his closest associates were shot in 1940. Yezhov claimed that his only crime was not killing enough Russians. Lavrentiy Beria’s secret police At the end of 1938 the Great Terror began to wind down. Yezhov resigned as head of the NKVD in November, to be replaced by Lavrentiy Beria. Beria’s first major successes as head of the NKVD were Yezhov’s arrest in April 1939 and Trotsky’s murder in Mexico in 1940. The NKVD at war During the Second World War Beria and the NKVD were responsible for policing ethnic minorities, groups that Stalin feared would side with the Soviet Union’s enemies: ● In 1942 Beria organised the mass deportation of the Kalmyks, from Ka lmykia which is north-west of the Caspian, to Siberia. Stalin feared that the Kalmyks would welcome a German invasion. By 1953, only 53,000 of the original population of 130,000 survived due to the brutal treatment they received in Siberia. ● In 1944, Beria ordered the deportation to Siberia of all 460,000 Chechens from their homeland in Chechnya within seven days. Chechens who were unwilling to leave their home or unable to leave were locked in stables and barns and burned alive. The deportation resulted in around 170,000 deaths. Beria after the war After the Second World War Beria’s NKVD continued to persecute the Soviet people: ● In 1945, the NKVD interrogated the 1.5 million Soviet prisoners of war who had been liberated from Germany. Stalin viewed these men as traitors for allowing themselves to be captured rather than f ighting to the death. Most were deported to Siberia. ● ‘The Leningrad Affair’: In 1949, Stalin launched a purge against officials in the Leningrad Party. Stalin claimed that the Leningrad Party acted independently as if it were ‘an island in the Pacif ic’. Around 200 Par ty members were arrested and forced to confess to crimes against the Party. Beria may well have been behind the Leningrad Affair, as his rivals were based there (see page 24). ● ‘The Doctors’ Plot’: Dur ing 1952 and 1953 many of Stalin’s medical staf f were arrested for trying to poison Stalin. Notably, anti-Semitism may h ave been a cause of this purge as ma ny of the doctors were Jewish, or h ad Jewish names, a nd St al in was a well- Lavrentiy Beria, 1899–1953 Born in 1899, Beria distinguished himself as an excellent student of maths and science. He joined the Bolsheviks in 1917. His political career began in earnest in the early 1920s when he was involved in the ruthless repression of anti-Communist movements in Georgia. In 1926 he was rewarded for his work by being promoted to head the Georgian OGPU. In this role, he organised Stalin’s purges of the Georgian Communist Party in the mid-1930s. Beria became the head of the NKVD in 1938. He stayed in this role for the rest of his life and became one of Stalin’s most trusted allies in government. Beria’s ruthlessness was obvious during the Second World War. During this period he organised mass deportations and mass executions. After the Second World War, Beria was put in charge of Soviet efforts to build a nuclear bomb. He was also one of a number of senior figures in government who had a realistic chance of winning power after Stalin’s death. Indeed, for most of 1953, Beria, along with Khrushchev and Malenkov (see page 29), was part of the ruling alliance that replaced Stalin. Beria was arrested and executed in 1953. His death marked the end of the use of mass terror as a political weapon in the Soviet Union.
87Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 known anti-Semite. Stal in died before the doctors could be executed, and following h is death they were released. Beria’s death For Stalin’s heirs, Beria was associated with the policy of terror. Stalin’s heirs were agreed that after Stalin’s death there would be no return to m ass terror and no further use of the NKV D against the Party. Therefore, three months after Stalin’s death, Beria was arrested by the NKV D and executed for treason and terrorism. Beria’s death was the symbolic end of Stalin’s policy of terror. Conclusion Stalin’s Great Terror took the use of terror to unprecedented heights. Terror became, for a while, a regular part of government, and following 1938 there was the continual threat that Stalin would unleash another wave of terror as large as that of the 1930s. Khr ushchev renounced the use of mass terror and stopped using it as a weapon against the Party. More than that, he organised the rehabilitation of thousands of former Party members (see page 32). Khrushchev’s preferred method of social control was to encourage ‘popular oversight’ in which ordinary citizens disciplined themselves and each other (see page 101). In 1959 Khrushchev proudly proclaimed that there were no longer any political prisoners in the Soviet Union, declari ng ‘there are no political prisoners, only persons of unsound mind’. The statement is indicative of Khrushchev’s preferred approach to dissidents, which was to subject them to compulsory psychiatric treatment (see page 88). 3 Andropov’s suppression of dissidents, 1967–82 In 1967 Brezhnev promoted Yuri Andropov to head the KGB. Andropov made a significant impact on the KGB. In the Khrushchev period, heads of the KGB had been low profile, and the job had become a dead end, no longer leading to positions of power within the government. Under Andropov this changed. This was partly due to a change of emphasis at the top of the Communist Party. Khrushchev had been committed, for at least some of his premiership, to a degree of cultural freedom. Brezhnev and the new leadership who took over in 1964 were suspicious of cultural freedom (see page 34). Andropov was a conservative, suspicious of liberalisation. Additionally, Andropov was an astute politician, capable of getting his own way, and he enjoyed the trust of Brezhnev. Andropov’s role was much smaller than that of previous secret police chiefs. Whereas Dzerzhinsky, Yezhov and Beria had limitless authority to imprison and execute, Andropov’s goal was to control dissidents, the tiny minority of citizens who refused to conform to the expectations of the Soviet regime. His strategy was to achieve maximum control through a m inimum of violence. In this sense, although Andropov was a conservative and suspicious of cultural freedom, there was no return to the mass terror of the Civil War or of the Stalin period. Andropov was also keen to expose and prosecute corruption in the Communist Party, but Brezhnev was less sympathetic to this agenda. Yuri Andropov, 1914–1984 Andropov was born in 1914, the son of an administrator on the Russian railways. He was orphaned at the age of 13 and was forced to work. As a teenager he had a number of jobs including that of sailor and telegraph clerk. He made the most of the educational opportunities available under Stalin and graduated from college at the age of 19. He was promoted within the Communist Party during the 1930s, partly as a result of the purges. In the mid-1950s he became Soviet ambassador to Hungary. In that position he witnessed the 1956 Hungarian Revolution – which temporarily ended Soviet control of Hungary. The events of the revolution, and the speed with which the Hungarian Communist Party lost control, horrified him. The events of the Hungarian Revolution persuaded him that reform should be undertaken with extreme caution and that dissident movements were potentially extremely dangerous. In 1967 he was appointed head of the KGB. He used his influence in government to advocate suppression of dissidents and any anti-Soviet activities. Specifically, in 1968 he argued for swift Soviet intervention to crush the reformist government that had taken over Czechoslovakia. Andropov was promoted to the Politburo in 1973 and played an important role in spotting new talent in the Communist Party. Indeed, he was responsible for the promotion of Mikhail Gorbachev.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin88 Andropov’s aims and methods Andropov’s key priority was the suppression of dissidents. In 1968 he issued KGB Order No. 0051, ‘On the tasks of state security agencies in combating ideological sabotage by the adversary’. The Order set out the policy of increased surveillance of and action against dissidents. Andropov adopted a number of strategies for dealing with dissidents. These were informed by a series of trials of well-known artists that took place from 1964 to 1966. These embarrassed the Soviet Government due to outcry from other nations who demanded the preservation of artistic freedom. Based on this experience, Andropov developed a series of strategies that dealt with dissidents in a more subtle way which avoided adverse publicity. Discipline in the KGB Andropov reformed the KGB to ensure that it could effectively identify dissidents. Between 1967 and 1970 he introduced the following measures to ensure that the KGB was highly eff icient: ● KGB agents were not allowed to accept gifts and were forced to declare their financial assets. ● KGB agents whose relatives broke the law were sacked. ● He promoted KGB agents from across the whole of the Soviet Union, based on their success in dealing with dissidents. ● In 1967 he established Directorate V, a special branch of the KGB, to deal specifically with dissidents. Emigration Having identified dissidents, Andropov had two ways of dealing with them. High profile dissidents with an international reputation were allowed to emigrate. A number of famous artists who consistently opposed the authorities were allowed to emigrate in the 1970s (see page 104–105). Indeed, the policy was extended and over 100,000 potential ‘trouble makers’ were allowed to leave the Soviet Union while Andropov was head of the KGB. The policy was related to Jewish emigration. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948 Soviet Jews had campaigned for the right to move to the new Jewish state. For years Soviet leaders had refused. Andropov, however, changed the policy, ensuring that most Jews who wanted to leave were given exit visas. Andropov justified the policy by referring to the demographics of the Soviet Union. Jews, he argued, were around one per cent of the Soviet population. However, they were well represented in creative and intellectual industries. One-fi fth of writers and journalists, to take one example, were Jews. In that sense, Jews were more likely to be found in the professions that produced dissidents. Therefore, Andropov argued, allowing Jews to leave the Soviet Union was a pragmatic way of dealing w ith potential dissidents without resorting to overt oppression. Repressive psychiatry Emigration was Andropov’s preferred weapon against well-known dissidents. However, less well-known figures could be sent to psychiatric institutions for compulsory psychiatric treatment. The policy had been used by Stalin and Khrushchev, but was expanded dramatically under Brezhnev. Andropov proposed the measure in April 1969, and the policy was endorsed in a secret resolution of the Council of Ministers later that year. Off icially, the government argued that anti-Soviet behaviour was a sign of a ‘paranoid reformist delusion’: a mental illness. Andropov did not believe this. However, he recognised that sending someone to hospital was much less likely to attract the attention of the world media than sending someone to prison. Moreover, criminal records were public documents and therefore Western journalists could trace dissidents who were sent to prison. Psychiatric records were private; therefore it was easier for the government to hide its repression. Repressive psychiatry had other advantages too. As psychiatric patients, their ‘treatment’ could continue indefinitely, whereas prison terms had to come to an end. Finally, psychiatric patients could be prescribed medication to keep them quiet. The practice was used against Protestant Christians and Jehovah’s Witnesses. These groups were small and considered as heretics by Russian Orthodox Christians. Therefore they were vulnerable to off icial persecution. Rumours about the practice of repressive psychiatry reached the West in the early 1970s. A delegation of US psychiatrists visited the Soviet Union to inspect hospitals. Andrei Snezhnevsky, President of the Association of Soviet Psychiatrists, persuaded the American visitors that Soviet psychiatry was serving its patients well. Prevention and repression Andropov changed the emphasis of the KGB from repression to prevention. He did this for two main reasons. First he believed that Stalinist repression was ineffective. Second, there was a growing belief in the party that socialism was incompatible with widespread repression. From November 1972, the KGB adopted a policy of issuing official warnings. The KGB set up a process whereby dissidents were interviewed and warned to stop their unorthodox activities. These people were then kept under surv
89Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 creating the adverse publicity of a trial. Around 70,000 Soviet citizens received a KGB warning in the 1970s. KGB agents estimated that these warnings stopped the formation of around 2000 subversive groups in the early 1970s alone. Nonetheless, warnings did not always persuade dissidents to conform. In such cases dissidents could be: ● demoted or sacked from their jobs; indeed many intellectuals ended up working as janitors during the 1970s as a punishment for their anti-Soviet attitudes ● sent to psychiatric institutions for ‘treatment’ ● exiled ● sent to prison. The number of dissidents sent to prison increased significantly after Andropov’s appointment in 1967 (see Table 1). Table 1: Numbers impri soned for cr eating anti-Soviet propaganda. Year Numbers imprisoned 1965–7 171 1968–70 528 Andropov was also prepared to use show trials, such as the 1972 trial of dissidents Pyotr Yakir and Viktor Krasin, who ran the samizdat human rights magazine Chronicle of Current Events. In addition to prison, the KGB would use violence to intimidate dissidents, as in the case of the ‘Bulldozer Exhibition’ of 1974 (see page 105). Samizdat publications Self-published, or samizdat, materials began to circulate in the Soviet Union from the late 1950s. Underground publishing was made possible by Khrushchev’s policy of increasing the availability of consumer goods. The availability of typewriters and paper allowed dedicated writers and their supporters to publish and circulate their own magazines and books. Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn Andrei Sakharov and A leksandr Solzhenitsyn were the most high-profile dissidents of the Brezhnev period. The two dissidents represented quite different traditions. Sakharov advocated human rights; Solzhenitsyn was a Russian nationalist and a devoted member of the Russian Orthodox Church. For Andropov they represented the two great threats to the Soviet Union: the doctrine of human rights and Russian nationalism. Sakharov had come to prominence through the Soviet nuclear programme and was regarded as the ‘Father of the Hydrogen Bomb’. From 1962, Sakharov became critical of the damage caused by Soviet nuclear tests. Moreover, in 1964 he led a campaign to expel Trofim Lysenko, Khrushchev’s favourite scientist, from the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In 1968 Sakharov made his criticisms public, circulating an essay, Reflections on Progress, arguing that the Soviet Union should respect human rights. The essay was a samizdat production and therefore not officially authorised. The samizdat network was extremely effective, and within a month the essay had been published in the West and broadcast on the BBC. However, Sakharov was well respected in the West and in the Soviet Union. Therefore the KGB were reluctant to persecute him. The KGB restricted his right to travel and the government reduced his salary. He was also warned to stop his dissident activities by the KGB. However, this backf ired. Sakharov gave a full report of the intimidation to the New York Times. By the end of 1968 Sakharov’s case was so well known that the KGB could not arrest him. Moreover, his disappearance to a psychiatric institution would also have caused outrage. Nonetheless, the KGB orchestrated a press campaign against him. Sakharov, however, kept writing. In 1975 he published My Country and the World, which proposed the reform of the Soviet Union on the basis of human rights, for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize. Sakharov was refused the right to leave the Soviet Union and was kept under constant surveillance. KGB documents described him as ‘Public Enemy Number One’. Eventually, Sakharov was sent into internal exile, forced to remain in the city of Gorky.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin90 Solzhenitsyn was a writer who became famous for his novel One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (see page 101). Solzhenitsyn fi nished his novel The Gulag Archipelago in 1968, smuggling the manuscript to the West for publication. The book described the horrors of Stalin’s prison camp system and it was therefore not possible to publish it in the Soviet Union. Two years later, he was awarded a Nobel Prize for Literature. Solzhenitsyn’s fame in the West meant that the KGB could not imprison him and instead he was forced into exile in America in 1973. The Helsinki Agreement The 1975 Helsinki Agreement committed countries across Europe to respect human rights. The Soviet Government was a signatory of the ag reement. Consequently, following 1975 dissidents used this to show that the treatment of dissidents was in breach of Soviet obligations under t he Helsinki A greement. Dissidents knew that they could not legally force the government to respect human rights even after the agreement was signed. But they could use the agreement as publicity to embarrass the government and thereby create pressure for change. Law and order campaign, 1979 With the exception of one or two high-profile outspoken figures, Andropov’s methods were successful in dealing with Soviet dissidents. However, 1979 was a difficult year for the Soviet Government and therefore they introduced stricter policies in anticipation of growing dissent. The problems facing the leadership included: ● economic slow down ● poor harvests ● war in Afghanistan (see page 74) ● the failure of Brezhnev’s negotiations with the USA ● growing corruption ● growing non-conformity. These problems, and the prospect of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, an event that would bring the world media to the Soviet capital, led to a law and order campaign. Backed by a Central Committee decree passed in August, Andropov attacked various forms of anti-social behaviour such as hooliganism, drunkenness and corruption. 4 Monitoring of popular discontent, 1982–85 Andropov succeeded Brezhnev as Soviet leader in 1982. Nonetheless, he retained control of the KGB. In the early 1980s the KGB continued to monitor public opinion, an initiative that Andropov had headed up since 1968. KGB agents monitored public opinion in a variety of ways. One technique was for KGB agents to pose as Westerners and initiate anti-government conversations with Soviet citizens. They also used techniques such as phone tapping and intercepting ma il. Andropov was aware of Brezhnev’s failings as a leader: the corruption of large parts of the government and popular discontent with the government. Moreover, he was concerned about growing anti-Communist feeling in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland where rising food prices had led to mass strikes. Andropov used information about popular discontent to justify a series of authoritarian policies. Popular discontent and social malaise KGB reports pointed to a growth in popular discontent in the late 1970s and early 1980s. There were several causes of discontent. Soviet citizens: ● were anx ious that as the 1970s progressed standards of living were improving more slowly ● were dissatisfied with the quality and availability of food and consumer goods ● felt that there were insuf ficient opportunities for promotion within Soviet industry and therefore hard work would not lead to improved status or pay ● resented the privileges and corruption of Party members and managers. These problems were serious, as since 1964, Soviet rule had been based on the ‘social contract’: the people supported Communist rule in return for regular increases in their standard of living (see page 117). Moreover, according to KGB reports, loss of faith in the system led to social malaise which included an increase in: ● alcoholism ● poor labour discipline ● increased black market trade ● avoidance of military service ● demand for Western goods ● sympathy for strikes taking place in Poland ● increased Church attendance ● falling birth rate.
91Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 Dealing with discontent, 1982–85 Andropov introduced a series of policies (see page 36) designed to tackle the mala ise by heightening discipline. KGB reports also showed that some Soviet citizens supported a return to Stalinist discipline. In this sense Andropov’s policies enjoyed some backing: ● Anti-corruption: Andropov investigated senior party officials and industrial managers who were using Soviet resources to make themselves rich. For example, Brezhnev’s Minister of the Interior, Nikolai Shchelokov, was sacked and put on trial for corruption. He took his own life before the end of his trial. ● Anti-alcohol campaign: workers could be sacked for drunkenness and could be fined for damaging machinery or products if they were drunk at work. ● Operation Trawl: an anti-drunkenness and anti- absenteeism campaign. KGB off icers visited parks, restaurants and train stations arresting people who were drunk or who were absent from work. Operation Trawl led to less absenteeism in the short term. However, Andropov became ill soon after his appointment as leader and was unable to sustain the campaigns. Chernenko, who became leader of the Soviet Union on Andropov’s death in 1984, continued the policy of workplace discipline, but scaled back the anti-corruption campaign in order to protect his supporters. Conclusion The Soviet political police were a constant feature of the Communist regime. However, their role and tactics changed over time. Andropov’s policies were much more subtle than the policies of Lenin’s or Stalin’s police chiefs. While Andropov was largely successful in dealing with dissidents, the KGB could not stop the growing social malaise, nor the corruption that had become an essential part of the regime by the 1980s. Work together Write a paragraph in answer to the question: What was the most significant turning point in the development of the Soviet police state? You could choose one of the following turning points or another of your own: ● the end of the Civil War ● the appointment of Yagoda ● the appointment of Yezhov ● the death of Stalin ● the appointment of Andropov. 1 Work with a partner who is writing a paragraph on a different turning point. Your paragraph should contain a clear focus on the question and detail about how the turning point changed the police state and how things stayed the same. A concluding sentence should explain why the turning point is so important. 2 Swap your paragraph with your partner. Read your partner’s paragraph. Now write another paragraph explaining why the turning point you selected is more significant for the development of the Soviet police state than the one your partner selected. 3 Swap again, and read both paragraphs. Discuss whose argument is more persuasive and why. 4 Note down three ways in which you can make your arguments more persuasive. Chapter summary ● Initially, Lenin hoped the Cheka and their use of terror would be a short-lived feature of the new regime. ● However, the failure of the world revolution and the economic retreat of the NEP led Lenin to rely on the violent political police in order to defend the regime. ● Stalin expanded the role of the NKVD under Yagoda and Yezhov, using torture, forced labour and execution against Communist Party members in order to consolidate his own power. ● After Stalin’s death, terror was never used on the same scale again. ● However, after the liberalism of Khrushchev, Brezhnev re-emphasised the role of the KGB and under Andropov the KGB effectively destroyed the Soviet Union’s dissident movement. Recommended reading J.A. Getty and R.T. Manning (eds.), Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (Cambridge, 1993), pages 40–62. This book focuses on Stalin’s terror. P. Kenez, A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End (Cambridge, 2006), pages 227–9. This section of Kenez’s book examines repression under Brezhnev. W. Taubman, S. Khrushchev and A. Gleason (eds.), Nikita Khrushchev, (Yale, 2000), pages 85–112. Taubman, Khrushchev and Gleason’s book examines Khrushchev’s life. This section of the book considers his use of repression.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin92 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1917–21 The Cheka ruthlessly supresses counter-revolutionary activity in the early days of the revolution and during the Civil War 1921–28 The secret police keep opposition under surveil- lance; they persecute priests and organise the first show trials 1929–38 The secret police organise mass terror against rebellious peasants and then the Party 1938–53 NKVD attacks on the Party decline; the NKVD organises mass deportations during wartime 1953–67 Relative liberalism: the secret police keep dissidents under surveillance and use repressive psychiatry against opponents 1967–85 The KGB successfully suppresses the dissident movement but is unable to end corruption Summary diagram: The secret police
93Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 Essay technique: Argument Essays that develop a good argument are more likely to reach the highest levels. As you know, your essays are judged on the extent to which they analyse (see page 59). The mark scheme distinguishes between five different levels of analysis. (This is a summary – the full mark scheme can be found on Edexcel’s website.) Level 1 (LOW) Simplistic or no analysis. Level 2 Limited analysis of key issues. Level 3 Some analysis of key issues. Level 4 Analysis of key issues. Level 5 (HIGH) Sustained analysis of key issues. The key feature of the highest level is sustained analysis: analysis that unites the whole of the essay. High-level arguments Typically, essays examine a series of factors. A good way of achieving sustained analysis is to consider which factor is most important. Consider the following question: How accurate is it to say that Widespread political terror was a constant feature of Soviet government in the years 1921–53.? The following introduction addresses the question, without developing an argument: This introduction could be improved by introducing an argument. An argument is a type of explanation. Therefore an argument is a claim supported by a reason. A good way of beginning to develop an argument is to think about the meaning of the words in the question. For example, what is meant by ‘widespread’, and what is meant by ‘a constant feature’? Widespread political terror was an important feature of Soviet government during the period 1921–53. Lenin and Stalin both used political terror against their opponents during the Kronstadt Mutiny, while oppressing religious groups, during the Great Terror and in Stalin’s last years. But the terror was more extensive in the 1930s than it was in other periods. Clear focus on the question. Considers a wide range of factors. Considers aspects of change and continuity. Introduction 1
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin94 Here is an example of an introduction that begins an argument: Activity: Developing an argument Look at the following question: How accurate is it to say that the period 1964–85 were years of complete stagnation? Using your notes from previous chapters: 1 Write a brief defin ition of stagnation. TIP: How is stagnation different from stability? 2 List the aspects of Russian life that could have stagnated under Brezhnev. 3 Write an introduction that clearly answers the question. – Begin with a clea r claim about the extent of stagnation. – Justif y this with rea sons based on your understanding of stagnation. – Make an argument about which aspect of Russian life was most stagnant. TIP: Remember, Brezhnev’s government changed over time – the extent of stagnation may have changed throughout the period. Political terror was a constant feature of Soviet government in the years 1921–53. However, political terror was only widespread in the late 1930s. Lenin used political terror against specific targets, such as the Kronstadt mutineers in 1921 or against outspoken priests. In this sense, political terror was a feature of Soviet government in the 1920s, but it was not widespread. Political terror became widespread during the late 1930s, particularly the period of Yezhovshchina (1936–38) in which the Great Terror was at its height. However, even under Stalin political terror was not widespread for the whole of his reign. He did use political terror from the mid-1930s until his death in 1953, but the Great Terror was an exceptional period. Therefore, while political terror was a constant feature of Soviet government, it was only truly widespread for a short period of Stalin’s reign. The argument begins with a claim: terror was consistent, but it was not always widespread. The claim is supported by a reason which is based on the meaning of the word ‘widespread’. The introduction concludes with an argument about the extent to which terror was consistent and widespread. This introduction focuses on the question and sets out the key issues on which the essay will focus. However, it also sets out an argument that can then be developed throughout each paragraph, and rounds off with an overall judgement in the conclusion. Therefore Introduction 2 is of a higher level than Introduction 1 (see page 93). Introduction 2
95Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 3c: The state and cultural change Overview Soviet leaders attempted to use art to motivate their people to support the government and build socialism. However, Soviet leaders were also keen to control painters, sculptors, writers and musicians. Stalin described artists as ‘engineers of the human soul’. In that sense he recognised the power of art, power that could be used against the regime if it was not correctly directed. In the early years of the Soviet Union there was a great deal of creativity as avant-garde artists worked to produce a new revolutionary art. However, Party officials did not understand or approve of the new experimental revolutionary style. As the Party extended its control of society it tightened its grip on art and artists. Under Stalin there was an approved style: Socialist Realism created idealised paintings and sculptures of heroic Soviet workers and the utopian future they were building. Khrushchev tried to encourage a greater freedom in the arts, hoping to create an alliance between the government and artists. However, liberalisation led to literature that was hostile to the Soviet Government and therefore Khrushchev’s policy zigzagged fr om openness to repression. Brezhnev’s policy was much more consistent: experimental art was not tolerated. However, the new form of consumer socialism that Khrushchev pioneered and Brezhnev continued created a cultural shift of its own. Fashion became a big issue, and Soviet leaders tried to rein in self-expression. This chapter considers: 1 Proletkult and the avant-garde, 1917–29 2 Socialist Realism, 1930–53 3 Thaw and non-conformity, 1954–64 4 Clashes between artists and the government to 1985. Note it down Using a note-making style of your choice, make notes on the different attitudes towards art among senior Communists in the early 1920s. Make sure that you highlight the key differences and how each thinker justified their approach to art. Make notes on the consequences of these different views for Soviet art in the 1920s. Finally, look up the works of art mentioned in this section on the internet and make a document containing images of these examples. Annotate the images, making sure you record the name of the artist, the title of the piece and the date it was produced. 1 Proletkult and the avant-garde, 1917–29 Following the October Revolution, new forms of art f lourished. The notion of a truly revolutionary art inspired painters, sculptors, fi lm makers and artists of all k inds to create new kinds of art. What is more, there were disagreements among leading members of the Communist Party about what revolutionary art should actually mean. Even so, all the leading Communists ag reed that art was of prime importance to the future of the revolution. Lenin was extremely interested in the potential and purposes of art. He was particularly interested in cinema, which he thought was the art of the future. Bukhar in, who played a leading role in Soviet politics throughout the mid-1920s, was a champion of artistic expression. For these reasons, there was a vibrant and experimental Soviet art scene from 1917 to 1929. Proletarian art? Communists believed that the October Revolution had ended capitalism and therefore had created a new kind of society where workers would increasingly be their own masters. However, Communists disagreed on what the new revolutionary culture should be like. Anatoly Lunacharsky, the new People’s Commissar of Enlightenment, argued that following the revolution proletarian culture should flourish. Lenin, however, believed that the proletariat should lear n from the best of bourgeois culture. Lunacharsky and Proletkult Lunacharsky argued that just as capitalism had been dominated by bourgeois culture, so the new revolutionary society should be dominated by proletarian culture: art made by working people reflecting the concerns and experiences of working people. Additionally, Lunacharsky believed that a truly revolutionary society should foster artistic talent among working people, as artistic expression was an important part
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin96 of a fulf illing life. Lunacharsky believed that proletarian culture would be fundamentally different to bourgeois culture. Proletarian culture, he argued, would naturally focus on collective experience and involve a wide range of people. However, Bourgeois culture, he argued, reflected the culture of capitalism. Therefore bourgeois culture was individualistic and dominated by an artistic elite. In order to foster the growth of proletarian culture, Lunacharsky supported Proletkult: the proletarian culture movement. The new organisation was established prior to the October Revolution. From 1918 to 1920 it became a national movement with branches across Russia. Through Proletkult , working people had access to local studios where they could paint, sculpt, rehearse plays and put on exhibitions and shows. By 1920 there were around 84,000 members of Proletkult working in over 300 studios. Proletkult published Gorn (Furnace) a monthly magazine that showcased the work of proletarian artists. Crucially, Proletkult was an independent organisation, free of Communist Party control. Bukharin was a champion of Proletkult. He used his position as editor of Pravda to promote the organisation throughout the Civil War. Lenin and revolutionary culture Lenin was cr itical of Lunacharsky’s philosophy and Proletkult . Lenin argued that the best culture was universal. It was neither bourgeois nor proletarian; rather it reflected the human spirit. Therefore he defended bourgeois culture and a rgued that working people should learn from the best bourgeois artists who had created a universal culture. Lenin also had misgivings about Proletkult. He believed that in searching for a new cu lture, Proletkult was encouraging artists to embrace Futurism, a style that Lenin believed was the worst kind of bourgeois art. Lenin argued that Futurism was degenerate, in the sense that it celebrated individual self-expression, and most working people simply could not understand it. Futurism Futurism was an international artistic movement that was inspired by urbanisation, youth and modern technology. Futurism emerged in the early twentieth century and influenced painting, sculpture and literature as well as other art forms. Futurist sculpture and painting was often influenced by angular industrial shapes. Futurists also attempted to capture the experience of travelling at high speed, which they associated with modern technologies such as cars and aeroplanes. Kazimir Malevich, best known for his painting ‘Black Square’ (1915), was the most famous Russian artist to be influenced by Futurism. The dissolution of Proletkult Proletkult flourished from 1917 to 1920, which was a remarkable achievement in the context of the Civil War. However, Lenin was suspicious of the organisation. He believed that Proletkult was dominated by socialists associated with opposition movements such as anarchism. Moreover, he believed that working people needed a basic education rather than opportunities for artistic expression. Therefore he believed that the continued independence of Proletkult was a danger to the revolution. Lunacharsky continued to defend the independence of Proletkult. However, Lenin sent representatives to the National Congress of Proletkult, which took place in October 1920. Following an appeal for Proletkult to support the Communist Government, the Congress voted and voluntarily merged with the Commissariat of Education. Dissenting artists who wanted to stay independent were criticised in the Soviet press. Following the merger, government funds were diverted from local activities to supporting traditional arts such as ballet. Agitprop Lenin and Trotsky believed that art could be used to inspire people to support the new government. In 1920, this led to the establishment of the Department of Agitation Propaganda (agitprop), a department within the Communist Party. In the same year, the Commissar of Enlightenment established a similar department: Glavpolitprosvet . Together these departments organised propaganda that was designed to support the government. The agitprop departments that were formed in 1920 built on propaganda work that had been going on since the revolution. Agitprop was often produced by avant-garde artists working for the government. In this sense, the style of early agitprop was experimental, much more experimental than Lenin was happy with, and much more experimental than anything produced after 1929. The avant-garde Avant-garde is a French term that can be translated as ‘advance guard’ or ‘vanguard’. In terms of art, it was used in the early twentieth century to refer to artists who were on the cutting edge of experimental art and culture. Avant-garde artists experimented with a variety of influences such as chance, geometric shapes, technology and the influence of dreams in order to create new kinds of art.
97Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 Painting and sculpture Russian artists associated with the avant-garde collaborated with the government to make posters, sculptures and paintings to encourage support for the new regime. El Lissitzky, a graphic designer and photographer, created the poster ‘Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge’ in 1918, one of the most famous experimental posters of the Civil War. The poster uses geometric shapes to represent the Red Army and the White Army. The style is reminiscent of the abstract art of the period, particularly ka zimir Malevich’s Suprematist work, which is also based on geometric shapes. Lissitzky’s poster also formed the basis of a sculpture in which a red wedge splits a block of white stone. The sculpture was unveiled in Moscow in October 1918 to celebrate the anniversary of the October Revolution. ‘Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge’ was one of over 100 agitprop posters that were produced during the Civil War. The Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA) worked with artists to produce posters that were displayed in shop windows or on the side of agitprop trains. Vladimir Mayakovsky, a poet and designer, made a series of simple graphic posters reminding Russians of the horrors of Tsarism and encouraging them to support the Red Army. Vladimir Tatlin was another artist who used sculpture to support the new regime. His ‘Monument for the Third International’ was designed to be the tal lest monument in the world. The monument was designed to be made from a series of geometric shapes that moved at different rates so that the shape of the monument was continually shifting. A ten foot (3 metre) model of the monument was completed in 1920, but the final monument was never built. ‘Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge’, 1918. In what ways is this poster revolutionary?
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin98 Revolutionary photography Alexander Rodchenko was the most famous avant-garde photographer to collaborate with the Soviet Government in its early years. Rodchenko used techniques such as photomontage to make posters celebrating the revolution. He was one of the founders of Constructivism, a Russian artistic movement which sought to produce art with a clear purpose. Indeed, during the period of the NEP Rodchenko used his talents to create advertising posters for companies. Revolutionary cinema Lenin believed that cinema was the most important art form of the twentieth century. He also argued that it should be used to inspire support for the new government. During the Civil War cinematic equipment, such as cameras, films and projectors, were extremely scarce. Nonetheless, in the 1920s, Soviet cinema flourished. Experimental film makers such as Dziga Vertov and Sergei Eisenstein made films that supported the reigne. Dziga Vertov Vertov was an experimental film maker. He rejected the Hollywood style, including the use of scripts, sets and actors. He preferred to make ‘cinema of fact’. Therefore his technique was simply to film people as they worked, shopped or had fun. Vertov made a series of documentary films called Kino-Pravda (fi lm-truth). He used mirrors, sped film up or slowed it down, ran fil m backwards and used montages to achieve experimental effects. Inf luenced by Futurism, he mounted cameras on cars and trains to capture the feeling of speed. He also spent a lot of time fi lming machines. His most famous film, A man with a movie camera (1929), was filmed in some of the Soviet Union’s biggest cities and tells the story of a day in the life of a Soviet city. His films were so experimental that the Soviet newspaper Pravda described them as ‘insane’, ‘puzzling’ and ‘laughable’. Sergei Eisenstein Eisenstein made a series of agitational films in the 1920s, which combined a revolutionary message with experimental fi lm making. Unlike Vertoz, he did use actors, scripts and sets, and his fil ms told clear stories. In the mid-1920s Eisenstein designed a series of seven films, entitled Towards Dictatorship of the Proletariat, which were designed to tell the story that led to the October Revolution. Strike (1925) was the first part of this series, and told the story of a strike set in 1903. Significantly, Eisenstein’s film was influenced by Futurism and abstract art, and it contained many scenes dominated by circles or grids. Eisenstein also used special effects to combine human faces with the faces of animals. Battleship Potemkin tells the story of a naval mutiny which took place during the 1905 Revolution, and October: Ten Days That Shook the World (1928) dramatised the events of the October Revolution. By the late 1920s Eisenstein’s experimental techniques were criticised as they could not be understood by workers and peasants. Moreover, in the 1930s the films were edited to take out references to Trotsky. Eisenstein continued to make films in a more traditional style under Stalin. Art under the NEP During the period of the NEP, there was a relatively large degree of creative freedom. However, as the 1920s went on the Communist Party was able to assert a greater degree of artistic control. From 1918 to late 1920, Lenin and senior Communists were preoccupied with winning the Civil War, and therefore there was relatively loose control of artists. Consequently, during this period Proletkult and avant-garde artists flourished. However, as the Civil War came to an end, Lenin began to enforce tighter control of artistic expression. The first victim was Proletkult. By the end of the 1920s, the Communist Party was firmly in control of art. According to most senior Communists, workers and peasants simply could not understand avant-garde art. Therefore, as the 1920s progressed, the avant-garde became less inf luential. Artists were forced to change their style and artistic institutions were attacked and in some cases closed. Kazimir Malevich, for example, sent his most radical paintings to Germany in 1927 and adopted a more conventional style at the end of his life. Moreover, the Petrograd State Institute of Artistic Culture was forced to close in 1926 following a campaign against avant-garde art in Pravda. The newspaper claimed that the art school was using government money to encourage individualism and debauchery. Off icial concerns about contemporary art forms encouraging moral problems also extended to popular culture. From the mid-1920s the government was critical of the inf luence of American fashion and music on young people. Fashion from the USA, particularly clothes associated with the flapper style, and jazz were extremely popular with young people in Soviet cities. Party leaders claimed that the new fashion and the rhythmic new music encouraged sexual promiscuity and drunkenness. They were also concerned that young people would rather dance than attend lect
99Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 late 1920s. These artists painted in the traditional style of nineteenth-century painters and produced pictures that obviously celebrated the achievements of the Soviet Government. Works such as Aleksandr Deyneka’s ‘The Defence of Petrograd’ won the praise of Party off icials. Conclusion In the early stages of the revolution there was considerable room for creativity. Experimental and avant-garde artists f lourished as long as they supported the Communist Party. There were also radical experiments in creating a new proletarian culture. However, as the Communists consolidated their power, they attempted to extend their control of artistic expression. Lenin considered independent artistic expression da ngerous and encouraging creativity among workers a waste of time. During the 1920s Communist leaders became increasingly worried about the moral problems that they believed modern art and pop culture caused. Therefore, from the mid- 1920s, independent creativity dwindled, the government criticised Vertov and Eisenstein for their experimental style and new more traditional artists emerged to satisfy the conservative tastes of Party off icials. 2 Socialist Realism, 1930–53 Stalin had strong views on art and therefore initiated a signif icant shift in Soviet art. Like many Communists, Stalin was suspicious of the avant-garde and experimental techniques. In 1930, Stalin wrote an article in The Bolshevik, which argued that revolutionary art should reflect government priorities rather than individual creativity. He also criticised abstract art and non-narrative fi lms arguing that ordinary Soviet citizens could not understand them. Following the establishment of the Union of Soviet Writers (USW) in 1932, the new group of artists developed ‘Socialist Realism’. The USW argued that the new style was genuinely revolutionary. Quickly this new style inf luenced other art forms. In many ways, this new style had been developing in the 1920s; the key change was the level of official support for the new traditionalism. Note it down Make an index card for each of the artistic styles discussed in this section: Futurism, avant-garde and Socialist Realism. On each card, make detailed notes about: ● the key features of the style ● key examples of art in this genre ● arts associated with the genre. Defining the new style Socialist Realism proved hard to define. Ivan Kulik, President of the Union of Soviet Writers, argued that Socialist Realism had two qualities: ● It contained a ‘true reflection of reality’. ● It aimed to ‘participate in the building of socialism’. In painting, this came to mean ar t that was realistic, in the sense that pictures looked a lot like photographs, and socialist in the sense that they were paintings of factory construction or workers producing raw materials. In terms of literature, the new style meant novels had to have a plot that ordinary people could follow and had to focus on a subject that was related to building socialism. Fyodor Gladkov’s 1924 novel Cement was held up as an example. The novel tells the story of a group of workers who, having played a major role in the Civil War, reconstruct a cement factory. Ballet changed too, to reflect the new style. In the 1920s Soviet ballet had been influenced by Constructivism and Futurism, therefore dance moves were angular. Additionally Soviet impresarios, such as Sergei Diaghilev commissioned experimental scores. For example in 1925 he commissioned world renowned Russian composer Sergei Prokofiev to write the music for The Steel Step, a Constructivist ballet. The ballet was designed to celebrate Soviet industrialisation and the used experimental techniques such as chromaticism. Under Stalin ballet became more traditional. From the early 1930s Soviet ballet became more about telling epic stories and much less about creative choriography. Leonid Lavrosky’s version of Romeo and Juliet, staged in 1940, was praised by the Soviet press for telling stories that were accessible to working people. Artistic production Under Stalin, art was produced in a similar way to other goods. Artists were set targets for the number of paintings or sculptures they were required to produce and sent to factories or collective farms to record what they saw. Equally, in 1936, during the Great Terror Soviet artists were purged. Nonetheless, according to Alexander Gerasimov, Stalin’s favourite painter, the terror led to a new ‘creative atmosphere of enthusiasm among the entire mass of artists’. Socialist Realism focused on building socialism as Kulik intended. To celebrate the opening of a ball-bearing factory, Soviet sculptors working in 1932 produced a giant sculpture of a ball bearing ten metres in diameter. Many paintings focused on the Five-Year Plans. For example, Gustav Klutsis’s ‘In the Storm of the Third Year of the Five- Year Plan’ portrays heroic workers mining, and Alexander
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin100 Lobanov’s painting ‘Training Workers for Magnitogorsk’ depicts the daily occurrence at the new Soviet steelworks. Soviet artists also celebrated Collectivisation. Samuil Adlivankin’s painting ‘Voting to Expel the Kulak from the Collective Farm’, for example, showed popular enthusiasm for dekulakisation. The style continued into the 1940s and 1950s. Famous paintings from Stalin’s later years include Fedor Shurpin’s ‘Morning of Our Motherland ’ (1949), which shows Stalin standing in a landscape transformed by collectivisation and industrialisation. The painting is full of the tractors, chimneys and pylons created by Stalin’s rule. The painting presents the Soviet Union as a utopia, and yet Stalin looks into the future, apparently imagining even greater things. Aleksei Vasilev’s painting ‘They are Writing About Us in Pravda’ (1951) focuses on the plentiful harvests and easy lives of peasants on collective farms. In that sense, Socialist Realism was deeply unrealistic. However, in part, these pictures were designed to show Soviet citizens the future that they were working towards, a utopian future of peace and plenty on efficient farms and in modern factories. Sculpture focused on the people building socialism as well as the process of building socialism. The leading Socialist Realist sculptor, Sergey Merkurov, was famous for creating giant statues of Lenin and Sta lin. He created the three largest sculptures of Stalin in the Soviet Union. Musical style was also more traditional in the 1930s. Stalin wanted music that was rousing and heroic. He praised Shostakovich’s music for the film Maxim’s Youth (1953). The film is part of a trilogy telli ng the story of an ordinary worker. Shostakovich composed a revolutionary song for the fi lm. The melody was so strong that Stalin sang along at the screening. Stalin liked the music because it could be sung by ordinary people. He also praised the use of accordions in the opening of the film because they were a common musical instrument that working people could relate to. Stalin also praised nationalistic music, and some of the music Shostakovich wrote under Stalin was based on melodies from traditional Russian folk music. Examples of Shostakovich’s nationalistic music include his Suite on Finnish Themes, which celebrated the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939. Dissenting artists There was a small amount of room in Soviet art in the 1930s to dissent from Stalin’s artistic vision. One way of doing this was to celebrate the achievements of Lenin rather than Stalin. The world famous Soviet film maker, Dziga vertov did this in his 1934 trilogy Three Songs about Lenin. The film focused on Lenin’s vision and the achievements of ordinary people. Stalin was barely mentioned in the fi lm. Conclusion Stalinism led to conformity and government control in almost all areas of life. Art was no exception. The art of Stalin’s period, however, did not simply reflect Stalin’s views on art. Rather it reflected growing concerns among Communists during the 1920s about the impact of experimental art and pop culture on the Soviet people. For many Communists in the 1920s and 1930s Socialist Realism was the best form of art for the new society. It could be understood by the Soviet people, its style reflected the best traditions of Russian art a nd the heroic subject matter inspired the Soviet people to give themselves to the construction of socialism. Nonetheless, the conformity was stif ling, and the new post-Stalin leadership were keen to allow greater freedom of expression following Stalin’s death. 3 Thaw and non-conformity, 1954–64 Khrushchev’s cultura l policy went through a series of ‘thaws’ and ‘freezes’. During the ‘thaws’ a degree of freedom of expression was encouraged, and during the ‘freezes’ government control was re-emphasised. This ‘zig- zag’ policy ref lected the contradictions in Khr ushchev’s approach to art and the pressure Khrushchev was under from the Communist Party to m aintain control and supress the truth about the true horrors of Stalin’s policies. Note it down Draw a timeline of the period 1954–64. Using bullet points, make notes on Khrushchev’s cultural policy during this period. You could use one colour for periods of thaw and another for periods when control over art was tightened up. Make sure you note down examples of the books that were written and published during this period. Khrushchev and art Khrushchev wanted to forge an alliance between the Party and creative intellectuals. Successive Soviet Governments had invested in education. As a result of investment in Soviet universities there were a growing number of intellectuals in the Soviet Union. Moreover, improvements in education meant that the Soviet intelligentsia was the fastest growing section of society in the 1960s. Khrushchev believed that intellectuals should help the government build socialism. Moreover, he believed that true intellectuals would underst
101Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 with Soviet leaders. He also believed that Communism should liberate artists. However, Khrushchev believed that ordinary Soviet workers were not ready for complete freedom, or even for the truth about Stalin’s policies. Indeed, he believed that freedom could destabilise the Party by allowing criticism of the government. Therefore Khrushchev’s policies lurched between his desire to increase freedom for some and his concern that too much freedom, especially for ordinary citizens, could undermine the regime. The ‘thaws’ Under Khrushchev Soviet culture experienced a series of ‘thaws’: ● 1953–54: Following Stalin’s death, the government authorised a series of novels which acknowledged generational differences between the new generation of the 1950s and the previous generation of Stalinists. The Soviet journal New World published Ilya Ehrenburg’s story The Thaw. The novel was critical of various aspects of Stalinism, including mass terror. ● 1956–57: Following Khrushchev’s Secret Speech (see page 31), there was another period of cultural liberalisation. New World published Vladimir Dudintsev’s Not by Bread Alone. Again, the story was critical of the Stalin period. Dudintsev’s novel tells the story of an innovative worker’s battles with the unjust Party bureaucracy. ● 1961–62: Followi ng the Twenty-Second Part y Congress and the vote to remove Stalin’s body from Red Square, a number of books were published that were critical of aspects of Sta lin’s rule. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s short story One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, which tells of the life of a prisoner in the Gulag, is the best-known work published in the period. Additionally, Dmitri Shostakovich’s opera, ‘Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk’, which had not been performed in the Soviet Union since Sta lin cr iticised it in 1936, was performed agai n in 1962. The ‘thaws’ were not purely about literature; there were other cultural innovations during these periods. For example, during the World Youth Festival, held in Moscow in 1957, young people d anced to ja zz music and African dr ummin g. Equally, in terms of music the Soviet Union experienced a ‘thaw’ under Khrushchev. For example, the classical music of Western Europe and the US, which was not taught in schools under Stalin, was put back on the curriculum in 1957. For example the work of US composer George Gershwin, which was inf luenced by jazz, was taught in schools from the late 1950s. However, at the end of each period there was a temporary freeze, as artistic expression went beyond the limits that the authorities were prepared to tolerate. For example, following the initial thaw in 1953–54, Boris Pasternak’s novel Doctor Zhivago led to cultura l restrictions. Pasternak’s novel was critical of Lenin’s period as leader and therefore unacceptable to Khrushchev’s regime. The book was banned in the Soviet Union until the late 1980s. Equally, after the fina l thaw Khrushchev was horrified by an exhibition of Moscow artists. He reacted to the show with anger shouting loudly that the work of the abstract artist Ernst Neizvestny was ‘dog shit’. The fina l freeze led to the arrest and imprisonment of several artists. The poet Josef Brodsky, for example, was arrested in January 1964. Challenging non-conformity In spite of the various ‘thaws’ the government was still keen to challenge non-conformity. Propaganda and ‘popular oversight’ Under Khr ushchev there was a significant change in Soviet propaganda. During Stalin’s rule, Soviet people had been depicted as heroic and, in a conventional sense, beautiful. Soviet farms and factories had been depicted as modern, efficient and harmonious. However, after 1954 this changed. Increasingly, propaganda posters poked fun at Soviet people. Graphic designers such as V. Fomichev and N. Denisovski designed posters that showed Soviet people in a new light. The new posters attempted to challenge non-conformity through ‘popular oversight’. Posters presented non- conformist citizens as comically bald, fat or laz y. ‘The Lazy Bureaucrat’ (1961) shows a plump man sitting at a disorganised desk. ‘The Alcoholic’ (1959) depicts a drunk ma n lying in a pool of his own vomit. The posters were designed to encourage ‘popular oversight’. Citizens were expected to keep other citizens under surveillance. However, rather than report misbehaving citizens to the police, good citizens were encouraged to intervene with helpful moral advice. For example, the poster ‘When two girls met’ (1963) tells the moral tale of how a good working-class upbringing leads to a disciplined child, whereas the children of indulgent intellectual parents grow up to be lazy, selfish and obsessed with fashion. Khrushchev-era posters were also a break from the past in that they recognised the ineff iciencies of Soviet farms and factories. For example, ‘The Cowshed’ (1958) pokes fun at the inefficiencies on Soviet farms by showing two cows living in a palace, complete with chandel
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin102 also contained a quote from kruschev criticising waste and at the top of the poster a quote from Khrushchev criticises wasteful spending on farms. Fomichev and Denisovski’s artistic style was also a break with the past as they tended to produce work that was similar to US car toons of the period. ‘The Alcoholic’ (1959). Disciplining ‘style hunters’ Khrushchev’s government went to great lengths to ensure that women conformed. The government was concerned that women would be seduced by consumerism into lives of wanton gl amour and reckless shopping. Consequently, there was an off icial campaign against young women who adopted Western fashion, so called ‘stilyaga’ (style hunters). Apparently, officials at Gosplan believed that women’s natural desire to shop could lead to lasting economic problems in a consumer society. Female sexuality was also a cause of off icial concern. The government assumed that fashionable clothes implied sexual promiscuity. As a result t here were official campaigns ag ainst Western fashion and ‘loose women’ in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The 1957 World Youth Festival had raised concerns that young Soviet women were having sex with male delegates from other countries. Notably, the authorities did not consider Soviet men having sex with foreign women a problem. During the festival squads of Party members patrolled the streets a nd shaved the heads of young Soviet women that they found having sex with foreign men. In some cases, these women were deported and forced to work on farms in the Virgin Lands for their ‘crimes’. Women’s lifestyles worried policy makers due to rising teen pregnancy, abortion rates and the many ‘children of the festival’. Soviet officials were worried by what they considered to be the emergence of a new phenomenon: female sexual desire. Officials considered male heterosexual desire to be natural and normal, but female sexual desire, of any kind, was considered to be a sign of unhealthy influences. Welfare policies attempted to direct women towards marriage and childbearing as a more healthy expression of their sexuality. Increased levels of consumer goods led to increased consumer choice. However, economic plan ners and government propaganda campaigns sought to guide women to make the ‘right choices’. Planned production of consumer goods wa s used to constrain women’s choices. Economic planners planned the production of cosmetics and clothes in accordance with semi-official standard s of beauty. The Teacher’s Gazette, a magazine aimed at female teachers, set out guida nce on how to dress appropriately in the consumer age. The magazine argued that Soviet women should dress in a way that reflected the socialist consensus, rather than seeking to express their individuality. The advice was given to female teachers as they were considered role models for young women. The maga zine advised ‘overly bright lipstick, colour on the eyelids and red nail varnish make a woman look vulga r’. Additionally, the Soviet Government went to great lengths to restrict public access to the 1959 American National Exhibition which contained an American beauty salon and fashion show. Government posters contrasted wholesome Soviet young women who wore knee-length skirts and plaits with young women who, following American fashions, wore capri pants and had shorter blow-dried hair. In essence, Khrushchev’s government, like the Soviet Government of the 1920s, associated modern fashion with frivolity, wastefulness and decadence. While the government and the Party encouraged women to adopt simple, contemporary, but conventional ways of dressing, they were unable to stop the rise of the stilyagism (fashion hunters). The government failed to constrain the Soviet desire for fashion. Between 1964 and 1970 consumer spending on clothes tripled. Moreover, in cities over half the clothes that were available in shops never sold, as shoppers considered them unfashionable. Rich city families employed private dressmakers, who worked from foreign fashion
103Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 magazines to produce clothes that satisfied modern tastes. By 1985, 450 Western magazines were available on the black market in big Soviet cities. The government continued to try to combat the ‘Western influence’ of fashion. However, during the 1970s trade with the West increased, so Soviet cinemas showed fi lms from the US and Western Europe that effectively showcased Western fashion. Soviet directors followed the lead of popular US films. For example, the heroine of The Blonde around the Corner (1983) wears Western clothes and lives in a fa shionable apartment. This strategy was clearly successful as it attracted 24 m illion people. The 1970s and early 1980s During the 1970s and early 1980s the government was still concerned about Western styles. Therefore Soviet magazines continued to ridicule Western ways of dressing, and teachers were expected to discourage Western styles at school. Nonetheless, sometimes official attempts to discourage new fashions backfired. For example, the comedy film An Office Romance (1977) ridiculed a fashionable young female secretary for her love of ‘provocative’ clothes. Nonetheless, audiences identified with the secretary rather than her conservative poorly dressed boss. Where women led, men followed. During the 1970s men too were approaching private tailors to get suits with the latest Western looks. In terms of pop culture, the government lost the battle against non-conformity, at least among women in the cities. By the mid-1970s the fashion hunters had won. Deviant artists Khrushchev’s ‘thaws’ did not allow all Soviet artists to publish their work through official government-owned publishing houses. Therefore, from the late 1950s, writers produced ‘samizdat ’ (self-published) magazines and books (see page 89). Alexander Ginzburg is the be st-known figure in the underground samizdat movement. He edited the magazine Syntax, which circulated on the Soviet black market. Doctor Zhivago was refused publication in 1954 in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, foreign editions were smuggled into the country and samizdat editions were also produced. Artists who refused to submit to government control were sent to psychiatric institutions in order to be cured. Josef Brodsky, for example, was sent to the Serbsky Institute where he was confined with people who suffered from mental illnesses that made them violent. Some artists were forcibly medicated as part of their ‘treatment’. Conditions in the hospitals were extremely poor. Inmates lived on watery soup, and in the cold and damp conditions their physical and often mental health deteriorated. British schoolboys from Forest Hill School in London visiting Moscow in 1961, being mobbed by young Russian women. In what ways is the fashion or sty le of the two Bri tish schoolboys in the centre of the picture di ffer ent from the yo ung Russians surrounding them?
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin104 4 Clashes between artists and the government to 1985 Some artists were optimistic following Khrushchev’s fal l, hoping that the new leadership would end the cultural ‘freezes’ and initiate a sustained thaw. However, Brezhnev proved less willing to allow criticism of Stalin than his predecessor. Note it down Using a note-making style of your choice, make notes on Soviet art under Brezhnev. Make sure that you note down key examples of conflict between artists and the government, as well as developments of official art during this period. Art and culture under Brezhnev Brezhnev was much less interested in the arts than Khrushchev. However, he was aware of the political impact of art and literature. He was extremely critical of Khrushchev’s wil lingness to publish works that exposed the diff iculties of life in the Soviet Union. Art under Brezhnev became nostalgic. Khrushchev appealed to a bright future and shook faith in the past by criticising Stalin. Brezhnev attempted to revive faith and interest in the heroic days of the revolution. Brezhnev’s cultural conservatism did lead to the creation of some exceptional art, particularly in terms of ballet. During the 1970s and 1980s Soviet ballet was in demand around the world. The Bolshoi Bal let, the Soviet Union’s most famous ballet company, was a source of huge national pride. The ballet Spartacus was one of the Soviet cultural triumphs of the era. The ballet, which celebrates an ancient slave rebellion was originally written in 1954. However, Yury Grigorovich’s choreography for the 1968 production, won international praise for its beauty following tours of Western capitals in the 1970s. Moreover, the Soviet government supported the ballet as the story of slave revolution was in keeping with Soviet ideology and the story was accessible to ordinary Soviet workers. Political scientist Piero Ostellino argues that under Brezhnev there were effectively three groups of artists and intellectuals: ● obedient functionaries: intellectuals and artists who were prepared to work with the system without question, whatever their personal opinions about the regime ● loyal oppositionists: intellectuals and artists who were critical of the system, but expressed their criticisms within off icial channels, trying to improve the system from within ● dissidents: intellectuals and artists who expressed their criticism publicly. The final group presented consistent problems for Brezhnev. The Sinyavsky–Daniel trial Initial hopes that Khrushchev’s fall would lead to a complete thaw were dashed by the trial of authors Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, who were arrested for producing ‘anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda’ in September 1965. The new post-Khrushchev leadership were extremely concerned about Khrushchev’s ‘cultural liberalism’, which they believed was undermining faith in the Soviet Union. Indeed, in early 1965 they commissioned a KGB report which stated that there were 1292 anti-Soviet authors who had written almost 10,000 anti-Soviet documents. In order to send a clear message that the thaw was over, the new leadership ordered the arrest and trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel, two authors who had been allowed considerable freedom under Khrushchev. The Sinyavsky–Daniel trial, which took place in 1966, was essentially a Show Trial. It was signif icant because the only evidence presented against them were their own writings, Daniel’s This is Moscow Speaking and Sinyavsky’s The Trial Begins. Worse still, both writers had enjoyed considerable freedom and some fame under Khrushchev. At the end of the trial the two authors were found guilty and sentenced to seven and five years in a labour camp. The trial, which revived Stalinist methods, and the attack on writers who had f lourished under Khrushchev led to fears that the new leadership were reviving Stalinism. The impact of international pressure The new leadership were, however, aware of the international outrage that persecuting writers and arti sts provoked. Therefore some writers, who had been imprisoned in Khrushchev’s last years, were released. Brodsky, for example, who had been subjected to forced psychiatric treatment and then imprisoned, was released in 1965. International pressure led to a change in the approach of the new leadership to artist dissidents. After the Sinyavsky– Daniel trial, show trials and imprisonment became rare. Rather, well-known dissident artists were allowed to emigrate. Brodsky, for example, emigrated to the USA where he continued writing and won the Nobel Prize for Literature. The Russian cellist, Mstislav Rostropovich,
105Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 a supporter of Boris Pasternak, also emigrated, as did Sinyavsky following his release. Lesser-known artists who deviated from the Party line were sent to psychiatric institutions. They lacked the profile of major artists and psychiatric treatment was not as newsworthy as a prison sentence, therefore the Soviet authorities could use this tactic without provoking embarrassing international reaction. Exact figures are not known, but estimates suggest that by the early 1970s there were 7000 to 8000 dissidents receiving ‘repressive psychiatric treatment’. The impact of the Prague Spring The Prague Spring of 1968 led to further hardening of Brezhnev’s attitude to art and culture. Reformers in Czechoslovakia had attempted to liberalise Communist rule and create ‘socialism with a human face’. This entai led a rejection of Stalinism and much greater freedom of artistic expression. However, the reform led to popular pressure within Czechoslovakia to end Communist rule and break away from the Soviet Union. Brezhnev responded by sending the Soviet Army to crush the liberal regime. The Prague Spring conf irmed Brezhnev’s view that cultural liberalisation was a danger to Communist rule. Therefore, following 1968, there was increasing pressure on artist s to conform. For example, Solzhenitsyn, who published controversial work under Khr ushchev, found it increasingly dif f icult to publish in the Soviet Union following 1968. Moreover, Alexander Tvardovsky, editor of New World and advocate of greater arti stic freedom in the 1950s and 1960s, was f inal ly forced to resign in 1970. The Prague Spring had other cultural consequences for the Soviet Union. Following 1968, Soviet official culture became profoundly nostalgic. The trend towards nostalgia had been obvious since 1965, but from 1968 it became the dominant trend in Soviet art. This was clear in Soviet cinema with films like Liberation (1970) and its four sequels released between 1970 and 1971, which celebrated the Soviet victory in the Second World War. Dissident artists, 1968–85 In spite of Brezhnev’s cultural conservatism and policy of repression, dissident artists continued to write, paint and perform in the Soviet Union throughout his premiership and into the mid-1980s. Nonna Goriunova’s Forest Ritual (1968) was a live performance in which she posed naked in a forest. The performance was a direct attack on the prohibition of nudity in Soviet art, and a statement about female beauty – independent of male desire. During the 1970s a group called the Moscow Conceptualists attempted to make art which was a ‘rebellion against everyday life’. The art that they produced was supposed to expose the truth about Soviet society and therefore be an a ntidote to official propaganda. Ilya Kabakov, one of the Moscow Conceptualists, created a f ictional autobiography called Ten Characters to illustrate the dullness of Soviet life. Finally, painter and writer Natalia Zhilina helped form Leningrad Underground Art. She was a member of the Mitki Collective, founded by Dmitry ‘Mitya’ Shagin in 1984. The initial inspiration for the group was Shagin’s book Mitki, a series of essays about the absurdities of Soviet life. Shagin worked in a boiler room while making his work and encouraged his followers to drink cheap wine and dress shabbily in old military shirts in order to demonstrate their rejection of the system and their preference for ‘warm and soulful pursuits’. The official reaction to the underground art scene was inconsistent. On some occasions exhibitions took place without interference. The Mitki Collective’s first exhibition took place in Leningrad in 1984, without any overt government intervention. However, on other occasions there was repression. The ‘Bulldozer Exhibition’ of September 1974, organised by artists Evgeny Rukhin and Oscar Rabin, for example, was broken up. Police driving bulldozers destroyed many of the paintings and sculptures displayed at the makeshift exhibition. Equally, the second Mitki exhibition of 1985 was raided by the police. Conclusion Brezhnev was highly sceptical of Khrushchev’s ‘thaws’. Moreover, unlike Khrushchev he wanted to celebrate the achievements of the Stalin period, rather than expose its atrocities. Under Brezhnev official art became backward looking, focusing in particula r on the Soviet triumph in the Second World War. The early Sinyavsky–Daniel trial sent a clear message that artistic dissent would not be tolerated and the thaw was over. Nonetheless, international pressure and the uncompromising spirit of Soviet dissident artists meant that by 1985 there was a thriving underground art scene that raids, bulldozers and the threat of psychiatric ‘treatment’ were unable to stamp out.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin106 Work together Having read this chapter, copy and complete the following table: Evidence of total control Evidence of limited control 1917–8 1929–53 1954–64 1965–85 Using your notes on Soviet politics, economics and culture, list evidence that the Soviet Government achieved total control in the left-hand column and evidence that government control was limited in the right-hand column. Having completed the table, swap with a partner. Compare the tables and ensure that you note down any statements that you missed. Discuss how far the Soviet Union truly established total control and in which periods control was at its most extreme. Together write one sentence evaluating the ex tent of control in each era. Chapter summary ● Art in the Soviet Union went through a series of phases. ● In the early days avant-garde artists collaborated with the regime, using their revolutionary style to support the revolutionary regime. ● From the 1930s Socialist Realism became the dominant style. ● After Stalin’s death dissident artists used new styles to promote new messages. ● The relationship between the Communist Party and artists was never easy. ● Communist officials and Party leaders recognised the power of art to inspire and direct the energies of the people. ● However, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev were all wary of the potential of art to be used to undermine the government, to expose the flaws in the Soviet system and to form organisations which could challenge the government. Socialist RealismAvant-garde Revolutionary approach to art, such as abstraction or photo montage Revolutionary themes, such as red victory in the Civil War or electrification Traditional approach to art, such as a representational or photographic style Revolutionary themes related to building or defending socialism, such as happy workers in factories or happy farmers on collective farms Summary diagram: The state and art.
107Theme 3 Control of the people, 1917–85 Essay technique: Counter-argument Activity: Relative importance Imagine you are answering the following question: To what extent were art and propaganda the main way in which the Communist Government consolidated its power in the years 1918–38? Using your notes from the previous chapters: 1 Draw the following diagra m: L e s s im p o rta n t M o re im p o rta n t 2 Write the following factors on cards or post-it notes and place them on the line according to their importance for the consolidation of Communist power (1918–38): – art and propaga nda – the creation of a one-par ty state – terror – compromise. 3 Now write a short argument justifying the relative importance of each factor. TIP: Remember, your argument must contain a statement and a reason. 4 Reverse the order of your first and second most important factors. 5 Write two sentences that explicitly argue that your second most important factor was actua lly the most important factor. This is your counter-argument. TIP: Remember, your counter-argument must contain a statement and a reason. 6 Use your origina l argument and counter-argument as the basis for writing two paragraphs in answer to the question. Essays that develop a good argument are more likely to reach the highest levels, because argumentative essays are more likely to develop sust ained analysis (see page 59). You can set up an argument in your introduction, but you should develop your argument throughout the essay. One way of doing this is to adopt an argument, counter- argument structure. A counter-argument is an argument that disagrees with the main argument of the essay. Setting up an argument and then challenging it with a counter- argument is one way of weighing up, or evaluating, the importance of the different factors that you discuss. Essays of this type will develop an argument in one paragraph and then set out an opposing argument in another paragraph. Imagine you are answering the following question: How far did the Communist Government control art and culture in the Soviet Union in the years 1921–64? You could write an essay in which the first two paragraphs set out the arguments as in the example in the table below: These two paragraphs could be developed into the beginning of a high-level answer. However, you will need to resolve the tension between the argument and the counter- argument (see page 136) and write a conclusion that weighs up the different aspects of the essay (see pages 142–143) in order to write a full essay. Paragraph 1: Argument The Communist Party believed that art and propaganda had an important role to play in building and defending socialism. Therefore they had a high level of control through government control of the media, government commissioning of art and government-produced propaganda. Paragraph 2: Counter-argument However, there were periods in which there was relative artistic freedom, such as during the 1920s and Khrushchev’s ‘thaw’. Therefore the Communist Government did not always seek total control of art and culture.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin108 The Big Picture Lenin and his fellow Bolsheviks believed that their revolution would transform society. Lenin’s vision was that Communism would lead to the benefits created by capitalism being shared by all working people. Lenin looked forward to a society where everyone had a decent standard of living, where everyone was able to benefit from a good education and where there was genuine equality between the sexes. Lenin’s vision was not realised in his lifetime. Civil war and the economic pressures of industrialisation meant that many in the Soviet Union continued to live in poverty, and many were unable to get a decent education during Lenin’s lifetime. Additionally, the ignorance and prejudice of many ma le Communists meant that sexual equality was never achieved. Access to education improved significantly under Stal in, and social benefits of all kinds were much more widely available under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. However, achieving sexual equality proved more difficult. From 1930 successive governments failed to address the issue of sexual equality. The Communist Party was male dominated. Most senior Communists failed to understand the problems of sexism in the Soviet Union and believed that sexual equality had been achieved. Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 In this theme you will consider the following: ➜ Social security: full employment, the provision of housing and social benefits, 1917–53; Khrushchev, Brezhnev, social security and social stability, 1953–85 ➜ Women and the family: women’s changing status in towns and the countryside; government attitudes towards women and the family ➜ Education and young people: the growth of education; literacy campaigns; state control of the curriculum. TIMELINE 1918 Compulsory labour introduced 1918 Komsomol founded 1919 Zhenotdel created 1919 The Decree on Illiteracy published 1922 The Young Pioneers established 1927 Fees for primary schools abolished 1930 Zhenotdel abolished 1940 Internal passport s introduced 1943 Gender segregation introduced into secondary schools 1947 Vaccines for common diseases such as typhus and malaria made universally available 1955 Abortion legalised 1963 Valentina Tereshkova becomes the first woman in space 1974 Construction of the Baikal–Amur Mainline (BAM) initiated 1979 Almanac, a small feminist movement, established in Leningrad
109Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 4a: Social security Overview From 1917 to 1985 successive Soviet Governments tried to organise an economy in which everyone worked and everyone had a good standard of social security. To some extent this reflected an ideological commitment to run an economy in a way that reflected the values of socialism rather than capitalism. Under War Communism the government, for the first time, introduced compulsor y labour. Rather than being paid, workers received free housing, free transport and food rations. The NEP’s compromise with capitalism led to the re-emergence of unemployment. However, the commitment to social welfare continued, and industrial workers benefited from the most extensive benefit system in the world at that time. Stalin’s Great Turn reintroduced compulsory labour. However, he prioritised economic construction over social welfare and therefore economic grow th did not lead to a better quality of life. Housing, which was already a particular problem, turned into a crisis by the end of the 1930s. Khrushchev re-emphasised welfare. He initiated housing programmes and an extension of welfare that transformed the lives of Soviet citizens. Brezhnev continued with Khrushchev’s policies, and although standards of living continued to improve, Brezhnev’s ‘social contract’ led to a stagnant society and a declining economy. This chapter considers: 1 Full employment and social benefits, 1917–53 2 Housing, 1917–53 3 Khrushchev, Brezhnev and the promotion of a stable society, 1953–85. 1 Full employment and social benefits, 1917–53 From 1917 to 1953 Lenin and Stalin tried to create economic systems that rewarded work and made sure that working people would receive benefits such as healthcare. However, economic problems undermined the system’s capacity to provide benefits for all. Moreover, Party members received more substantial benefits than the rest of the population. Note it down The provision of social benefits went through a series of phases between 1917 and 1953. Skim the tex t and the sub-headings and work out what the major phases were. Use a note-making style of your choice to make notes on healthcare provision in each phase. In each case begin by noting down a general statement about the availability of benefits in that period. Then take down specific details that demonstrate what was available and the limits of availability. Marxism and work Marxism is, in part, a theory about work. One of Marx’s central criticisms of capitalism was that capitalist economies do not reward work. Marx argued that under capitalism people grow rich because they own property allowing them to charge rent and to own anything that is produced in their property. Workers, however, stay poor because they have no property. Marx viewed capitalists as ‘parasites’ in the sense that they lived off the work of the working class without contributing to their well-being. After the revolution Marx argued that parasitism should be abolished and that all able people should work. Marx also argued that the relationship between work and wealth would go through two phases after the revolution: ● Socialist economic organisation would be based on the principle: ‘from each according to their ability, to each according to their ability.’ Therefore work, rather than property, would be the key to gaining economic resources. ● Communist economic organisation would be based on a higher principle: ‘from each according to their ability, to each according to their need.’ Marx believed that during Communism, the fina l phase of human history, society would be so wealthy that everyone would be able to have what they needed. Therefore he argued that people would contribute in whatever way they could and get the resources they needed, regardless of the scale of the contribution they made. Work and benefits under Lenin Lenin’s view of work was influenced by Marx. Indeed, in 1918 he published the Declaration of the Rights of Toiling and Exploited People, which introduced two principles that were designed to transform work: ● The Declaration abolished the private ownership of land. Therefore capitalists could no longer make money simply by owning things.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin110 ● The Declaration introduced universal labour duty. This was designed ‘to eliminate the parasitical layers of society’ by ensuring that everybody worked and therefore capitalists could no longer simply live off the labour of others. These principles were enshrined in every version of the Soviet Constitution. In many ways, the Soviet system failed to reflect these principles, but in some senses they continued to inspire policy makers until the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. Work 1917–18 Lenin’s economic policy went through several phases but they all ref lected the Communist Party’s belief in the duty of all people to labour. Ensuring stable employment was extremely diff icult between October 1917 and m id-1918. The revolutions of 1917 had caused economic chaos. Around 570 industrial enterprises closed between March and August 1917. As a result, unemployment had increased to over 100,000 by October 1918. The situation worsened after the October Revolution. Lenin called a tr uce, effectively taking Russia out of the First World War. Consequently, war production ceased, leading to higher unemployment. By March 1918, 75 per cent of chemical and metal workers in Petrograd were unemployed. During this period Lenin stressed the duty of labour discipline and collaboration between workers and their former bosses, who were employed as ‘bourgeois specialists’. Importantly, the ‘bourgeois specialists’ no longer made money through property. Rather they received wages for their work running factories and organising production. Lenin’s early economic plans failed to stop the disintegration of the economy and rising unemployment. War Communism (see page 43), changed patterns of work again. Work and benefits, 1918–21 In theory, War Communism was based on a relationship between the government and workers. Workers had a duty to provide labour, and the government had a duty to provide food and basic amenities. The widespread unemployment of early 1918 was ended by the introduction of compulsory labour. From September 1918 able-bodied men between 16 and 50 lost the right to refuse employment. People in work were issued a work card which entitled them to food rations. War Communism also ref lected the principle of allocating resources according to the value of work. After money was abolished, rations were allocated according to occupation. The population was divided into six groups according to their occupation. The rationing system was based on class, so that working-cla ss people received the highest rations, but people working in middle- class occupations such as medical doctors received less. Aristocrats and former factor y owners, ‘the former people’, were entitled to about 25 per cent of the food that working people received. At the height of the rationing system 36 products were rationed and there were 22 million people entitled to ration cards. Rationing was organised by Prodraspred (Section of General Distribution), which had subsections which delivered rations to workers and a Community Section which tried to deliver food to schools and to people who could not work due to sickness or disability. Workers also had access to other benefits, at least in Moscow and Petrograd. For example, a work card entitled workers to travel on public transport. Communal dining halls were set up in factories to feed workers. The government claimed that 93 per cent of people living in Moscow in 1920 were regularly fed in communal dini ng halls. Other communal facilities such as laundries and crèches were also provided in urban centres, in part to help women work in factories. Party members also enjoyed special privileges. The government ran special shops where Party members could acquire food and goods that were scarce. In practice, the system of compulsory work and government provision was unsuccessful: ● Compulsor y labour proved unsustainable in the conditions of the Civil War. By July 1920 factories were beginning to close due to fuel shortages. The government responded by forcing unemployed people to search for fuel or join food detachments, groups of men organised in a similar way to the army who were responsible for searching vi llages for food. ● War Communism never provided more than 50 per cent of the food and fuel that people needed to live on. In the short term, people turned to the black market. In the longer term, workers f led the cities seeking work and food on farms. Between 1917 and 1921 the population of Petrograd dropped by 50 per cent. The total population of factory workers reduced by 25 per cent during the Civil War. Factory closures and food scarcity meant that War Communism ultimately failed to create a system of full employment which provided social security for al l those in work.
111Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 Work and benefits in the 1920s The relationship between compulsory work and government benefits disappeared under the New Economic Policy. Lenin conceived the NEP as a return to state capitalism, with the goal of promoting economic growth. Therefore a degree of capitalism and unemployment returned. Unemployment was a significant problem between 1921 and 1924 (see Table 1). Table 1: Unemployment figures, 1921–24. Year Percentage of the labour force unemployed 1921 5.5 1922 8.6 1923 16.6 1924 18.0 Unemployment surged for a number of reasons: ● In 1921 and 1922 soldiers from the Red Army were demobilised and found it hard to get work. ● Urban workers who left the cities towards the end of the Civil War returned. Some were unable to get jobs. ● At the beginning of the NEP the government tried to ‘rationalise’ industry in order to make it profitable. Therefore the number of workers in government factories was reduced to lower labour costs. ● As War Communism ended, the government sacked around 225,000 administrators who had been employed administering the system. Attempts to increase productivity in 1926 kept urban unemployment high in the mid-1920s. The government prioritised jobs for former members of the Red Army. Additionally, funding for crèches was ended. These policies, and traditional sexism, meant that women were far more likely to be unemployed than men. Indeed, in 1922, 62.2 per cent of unemployed people in the Soviet Union’s towns and cities were women. In spite of these problems, there were some attempts to make sure that workers benefited from work in the Soviet Union. During the 1920s an extensive system of benefits was created for urban workers. The system was administered by trades unions of local soviets: ● The 1922 Labour Law gave unions the right to negotiate binding agreements about pay and working conditions with employers. ● Social insurance, which paid disability benefits, maternity benefits, unemployment benefits and medical benefits covered nine million workers. ● The government invested in education for urban workers and their families (see page 133). The system of social insurance for Soviet workers was the most comprehensive in the world. However, peasants were almost entirely excluded from these benefits due to the government’s focus on the special position of the proletariat. In conclusion, while unemployment was a major problem during the period of the NEP, urban workers were clearly better off in 1926 than they had been before the revolution in 1913. They were paid around ten per cent more and ate more meat and fish. Peasants, by contrast, did not benefit from the social insura nce available in the cities. Work and benefits under Stalin The link between compulsory work and social benefits, which had been eroded under the NEP, was re-established under Stalin. The Five-Year Plans and Collectivisation were deliberate attempts to move away from the compromise with capitalism that took place under the NEP. Therefore various aspects of capitalism that Communists saw as problematic, which had been tolerated in the 1920s, were ended following Stalin’s Great Turn. For Sta lin, Soviet workers were a crucial economic resource, central to building socialism. Therefore he wanted to ensure full employment in order to ensure rapid industrialisation. Employment and benefits in the 1930s Rapid industrialisation led to full employment for men and women. Moreover, relatively well-paid jobs in the cities attracted peasants f leeing the horrors and poverty associated with Collectivisation. However, full employment did not lead to a rising standard of living. Safety was not a benefit that Stalin prioritised for his workers. Therefore working conditions deteriorated as a result of the Five-Year Plans. Speedy construction was more important to Stalin than clean and sa fe workplaces. Equally, miners worked in dangerous conditions as meeting production targets was more important than the health and safety of workers. Stalin introduced harsh labour d iscipline. Many measures that had been brought in as part of War Communism were revived: ● Lateness was crimina lised. ● Unions lost the right to negotiate with factory managers. ● Damaging factory property was crimina lised. ● Strikes were banned. Stalin also introduced the ‘continuous work week’. Workers still received one day off a week, but it changed from week to week. Consequently, factories and mines could work seven days a week, rather than closing down on Sundays.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin112 In 1940 workers lost the right to change jobs. During the Five-Year Plans, demand for labour was very high as factory managers needed as many workers as possible to meet production targets. Therefore workers were able to move from job to job in search of better pay and conditions. This was stopped in 1940, and internal passports were introduced to prevent workers moving from town to town without permission. Over time, the Five-Year Plans did lead to improved benefits: ● Workers were entitled to food rations. ● By 1933 most Soviet citizens had access to electricity. ● During the 1930s, 30,000 km of railways were built, increasing access to transport. Passenger traff ic increased by 400 per cent in the 1930s. ● The Moscow Metro opened in the 1930s, providing underground transport to the population of the capital. ● There was a significant increase in healthcare provision, including mass vaccination campaigns dealing with smallpox, diphtheria, mala ria and t yphoid. ● Factory and farm canteens provided meals for workers. There was a significant shift in how these benefits were administered. Under the NEP benefits were available through trades unions or through local soviets. However, during the 1930s benefits were increasingly available through factories or collective farms. This re-emphasised the link between work and social welfare. New factories became the heart of ‘company towns’, in which factories provided employment and administered benefits, including hospitals and housing (see page 115). Peasants benefited much less than workers. For example, they were not entitled to rations, and food was much scarcer on farms than it was in cities as the government seized the vast majority of farm production. During the late 1930s farm workers would have to travel to towns to buy bread, as there was so little food available on the farms. Soviet healthcare under Stalin Stalin’s healthcare system was linked very closely to employment. Between 1929 and 1950 the government attempted to expand the system to all areas of society. However, healthcare was better in the cities than in small towns or on collective farms. Stalin’s healthcare system was designed to keep workers healthy enough to keep working. Therefore the doctors were based at factories and collective farms. Doctors were required to reduce days lost through sickness year on year. Moreover, doctors were expected to be very strict about allowing people to have time off due to illness. In theory all Soviet citizens had rights to these benefits. However, in practice scarce resources meant that some benefited more than others. For example, Soviet healthcare operated a ‘Party first’ policy, where Party members were guaranteed vaccines and other workers could queue for any medicine that remained. Additionally, while all workers were entitled to rations, senior Party members could organise special events, such as banquets, which were paid for from government money. This system of privileged access to resources led to radical inequalities. For example, in Dnepropetrovsk, a city in the Ukrai ne, all Party off icials were vaccinated against typhus, and yet there were 10,000 cases of malaria among the working population in 1932 and 26,000 in 1933. Employment and benefits, 1945–53 Full employment continued after the war. The industrial workforce increased from 8 mill ion to 12.2 mill ion between 1945 and 1950 largely as a resu lt of returning soldiers. Food shortages had a significant impact on the benefits workers received. Eating in com munal ca nteens cost workers between 250 and 300 roubles a month in 1947, about half of a worker’s monthly wages. Workers under 18 were entitled to three subsidised meals a day in f actory or farm canteens. However, the subsidies only covered 2.3 kg of meat and six eggs a month, and most young workers, who earned low wages due to their junior positions, could not afford to pay for the meals. As a result there was a marked decline in communal eating following the war. Conditions were better in Stalin’s later years. In spite of the war, healthcare improved significantly from 1940: ● Infa nt morta lity declined by 50 per cent between 1940 and 1950. ● The number of medical doctors increased by two-th irds between 1947 and 1952. ● Vaccines for common diseases such as typhus and malaria were made universally available from 1947. Malaria declined radically from 1949 onwards. Nonetheless, the expansion of healthcare did not lead to an improvement in the health of the Soviet people. Food shortages, poor housing and the poverty caused by the war meant the sickness rates did not fall: ● The planned economy struggled to produce simple things like soap, warm clothing and shoes, which led to greater health problems. ● Food was a major problem. In order to make up for shortages, work canteens used rotten food, animal
113Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 feed and other products that were unfit for human consumption. This led to illness. ● Sanitation in factories and farms was often inadequate, leading to lice infestations and outbreaks of dysentery and vomiting. ● Hygiene education was poor. It was not until 1947 that there was a publicity campaign encouraging workers to ‘use the toilet in a civilised fashion’ and wash their hands after using toilets. Indeed, the average Soviet worker took between ten and thirteen days off ill a year in 1946. This figure remained constant until the mid-1950s. Conclusion In theory, Communists believed that all people had the duty to work and all people had the right to certain benefits. However, from 1918 to 1953 none of the economic systems that were tried delivered a satisfactory relationship between work and benefits. War Communism and the Five-Year Plans succeeded in mak ing work compulsory, at least for the majority of the population, but consistently failed to ensure that workers benefited from the system. Under the NEP industrial workers were guaranteed a wide range of benefits. However, unemployment was widespread and the benefits were not available to peasants. Finally, the Communists never fully abolished parasitism. Capitalist parasites may have been liquidated in 1928, but Party members still enjoyed a privileged lifestyle that was based on their status rather than the work they did. 2 Housing, 1917–53 Housing was a continual problem for the Soviet people. Housing was destroyed in the Civil War and in the Second World War. Moreover, large numbers of people moved from the country to the cities at the beginning of the 1930s to get jobs in the new factories, putting pressure on already crowded cities. Additionally, housing was expensive to build, and the Soviet Government continually had other priorities. In the 1920s, Soviet authorities redistributed existing housing, taking it away from rich property owners and allowing poor people to live in the houses of the ‘former people’. Under Stalin house building did take place. However, with the exception of a few ‘model’ developments the housing was cheap and lacked facilities such as running water, electricity and sewerage. Redistribution of property, 1918–28 From the beginn ing of 1918 working people in cities had forcibly taken property away from aristocrats and the middle class. Former owners were either killed, forced out of their homes or allowed to retain a single room for themselves and their families. Many others squatted in deserted buildings. Len in issued a decree in August 1918 to try to br ing the process under control. Local soviets were empowered to take property away from its owners and to redist ribute it to the poor and homeless. By the end of the Civil War workers were fleeing the cities in search of food as factories closed. Therefore the government authorised the destruction of houses in order to provide timber for fuel. Under the NEP between 60 and 80 per cent of urban housing was denationalised. Redistribution of property was initially outlawed. However, after Lenin’s death there were fresh attempts to redistribute housing. In 1923–24 large town houses were ‘socialised’. Property owners were forced to live in a single room, while working-class fam ilies were moved into the other rooms. Often the authorities assumed that one room was enough for an entire f amily. At the same t ime, Church property was nationalised, priests were evicted from their cottages and Church buildings were turned into stores, civic centres or housing. Experiments with rent-free housing ca me to an end in 1921 when rent was reintroduced. House building restarted after the Civil War in 1923. Under the conditions of the NEP 89 per cent of house building was undertaken by private companies. There were small attempts to create buildings that ref lected the Note it down From 1917 to 1953 Soviet Governments had a range of policies regarding housing. Skim this section and work out what the main policies were. Then, using a note-making style of your choice, make notes on each of the different policies implemented during the period. Make sure your notes include all the appropriate technical terms, key details about the kinds of housing available, and the priorities of the government at the time and how this impacted on house building.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin114 values of the revolution in the Soviet Union’s major cities. These include the Zuev Club, the Rusakov Club and the Burevestnik Factory Club all built between 1927 and 1929. These were designed in a Constructivist style as social, educational and cultural centres for Soviet workers. Additionally, Constructivist houses were built, such as the Narkomfin Apartment House in Moscow. The building was designed to facilitate collective living th rough the provision of a collective kitchen, crèche, library, gym and laundry facilities, as well as a roof g arden. The provision of a communal kitchen, crèche and laundry ref lected a commitment to t he liberation of women through sharing domestic duties. Four of these blocks were planned, construction star ted in 1928 and only two were built. Although these bui ldings were revolutionary a nd extremely well designed, only a few were built and therefore they made little impact on the lives of Soviet citizens. Constructivist architecture Constructivism was an avant-garde style that was popular among artists in Russia in the late 1910s and continued to be influential into the 1920s (see page 117). In terms of architecture, Constructivism was deliberately futuristic. The design of buildings echoed the look of machines. Buildings tended to be based on dramatic geometric shapes, such as cylinders and cubes. Housing under Stalin Under Stalin housing in cities became an acute problem. The urban population trebled between 1929 and 1940 as peasants escaped collective farms for jobs in the cities, and therefore demand for accommodation increased signif icantly. The government deliberately tried to keep the housing budget to a minimum and addressed the housing shortage in a number of ways. The Zuyev Workers’ Club in Moscow, a prominent work of Constructivist architecture. What is revolutionary about the Zuyev Workers’ Club?
115Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 Kommunalka In existing cities Soviet authorities divided buildings into small kommunalka (communal apartments). Entire families would share a single small room. Bathrooms, where they existed, and kitchens were shared. The average family kommunalka was 5.5 squa re metres in 1930. However, pressure for housing meant that over time kommunalka were redivided. By 1940 the average kommunalka was 4 square metres. Often buildings were divided up into barely useable spaces. For example, rooms would be divided, without being rewired. Therefore one light switch would control the lighting of several apartments. The government also failed to invest in sewerage or communal facilities. For example, bathhouses were scarce. The 650,000 people in the Liubertsy district of Moscow, for example, did not have a single bathhouse. The modernisation of urban centres was also a low priority. For example, during the 1930s electrification and the provision of street lights slowed. Similarly, the authorities made no attempt to introduce modern sewerage. Coal sheds and under-stairs cupboards were converted into accommodation. In one case in Moscow a family of six lived in an under-stairs cupboard. The 1930s also saw the emergence of ‘corner-dwellers’: people who lived in corridors or communal kitchens within kommunalka buildings. Corner-living could be expensive; space in corridors could cost as much as half a month’s wage. Moreover, corridor living was often permanent. One worker in Leningrad lived in a corridor for five years before being moved into a kommunalka. Factory towns New buildings were constructed under Stalin to support the new factory towns like Magnitogorsk. However, construction of factories was prioritised over housing. Accommodation in the new factory towns was often inferior to the kommunalka. Rather than allowing one family per room, several fa milies would occupy a barracks- style dormitory. The best of these were built of timber and insulated with straw. They did not have running water or bathrooms. New factory towns also lacked other basic necessities, such as paved streets and electric lights. Magnitogorsk was initially designed as a model town. At the beginning of the project planners commissioned a radical German architect to design clean, modern, state- of-the-art accommodation. However, these houses proved too expensive. The few that were built were occupied by American specialists who came to advise on the project, and later by the managers of the factory. Even the initial designs provided no kitchens, assuming that all workers would eat in factory canteens. Within a year of the project starting the initial housing plans were abandoned. The majority of workers lived in barrack-style dormitories and around 20 per cent lived in mud huts. The combination of dormitory living and poor sanitation led to disease and lice. New factory towns built outside the Ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk were similarly basic. They had no sewerage system, streets were not paved and there were no electrical lights, in spite of the fact that they were extremely close to the Dnieper hydroelectric power station. Housing, 1941–53 The Second World War made the housing situation much worse. The destruction caused by the war was immense. Approximately one-third of urban housing was damaged or destroyed between 1941 and 1945. However, Stalin continued to prioritise industrial buildings over housing. The official pre-war policy of cramming more people into smaller spaces continued. By 1947 the average worker in a kommunalka had four square metres of space, and the average worker living in a dormitory had three square metres. Conditions in dormitories were poor. Workers in the Moscow coalfields were housed in dormitories. However, there were only 15,000 beds for the 26,000 workers. All kinds of furniture were scarce. There was one table between every 10 workers, one wardrobe for every 27 workers and one wash basin for every 70 people. The government did begin a scheme to encourage workers to build their own homes. However, building materials were scarce, there was a series of administrative obstacles and the process was expensive. Consequently the scheme proved largely unsuccessful. House building was not a major priority under the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1945–50). Budgets were small, and management inefficient. Workers were often reassigned to other projects, which meant that even the small number of projects that were started progressed extremely slowly. For example, in the first half of 1948 housebuilding projects outside Moscow spent 40 per cent of their budget and were then suspended, meaning that not a single house was completed. Those houses that were constructed in the early 1950s, like much of what was produced under Stalin’s Plans, were often extremely poor quality. Roofs leaked, plaster fell off walls and there was no gas, electricity or sewerage. Housing on collective farms was prioritised.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin116 Conclusion Housing was never one of Stalin’s priorities. Industrialisation always took precedence. In many ways, Stalin’s policies created the housing crisis, which was exacerbated by the apalling destruction caused by the Second World War. His policies did little to solve the problems and therefore his workers were forced to live in squalid accommodation with no amenities or privacy. 3 Khrushchev, Brezhnev and the promotion of a stable society, 1953–85 Full employment continued, in theory, from Stalin’s death until 1985. Indeed, full employment was part of the economic model of planned industry and collective agriculture that was at the heart of Soviet society from 1928 to the late 1980s. However, the post-Stalin leadership had different objectives to Stalin. Whereas Stalin prioritised giant factories and the mass production of raw materials, Khrushchev and Brezhnev wanted the Soviet economy to produce a better standard of living for Soviet citizens. Note it down Khrushchev and Brezhnev implemented radically different social policies to Stalin and Lenin. Begin your note making by taking down the key shift in priorities that took place around the time of Stalin’s death. Next, using a note-making style of your choice, make notes on the key features of Khrushchev’s and Brezhnev’s social policies. Make sure you note down details relating to: ● their priorities ● their policy initiatives ● their achievements. Khrushchev, socialism and sausage Khrushchev summarised his approach to socialist economics and politics with the phrase ‘What sort of Communism is it that cannot produce sausage?’ Communism, for Khrushchev, implied a better standard of living for working people. Therefore Communism was impossible without a plentiful supply of consumer goods and food. This focus on plenty was evident in his Virgin Lands Scheme and his policy of increasing the production of consumer goods. His welfare and housing policies also reflected this commitment. Health and welfare Khrushchev believed that a socialist society should look after the welfare of all. Therefore he increased investment in healthcare. The Soviet healthcare budget more than doubled in Khrushchev’s first years, from 21.4 billion roubles in 1950 to 44.0 billion roubles in 1959. Soviet health greatly improved, particularly in the countryside. Death rates and infant morta lity rates both dropped (see Table 2). Table 2: Death rates and infant mortality rates, 1950 and 1965. 1950 1965 Death rate (per thousand population 9.7 7.3 Infant mortality rate (per thousand live births) 81 27 The pensions budget quadrupled from 1950 to 1965, partly because pensions were raised and partly because the number of pensioners increased from 1 million in 1950 to 4.4 million in 1965. Major reforms introduced in 1961 improved social benefits signif icantly. New laws introduced: ● free lunches in schools, offices and factories ● free public transport ● full pensions and healthcare rights for farmers. These social benefits reforms marked a significant improvement in the standard of living of the Soviet people. Housing Khrushchev had similar success in terms of housing. Between 1950 and 1965 the amount of urban housing more than doubled. This was due to a deliberate policy initiative by Khrushchev to construct more urban homes. First, Khrushchev ordered a halt to new government and communal buildings. Secondly, he invested in new materials and techniques in order to solve the problem of housing. He argued that cheap mass housing was necessary in the short term, and that in the 1980s, when Communism had been achieved, these houses could be replaced by more sophisticated housing. The result was a new kind of low-cost housing block nicknamed Khrushchyovka. Although they were designed as temporary buildings, K hrushchyovka became the standard model for all new homes. Construction of Khrushchyovka continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Khrushchev ordered architects to abandon grand Sta linist architecture and to focus on low-cost functional buildings. The result was the K-7 apartment block, which could be constructed quickly and easily from la rge prefabricated
117Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 concrete panels and standardised windows and doors, rather than being built slowly from brick. The new blocks allowed families to have an entire apartment, rather than being forced to live in a single room, or to share a dormitory. Khrushchyovka apartments included a bathroom, a kitchen and at least two bedrooms to allow parents to sleep in a separate room from their children. Apartments tended to be small, but were, nonetheless, over ten times bigger than the kommunalka of the Stalin period. Khrushchyovkas tended to have five storeys; larger models were built in big cities and fitted with elevators. The Khrushchyovka transformed Soviet family l ife. However, they also worried the authorities. The Khrushchyovka effectively recreated privacy. Soviet authorities were no longer able to keep a check on the population through informants in dormitories or in kommunalka blocks. Therefore the new type of accommodation led to a propaganda campaign encouraging citizens to live good socialist lives (see page 101). The ‘social contract’ Social policy under Brezhnev continued to follow the direction set by Khrushchev. However, while the policies continued, the justification for the policies changed. For Khrushchev, an improved standard of living in the short term was the first step to Communism, a society in which everyone was wealthy. Brezhnev, however, abandoned Khrushchev’s promise of reaching Communism by 1980. Brezhnev’s goal was the promotion of a stable society. Brezhnev’s rule was based on the ‘social contract’ or ‘Little Deal’, a tacit bargain between the government and the Soviet people. In essence Brezhnev’s government promised a rising standard of living and greater social benefits in return for obedience and conformity. In that sense, the Soviet people traded political rights for economic well- being. In essence, the ‘social contract’ was Brezhnev’s formula for promoting social stability. Brezhnev’s social contract contained five main elements. The government guaranteed: ● job security through guaranteed full employment ● low prices for essentia l goods ● a thriving second economy, free of government interference ● social benefits such as free healthcare ● some social mobility. Under Brezhnev standards of living increased signif icantly. Social benefits included subsidised rent, and utilities such as electricity and water were provided practically free of charge. The government also provided healthcare and pensions. Indeed, spending on health and pensions grew by between four and five per cent a year under Brezhnev. From 1970 subsidies extended to holidays. Generally, Brezhnev’s ‘social contract’ succeeded in promoting social stability. During the late 1960s and 1970s Soviet citizens enjoyed an unprecedented standard of living. Through a combination of government benefits, work and trading on the black market, citizens were guaranteed a secure and comfortable life. Moreover, organised opposition to the government was extremely rare. By ensuring a relatively high and rising standard of Soviet architecture, 1929–1965 Lomonosov Moscow State University, one of the Seven Sisters. Under Stalin architecture moved away from t he Constructiv ism of the 1920s. Stalinist architecture tended to be palatial or monumental. Rather than experimental or futurist ic buildings, Stalin’s architects built more t raditional buildings. In this sense, Stalinist architecture was similar to the Stalinist artist ic style Socialist Realism (see page 99). The Seven Sisters, a g roup of skyscrapers built in Moscow between 1947 and 1953, reflect this sty le. They resemble Russian architect ure of t he sevent eent h century, but were constructed using techniques developed to build skyscrapers in cities like New York. Khrushchev was highly critical of this style. Construction was expensive and tended to create grand government buildings rather than private housing. Under Khrushchev building became much more functional. Buildings were not decorated in traditional styles, as Khrushchev believed this wasted resources. Consequently, all Khrushchyovka apartment blocks tend to look the same.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin118 living, Brezhnev’s policies broadly succeeded in promoting social stability in the period 1964–85. Stagnation The ‘social contract’ created a stable society, but it also led to stagnation. Brezhnev’s refusal to tackle economic and social problems led to a re-emergence of old problems. First, full employment led to serious economic ineff iciencies. Estimates suggest that in the 1970s there was hidden unemployment of around 20 per cent. This means that 20 per cent of employees were being paid but were not doing a useful job. At the same time there were serious labour shortages. In the late 1970s there were at least 1 million vacancies in Soviet industry that went unfi lled. This led to lower production rates in some industries. Secondly, female unemployment was on the rise. This problem affected Central Asia and the Caucasus, where employment was still centred on mining and heavy industry and where women were refused jobs due to gender stereotypes. In these areas estimates suggest that as many as ten per cent of women were unemployed. Even in central Russia political dissidents were denied the right to work and were therefore disqualif ied from many social benefits. Around two per cent of Russians were out of work by 1985. Finally, in spite of increased health spending, Soviet health declined. Infant mortality rates increased from three to seven per cent in the 1970s while life expectancy declined from 68 to 64 years for men in the same period. Alcoholism was one of the main causes. Conclusion Ultimately, the model of full employment, social benefits and political conformity promoted social stability. However, it also led to economic stagnation. Although standards of living continued to rise into the late 1970s, the Soviet Union lagged behind the West. Moreover, full employment led to inefficient uses of labour which slowed economic growth, which in the long term threatened to lower living standards and therefore undermine Brezhnev’s ‘social contract’. Nonetheless, Brezhnev was more concerned with retaining power and creating a stable compliant society. In this sense his policies succeeded, even if they led to economic stagnation. Work together Having read this chapter write a paragraph in answer to the following question: How far was the Soviet Government committed to the social security of Soviet citizens in the years 1917–53? Swap your paragraph with a partner, and discuss: ● Which paragraph demonstrates the clearest focus on the question? ● Which paragraph has the most detailed examples from the period? ● Which paragraph provides a better answer to the question, and why? Make a note of at least two ways in which you could improve your writing. 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1918–21 Priority: Winning the Civil War, therefore social benefits were of secondary importance 1921–28 Priority: Economic development and social peace, therefore there was a greater emphasis on social benefits in order to guarantee social peace 1928–41 Priority: Economic development, therefore social benefits were limited in order to ensure there were sufficient resources for industrial growth 1941–45 Priority: Winning the Second World War, therefore social benefits were of secondary importance 1945–53 Priority: Economic reconstruction, therefore social benefits were limited in order to promote the rebuilding of the economy 1954–64 Priority: Reforming socialism to ensure that it guaranteed a good life for all, therefore social benefits became central to the system 1964–85 Priority: Ensuring social stability, therefore high levels of social benefits were used to ensure support for the regime Summary diagram: Government priorities and social benefits.
119Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 Chapter summary ● Communists were ideologically committed to ensuring that working people enjoyed the full benefits of industrial society. ● From 1917 to 1953 this proved difficult to achieve as there were continual economic shortages and Stalin prioritised economic development over the well-being of the Soviet people. ● Khrushchev and Brezhnev re-emphasised the need for Communism to provide a decent standard of living for all people. ● For Khrushchev this meant better quality housing and greater availability of food. ● Under Brezhnev’s ‘social contract’, social stability was built on the guarantee that the standards of living would continue to rise and that all Soviet citizens would enjoy economic security. Recommended reading D. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II (Cambridge, 2004), pages 91–116. This section of Filtzer’s book looks at the problem of housing in the Soviet Union in Stalin’s last years. S. Malle, The Economic Organization of War Communism, 1918–1921 (Cambridge, 1985), pages 322–37. This part of Malle’s work looks at living standards during the period of War Communism. R.G Suny, The Cambridge History of Russia (Cambridge, 2006), pages 300–5. This part of the book discusses the nature and significance of Brezhnev’s social contract. Activity: Question practice 1 Was communist ideology the main reason for improvements in social secur ity in the period 1953–85? Ex plain your answer. AS 2 How far did government policy towards art and culture change in the years 1928–85? AS 3 How accurate is it to say that the Soviet government successfully promoted social stability in the years 1953–82. 4 How accurate is it to say that the Soviet Government was stable and successful in the years 1945–82.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin120 4b: Women and the family Overview As the Soviet Union was a communist country, men and women were officially equal. However, Soviet Governments never wholly ended sexual inequality. Indeed, there were deliberate attempts to sustain traditional gender roles. For most of the period 1917–85 women were under-represented in the highest levels of government, expected to take low- paid and low-status jobs, and forced to work a ‘double shift’ comprising paid work and unpaid domestic labour. Women in the country worked in the lowest paid and hardest jobs in Soviet society. Women in the cities had more opportunities in terms of education and they received higher pay. Nonetheless, by the 1950s women’s working opportunities had narrowed and even within professional jobs women were expected to play roles that reflected their ‘natural’ desire to nurture. Soviet family policy changed in a variety of ways between 1917 and 1985. Early Soviet thinkers embraced radical ideas about social and family change. However, by the mid- 1920s the traditional family was held up as the best social model. From then on even Soviet leaders who took women’s issues seriously assumed that women would always play a primarily domestic and nurturing role. This chapter considers: 1 The changing status of women 2 Women at work 3 The Soviet family. 1 The changing status of women The status of women changed throughout the period 1917–85. Government policy went through a series of phases. Sometimes there were initiatives that were designed to liberate women; on other occasions policy was much more conservative. The government’s attitude can be seen through official propaganda and through women’s changing legal rights. Note it down Using the 1:2 method (see pages x), make notes on the different ways in which women were represented in Soviet propaganda in the years 1917–85. Look out for key changes in the presentation of women and use highlighters or different coloured pens to highlight key changes in the way that women were presented. Marxism and sexual equality Marxists are committed to establishing a truly equal society. In traditional societies, Marx argued, there were a variety of different types of inequality, including sexual inequality, racial inequality and class inequality. For Marx, the most important type of inequality was class inequality, because Marx believed that destroying class inequality would lead to the destruction of all other kinds of inequality. Lenin had a slightly different view. He argued that capitalism itself would lead to the destruction of sexual and racial inequalities. Class inequalities would persist under capitalism, but capitalism was based on economic efficiency and this required businesses to recognise talent wherever they found it, regardless of sex or race. Lenin’s view was important to the early years of the revolution. Lenin argued that the Communist Government had to complete all of the tasks that capitalism should have completed in the Soviet Union. This included the industrialisation of the economy and the destruction of sexual and racial inequality.
121Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 Women in government propaganda Women feature prominently in Soviet iconography. Pictures, photographs, films and statues produced from 1917 to 1985 show how the government’s view of women changed. Playing a supporting role, 1917–40 Between 1917 and 1940 women tended to play a supporting role in Soviet art. One of the most famous statues that symbolised the Soviet Union under Stalin was the ‘Worker and Kolkhoz Woman’ (1937). The 25-metre-high stainless steel statue comprises two figures, a male factory worker holding a hammer and a female collective farm worker holding a sickle. Soviet propaganda posters of this period often contain a male industrial worker and a female peasant representing the whole nation. The distinction between the two types of worker emphasises a difference in role between men and women. According to Lenin’s writings, industrial workers and peasants both played an important role in overthrowing capitalism. However, industrial workers played the leading and decisive role, whereas peasants played a supporting role. By routinely depicting men as industrial workers and women as peasants, the Soviet government believed that men played the primary role in society. From 1917 to 1940 women were much less visible i n propaganda then men. During the Civil War posters were dominated by male soldiers, and during the f irst three Five-Year Plans male workers were the focus of posters. Women represented in imagery of this period tend to be either mothers or children. Again, this indicates that women were expected to play a maternal role rather than f ight or work on the front line of building socialism. Some Soviet propaganda ridiculed women and femininity. Sergei Eisenstein’s film October (1928) mocked female soldiers who fought against the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution. Moreover, it contrasted the masculine and decisive Bolsheviks with their effeminate, dithering political opponents. Broadly, women who feature in Soviet art and propaganda from 1917–40 play similar roles to women in Russian religious art prior to the revolution, which also presents women as supportive mother figures, or weaker than men. In that sense, Soviet iconography indicates that attitudes to women changed little in the f irst few decades after the revolution. Women at war, women in space 1941–64 Women featured heavily in Soviet propaganda in the Second World War and the Cold War. The poster ‘The Motherland is Calling’ presented a woman as the symbol of the Russian nation and celebrated the vital work of women during the war. However, Soviet propaganda still presented women as vulnerable and in need of male protection during the war. For example, in 1942 Pravda media published a series of explicit pictures of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya (widely known as ‘Tanya’), an 18-year-old woman who was enslaved, tortured, mutilated and hanged by German soldiers. Her mother toured the country appealing to Soviet men to defend Soviet women and the motherland. Soviet propaganda linked defending the motherland with defending Soviet women regularly in this period. After the war, heroic women were presented as symbols of the absolute sexual equality that Soviet leaders claimed had been achieved following the revolution. Devushkivoiny (girl-warriors) and frontovichki (women who served on the front line) were a feature of top level speeches, including
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin122 Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, and of Soviet war films all the way through to the 1980s. Additionally, in 1963 Valentina Tereshkova became the first woman in space and the Soviet Union’s new woman hero. Born on a collective farm, she lost her father in the Second World War. Nonetheless, through Soviet education and the opportunities available in Soviet industry, she became an engineer and the first female cosmonaut. According to the head of the Soviet Space Programme she was nothing less than ‘Yuri Gagarin in a skirt’. At the same time, there was an official concern about women, and a campaign against young women who adopted Western fashion (see page 102). Good mothers and absent mothers, 1964–85 Under Brezhnev Soviet propaganda projected a more traditional view of women. Propaganda in the late 1960s and early 1970s emphasised that a true Soviet woman should be an exemplary worker and cari ng wife and mother. The tone of propaganda became even more conservative in the mid-1970s. Falling birth rates led to a campaign encouraging women to have babies. Brezhnev’s pronatal campaign emphasised ‘natural differences’ between the sexes, stressing women’s ‘natural’ ability to nurt ure and ‘natural’ need for a strong man. By the late 1970s this pronatalist message was coupled with of ficial criticism of women who ‘neglected’ their children by going to work. According to Brezhnev’s propaganda, working women were responsible for juvenile delinquency, rising crime, drug tak ing, alcoholism and family breakup. This view persisted into the 1980s and was reaf fir med by the last three Soviet leaders. Conclusion Soviet propaganda did not present a consistent view of women; rather it reflected shifti ng off icial policies regarding women’s roles and women’s emancipation. It did, however, reflect the concerns of the male-dominated leadership of the Soviet Union, who were suspicious of women and who were therefore determined to keep female liberation within narrow bounds. 2 Women at work Working women became a key feature of Soviet society in the 1930s. By 1955, 49 per cent of the Soviet workforce were women, a fact that Soviet leaders argued proved that sexual equality had been achieved. Nonetheless, promotions for women were rare, and there were significant inequalities in pay. Women working in the towns had many more opportunities than women who worked in the countryside. Finally, women tended to play a minor role in government throughout the whole period 1917–85. Note it down The lives of women in the towns were considerably dif ferent from the lives of women in the cities. Divide a large sheet of paper into two. Using a note-making style of your choice, make notes on the opportunities available to women and the limits of those opportunities (i) in the country (ii) in towns and cities. Additionally, make a note of the government’s view on the nature and role of women and the way this affected policies towards women in the workplace. Valentina Tereshkova.
123Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1928 1936 Year N u m b e r o f w o m e n (m illio n s) 1940 1945 Figure 1: Number of women in the Soviet industrial workforce. Working in the towns During the Civil War, Zhenotdel – the women’s department of the Communist Party – recruited women from the towns to fill jobs in nursing and food distribution. Alexandra Kollontai, head of Zhenotdel, believed that this reflected a natural division of labour: men should fight and rebuild industry once the war was over; women should lead the way in nurturing roles. Indeed, when the Civil War ended, women who had been working in industry were sacked so that men could take the industrial jobs. Under the NEP opportunities for women in factories were limited. The NEP led to widespread unemployment. Female prostitution was also widespread, as it was legal and one way of making money. During the 1920s, it is estimated that 39 per cent of urban men used prostitutes, indicating that it was a large market. Women joined the industrial labour force in large numbers due to the demands of the Five-Year Plans. In 1928, the last year of the NEP, only 3 million women worked in Soviet industry. By 1940 that f igure had leapt to 13 million (see Figure 1). Indeed, by 1940, 41 per cent of workers in heavy industry were women. Soviet authorities recognised the importance of women in industry and therefore allocated an increasing number of places in higher or technical education to women: from 20 per cent in 1929 to 40 per cent in 1940. However, there were signif icant pay differentials. Women doing the same jobs as men were only paid 60 –65 per cent of men’s wages. Equally, women were subjected to verbal and physical abuse in factories. Some men refused to work on teams that included women, believing that working with women brought bad luck. Women’s participation in the Five-Year Plans laid the foundation for greater participation during the Second World War. In some towns during the war women made up 75 per cent of the workforce. After the war new trends developed in terms of women working in the cities. During the 1960s, around 45 per cent of industrial jobs went to women. However, women tended to be restricted to: ● production line work in light industry, which was intensive but required low levels of skill, such as textile production ● heavy manual labour, which was also low skil led. In this sense, there was a change from the period 1928–41. Under Stalin, women tended to do all kinds of factory work, but be paid less. After the war, women tended to be employed in low-skill sectors of industry, whereas men were employed in high-skill sectors. Therefore women were paid less because they were doing less skilled work. Senior jobs within light industry, such as the job of foreman, routinely went to men. Indeed, between 1959 and 1965 less than one per cent of factory foremen in the textile industry were women. During the 1960s another form of employment open to women was clerical or administrative work. In the mid- 1960s, 74 per cent of people employed in clerical positions in health services and education were women. In towns Leisure Outside of work, women in cities also had access to various kinds of leisure. During the 1950s and 1960s, dancing became a big urban pastime. According to Soviet films and magazines, women loved to dance far more than men. Dancing became so popular that the government produced etiquette manuals advising men on how to ask women to dance and how to deal with rejection. According to official advice, men alone could initiate dancing; women could not ask men to dance. Women could, however, dance with other women if no male partners were available. Official festivals were also organised in large urban centres to show off the latest fashions for women. ‘Holiday of Girls’, for example, was an event in which the headquarters of the Soviet Army was transformed for a fashion show, cookery show and grand ball. The event celebrated female beauty and domestication, establishing an ideal for Soviet women. Significantly, the emphasis was on beauty in order to please men. The ‘Holiday of Girls’ discouraged young women from discussing or engaging in sex. The Soviet Ministry of Health published reports ‘scientifically proving’ that women felt no sexual desire until their mid-20s.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin124 around 50 per cent of working women worked in clerical positions, and the other half worked in industry. Finally, 90 per cent of the able-bodied population who did not work outside the home were female in the mid-1960s. BAM recruitment The mid-1970s saw another major female recruitment campaign. In 1974, Brezhnev initiated the construction of the Baikal–Amur Mainline (BAM), a 4324-kilometre rail line across the north of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev was aware that the male workers and administrators who staffed the project would want female company, and therefore he initiated a campaign to recruit female workers from urban centres in their mid-20s. Remarkably, the campaign stressed that building the BAM was an opportunity for women to gain true liberation through work and establishing new homes in the north of the countr y. At the same time, the recruitment campaign stated that finding men would be easy. BAM construction was male dominated and therefore bamovkas (female BAM workers) would, the publicity implied, have the pick of the men. Thi s was a contrast to Soviet society as a whole where men were in the minority. BAM publicity also emphasised other traditional aspects of Soviet womanhood. Bamovkas were expected to preserve their femininity by being caring, wise and maintaining, what BAM adverts called, their ‘delicate female features’. Many bamovkas did do important construct ion work. However, others were employed in low-paid positions such as waitres sing. In many ways the BAM recruitment campaign exemplified the Soviet attitude to urban women: they were expected to be independent and equal, but in a way that served the interests of men. Educating female workers Education was widely available to women in cities. By the 1960s women made up half of the Soviet Union’s graduates. As a result of women’s education, by the 1970s women dominated certain professions. By 1985 around 70 per cent of medical doctors were women, about 75 per cent of employees in universities were women and around 65 per cent of people employed in art and culture were women. Signif icantly, pay scales i n these ‘feminised’ industries were lower than in factory management, which was dominated by men. Working in the countryside During the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s a high proportion of women worked in agriculture. Women in the countryside performed a ‘triple shift’. They provided agricultural labour on farms, they were responsible for household chores and they were often engaged in handicrafts to supplement the family income. Some women on collective farms achieved a high social status. Specifically, female tractor drivers could earn a relatively high wage. During the period of the NEP there were only eight female tractor dr ivers across the whole of the Soviet Union. That figure had risen to 50,000 by 1940. However, female tractor d rivers made up less than 0.5 per cent of the total rura l female population. Most women did unskilled jobs and therefore had little wealth or social status. Women and the Virgin Lands Women were specifically targeted in the campaig n to recruit volunteers to work on the Virgin Lands. The recruitment campaign started in 1954 and continued to 1974. The campaign to recruit women focused on specific roles: women were required to act as m ilkma ids, gardeners and to start fami lies. Women were not recruited to work with machinery or dr ive tractors; rather the emphasis was on women as manual labourers and carers. The off icial slogan for recruiting women was: ‘Your caring hands are needed everywhere.’ Government off icials wanted to recruit ‘girls’ – young women of around 25 – rather than older women. They believed that young women would entice men to move to the Virgin Lands. A famous slogan that summa rised this aspect of the campaign was: ‘Join us, girls, in the Virgin Lands.’ Single women over the age of 26 were turned down for the scheme, as were single mothers. Women in the Virgin Lands tended to do the lowest paid and most demanding jobs. For example, of the 6400 women recruited in August 1958, less than 450 found work in well-paid professional jobs. The majority were haymakers and milkmaids, whose wage was about 15 per cent that of male tractor drivers. Women from Moscow were the most likely to complain about the conditions because they were used to a much more comfortable life in the capital. Equally, local women were horrified by the ‘immorality’ of the women from Moscow who enjoyed dancing and singing Western songs. Few women from cities stayed in the Virgin Lands long. Finally, female farm workers in the Virgin Lands were often subject to sexual abuse and rape. Although there are no exact figures, apparently sexual violence was common. Farm managers tended to blame the women and on occasion force rapists to marr y their victims. Mechanisation of farming, an important goal of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956–59) and the Seven-Year Plan (1959– 65), was suppos
125Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 Moreover, collective farms tended to give men priority in terms of access to machines. In this sense mechanisation failed to make a difference to the lives of women in rural areas. Farming in the 1970s and 1980s Women continued to work in low-status, low-paid jobs in farming in the 1970s and 1980s. By 1983, around 65 per cent of work on farms was still unmechanised. Moreover, as industry expanded men left collective farms to get jobs in factories, leaving women over-represented in the lowest paid jobs. By 1970, 72 per cent of the lowest paid Soviet farmers were women. Professional opportunities also reflected the general prejudice that women played a nurturing role rather than a leadership role. Indeed, by 1980, 80 per cent of teachers in rural schools were women, whereas only 2 per cent of farm managers were women. In short, the majority of women in Soviet agriculture worked in low-status and low-paid roles. In the worst cases, notably the Virgin Lands Scheme, women were recruited specifically to marr y men and were subjected to sexual violence. Professional opportunities for women on Soviet farms were extremely limited, and those that did exist ref lected widespread stereotypes regarding a woman’s role. Fighting for the motherland Women played a central role in the Soviet armed forces during the Second World War. In 1941, fighting was still considered a man’s job and women who tried to enlist were turned away. However, by 1945, 800,000 women had served in combat roles. Female fighters included those in the three female flying regiments. Initially, female f lyers were regarded with disdain by male pilots. However, as the war progressed the achievements of some women were considerable. For example, Lydia Litvyak shot down 12 German planes before being killed in combat. One female squadron were nicknamed the ‘Night Witches’ due to their deadly skill. According to most accounts female soldiers and pilots enjoyed the respect of their male colleagues. Indeed, reports of sexual harassment are rare. However, after the war many male soldiers went on to have long careers in the military. Women, by contrast, were demobilised and denied entry to Soviet military academies. In that sense wartime sexual equality was short-lived. Female Party members Women were consistently under-represented at the highest levels of the Party. Immediately following the revolution, women tended to get jobs in government that reflected traditional stereotypes of their role. During the Civil War, female Party members tended to work in the Commissariat of Social Welfare, the Commissariat of Health or the Commissa riat of Education, whereas male Party members worked in government departments dealing with the economy or the militar y. Signif icantly, female communists did not play a signif icant role in the Party’s most senior committees. In 1918, for example, only five per cent of delegates to the Party Congress were women. Nonetheless, during the 1920s it was usual for senior female Part y members who had had children to employ nannies so that they could continue with their political work. Generally, in the first ten years of com munist rule, female pa rticipation in politics stagnated. Around 10 per cent of Party members in 1918 were women; by 1928 that f igure was 12 per cent, only a small increase. Female Party members were expected to play a homemaking role in the 1930s. Party members were no longer encouraged to employ nannies. Rather they were expected to be exemplary wives and mothers who were devoted to creating and managing ‘a well- ordered communist home’. Female Party members who married were expected to give up work and join the obshchesttvennitsa movement: the ‘movement of wife activists’. ‘Wife activists’ were expected to help organise nurseries, engage in charity work and supervise factory canteens. Generally, ‘wife activists’ were expected to play a mothering role for the whole of Soviet society. At home they were expected to be perfect examples of ‘order, warmth and feminine comfort’, providing for all of the needs of their husbands and families. From 1953, women played a slightly larger role in Soviet politics. However, as in the 1920s, women were expected to contribute to political work that concerned health, social services and education, ref lecting their ‘natural’ role as nurturers. Women played a significant role in local soviets. Between 1959 and 1984 the proportion of women in the soviets grew from 27 per cent to 33 per cent. However, soviets played a very small social role, and in the most senior parts of the Soviet system, women never made up more than 10 per cent of deputies. Larger numbers of women joined the Party after 1953. Between 1956 and 1983 the proportion of women in the Party increased from 19.7 per cent to 26 per cent. However, women were never more than 4 per cent of the Central Committee between 1953 and 1985. Clearly, increased participation of women in the wor
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin126 3 The Soviet family Emphasis on the Soviet family changed over time. Moreover, as family policy changed, so did the legal rights of women. In some periods there was a deliberate attempt to reform the family and emancipate women; in other periods policy was much more conservative. Note it down Soviet policy towards the family changed overtime. Skim this section and work out the major periods of government policy. Using a note-making style of your choice, take down details of policies related to women and the family. Use different coloured pens to distinguish between policies that were designed to liberate women from their traditional roles and policies that were designed to reinforce their traditional roles. Families and women in the 1920s Lenin’s government did not have a consistent view on the family. Alexandra Kollontai believed that the family was an oppressive social organisation. She advocated replacing the family with communal living and monogamous marriage with free love. For Kollontai, the family encouraged selfishness and individualism. Kollontai advocated the ‘withering away of the family’ as an essential part of the emergence of the ‘new woman’ who was truly liberated. Lenin and Trotsky, however, were more conservative. Lenin was particularly critical of free love. Nonetheless, Lenin recognised the abuses that went on in traditional marriage and the need for reform to marriage and divorce laws. Immediately after the revolution significant steps were taken to reform the traditional family and liberate women. Between its creation in 1919 and its abolition in 1930, Zhenotdel worked with a variety of government departments to advance women’s rights: ● Education: Zhenotdel worked with the Commissariat of Education to introduce co-education. They also established women’s reading rooms in urban centres where women could study. Zhenotdel e stablished education schemes for women in factories and set quotas to ensure that women were represented at all levels of education. By 1930, around 28 per cent of university students were women, compared to 12 per cent in Germany and 20 per cent in Britain. ● Legal rights: Zhenotdel collaborated with the Commissariat of Justice to enshrine women’s rights in law. From 1919 women were given a legal right to equal pay for equal work, and equal voting rights. ● Reproductive rights: The Soviet Union was the first country to introduce a legal right to abortion on demand. Contraception was also legal during the 1920s. ● Marital rights: During the 1920s ‘postcard divorce’ was available to men and women. From 1926 it was legal for one partner to end a marriage simply by sending a letter or postcard telling their partner that the relationship was over. The government looked on marriage as a simple contract that could be dissolved simply and easily by either husband or wife. ● Sexual rights: Lesbianism was not crimina lised before the revolution and was never regarded as a criminal offence in the Soviet Union. Prostitution was also legalised. Zhenotdel worked with the Commissariat of Health to offer medical support to prostitutes. Sadly, some of these early policies quickly became meaningless or were counterproductive. Legal and political equality was la rgely meaningless because democracy was suspended in m id-1918 and effectively abol ished in 1921. Equally, legal rights were difficult to uphold because Soviet law courts had very little real authority. Equally, men made use of the new divorce rights in order to divorce women soon after they became pregnant. Between 1917 and 1928, 70 per cent of divorces were initiated by men. This often left women without a home, unable to work as they needed to look after their new child and therefore without an income. By 1925 experiments in communal living had ended. Kollontai’s vision of the ‘withering away of the family’ had been formally abandoned. The 1926 Marriage Code reflected the official belief in the traditional family. It made adoption easier so that families could take care of children who had been orphaned during the Civil War. It also established de facto marriage: it gave men and women who were living together the same status as legally married couples. In both senses it underlined that the new government believed that marriage was the essential model for society. Zhenotdel was also unwilling to help women who were victims of sexual harassment. Indeed, Soviet law did not recognise sexual hara ssment as a crime. Women organised themselves to protest against sexual abuse. In Leningrad in 1928, for example, women workers organised strikes and walkouts. However, male party officials viewed striking women as troublemakers and complaints from women as an ‘anti-Soviet’ activity. Therefore no changes were made and sexual harassment continued. Finally, under the NEP the government did not fund crèches or day care facilities. Government money was used to modernise industry, not to emanc
127Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 re-emphasise marriage, as it provided a degree of security and did not require the government to spend money. As funding was cut from crèches and children’s homes, street gangs developed. Groups of children who had lost their parents in the Civil War or who had been abandoned due to family breakup lived through petty cr ime. The Great Retreat, 1936–53 During the mid-1930s, government policy towards the family became much more conservative. Compared to the ‘advance’ of women’s rights in the 1920s, Trotsky, writing in exile, described the new conservative policies of the 1930s as the ‘Great Retreat’. In part, Stalin’s policies were a reaction against the problems created by the liberal policies of the 1920s. However, they were also designed to create a stable society that could put all its energies into industrialisation. Stalin’s key aim was to increase birth rates and cut divorce rates. To achieve this, significant legal changes were introduced in 1936: ● Abortion was criminalised unless the life of the pregnant woman was in danger. ● Contraception was banned. ● Male homosexuality was crimina lised. Consensual sex between men was punishable by five years in a labour camp. ● Lesbianism was treated as a ‘disease’. Lesbian women could be subjected to hypnotherapy in an attempt to ‘cure’ them of their ‘unnatural’ desires. ● Sex outside of marriage was stigmatised. Collective farm managers carried out ‘medical virginity checks’ on young women to enforce sexual abstinence. ● Divorce was made expensive and difficult to obtain. A first divorce cost approximately one week’s wages; subsequent divorces were more expensive. ● Following divorce, fathers were required to pay a minimum of one-third of their income to their former wives to support their children. Men were required to pay 60 per cent of their salary if they had left three or more children. In addition to these policies, Stalin adopted a pronatalist policy of offering f inancial incentives for women to have children. Women with seven children received 2000 roubles a year for five years. This f igure increased to 5000 roubles for mothers with eleven child ren. These policies were backed up by a media campaign which exposed unfaithful men. For example, the trades un ion newspaper Trud regularly carr ied stories about men who abandoned themselves to lives of ‘wildness, degeneracy and baseness’. In addition to working on collective farms or in Soviet industry, women were expected to perform essential family labour. On average, women spent five times longer on their domestic responsibilities than men during the 1930s. In essence, Stalin’s policies emphasised the importance of stable famil ies based on monogamous heterosexual relationships. Stalin believed that these formed the basis of a successful socialist society as they provided a disciplined environment in which to bring up children. Women and the family, 1953–85 Women’s rights were re-emphasised in the years following Stalin’s death. However, Khrushchev focused on women’s rights in the context of traditional fami lies. Generally, Khrushchev wanted women to continue to perform their traditional roles as wives and mothers, but he wanted to make these roles easier. Khrushchev’s government made some attempt to recognise and address the problems facing women in the Soviet Union. By 1956 there were several national women’s magazines including Woman Worker, Peasant Woman, Women of the World, and Soviet Woman. These magazines carried articles by women describing their lives and exposing the inequalities that persisted in Soviet society, particularly the poorly paid jobs and the ‘double shift’, and the government’s failure to support women who had families. Khrushchev’s government was also aware of the impact of the Second World War on women. The war led to the deaths of over 10 million men. As a result, the proportion of women in Soviet society grew from 52 per cent in 1939 to 55 per cent in 1959. The war had also led to many lone- parent families. In this context the traditional Stalinist model of a heterosexual monogamous family in which the husband worked and the woman stayed at home no Soviet women’s magazines The rise of Soviet women’s magazines was an unexpected consequence of two of Khrushchev’s policies. First, they were part of the new consumer socialism that Khrushchev advocated. Secondly, the publication of letters dealing with daily experience reflected his policy of cultural ‘thaw’. Women took full advantage of these changes to write about their own experiences, and this soon spread from women’s magazines into the mainstream press. Indeed, by the late 1950s newspapers were containing storie s about rape and domestic violence which exposed major problems in Soviet society. By the late 1950s the magazines were a forum in which women could discuss their own experiences of abortion, childbearing, motherhood, sex and work.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin128 longer worked for many families. Therefore Khrushchev introduced a series of policies to change the legal status of women and make family life easier for married and unmarr ied women: ● In 1955 abortion was legalised. ● In 1956 state paid maternity leave increased from 77 days to 112 days. ● The Sixth Five-Year Plan, starting in 1956, contained a commitment to ‘improve in every way the working and living conditions of women workers’ including the expansion of crèches, childcare facilities and communal laundries. ● The Seven-Year Plan aimed to eliminate the ‘double shift’ by introducing convenience foods and mass- produced clothing, ending the need for women to cook and sew. ● The Seven-Year Plan also aimed to make refrigerators widely available, ending the need for daily shopping trips. In spite of these changes problems remained. Contraception remained hard to acquire. Letters to women’s magazines indicate that crèches opened late and closed early so that women were still unable to work full days. Also some employers refused to recognise the new legal entitlements regarding maternity leave and maternity pay. Equally, the Sixth Five-Year Pla n and the Seven-Year Pla n failed to end the double shift. Domestic appliances were either less helpful than anticipated or less widely available. Surveys continued to show that women spent more time doing household chores than men and therefore had less access to leisure activities or education than men. Generally, although the government aimed to make domestic work easier, it still viewed housework as a woman’s job. This was evident in the publication of a two-volume Short Encyclopaedia of Housekeeping published in 1959 in order to help women deal with their domestic role. Women under Brezhnev Brezhnev continued to stress the centrality of the family to Soviet life. Under Brezhnev much less was done to try to improve the status of women. Officially, the government proclaimed that sexual equality had been achieved. The lack of women in the most senior jobs in industry, agriculture and government was explained by women’s ‘natural ’ desire to focus on their families. The government banned information about women’s campaigns in the West being reported in the Soviet press in order to try to suppress debates about women’s roles and sexual oppression. Brezhnev tended to think of women primarily as unsk illed workers whose prime goal was having children. Sexual morality was strict: male homosexuality was a crime, lesbianism was a mental disorder and sex was about making babies rather than pleasure. Within the home traditional roles endured. By 1982, off icial figures indicated that women spent twice as much time doing domestic chores as men. Brezhnev v iewed this as par t of the natura l order and applauded women for their sacrif ice. As noted above, Brezhnev’s main concern was for women to have more babies and to look after them properly. Therefore the government d id nothing to address sexual i nequality in domestic labour. Brezhnev did introduce some reforms to make women’s lives easier. For example, he lowered the pension age for women from 60 to 55. Conclusion Soviet family policy changed over time. As family policy changed, so did the official status of women. Initial attempts to ensure the liberation of women were replaced by a more conservative policy. In the 1950s and early 1960s there was a renewed attempt to liberate women. However, Khrushchev’s campaig n never questioned the basic nature of the family or the assumption that women should be responsible for childcare a nd domestic labour. Under Brezhnev, policy towards women hardened again. Once again, the emphasis was on women having children, while men took the high-status jobs in the public sphere. Feminism in the Soviet Union Feminist intellectuals and feminist groups were suppressed by the KGB. As a result the feminist movement in the Soviet Union remained small, particularly compared to the USA. However, in the period 1979–82 feminist groups began to emerge in the Soviet Union. For example, Almanac, a small feminist movement, was established in 1979 in Leningrad by Tatiana Mamonova. It attempted to raise questions about women’s status through the publication of a magazine. However, the government supressed the magazine and members of the group were forced to emigrate following police harassment. The League for Emancipation from Stereotypes (LOTOS) was formed in Moscow in 1980. LOTOS was an informal network of female academics and teachers who attempted to influence public debate by publishing research. The group was finally supressed by the Soviet authorities in 1983.
129Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 Chapter summary ● Between 1917 and 1985 there were considerable changes in the roles of women and the nature of the family. ● Revolutionary hope that the family and women’s roles would be fundamentally transformed were quickly abandoned. ● Monogamous heterosexual families, where men and women played clearly defined roles, became the norm. ● However, women increasingly played a role in the Soviet workforce. ● In the country women tended to perform the low-paid, low-status work. ● In the cities, however, women were employed in all aspects of industry during the first three Five-Year Plans. ● As light industry grew, women were increasingly employed on production lines, while men worked in more highly skilled positions. ● After 1930 Soviet leaders never questioned the assumption that women played an essentially domestic and nurturing role. ● Therefore successive leaders developed policy that reflected a fundamental difference between the roles of men and the roles of women. 1965–79 Brezhnev promotes motherhood. Government-led attempts to address sexual inequality cease. 1979–85 Small feminist groups emerge in major cities. The KGB harasses leading feminists forcing the groups to end. 19201910 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 19901980 1917–30 Zhenotdel leads the campaign for sexual equality. However, the campaign has limited impact due to economic problems and the prejudice of male communists. 1930–40 Opportunities for women increase in factories and on collective farms. Educational opportunities also increase. Pay inequalities persist and contraception and abortion are outlawed. 1955–64 Khrushchev extends women’s rights by legalising abortion. His other policies are designed to help women reflect traditional stereotypes regarding the roles of women. Government officials are concerned about women’s desire for fashion and the promiscuity of some young women. 1941–55 Women’s contribution to the Second World War is celebrated in official propaganda. Summary diagram: Women and the family. Recommended reading S. Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (Oxford, 2000), pages 35–66. This part of Fitzpatrick’s book discusses women in Stalin’s Russia. E. Casey and L. Martens (eds.), Gender and Consumption: Domestic Cultures and the Commercialisation of Everyday Life (Ashgate, 2007), pages 49–78. This section of Casey and Martens work analyses the government’s concerns about young women in the Soviet Union during the 1960s. N. Chernyshova, Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era (Routledge, 2013), pages 184–203. In this chapter Chernyshova examines the Soviet government’s concern about the impact the role of women in a consumer economy.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin130 Essay technique: Resolution Your essay plan could look like this: Paragraph 1: Argument Soviet Communism failed to create sexual equality because after the abolition of Zhenotdel men dominated every aspect of government. Paragraph 2: Counter-argument Soviet Communism succeeded in creating greater sexual equality because of the new opportunities for women in factories and collective farms. Paragraph 3: Counter-argument Soviet Communism succeeded in creating greater sexual equality because of the new opportunities for women in education. Paragraph 4 Soviet Communism’s record on sexual equality was mixed because of the changing social policies regarding divorce, abortion and families. The highest marks on Sections A and B of the exam are available for sustained analysis. One way of achieving this is to write an essay that develops a clear argument (see page 93) and counter-argument (see page 107). Having set out an argument and a counter-argument you should resolve the tension between the two. One way of concluding an essay is to resolve the debate that you have established between the argument and the counter-argument. Imagine you are answering the following question: How accurate is it to say that Communism failed to create sexual equality in the years 1918–53? This essay has one clear paragraph arguing that Soviet Communism failed to create sexual equality, two arguing that there was some success and a final paragraph arguing that the record was mixed. You can resolve the tension by weighing up the argument and counter-argument in the conclusion. In so doing, you can reach a supported overall judgement. The conclusion on page 131 evaluates the argument and counter-argument. It resolves the tension by identifying a problem with the counter-argument, while also acknowledging that there is some truth in the counter- argument. Even so, ultimately it returns to the main argument that sexual equality was not achieved. TIP: The process of evaluating the argument and the counter-argument is helped by the use of words like ‘however’ and ‘nonetheless’, which indicate that the paragraph is weighing up contrasting arguments.
131Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 In conclusion, Soviet Communism failed to create sexual equality in Russia in the years 1917–53 because under Lenin and Stalin, the government was dominated by men. Indeed, small early steps designed to represent women in government, such as the creation of Zhenotdel, and designed to give women rights to abortion and divorce were abolished by Stalin. However, there were new economic opportunities for women on Stalin’s collective farms and in the factories created during the Five-Year Plans of the 1930s. Moreover, there were new opportunities for women in education too. Nonetheless, even in the economy men dominated. Women were routinely paid less than men, and more men than women gained places at university. Indeed, it is fair to say that the new opportunities for women were designed to improve the economy rather than liberate women. Therefore, although there were some steps towards sexual equality, Communism ultimately failed to create sexual equality in the Soviet Union in the years 1917–53. The conclusion begins with the main argument, which summarises paragraphs 1 and 4. The conclusion cont inues by contrasting this with the counter-argument – summarising paragraphs 2 and 3. Identifies a problem with the counter-argument. Acknowledges that there is some truth in the counter- argument. Finally, the conclusion resolves the tension, by evaluating the argument and the counter- argument, concluding that sexual equality was not achieved. Activity: Resolving tensions Imagine you are answering the following question: How accurate is it to say that the majority of Soviet citizens accepted limited political freedom in order to benefit from economic security in the years 1964–82? Here is a possible plan: Paragraph 1: Argument In the years 1964–82 the majority of Soviet citizens accepted limited political freedom, because the standard of living was better than they had ever known it. Paragraph 2: Argument The majority of Soviet citizens clearly accepted limited political freedom because there was widespread participation in soviet politics and dissidents were in the minority. Paragraph 3: Counter-argument The majority of Soviet citizens did not wholly accept limited political freedom because cynicism, alcoholism and absenteeism were wide-spread, which indicates high levels of dissatisfaction with the regime. Paragraph 4: Counter-argument The majority of Soviet citizens did not wholly accept limited political freedom for the whole period because as the economy stagnated levels of dissatisfaction grew. 1 Answer the following questions: a) W hich is stronger, the argument or the counter- argument? Why is it stronger? b) What are the f laws in the weaker argument? c) What strengths does the weaker argument have? 2 Having answered these questions, write a conclusion that weighs up the argument and the counter- argument in order to reach an overall judgement. TIP: Use the words ‘however’, ‘nonetheless’ and ‘therefore’ to structure the paragraph.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin132 4c: Education and young people Overview Education was a continual priority and a continual problem for Soviet leaders. All agreed that education was fundamentally liberating and therefore an essential part of the new society. However, there was disagreement concerning how education was supposed to liberate the Soviet people. Lunacharsky argued that new teaching methods and a general education that did not constrain the citizen’s future was the key to a new revolutionary education. Lenin, by contrast, thought that the first job of Soviet education was to liberate the Soviet people from ignorance by teaching them to read and write. Stalin wanted to use education to help build socialism and in so doing liberate the Soviet Union from capitalism. Khrushchev attempted to revive some of the goals of Lunacharsky, whereas Brezhnev attempted to revive some of Stalin’s educational approaches. In spite of these different approaches, Communism transformed education. Before the revolution education was the privilege of the few; by the 1960s it was the right of the many. This chapter considers: 1 Education during a period of transition 2 The reduction of illiteracy 3 State control of the curriculum, 1932–53 4 Educational reform and expansion, 1953–85. 1 Education during a period of transition Lenin and other Communists believed that the Soviet Union was in a period of transition, between capitalism and Communism. The transitional nature of this period affected the goals and development of Soviet policy. Note it down Using a spider diagram, make notes on the goals that communists had for education and the problems that they faced in the first years of the revolution. Distinguish between different types of problems using different coloured pens. The goals of education There were a variety of views about education within the Communist Part y in 1917. These ref lected different conceptions of what education had been and what it should be. Communists tended to believe that education was important. Lenin, for example, believed that a high level of education, starting with basic literacy, was an essential part of building socialism. Socialism, according to Lenin and his followers, would require industrialisation, which in turn required an educated workforce who could understand the complex processes of industry. From this point of view education served the long-term goa ls of the revolution by helping to lay the foundation for industrialisation. By contrast, other communists, like Anatoly Lunacharsky, People’s Commissar of Enlightenment, believed that the primary goal of education was to allow individual students to f lourish. Communists like Lunacharsky, therefore, believed that the revolution should liberate the student, rather than education serving the goals of the revolution. The problems of education There was also disagreement over the nature of education in a revolutionary society. Education was traditionally associated with privilege and status in Russia, as only children from relatively rich backgrounds had access to schooling. This raised a series of questions: ● Should Communists continue with traditional forms of education, or create a new kind of revolutionary education? ● Should Communists work with educated people even though they were part of the traditional elite? ● How should Communists educate the millions of workers with little or no formal education? These questions were complicated by the practical problems of organising education. These included: ● low levels of literacy – only around 32 per cent of the population could read and write in 1914 ● educational inequalities – Russians tended to be better educated than non-Russians, and urban education was better than rural education. Practical problems and ideological debates were further complicated by the notion that after 1918 Russia was in a ‘period of transition’, rather than being a socialist society. Therefore some Communists argued that in the short term compromises were necessary between socialist principles and the need to rebuild society after the Civil War. These k inds of questions and concerns led to a variety of twists and turns in educational policy between 1918 and 1936.
133Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 The growth of education, 1918–28 Initially, educational policy was directed by Lunacharsky and Nadezhda Krupskaya – an educational theorist and Lenin’s wife. During the Civil War there were attempts to institute a new polytechnic style of education and to deal with illiteracy. Unified labour schools In October 1918, the Soviet Government issued a decree introducing a series of reforms which: ● established unified labour schools to provide free polytechnic education to all children aged 8 to 17 ● banned religious instruction in schools ● introduced co-educational schools, ending gender segregation of schooling ● abolished corporal punishment, homework and exams ● promised free breakfasts for schoolchildren and free medical examinations ● allowed church buildi ngs to be converted into schools ● made education compulsor y. Secondary schooling was designed to be vocational. The government proposed the creation of factory schools or professional schools in which young people spent four hours a day in factories learning skills a nd four hours a day being taught in school. Lunacharsky favoured progressive teaching methods based on the theories of American educationalists such as John Dewey. These methods included learning through activities and through play, rather than rote-learning, using textbooks or traditional lecturing. In reality, schooling fell short of Lunacharsky’s vision in the early years of the revolution. Under the conditions of the Civil War there were insufficient resources to invest in education. Free compulsory education to the age of 16 was not achieved in the Soviet Union until the 1950s. Moreover, schools did not have the resources to provide free meals or medical check-ups. Finally, teachers continued to use traditional methods as there was no reliable system for training teachers. Polytechnic education Marxists were critical of education that forced students to specialise. This, they argued, trapped a student in a specific area. Rather than offering specialist training, Marxists advocated a polytechnic education: a general education that taught many technical skills. This would allow students to enter whatever branch of industry they chose and to move between industries. Education under the NEP The NEP was a period of compromise. This affected education as well as the economy as a whole. Educational provision declined in the first years of the NEP. Financial problems meant significant cuts in educational provision. In 1921 the government: ● forced some schools to close to save money. ● introduced fees to pay for prima ry and secondary education for all except the poorest children and the children of those unable to work due to war injuries ● scrapped plans for opening children’s homes linked to schools for the 7 mill ion children orphaned by the Civil War. In the first 18 months of the NEP the number of children in education halved, as did the number of schools. Expansion in the mid-1920s As the economy stabilised, education expanded. First, from 1927 fees for primar y schools were abolished, and from then on the majority of chi ldren received a four-year primar y education. By 1928 about 60 per cent of Soviet children of prima ry school age were in school, around 10 per cent more than prior to the revolution. However, there were signif icant inequalities in the system. For example, in towns and cities children in education tended to get the full four years of pri mary education, whereas in the countryside children were un likely to complete three years of education. Secondary education took a new direction during the 1920s. Under the NEP education was funded locally rather than by the Commis sariat for Education. Therefore central government had difficulty controlling the development of education. Rather than follow the educational programme of polytechnic schools that had been outlined in 1918, local soviets simply took over existing gymnasia, schools that had been set up by the Tsarist regime. Around 97 per cent of students paid fees to attend. Therefore the schools tended to be dominated by the children of the wealthy. Around 90 per cent of middle-class students started secondary school and around 25 per cent finished secondary school, whereas only 40 per cent of working-class students started secondary school and only 3 per cent finished secondary school. Finally, the vast majority of teachers in the former gym nasia were trained before the revolution. Therefore they continued to teach in the t raditional way. Additionally, their approach to subjects such as history remained traditional. The government wanted teachers to teach the history of class struggle and of the working class. However, teachers tended to continue to teach the history of Russia, particularly the achievements of the Tsars.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin134 Young people’s groups in the 1920s Komsomol, the Young Communists’ League, and the Young Pioneers were youth organisations established in the early days of the revolution to provide a way for young people to express their support for the Communist Party, learn about political campaigning and enjoy communal recreation. The Young Pioneers was established in 1922 to cater for children between the ages of 10 and 15, whereas Komsomol was founded in 1918 for people between the ages of 16 and 28. Communist Party leaders assumed that young people would be naturally attracted to communist values as they believed that young people were likely to be naturally radical. Komsomol members and the Young Pioneers wore a uniform and took part in activities such as camping and hiking. They also had talks from local factory workers, soldiers from the Red Army and farm workers. Komsomol distributed posters of Lenin, Trotsky and other leading members of the government, and Komsomol members took part in a variety of campaigns. For example, Komsomol members were sometimes sent into markets to monitor prices, were sometimes instructed to distribute Communist Party leaflets and were also involved in anti-religious campaigns. In theory Komsomol members were meant to be disciplined and keen supporters of the Communist Party. However, in reality they often had a reputation for drunkenness, promiscuity and hooliganism. Moreover, young people rarely attended the political meetings organised by Komsomol, but Komsomol parties and dances were extremely popular. Party leaders were aware of the nature of Komsomol and therefore in 1926 issued a directive that Komsomol leaders should discourage drinking, dancing and sex, and encourage ‘healthy forms of entertainment’. 2 The reduction of illiteracy Lenin believed that ending illiteracy was crucial to building socialism. Therefore tackling illiteracy was Lenin’s central educational aim. In 1919 the new government published the Decree on Illiteracy which required all illiterate people between the ages of 8 and 50 to learn to read and write. It also gave the government the right to conscript literate people into the education system to teach. The literacy campaign continued throughout the 1920s with mixed results. Note it down Create a timeline for illiteracy in this period. Make notes on the timeline on the policies used to tackle illiteracy and, using a different colour, on the consequences of these policies. The Red Army Trotsky shared Lenin’s view about the importance of literacy. Consequently, as leader of the Red Army, he introduced education for all soldiers. As a result, literacy rates increased from 50 per cent in 1918 to 86 per cent in 1921. The campaign continued after the war was won, and by 1925 100 per cent of soldiers in the Red Army could read and write. Literacy and the Civil War Outside the Red Army the Civil War saw a decline in literacy. The Communist Government published 6.5 million textbooks containing simple rhymes that taught the alphabet. Therefore there was a rise in the number of people who could identify letters, but this campaign did not lead to an increase in genuine literacy. Lunacharsky also set up a network of reading rooms or likpunkty (liquidation points) in towns and villages. They offered six-week intensive courses in reading and writing, and were designed to ‘liquidate’ illiteracy. However, learning was not a priority for those trying to survive the Civil War. The literacy campaign was set back by a series of factors: ● The majority of teachers in 1917 did not support the regime; they advocated Western-style democracy. Indeed, teachers went on strike in early 1918 in protest at the new government. ● The government prioritised militar y victory and economic survival over education. ● Many schools were requisitioned by the army and turned into stores or barracks; therefore education ceased. ● The war economy did not produce or distribute educational products. By 1920 the schools that were open reported that they had one pencil for every 60 students and one pen for every 22. ● The war disrupted education across the country. Literacy and the NEP Initially economic conditions led to the scaling back of the already small literacy campaign. To save money the government closed 90 per cent of the reading room network established during the Civi l War. However, in
135Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 the mid-1920s there was a new campaign to ‘liquidate illiteracy’. In May 1925 the government announced an initiative to ensure that all adults in the Soviet Union were literate by October 1927: the tenth anniversary of the revolution. Working with trades unions the government set up libraries and reading groups in factories to educate workers. There were some successes. For exa mple, the Metal Workers Union reported an increase in literacy from 86 per cent in 1925 to 96 per cent in 1926, and the Transport Workers Union achieved 99 per cent literacy by 1927. However, educating peasants proved harder. Therefore the goal of the campaign was pushed back to 1933. Overall, literacy rates improved from 38 per cent in 1914 to 55 per cent in 1928. However, the achievement was extremely uneven and rates of illiteracy began to increase after the illiteracy liquidation campaign ended in 1927. Stalin’s war against illiteracy Under Stalin the campaign agai nst illiteracy was relaunched. The Sixteenth Party Congress of 1930 adopted new targets to eliminate illiteracy and ensure that primary schooling was compulsory during the First Five-Year Plan. The government recruited 3 million volunteers from Komsomol to educate workers and peasants. The campaign was organised in a military fashion. Volunteers were called ‘cultural soldiers’, organised in ‘cultural battalions’ and tasked with fighting a ‘cultural war’ against illiteracy. However, the campaign took place in the midst of Stalin’s campaign to collectivise agriculture (see page 54). As a result, teachers were attacked as they were associated with the government and therefore considered the enemy. Around 40 per cent of teachers were physically attacked in the first year of the campaign. For example, some teachers were locked in schools that were then set on fire, while others were beaten to death or had acid thrown at them. There were also rumours that the teachers were really there to kidnap children and send young Soviet women to China as slaves. Teachers were also poorly equipped and poorly supported. They often arrived with no textbooks or writing materials. Additionally, they had little to offer peasants who attended schools. For example, they were unable to provide free school meals. In spite of this unpromising start the campaign was successful. During the first Five-Year Plan 90 per cent of Soviet adults had attended a literacy course. These courses were not wholly successful, but approximately 68 per cent of people were literate by the end of the First Five-Year Plan, a signif icant improvement from 1928. Stalin’s campaign continued throughout the 1930s. By 1939 over 94 per cent of Soviet citizens were literate. Significantly, literacy rates Dawn of the Motherland (1949). What evidence does this picture contain of Stalin’s modernisation of the Soviet Union?
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin136 reflected inequalities in society, so while around 97 per cent of men were literate only 90 per cent of women could read and write. Equally, educational culture became obsessed with statistics and centrally enforced targets. Therefore although literacy rates shot up, there was no focus on the full educational development of the students. Nor was there any official attempt to encourage students to read or write for pleasure. Nonetheless, mass literacy was one of the successes of Stalin’s first decade in power. 3 State control of the curriculum, 1932–53 Under Stalin, the government established tight control of the curriculum. From 1932 to 1935 the government ordered extensive changes to what was taught in schools. Curriculum changes were a response to criticisms of the People’s Commissariat for Education and educational standards in schools in the 1920s. The reforms also reflected the values and methods of Stalinist society. In order to ensure that young people became good workers on collective farms or in government factories, schools emphasised discipline, hard work and traditional skills. Additionally, in order to ensure that children became obedient citizens, schools began to emphasise patriotism and respect for great Russian leaders. Teachers too were expected to embrace the values and methods of the command economy. Note it down Draw a timeline on a large sheet of paper covering the period 1932–53. Using bullet points, make notes on: ● the goals of educational policy under Stalin ● the educational reforms introduced under Stalin ● the consequences of Stalin’s educational policy. Educating workers Under Stalin, education was expected to turn young people into good workers. In 1931 a decree ordered curriculum reform. The decree abolished the polytechnic focus that had been put forward in 1918. Rather it stated that core subjects such as reading, writing, maths and science should form the basis of a socialist education system. The aim was to ensure that all people had a foundational level of education necessary for work in factories or farms. Moreover, the progressive methods that were advocated in the 1920s were abolished. Stalin’s education system stressed regimented discipline. A 1932 decree introduced new standards of discipline. Teachers were required to ensure that students attended regularly and were punctual, and were also required to set regular homework. Moreover, there was a national code of conduct which covered the correct way to stand and sit in classes. Students could also be expelled from school for misconduct. In essence, school discipline was supposed to prepare students for the labour discipline that they would experience in Soviet factories under the Five-Year Plans. In 1933 a new series of textbooks was launched to support the new curriculum. Finally, in 1935 a system of national examinations was introduced. These were designed to grade the workforce of the future so students with good grades could be identified and trained for management posts, and less successful students would be assigned more manual jobs. Educating citizens During the 1930s education acquired a new focus on traditional Russian history. Following the Decree on the Teaching of Civic History, issued in May 1934, history lessons, and new Soviet history textbooks, focused on the achievement of great men such as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. History teaching also became more nationalistic, stressing the history of the Russian nation rather than the history of class str uggle or the international working-class movement. This emphasis emerged at the same time as the cult of Stalin. In that sense, the new focus on great Russian leaders was part of the hero-worship that was becoming a feature of Soviet culture at the time. The new educational focus was designed to make students respect Stalin and love their country. Stalinist teaching methods Teachers were encouraged to set an example for their students by emulating Stakhanov (see page 53). For example, in 1936 Olga Fedorovna Leonova pledged that all of her students would gain excellent grades. When she had fulfilled this promise a media campaign made her an example for all Soviet teachers. Evidently, teaching and study in the Soviet Union reflected the aims and methods of Sta lin’s economy. Youth groups under Stalin During the 1930s members of Komsomol and the Young Pioneers were expected to spy on their parents and report any criminal behaviour to the police. Komsomolskaia Pravda, the Soviet Union’s young people’s magazine, reinforced this message. The most famous member of Komsomol during the 1930s was Pavlik Morozov, who was supposedly killed by a kulak at the age of 14. Komsomolskaia Pravda described him as hard working and obedient, the model for other young people to follow.
137Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 Educational expansion under Stalin The expansion of primary education continued under Stalin. The government set the target that 100 per cent of children aged between 8 and 12 would be enrolled for primary schools by 1932. Off icial figures show that they achieved the enrolment of 95 per cent of children. Even though they missed their target, this was a dramatic increase from the 60 per cent enrolled in 1928. Fees were still an important part of the education system outside primary school. Stalin’s prime objective in the 1930s was industrialisation. Therefore the government was unwilling to spend money on education beyond what was necessary to ensure the workforce could operate government factories. For most workers primary education was enough. Fees were maintained in the higher levels of education to keep costs down. They also limited access. Significantly, the Communist Party and trades unions offered scholarships and grants to help students access higher education. However, the system favoured the sons and daughters of Party officials. Indeed, the scheme was part of Stalin’s broader policy of rewarding loyal Party members. In spite of educational fees, higher education grew significantly during the 1930s. The number of universities increased by around 800 per cent, from 105 in 1914 to 817 in 1939. The number of students receiving a university education increased by a similar proportion, from 127,000 in 1914 to 811,000 in 1939. Secondary education also expanded. By 1939 approximately 1.5 million Soviet citizens, seven per cent of the child population, completed their secondary education compared to just 216,000 in the last years of the NEP. Stalin’s final attempt to ensure discipline at school came in July 1943 when a decree introduced gender segregation into secondary schools. Where possible, local soviets were encouraged to ensure that male and female students did not share the same buildings. Stalin felt that interaction between the adolescent male and female students was likely to lead to distraction and ill-discipline. Expansion continued after the Second World War, and by 1953 official figures showed that: ● almost 100 per cent of children aged 8 to 12 gained the full four years of primar y education ● around 65 per cent of children aged 12 to 17 gained some secondary education ● around 20 per cent of children aged 15 to 17 completed secondary education. Labour Reserve Schools In addition to the network of primary schools, secondary schools and universities, the Soviet Union also established Labour Reserve Schools (LRS). These were established by the Ministry of Labour in 1940 in order to train young men between the ages of 14 and 17 in specialisms in industr y. In a sense, the LRSs were a form of industrial conscription. Quotas for compulsory recruitment were issued. Recruits were then enrolled in training courses lasting between six months and two years, followed by a four-year work placement. For the period of their education they were provided with accommodation and food, but no pay. During the Second World War the LRSs became an important part of Soviet industr y. Young men could avoid militar y service by enrolling i n a LRS and then be deployed to fulf il a specialist role in a factory i n order to facilitate war production. Additionally, the LRSs started recruiting women. Conditions in the LRSs were harsh and students who deserted could face sentences of between one year in prison and ten years in a gulag. During the Fourth and Fifth Five-Year Plans (see page 50), LRSs played an important part in providing the skilled labour necessary for economic reconstruction. For example, between 1946 and 1952, the LRSs recruited 4.2 million young people and trained them to work in metallurgy, electricity production, industrial and militar y construction, and as railway workers. LRSs were another feature of government control of the curriculum, as the government set the quotas for the number of people to be trained and the areas of industry they should study. University education under Stalin Stalin’s Great Turn required an expansion of Soviet universities. During the period of the NEP Soviet industry had been run by ‘bourgeois specialists’, people who had been born into privileged classes prior to the revolution. Stalin wanted to replace these people, who in his view were enemies of socialism, with a new generation of ‘red specialists’. Therefore Soviet higher education had to be expanded. Stalin launched the new policy in 1928, and the number of university enrolments quickly increased. In 1927 enrolments totalled 170,000. By 1932 this had grown to 500,000 and in 1940 the number of enrolments stood at 812,000. Between 1936 and 1938 a new examination system was introduced along with new standards of discipline. By the late 1930s the university staff who had been employed before 1928 were purged and replaced with red specialists. In spite of the purge, the number o
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin138 4 Educational reform and expansion, 1953–85 While education grew under Stalin, the essential structure and curriculum stayed the same from the mid-1930s to 1953. Therefore Khrushchev believed that education, along with much else in the Soviet Union, was in need of reform. Khrushchev’s reforms proved unpopular, and Brezhnev restored much of the Stalinist curriculum after Khrushchev’s fa ll. Note it down Draw a timeline covering the period 1953–85. Using bullet points, make notes on: ● educational reforms ● educational expansion ● the restoration of traditional educational policy. You can use different coloured pens to distinguish between the three. Khrushchev’s reorganisation and expansion Between 1929 and 1953 schools in towns and cities improved considerably. Schools in the country were often much smaller and lacked resources. Teachers, for example, were often unwilling to give up the relative comfort of Soviet towns to work in the country. In order to address this, Khr ushchev ordered the merger of small country schools and the establishment of new schools that would offer the full ten years of compulsory education. However, the scheme only a ffected certain a reas, and the majority of country schools remained small a nd poorly resourced. Khrushchev doubled the number of schools in towns and cities. He also invested in teacher training and recruitment. The number of teachers rose from 1.5 million in 1953 to 2.2 million in 1964. Moreover, the level of teachers’ education also improved under Khrushchev. In 1953 only 19 per cent of teachers had a university education; that rose to 40 per cent in 1964. Perhaps the most important reform in terms of improving access to education was the abolition of fees for students attending secondary school and university in 1956. This was followed in 1959 by the establishment of special funds to help maintain poor students who attended secondary schools. The fund paid for clothes, footwear, textbooks and school dinners. As a result of these reforms, the proportion of 17 year olds who completed secondary education rose significantly from about 20 per cent in 1953 to about 75 per cent in 1959. Educational reform, 1956 By 1956 Khrushchev believed that the Soviet curriculum was in need of reform. The Soviet curriculum stayed much the same from 1931 to 1955. Indeed, of the 61 textbooks in use in 1958, 46 had been initially written in 1933. Khrushchev’s 1956 reforms reintroduced polytechnic education. This reflected the needs of Khrushchev’s industrial policy. Whereas Stalin’s economy needed disciplined and literate workers, Khrushchev’s new light industries needed workers with more sophisticated skills. The reforms also ref lected the impact of the war. High mortality rates in young men led to a shortage of ski lled labour in the 1950s. As a result of the reforms, education became more practical. This is evident from the amount of time in class devoted to different subjects (see Table 3). Table 3: Percentage of time in class devoted to different subjects. Percentage of curriculum time Subject area 1947 1959 Change Humanities (including history, music and art) 50 40 –10 Science (including mathematics) 42 31 –10 Practical training 8 28 +20 In addition to the changes in the amount of time given to different subject areas, education was made more practical by increasing the practical focus of science and maths teaching. Finally, outside of lessons schools were expected to organise trips to factories and far ms as well as work experience placements. The 1958 reforms The reforms of December 1958 took Soviet schools further in the direction of polytechnic education. The 1958 reforms reflected Khrushchev’s suspicion of the prejudice instilled by traditional education. He complained that academic education made students believe that they were too good to work in factories or on farms. Khrushchev’s reforms were set out in the December 1959 Education Law. The law: ● made education compulsor y for children aged 7 to 15 ● required schools to offer 11-year programmes rather than 10-year programmes so students could stay on to the age of 19 ● restructured education for students aged 16 to 19, so that most students would complete their education through a combination of education in schools and vocational training in local factories or on local farms
139Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 ● ensured the most academically gifted students would be given places at special schools that focused on academic education ● introduced a new course, ‘the fundamentals of political knowledge’, for all 15 year olds to ensure they knew the benefits of the Soviet system and the essentials of Marxism. Final reforms Khrushchev continued to try to reform education. His fina l reforms were part of his broader policy of de- Stalinisation. ● Stalinist discipline was relaxed in November 1960 when a new code of conduct was introduced which abolished the rules about correct sitting and standing postures. ● In 1961 Khrushchev ordered a new emphasis on learning foreign languages. Again this ref lected a rejection of Stalin’s emphasis on cultural isolation. ● The requirement to set homework was also dropped, and final exams, introduced by Stalin in the 1930s, were replaced by continuous assessment. ● In June 1962 teachers lost the right to expel students who were underachieving. The impact of Khrushchev’s reforms Khrushchev’s reforms were unpopular and a failure. They were unpopular because most parents wanted their children to get an academic education, rather than complete vocational courses. This v iew was particularly common among Communist Party members. The reforms were a failure because they were never fully implemented. By 1962, when all schools were supposed to offer courses to students up to the age of 19, only 65 per cent of schools had complied with government regulations. The slackening of discipline was generally ignored by teachers, who continued to set homework and insist on correct standing and sitting postures. Curriculum reforms were not implemented in 47 per cent of schools. The most successful aspects of Khrushchev’s reforms were those that improved education for the academic elite. These reforms were welcomed by Party officials, and the number of special schools increased signif icantly (see Table 4). Table 4: The number of special schools in 1959 and 1966. Type of school 1959 1966 Academic 5 24 Art and Sculpture 5 50 Ballet 16 18 Moreover, Khrushchev’s reforms did not address some of the fundamental problems in Soviet education, such as poorly maintained or poorly built school buildings and the shortage of teachers in rural areas. Soviet education, 1964–85 Khrushchev’s reforms were extremely unpopular with members of the Communist Party. Other leading Communists branded them ‘crackpot’ educational schemes. Therefore Brezhnev’s top educational priority was to reverse Khrushchev’s educational reforms. Repealing the Khrushchev reforms The educational priority of the post-Khrushchev leadership was to repeal Khrushchev’s reforms. Between 1964 and 1966 the Council of Ministers: ● ended the 11-year schooling policy in favour of a gradual shift from 8 -year schooling to 10-year schooling ● drew up a temporary curriculum to restore the focus on academic education ● ended vocational training for students aged 16 to 19 in factories and on farms ● abandoned compulsory secondary education, replacing it with a target that 100 per cent of children would complete secondary education by 1970. Slowing expansion Expansion of secondary schooling slowed from 1966. By 1976 only 60 per cent of students finished secondary education, far short of the 1970 target. The number of teachers remained roughly stable, but there was a continual increase in their level of qualifications. By 1978 almost 70 per cent of teachers had a university education. Small-scale reforms Brezhnev introduced some small- scale reforms in the 1970s. The School Statute of September 1970 required textbooks to be updated to reflect the l atest scientific knowledge and reintroduced compulsory homework. The Fundamental Law on Soviet Education, 1973, essentially consolidated the existing approach to education in a single document. During the 1970s attempts were made to increase peasant participation in schooling by requiring a ll schools to provide hot school meals. Free meals were available to poor students. Additionally, in the late 1970s textbooks were made available to students free of charg e. The curriculum remained largely unchanged under Brezhnev. Indeed, by 1985 students were still required to study the same mix of subjects as those established in 1947.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin140 University education, 1953–85 Soviet universities were one of the real successes of the Communist education system. Between 1953 and 1980 student numbers in higher education grew from about 1.5 million to over 5 million, around 19 per cent of the population. Growth in student numbers took place following 1958. Moreover, the university curriculum expanded to reflect the diverse needs of Soviet light industry. From 1958 there were new courses, including electronics, radio, construction, agricultural chemistry and machine-building. Academic staff increased from 87,000 to 380,000 between 1958 and 1980 to teach the growing number of students. There were attempts to serve the diverse communities that comprised the Soviet Union. For example, in 1954 Khrushchev initiated the building of five new universities to serve students from non-Russian ethnic backgrounds. Brezhnev continued this initiative by founding 18 universities in non-Russian Soviet republics including Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Postgraduate education also g rew. In 1953 only 9000 Soviet citizens had doctorates; by 1975 that figure had risen to 32,000. Soviet authorities were concerned about the impact of such high levels of education, fearing that advanced study would lead to political non-conformity. Therefore most postgraduate courses focused on sciences, which were considered politically less dangerous. Postgraduate students in the humanities were expected to write a chapter on how their research supported the established truths of Marxism- Leninism in order to show that they remained committed to the official ideology. Work together 1 Write a paragraph in answer to the following question: How far did the Soviet Government achieve its educational aims in the years 1917–53? Make sure your answer focuses clearly on the question, considers both sides of the question, considers media and religion, covers the whole time period and concludes with some genuine evaluation. 2 Having written the paragraph, swap it with a partner. Discuss which paragraph: ● focuses more clearly on the question ● uses the most appropriate evidence to support its points ● most effectively defines the educational aims of the government ● most effectively covers the whole period ● contains the most effective evaluation. 3 Having discussed these different aspects of your paragraphs, note down three things you could do to improve or maintain your essay technique. 4 Now repeat the activity focusing on the period 1953–85. Try to improve your paragraph based on your discussion of your original paragraph. Komsomol, 1954–85 Khrushchev and Brezhnev had different views of the role of Komsomol. Khrushchev seems to have had a lot of faith in the organisation and was keen to involve Komsomol members in his initiatives. For example, he instructed Komsomol’s leaders to recruit young volunteer workers to work on the Virgin Lands Scheme. Khrushchev hoped that Komsomol would play a leading role in holding factory managers and Party officials to account, reminding them of the vision that they were all working towards. Brezhnev, by contrast, was suspicious of Komsomol. He viewed Komsomol’s leadership as young and ambitious, and therefore potentially dangerous. Brezhnev essentially wanted Komsomol to celebrate the achievements of the Party and the leadership. He believed that Komsomol should keep young people disciplined and obedient and should emphasise the values of working hard and respecting the government.
141Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 Chapter summary ● From 1917 to 1985 education was radically reformed. ● Education reforms reflected the changing needs of the Soviet economy, the changing ideological emphasis of the leadership and the interests of policy makers. ● Lunacharsky wanted to ensure that Soviet education liberated students through progressive teaching methods and a polytechnic approach that allowed students to train for a variety of different economic roles. ● Lenin emphasised the liquidation of illiteracy as the greatest task facing Soviet education, arguing that true freedom began with the most basic education. ● Stalin continued Lenin’s literacy drive, but refocused education on ensuring a disciplined workforce with the essential skills and the necessary loyalty to build socialism. ● Khrushchev revived polytechnic education stressing the dignity of factory and farm work. However, his own party rejected this, wanting an academic education for their children. ● Brezhnev revived a more traditional educational system but continued Khrushchev’s drive to extend the benefits of education to the peasantry and the Soviet people outside Russia. ● By 1985 most Soviet citizens gained a world-class education, which, in itself, was a revolution from the experience of Russians in 1914. BREZHNEV Traditional teaching and traditional curriculum, but expanded educational provision to ensure a good standard of education for all Polytechnic education to emphasise the dignity and importance of workKHRUSHCHEV Discipline and essential skills for economic modernisationSTALIN Liquidation of illiteracy as the foundation of freedomLENIN Polytechnic education to liberate individual studentsLUNACHARSKY Summary diagram: Education and young people. Recommended reading V. Brovkin, Russia after Lenin: Politics, Culture and Society, 1921–1929 (Routledge, 1998), pages 107–32. This chapter of Brovkin’s book analyses youth culture in the Soviet Union in the 1920s. S. Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union 1921–1934 (Cambridge, 2002), pages 113 –36. In this chapter Fitzpatrick explores the change in education that took place under Stalin. M. Iliˇc, S.E. Reid and L. Attwood (eds.), Women in the Khrushchev Era (Palgrave, 2004), pages 75–95. In this chapter the authors consider sex and youth culture in the early part of the Khrushchev era.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin142 Essay technique: Evaluation and relative significance In conclusion, clearly the Soviet Government was based on the secret police throughout the period 1928–85. For example, the secret police played a major role in supporting Stalin’s government, particularly during the Great Terror, and Brezhnev reversed Khrushchev’s attempts to reduce their role in Russian culture. However, other factors such as propaganda and economic incentives also helped support communist rule. During Stalin’s Five-Year Plans, propaganda encouraged workers to make big sacrifices in order to build a better future, and economic incentives were also important during the Stakhanovite period, under Khrushchev and as part of Brezhnev’s ‘social contract’. Therefore, although the secret police played an important role supporting communist rule, they were not wholly responsible because propaganda and economic rewards were also important to the stability of the government. The fir st par t of the paragraph focuses on the given factor, examining the importance of the secret police. The fir st par t of the paragraph weighs the given factor against other factors: propaganda and economic incentives. The final part of the paragraph makes a judgement about the significance of the different factors. In this example the evaluation is helped by using a series of words that weigh the importance of the secret police against the importance of terror. ‘Clearly’, ‘however’ and ‘therefore’ are useful words as they can help contrast the importance of the different factors. This conclusion could be improved by explicitly weighing the relative significance of the factors in the light of a valid criterion. An example of an improved conclusion can be found on page 143. Reaching a supported overall judgement is an important part of doing well in Section A and B essays. One aspect of reaching the very highest level is to reach a supported overall judgement by evaluating the relative significance of different factors in the light of a valid criterion. This section examines how to evaluate and how to establish valid criteria. Evaluation The purpose of evaluation is to weigh up and reach a judgement. Therefore evaluation needs to consider the importance of two or more different factors, weigh them against each other and then reach a judgement. Evaluation is a good skill to use at the end of an essay, because it helps support your overall judgement. For example, imagine you are answering the following question: How accurate is it to say that the Soviet Government relied wholly on the secret police to retain its power in the years 1928–85? You might want to weigh up the extent to which the Soviet Government relied on the secret police on the one hand, and propaganda and economic incentives on the other. For example, your conclusion might read:
143Theme 4 Social developments, 1917–85 In conclusion, clearly the Soviet Government was based on secret police throughout the period between1928 and 1984. This was particularly true during the years 1935–38 when the Great Terror affected the whole of the Russian population.Terror continued under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, but it affected far fewer people. However, other factors such as propaganda and incentives also helped support communist rule. Propaganda was less important than the secret police, because after 1964 the Russian population became increasingly cynical and therefore propaganda was not very influential under Brezhnev. The most important factor was economic incentives. These became a feature of Russian life during the Second Five-Year Plan and became increasingly important to the Russian people due to Khrushchev’s and Brezhnev’s attempts to create a consumer society. Indeed, following 1964 Brezhnev’s ‘social contract’ with the Russian people was based on economic incentives much more than on the secret police or inspirational visions of propaganda. Therefore, although the secret police played an important role supporting communist rule and were much more effective than the increasingly ineffectual propaganda, economic incentives were the most important factor because from 1953 and particularly after 1964 they were the main reason that the Russian people supported communist rule. This par t of the par agraph begins to evaluate the importance of the secret police by considering the criteria of duration and scope. Here the paragraph argues that propaganda was less important than terror, by referring to the same criteria: duration (propaganda was increasingly ineffective from 1964 to 1984) and scope (most people stopped believing the propaganda from 1964 to 1984). Using the same criteria, the paragraph argues that economic incentives were the most important factor. The final sentence explicit ly weighs the different factors in terms of the criteria and reaches an overall judgement. Relative significance Clearly the Soviet Government relied on the secret police, propaganda and economic incentives. However, the best essays will make a judgement about which was most important based on a valid criterion. It is up to you to come up with a valid criterion. Criteria can be very simple. The following criteria are often useful: ● Duration: which factor was important for the longest period of time? ● Scope: which factor affected the most people? ● Effectiveness: which factor achieved most? ● Impact: which factor led to the most fundamental change? For example, in answer to the essay question on page 142. You could compare the factors in terms of their duration and their scope. For example, you could argue that economic incentives were more important than propaganda or terror because they affected more people for a longer time: This conclusion is an example of high-level work because it reaches an overall judgement and supports it through evaluating the relative significance of different factors in the light of valid criteria.Activity: Weighing up the factors Here is a plan in answer to the following question: How accurate is it to say that the Soviet Government was totalitarian in the period 1964–84? Plan: • Paragraph 1: Communist political control – almost total • Paragraph 2: Communist economic control – very large • Paragraph 3: Communist cultural control – large, but not complete • Paragraph 4: Increasing popular disenchantment with the government 1 Using your notes from previous chapters, decide on the criteria that you are going to use to judge how accurate it is to describe the Soviet Government as totalitar ian in the period 1964–84. 2 Having established your criteria, write a sentence that summar ises the extent to which the Russian Government was totalitarian in the period 1964–84. 3 Support this by writing three or four sentences that weigh up at least three of the factors mentioned in your plan. 4 Write a final summar y sentence that explicitly weighs the different factors in term s of your criteria and reaches an overall judgement.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin144 Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? The Big Debate Between 1985 and 1991 there was a fundamental shift in global politics. A series of profound changes, including the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, climaxed with the fall of the Soviet Union. The collapse of European Communism was a deep shock. Few predicted it. In fact it was commonly assumed that the USSR and the Cold War would continue into the twenty-first century. The fall of the Soviet Union has led to considerable historical debate. Historians have offered a variety of explanations for the collapse. The examination focuses on four of the key explanations: 1 The significance of the economic weaknesses of the USSR and the failure of reform Some historians argue that the USSR disintegrated due to its economic weaknesses. From this point of view the collapse of the USSR had roots in the late 1920s. Stalin’s decision to collectivise agriculture and introduce a command economy created an economic system that was fundamentally inefficient. According to this perspective, free markets would always outperform command economies in the long run. This became increasingly apparent in the late 1950s. Under Khrushchev the economy declined, under Brezhnev it stagnated, and finally under Gorbachev it collapsed. Some historians link this to the arms race. They argue that the USSR’s economic weaknesses were exacerbated by massive defence spending, which meant that other areas of the economy were starved of money. Economic collapse, in turn, caused political collapse. 2 The effects of Gorbachev’s failure to reform the Communist Party and the Soviet Government A second argument is that the USSR fell largely due to the failure of Gorbachev’s political reforms. According to this point of view Gorbachev made two kinds of mistake. The first was to believe Soviet politics could be reformed without destroying the Communist Government. Remarkably, he believed that the introduction of political rights, such as the freedom of speech, would reinvigorate Communism. In reality it led to a sustained attack on Communism and ultimately the fal l of the USSR. Gorbachev’s second set of mistakes were tactical. That is to say that Gorbachev made key decisions, such as refusing to stand for election as President of the USSR, which weakened his position and strengthened the position of those who sought to destroy the USSR.
145Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? 3 The impact of the nationalist resurgence in the late 1980s in the Soviet republics and in the communist states of Eastern Europe Next, some historians argue that nationalism was to blame for the collapse of the USSR. From this perspective, historians argue that the new freedoms that Gorbachev introduced allowed nationalist groups to organise, set out their agendas, win elections and gain increasing independence. These trends emerged first in the Eastern Bloc. Starting in Poland and Hungar y, communist governments across Eastern Europe were overthrown in anti-communist revolutions. The 15 Soviet republics followed, one by one leaving the USSR. From this point of view, however, Gorbachev’s reforms were not the key issue. They were merely the short-term cause which allowed the expression of a long-standing desire for independence. 4 How far Gorbachev and Yeltsin can be seen as responsible for the collapse of the USSR in 1991 Finally, some historians argue that the fall of the Soviet Union was primari ly due to Gorbachev and Yeltsin: the final leader of the Soviet Union and the first leader of post-Soviet Russia. Gorbachev, they argue, had a vision of a free, pluralistic Russia. He was willing to criticise the past and introduce radical reforms. Moreover, more often than not, Gorbachev refused to use force. Therefore there was nothing stopping Eastern European countries or the Soviet republics from rejecting communist rule. Yeltsin’s role was more short term but, perhaps, no less important. Yeltsin’s key achievements were to lead opposition to the coup of August 1991, to ban the Communist Party in Russia and to negotiate the Belavezha Accords, which abolished the USSR. Significantly, all historians agree that the Soviet Union had serious economic problems; all agree that Gorbachev’s reforms failed to achieve his aims; all agree that nationalism, Gorbachev and Yeltsin played major roles in the break-up of the USSR. They key issue is which factor was the prime reason for the dissolution of the USSR. This section considers each of these interpretations in turn.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin146 1 Economic weaknesses and the failure of reform Overview The fall of the Soviet Union was due, in part, to long-term economic weaknesses and, in the short term, the failure of economic reforms. The long-term economic weaknesses were related to the command economy and collectivisation, which was inherently inefficient and wasteful. Additionally, the Soviet economy was under huge pressure because of the government’s military spending commitments. However, these long-term problems did not threaten immediate economic collapse. Gorbachev’s economic reforms exacerbated the economic weaknesses of the Soviet Union, causing an economic crisis which undermined the government. This chapter considers: 1 Long-term economic weaknesses 2 Gorbachev and the Soviet economy 3 Transition to a market economy. 1 Long-term economic weaknesses From 1928 until the late 1980s the Soviet economy was essentially a command economy (see page 42). Under Stalin this economic policy led to significant success. The First Five-Year Plan led to the industr ialisat ion of Russia. Russia’s economic might was a key factor i n the Soviet victory ag ainst the Naz is in the Second World War, and by 1945 the Russia n economy was the f astest growing i n the world. During the m id-1950s the Soviet economy grew at an average a nnual rate of 7.1 per cent, whereas the US economy grew at a mere 2.9 per cent. Consequently, many politicians, economists and historians assumed that the Soviet economy would catch up and overtake Western economies. In fact, during the 1950s there was concern in the West that communist economic policy might be superior to capitalism, and that Communism might eventually become the dominant world system. Khr ushchev’s economic reforms promoted g rowth in agr iculture and raised livin g standards. However, growth rates declined. From 1958–63 the Soviet economy grew at 5.3 per cent annually. Moreover, from 1945 the Soviet economy had to compete in an arms race, producing ever more sophisticated weapons at huge expense. The decline that beg an under Khr ushchev became worse under Brezhnev. In the 1970s an nual growth averaged 2 per cent, and by 1980 this h ad dropped to 0.6 per cent. Brezhnev’s successors were determined to reverse the decline, but their strategies ultimately failed. Note it down Using a note-taking style of your choice, note down the key weaknesses of the Soviet economy. Remember, your notes need to record: ● the reasons for Soviet economic weakness ● the economic data that illustrates the extent of the weaknesses. Fundamental economic weaknesses The Soviet economy was fundamentally f lawed. One major problem was that the Soviet economy failed to create incentives for hard work or innovation. From 1945 to 1980 the Soviet Union was increasingly egalitarian – the difference between the richest and the poorest was much smaller than in the West. For example, in 1970, the richest ten per cent of American society were seven times wealthier than the bottom ten per cent. In Russia, in the same period, the richest ten per cent were only three times wealthier than Russia’s poorest. As a result, there was less incentive for workers to improve. Consequently, labour productivity was much lower in the Soviet Union than it was in the West. A second problem was waste. Gosplan, the State Planning Committee, measured and rewarded production. The quality of production was irrelevant, as was the proportion that was actually used. Therefore, although large amounts of goods were produced, they were often wasted. For example, by the early 1980s Gosplan demanded the production of 400,000 tractors every year. However, at least 20 per cent were never used, due to the shortage of tractor drivers. Waste in industry was also a problem. In 1986, for example, Gosplan estimated that 12 per cent of machinery was never used.
147Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? Next, the Soviet economy had never been fully modernised. This was a particular problem in agriculture. Although there were too many tractors, Soviet agriculture lacked more sophisticated machinery. This meant that Soviet agriculture required much more labour than American farming. In the 1960s, for example, 25.4 per cent of Soviet workers were employed on farms, compared to just 4.6 per cent in America. The Soviet transport system had also never been fully modernised. Therefore transporting food around the country was diff icult. Finally, a lack of modern storage facilities meant that a lot of what was produced was wasted. Grain, for example, often rotted in inadequate storage facilities before it could be used. Therefore, while a much greater proportion of the Soviet population worked on farms, American farms were six times more productive. The Soviet economy also str uggled due to the ar ms race with the US. From 1945, Russia produced ever more expensive missiles, nuclear bombs, tanks and f ighter planes. Between 1965 and 1985 the proportion of Soviet gross domestic product (GDP) spent on defence increased from around 12 per cent to 17 per cent. This was a much greater burden than American defence spending, which averaged around 6 per cent over the same period. Soviet defence spending was a huge economic problem because it star ved other areas of the economy of much needed funds. A final chronic problem was centralisation. The economy was controlled by government administrators. In far ming, for example, the government set the timetable for planting and harvesting. As a result, farmers could not use their expertise to adjust the schedule to take weather conditions into account. Equally, central planners set schedules for the delivery of fertilisers used on farms. Often fertilisers arrived at the wrong time or were the wrong type for the crops grown.These problems explain why the production of important crops improved slowly. For example, Soviet sugar beet production increased by 28 per cent in the period 1956 to 1980, whereas production of sugar beet in North Dakota, which has a similar climate to the Soviet sugar farms, increased by 191 per cent. Centralisation caused significant problems because it meant that production could not be maximised. The road to serfdom (1944) One of the first writers to analyse the problems of the Soviet economy was the Austrian- born economist Friedrich Hayek. Although Hayek was not a historian, his work became increasingly influential from the 1970s and affected the perspectives of many Western historians. In his book The Road to Serfdom, Hayek believed that he had spotted a fundamental flaw in the Soviet economy. He contrasted market economies with planned economies. He argued that in a market economy everyone has an impact on what is produced, as we all make decisions about what we buy and where we work. Therefore a market economy is broadly efficient because economic decisions reflect the economic knowledge of everyone in the market. In a planned economy, by contrast, decisions are made by a few economic experts. Significantly, however good economic experts are they could never know as much as the market. Therefore decisions made in market economies tend to be more efficient. Over time, he argued, market economies would always outperform planned economies, and people who live in planned economies will be reduced to poverty compared to those who live in market economies. Hayek’s theories were extremely influential from the 1970s and influenced those who argued for economic reform. Moreover, some historians and economists such as Theodore Burczak argue that Hayek’s theory explains why the Soviet economy could not survive in the long term.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin148 Historical interpretation: Long-term economic problems Historians have argued about the impact of long-term economic weaknesses on the Soviet Union. Richard Sakwa claims that the nature of the command economy meant that in the long term the Soviet economy was bound to stagnate. Paul R. Gregory, by contrast, argues that even as late as 1988 the Soviet economy was far from collapse and that long-term weaknesses did not undermine the stability of the system. Extract 1 From Richard Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, published in 1998. In its final years the Soviet economy faced significant problems, including systemic difficulties arising from problems internal to the socialist economy, and which could be remedied by actions taken by the leadership itself. Most of the latter arose from the pattern of Stalinist super-industrialisation which created a vast top-heavy bureaucracy managing the country’s economic life. At a certain stage the enormous costs and wastage involved in maintaining the managing mechanism, the heart of the command economy, condemned Soviet- type economies to relative stagnation. In the absence of the invisible hand of capitalist market forces, and the increasingly palsied condition of the visible hand of command planning, such economies had no self- sustaining mechanism to imbue them with dynamism. These problems were not new, and the issue of economic reform had been at or near the top of the agenda at least since the death of Stalin. Extract 2 From Paul R. Gregory, The Political Economy of Stalinism, published in 2004. The Soviet administrative-command economy continued to have positive economic growth until 1989. The negative growth thereafter is indicative of an economic system in collapse. Although the USSR began the postwar era with high rates of growth (which were matched by much of Europe and exceeded by the economic miracles in Germany and Japan), its growth declined steadily after 1970. Whereas growth in Western industrialized economies turned down in response to energy crises in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, they bounced back so that no long-term declining trend was evident. The fateful decision in favour of radical economic reform was not forced by outright collapse. The party elite were reasonably satisfied, and the Soviet population was not in open opposition. The administrative command system, on the eve of its radical change, was inefficient but stable. Gosplan’s projections called for an annual growth rate of some 3 percent through the year 2000. Declining Soviet growth rate, coupled with the acceleration of growth in China, Southeast Asia, and the marked recovery of the U.S. economy, were troubling but do not fully explain the fateful steps that eventually spelled the demise of the system. Having read the extracts: 1 Summarise the key argument of Extract 1 and Extract 2. 2 Select three details from your own knowledge that support the argument of Extract 1. Write these down as a list under your summaries. 3 Swap your summaries and discuss lists: ● Which summary best captured the argument of Extract 1? ● Which summary best captured the argument of Extract 2? ● Which details most precisely supported the argument of Extract 1?
149Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? 2 Gorbachev and Perestroika Note it down Using a note-taking style of your choice, note down the following key details concerning Gorbachev’s economic reforms: ● the goal of Gorbachev’s policies ● Gorbachev’s methods ● the reasons for failure. Gorbachev’s economic policy changed radically from 1985 to 1991. Initially, he attempted to stimulate economic growth within the existing system. When this failed he attempted to introduce some aspects of the free market, while retaining many of the essential features of the command economy. Finally, he abandoned central planning altogether in order to create a genuinely free market. Gorbachev referred to his economic and political reforms as ‘Perestroika’, which means ‘restructuring.’ Historian Richard Sakwa argues that perestroika had three stages: ● Rationa lisation, 1985–86: This was a period of uskorenie: initial economic reforms. Led by the Communist Party, the reforms were designed to stimulate economic modernisation, higher rates of economic growth and higher levels of production. ● Reform, 1987–March 1990: Gorbachev initiated reforms intended to introduce market forces into the Soviet economy. At the same time he initiated political reforms designed to build support for greater economic change. ● Transformation, March 1990–August 1991: During this stage of perestroika Gorbachev began to abandon the fundamental aspects of the system such as single-party rule and the command economy. Additionally, the Party lost control of the process. Gorbachev’s reforms consistently failed to increase economic growth. Indeed, under Gorbachev the economy stopped growing and began to shrink. By 1985, the Soviet economy was not merely lagging further behind the West, it was beginning to be overtaken by developing countries in Asia. Gorbachev recognised that the economy was stagnating and embraced economic reform. Alcohol production Gorbachev’s first initiative continued Andropov’s anti- alcohol campaign. In May 1985 Gorbachev reduced alcohol production at state-run factories by 50 per cent. In addition, 55,000 Party members were assigned to a new task force to stop the illegal production of alcohol. In general terms, the policy failed. First, although there was a drop in alcohol consumption among moderate drinkers, alcohol consumption in 1987 was still double that of 1960. In 1987, Soviet citizens over the age of 15 were still consuming between 15 and 16 litres of alcohol every year and there were still 4.5 million registered alcoholics. However, Soviet citizens were now drinking samogon, illegally manufactured alcohol. Therefore the government made much less money out of vodka sales. Indeed, government alcohol revenues dropped by 67 billion roubles (9 per cent of GDP), making economic problems worse. As a result the campaign was abandoned in 1988. Mikhail Gorbachev, 1931– Gorbachev was the last leader of the Soviet Union. Prior to his appointment as General Secretary in 1985 he had been promoted by Andropov, who believed he had talent and dynamism. His goal, like that of Andropov and Khrushchev, was to reform Communism in order to make it more successful. In this sense, his various policies were designed to save Communism rather than to destroy it. In spite of his commitment to revitalising Communism Gorbachev had no clear plan. Rather he improvised and was prepared to change direction. Gorbachev played a key role in ending the Cold War, in causing the break-up of the Eastern Bloc and in the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin150 Acceleration Acceleration, or uskorenie, was an economic initiat ive designed to end economic stagn ation and get the Soviet economy moving a gain. Acceleration was at the hear t of the Twelfth, and final, Five-Year Plan (1986–90). In essence, acceleration meant a huge increase in investment which was designed to modernise t he Soviet economy and therefore make it more ef f icient. Gorbachev predicted that the new i nvestment would lead to a 20 per cent increase in industrial production in the next 15 years. Acceleration failed. A m ajor reason was the decline in the global price of oi l. Duri ng the 1970s the Soviet economy had made a great deal of money from selling oil to the West. However, the oil price fell from $70 a barrel in 1981 to $20 a bar rel in 1985. As a result, Soviet oil revenues dropped by more than two-thirds. Combined with the drop in a lcohol revenues, the Soviet Government had signif icantly less money from the mid-1980s. Therefore Gorbachev financed acceleration from borrowing from Western countries. As a result, government debt rose from $18.1 billion in 1981 to $27.2 billion in 1988. Gorbachev invested in energy production, ignoring the advice of his economic experts who argued for more investment in high-tech machines. Therefore the investment did not lead to greater growth. Increasing levels of debt meant that the government was spending more and more money on interest payments. Consequently, there was less money for further modern isation or to produce consumer goods. In sum, rather than leading to economic growth, acceleration created an economic crisis. Partial market reform Acceleration was the Soviet Government’s last serious attempt to save the centrally planned system. From late 1986 senior Communist off icials began to believe that only some degree of market reform could bring about economic recovery. The first small reform was the Law on Individual Economic Activity of November 1986. This made it legal for families and individuals to make money from small-scale work such as private teaching or repair and maintenance jobs. The 1987 Law on State Enterprise was much more radical. It was i ntended to devolve power from central government to factory ma nagement. For example, factory m anagers were allowed to set the prices for their production. This reform failed in t wo ways. Firstly, very little power was actually devolved as Gosplan found new ways of maintaini ng central control. Secondly, the ability to charge higher prices meant that the government had to pay more for goods, which further increased government debt. The 1988 Law on Co-operatives made it legal to set up large-scale private companies. By 1990 nearly 200,000 private companies, or co-operatives, had been set up across the USSR. Many co-operatives were successful. In the first year, the turnover of the co-operatives increased from 29.2 million roubles to 1.04 billion roubles. Moreover, the incomes of co-operative members were between two and three times higher than people employed by state enterprises. In addition to these reforms Gorbachev increasingly restricted the power of Gosplan. Initially, he devolved Gosplan’s powers to the governments of the republics. In 1990 Gosplan was f inally abolished. Problems with the market From 1987 to 1990 Gorbachev’s economic reforms created a partia l market. Gorbachev hoped that he could combine the best features of the market with the best features of planning and in so doing revive the economy. However, the new market could not function properly and created greater problems. Markets require prices that accurately ref lect the true value of goods and services – that is to say, prices that ref lect how much it costs the producer to make the goods and services. However, the Communist Government subsidised prices – allowing consumers to buy goods at a price well below the market rate. Initially, the new co-operatives could sell goods at a price of their choosing. However, free market prices were higher than state-subsidised prices, and therefore the free market goods were unpopular. The government responded by imposing low prices on the co-operatives. This ‘price capping’ made production uneconomic and therefore caused problems for the new co-operatives. Economic chaos and political problems Partial market reform created economic chaos. The reforms undermined the central planning system, while at the same time failing to create an effective market alternative. As a result, there was no effective way of distributing goods, and shortages of essential goods increased. For example, during 1990 there were severe food shortages. Although Soviet farms had produced 218 million tons of grain, there was no longer an effective distribution system. The state distribution systems had been abolished and the market was still developing, therefore there were food shortages across the Soviet Union.
151Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? What is more, Gorbachev’s economic reforms had been a failure. Figures for the Twelfth Five-Year Plan demonstrated the failure of the new policies. Government figures showed that between 1986 and 1990 GDP had shrunk by four per cent, although the official figures are likely to underestimate the drop. This was the worst economic performance in Soviet history. In April, Gorbachev finally cut government subsidies for basic products, allowing prices to rise. He hoped that the cut in subsidies would reduce government spending and allow the economy to stabilise. Prices increased rapidly (see Table 1). Table 1: Price of goods in Januar y 1990 and April 1990. Price in January 1990 (roubles) Price in April 1990 (roubles) Beef (kilo) 2.00 7.00 Pork (kilo) 1.90 5.30 Butter (kilo) 3.50 8.80 Rye bread (loaf) 0.12 0.48 Cotton cloth (metre) 1.12 3.00 The economic chaos had political consequences. Price rises led to widespread dissatisfaction with the Communist Government: ● Gorbachev’s approval rating dropped from 52 per cent in December 1989 to 21 per cent in November 1990. ● The number of strikes increased. In 1990 only 260 enterprises were affected by strikes; in 1991 that figure had risen to 1755. As faith in the Communist Government declined there was a rise in support for nationalist movements demanding the break-up of the Soviet Union (see page 172). 3 Transition to a market economy As a result of this chaos, and due to his growing conviction that market economies were superior to planned economies, Gorbachev accepted the need to abolish the centrally planned system and introduce a full market economy. Nonetheless, achieving this would be difficult, and Gorbachev was faced with increasing opposition from hardliners within the Communist Party (see page 161). The 500 Day Program In order to minimise the economic problems that were expected during the transition to a market economy, Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin commissioned two Soviet economists, Stanislav Shatalin and Grigorr i Iavlinskii, to devise a plan for the economic transition. The result was the ‘500 Day Programme’, published in August 1990. Shatalin and Iavlinskii proposed widespread privatisation and complete marketisation in less than two years. Gorbachev initially supported the proposals, but under pressure from senior hardline communists he backed down. He remained committed to an economic transformation, but was persuaded that it should happen at a slower pace. Ultimately, radical reform continued during 1991. However, the government did not adopt an overall plan, largely because of Gorbachev’s refusal to act decisively. Reform and collapse, 1991 In January 1991, the Supreme Soviet introduced private property as an important step towards a free market economy. As a result, the Soviet people could own land and factories in a way that had been impossible since the 1920s. In April, a law was passed to allow citizens to trade stocks and shares. Again, this reform was designed to revitalise the economy through the introduction of market forces. However, the economy continued to decline. Oil production fell by 9 per cent, while steel and tractor production both fell by 12 per cent. An official government report stated that the Soviet economy was moving beyond crisis to catastrophe. By the summer of 1991, the Soviet Government and the republican governments were effectively bankrupt. Neither had the economic power to govern. Consequently, although Yeltsin announced a programme of full marketisation in October 1991, it was difficult to implement. Note it down The transition to the market economy posed a series of problems for Gorbachev’s government. ● Skim read the section, looking at the sub-headings and the key words. Make a list of the key aspects of the transition. Use these as main headings on a spider diagram. ● Read the section and make notes on the different aspects of: ● the problems facing the Soviet economy ● the solutions that were proposed ● the policies that were introduced ● the impact of these policies. ● As you read the section, you can add other headings to your diagram if you missed anything while skimming the text.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin152 Extended reading: Interpretation Historian Martin McCauley considers the Soviet economy and the impact of economic problems on the fall of the Soviet Union. Since the mid-1920s the Soviet economy was geared for war. The stupendous achievement in defeating Hitler’s Army in 1941–45 strengthened what became known as the military- industrial complex. The onset of the Cold War in 1947 led to the conviction that only military might could save the country from an American attack. But as Lenin had pointed out the race between capitalism and Communism would be won by the system which achieved the higher labour productivity per worker. By the mid-1970s Soviet leaders were aware of three major economic problems. The first was how to increase the supply of consumer goods in line with the aspirations of the population. The second major problem was the need to accelerate technological development. The most advanced sectors were the military and the nuclear industry but, the country neglected electronics, lasers and other high tech sectors. It did not invest in computers to the extent the Americans did. It was slow to react to the computer revolution. The third problem was low labour productivity, lack of discipline, drunkenness, theft and general inefficiency of the civilian economy. Mikhail Gorbachev was aware of these problems when he became Party leader in March 1985. He regarded the number one problem to be the raising of living standards. His first initiative was called uskorenie or acceleration. This aimed at a rapid expansion of the machine building industry. This would permit more machinery to be used to produce consumer goods. As Gorbachev had a limited grasp of economics he left the problem of where the extra investment was to come from to the Ministry of Finance. Gosplan opposed the extra investment in machinery. It preferred more money for consumer goods production. It was overruled and this set the pattern for the Gorbachev era. He rarely saw eye to eye with Gosplan. National economic performance in 1985 was inflated to demonstrate that growth was greater than in 1984 under his predecessor. In reality, the results of uskorenie were disappointing so a new policy, called perestroika or restructuring, was announced. Gorbachev toured the country and was received with great enthusiasm. The future is bright – the future is perestroika – was the message. Unfortunately when asked in factories what exactly perestroika meant, he was at a loss to define it succinctly. For those who favoured market-oriented solutions it did not touch on the most important topic – price reform. This led to an even more radical reform, the Law on the State Enterprise of 1987. It was probably the most destructive of all the economic reforms. Enterprises were to go over to self- financing. This was putting the cart before the horse. The first step should have been price reform. The first move to a market economy was the law on co- operatives and the law on leasing in 1988. The former permitted the setting up of co-ops by individuals and also Activity Having read the essay on pages 152–153 answer the following questions. Comprehension 1 What does McCauley mean by the following phrases: ● ‘military-industrial complex’ ● ‘the Party apparatus’ ● ‘Gorbachev removed the ideological and political pillars on which the Soviet Union was built’? Evidence 2 Make a list of the examples of Gorbachev’s successes and fai lures in McCauley’s essay. Interpretation 3 Identify the passage in which McCauley explains why, in his view, the Soviet Union collapsed. 4 Summarise McCauley’s interpretation in 25 words or less. Evaluation 5 Using your own knowledge, write a paragraph explaining how far you agree with McCauley’s interpretation of the fall of the Soviet Union.
153Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? companies. The law on leasing allowed workers to lease part of their own enterprises, set up their own co-ops and sell their own goods. The advantage was that prices were not controlled by the state so a market price could be charged. This led to consumers complaining about high prices and profiteering. Co-op tea shops were used to get around the vodka ban which Gorbachev had introduced to deal with drunkenness. The teapots contained vodka not tea! This reform left a large hole in state revenues as sales of alcohol had brought in the most revenue. Money was simply printed to fill the shortfall. Gorbachev concluded that the main reason for the failure of perestroika was the opposition of the Party apparatus. Glasnost was to shake up the apparatus from below. Citizens could vent their anger about the deteriorating situation on the local Party bigwigs. Gorbachev, in 1988, took the momentous decision to remove the Party apparatus from the industrial economy. The net result was that by the end of 1989 the Party and government had lost control. The USSR Supreme Soviet, the parliament, convened in 1989, passed a raft of economic legislation but had no way of forcing implementation. The most dramatic move to the market economy was the 500 day programme in 1990. However, it was too radical for Gorbachev but Boris Yeltsin, in October 1990, declared it would be implemented in the Russian Federation. Hitherto t here had been some co-operation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin on reform. Now it was open warfare between the Soviet Union, headed by Gorbachev, and the Russian Federation, led by Yeltsin. Politics took over and the economy headed for collapse. The other republics of the Soviet Union followed suit and claimed sovereignty. They declared that only thos e Soviet laws which benefited them would be implemented on their territory. The astonishing conclusion is that Gorbachev did not understand how the Soviet planned economy functioned. His advisers were over confident and their recipes for growth often had the opposite effect. Moving from a command to a market economy was something which had previously never been considered. Gorbachev was perplexed by the failure of the reforms. There was a belief that a reform borrowed from a market economy – for example, enterprise self-financing – could be grafted on to a command economy and the result would be the best of both worlds, socialist and capitalist. A magic mix of the best of capitalist and socialist policies would work miracles. However, monetary (the emission of money and credit) and fiscal (taxation) policy was loose and inevitably led to high inflation. Hence financial reforms from the centre in 1990 and 1991 had little effect. China and Vietnam have demonstrated that it is possible to move from a command to a market economy without undermining the power of the Communist Party. Hence the reasons for the failure of economic reform are political. Gorbachev removed the ideological and political pillars on which the Soviet Union was built. As a result the whole edifice collapsed. Martin McCauley is a historian who specialises in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China. He studied at the Universities of Westminster, London, Paris (Sorbonne) and Perugia (Italy), The Teachers’ University (Beijing) and the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy (Moscow). He taught at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College, London, for over 30 years. Among his many publications are The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union; Gorbachev ; Stalin and Stalinism; The Origins of the Cold War 1941–49; and Russia, America and the Cold War 1949–91. He is at present working on a book entitled Communism: The Whole Story. Work together Having completed the activity, swap your notes with a partner. Consider the following questions: 1 Did you both spot the same evidence in McCauley’s essay? 2 Has your partner missed anything? 3 Did you agree on which passage contained the interpretation? If not, who was right? 4 What was good about your partner’s summary of McCauley’s interpretation? 5 Can you learn anything about McCauley’s interpretation from your partner’s summary? 6 How far did you both agree with McCauley’s interpretation? Use these questions to feed back to each other and improve your analysis of the debate.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin154 Conclusion Long-term weaknesses in the Soviet economy clearly undermined the Soviet Union. However, it is important to remember that in 1985 there was no economic crisis, and no indication that the Soviet Union was in danger of imminent collapse. Gorbachev’s reforms created an economic crisis, which rapidly turned into a catastrophe. In so doing, he undermined the authority of the Communist Government and the government’s economic power. However, there are clearly other factors which explain the fall of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s political reforms allowed Soviet citizens to express their dissatisfaction and to organise against the government (see page 162). Equally, Gorbachev and Yeltsin played key roles in the crucial period of crisis (see page 184). Historical interpretation Gorbachev’s reforms Historians disagree over the reasons for the failure of Gorbachev’s economic reforms. Some historians, such as Archie Brown, believe that effective reform was possible but that Gorbachev’s policies were poorly conceived. Other historians, such as Stephen Richards Graubard, argue that reform was inherently impossible. For Graubard, Gorbachev should either have stuck with the command economy or abandoned it and introduced a market economy. On this account, reform, the attempt to make the command economy work better, was impossible. Extract 3 From Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Era, published in 2006. There is no doubt that the attempt to reform the Soviet economy ended in failure. Part of the reason for that was the tension between reforming an existing system to make it work better and replacing that system by one which had a quite different logic. In the early years of perestroika the first aim was being pursued – and with only very limited success. By 1990–1, while there was not a consensus, there was at least a broad body of support among specialists for the idea that the command economy had to give way to a market economy. It was clearer to Gorbachev than to Yeltsin that this would mean tens of millions of citizens becoming worse off for some years to come. Freeing prices would improve the supply of goods and services but would also raise those prices to a level the majority could ill afford. Much of the economic legislation of the perestroika years – not least the Law on Co-operatives – had helped to pave the way for marketisation, but the Soviet economy remained in limbo at the end of the Gorbachev era. It was no longer a functioning command economy but not yet a market system. Extract 4 From Stephen Richards Graubard, Exit from Communism, published in 1998. Gorbachev’s major failure was economic reform. Keenly aware of the need for economic reform he never realised that no middle way existed. As a result, his economic policies tended to fall between two stools, leading to a completely inconsistent economic system, utterly out of balance. The Soviet economic system became far worse than it would have been under an ordinary command economy, or a bold step forward to complete market economy. Initially, Gorbachev was impeded by Communist conservatives, but from 1990 on he showed that he was unprepared to go very far himself. At the very end he insisted on slow change. He failed to grasp that disintegration and chaos had already been reached and that speedy action was the requirement of the day. Having read Extracts 3 and 4: 1 Write a paragraph stating how far you agree, or disagree with Extract 3. Your paragraphs should contain: ● a summary of the extract’s argument ● evidence that either supports or challenges that argument ● a concluding sentence in which you analyse the extent to which the argument of the extract is valid. 2 Swap your paragraph with a partner, read them and then write two suggestions about how the paragraph could be improved. 3 Finally, repeat the process for Extract 4. Make sure you incorporate the advice you have received about how to improve your paragraph.
155Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? Essay technique: Identifying the interpretation Section C of the exam paper is different to Section A and B (see exam brief page vi). Unlike Section A and B it contains two extracts from the work of historians. Significantly, Section C tests different skills. In essence, Section C tests your ability to analyse different historical interpretations. Therefore you must focus on the interpretations of the extracts. Interpretations and evidence The extracts will contain a mixture of interpretations and evidence. The mark scheme rewards essays that focus on the interpretations offered by the extracts more highly than essays that focus on the information or evidence mentioned in the extracts. Therefore it is important to identify the interpretations. ● Interpretations are a specific kind of argument. Like all arguments, they tend to make general claims such as ‘The Soviet Union was doomed to fail because of the fundamental flaws in its economic system.’ ● Information or evidence tends to comprise of specific details. For example: ‘Economic reforms failed to stimulate economic growth in key industries.’ Imagine you are answering the following question using Extract 1 below and Extract 2 on page 156: In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed because of ‘policy errors or mistakes within Gorbachev’s reforms’ (Extract 1, lines 4–5). To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts using your own knowledge of the issues. Extract 1 Robert Strayer, Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse?: Understanding Historical Change, published in 1998. To some observers, the Soviet system was unreformable and too far gone to respond to any treatment at all. Therefore, the Gorbachev program was doomed from the start. Other historians have pointed to various policy errors or mistakes within Gorbachev’s reforms. On the economic front, some have criticised Gorbachev for neglecting agriculture. Others noted that his policy of raising wages while ignoring the importance of a balanced budget allowed inflation to get out of control thus undermining his reforms. Might a more sequenced approach of delaying political change until a market economy took hold have prevented the Soviet Union’s disintegration? Counter-argument Argument Evidence that supports the argument Extract 1 contains two interpretations: a counter-argument (see page 107), and an argument (see page 93–4). Additionally, Extract 1 contains information and evidence that supports the argument. While writing your essay it is important that you evaluate both the interpretations. You should evaluate the interpretations by introducing your own knowledge (see page 182–183).
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin156 Activity: AS-Style question Historians have different views about the reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union. Analyse and evaluate the extrac ts and use your knowledge of the issues to explain your answer to the following question: How far do you agree with the view that Gorbachev’s economic reforms led to the collapse of the Soviet Union? Extract 2 Anders Aslund, Russia’s Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed, published in 2007. The sudden burst of activity in the Soviet Union over 1985–87 broke two decades of stagnation. From the outset, Gorbachev’s top priority was to revitalise the economy. His team tried all kinds of measures, but economic growth did not improve. Shortages became worse because tax revenues declined with the anti- alcohol campaign, and a larger share of GDP was diverted to inefficient investment. Perestroika fell miserably short of its main goal to boost economic growth. Glasnost took off later than the other policies and much more gradually. It came into its own in 1987 and freedom of speech was attained in 1989. Gorbachev unleashed glasnost in order to undermine hard-line communist opposition to his reforms. But glasnost turned into an unguided missile. It condemned not only the hard-liners but the very foundations of the Soviet state, especially its ruthless policies against various nationalities. Rather than strengthen the Soviet state, glasnost eventually suggested that the soviet government was no longer sustainable. Activity: Identifying the interpretation Imagine you are answering the following question using Extract 1 (page 155) and Extract 2 on this page: In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed because ‘Rather than strengthen the Soviet state, glasnost eventually suggested that the soviet government was no longer sustainable.’ (Extract 2, lines 19–21). To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts using your own knowledge of the issues. 1 Identify the following aspects of Extract 2: ● the argument ● information or evidence that supports the argument. 2 Having identif ied these extracts, share your answer with a par tner. Consider the following questions: ● Did your partner correctly identify the interpretation? ● Did you both spot the same information in the extracts? ● Has your partner missed anything? ● Did you miss anything that you should note down? ● What can you learn from your partner’s approach? Use these questions to feed back to each other and improve your analysis of the extract s.
157Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? 2 Gorbachev’s political reforms Overview The collapse of the Soviet Union was due, at least in part, to the nature of Soviet politics and Gorbachev’s political reforms. Gorbachev’s political reforms started slowly. Nonetheless, his initial reforms led to pressure for greater freedom. By 1988 Gorbachev was willing to embrace more radical measures, including competitive elections. The elections of 1989 and 1990 transformed the Soviet system. These changes were profound. His policies allowed greater freedom than Russia had ever known. He ended some of the key features of communist rule, introducing competitive elections which ended the dominance of the Party leadership. However, by 1990 Gorbachev had lost control of the process of reform, and soon after he lost control of the Soviet Government. This chapter considers: 1 The problems of political reform 2 Gorbachev’s early political reforms, 1985–86 3 Glasnost, 1986–88 4 Democratisation, 1988–90 5 Constitutional reform. 1 The problems of political reform Note it down Using a note-taking style of your choice, note down the key problems with the Soviet political system. Remember, your notes need to record: ● the basis of the Communist Government’s authority ● the economic data that illustrates the extent of the weaknesses ● the reasons why reform posed a threat to the Soviet Union ● Gorbachev’s initial objectives for reform. The fundamental nature of Soviet politics had been established by Lenin and Stalin. Between them they had created a political system which included: ● a centralised party with control over the state across the whole of the Soviet Union ● regional parties in each of the republics that obeyed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ● a disciplined party that obeyed the direction of the Politburo. The Communist Party had become the government of the Soviet Union, controlling the economy, the army, the police and the media. Crucially, any policy which weakened the authority or discipline of the Party risked weakening the Soviet Union, as the Communist Party held the Union together. However, the communists remained ideologically committed to creating a genuine democracy based on the will of all of the working people in the Soviet Union. This tension between the reality of Soviet government and Communist ideals created discussion in the Party which periodically led to pressure for reform. Over time, the tension between the official goals of the Party and the reality of life in the Soviet Union led to widespread cynicism. In essence, the Soviet people became increasingly aware of the corruption of Party officials. Nonetheless, in general terms, the Soviet people tolerated the government as the Party was improving living standards year on year. The cynicism of the people troubled idealists in the Part y, who hoped that reform of the Party and some kind of democratisation would inspire the new generation to embrace Communism and finish the journey started by Lenin in 1917. Nonetheless, reform was dangerous. True democracy could lead to the fall of Com munism. Indeed, Khrushchev’s reforms had threatened Soviet control of Hungary and Poland (see page 342). Therefore, under Brezhnev there was little meaningful reform and no attempts to democratise the government. Andropov essentially continued Brezhnev’s policy of supressing political dissent. Nonetheless, Andropov al lowed greater freedom within the Party leadership to discuss the Soviet Union’s social and economic problems. His desire to deal w ith long-term problems such as economic decline and corruption meant that he promoted Communists who were prepared to question the system to senior positions. Indeed, Gorbachev owed his position on the Politburo to Andropov.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin158 Gorbachev’s objectives At the time of his appointment as General Secretary, Gorbachev’s key political aim was to revitalise the Soviet Union. He wanted to end the stagnation of the Brezhnev period, including the corruption of senior members of the Party. He also wanted to end the cynicism and apathy of the Soviet people. He did not have a clear strategy for achieving these goals, but he consistently argued that the Soviet Union needed to return to the model that Len in had outl ined in 1917, with people playing a genuine role in politics through participation in local soviets. Historical interpretations: Was the Soviet Union’s fall inevitable? Long-term economic weaknesses and the fundamental contradiction between the political goals of Communism and the political reality of the Soviet system have led some historians to argue that the fall of the Soviet Union was inevitable. In Extract 1, Jeremy Smith sets out an argument that the Soviet Union was bound to fall at some point. Archie Brown, in Extract 2, takes a different approach, arguing that in 1985 the Soviet Union was still strong enough to keep going into the twenty-first century. Extract 1 From Jeremy Smith, The Fall of Soviet Communism, 1986–1991, published in 2005. Many historians adopt the long-term view that the Soviet system, while successful in transforming the former Russian Empire into a powerful industrial state, contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Systemic weaknesses, a redundant ideology, internal contradictions, and the absence of the flexibility required to adapt to changing environments and challenges meant that, even if its collapse need not have occurred exactly when it did, it was ultimately inevitable. Having read Extracts 1 and 2: 1 Write a paragraph stating how far you agree, or disagree with Extract 1. Your paragraphs should contain: ● a summary of the extract’s argument ● evidence that either supports or challenges that argument ● a concluding sentence in which you analyse the extent to which the argument of the extract is valid. 2 Swap your paragraph with a partner, read it and then write two suggestions about how the paragraph could be improved. 3 Finally, repeat the process for Extract 2. Make sure you incorporate the advice you have received about how to improve your paragraph. Extract 2 From Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Era, published in 2006. While there had been an accumulation of problems over several decades, including a secular decline in the rate of economic growth and rising rates of infant mortality and alcoholism, and though the gulf between Soviet rhetoric and reality had led to an increase in popular cynicism, there was no strong pressure from below for change in 1985. The dissident movement had been crushed and the atmosphere was primarily one of political apathy and fatalism. In Brezhnev’s time there had been a lot of talk about the ‘scientific and technological revolution’, but technologically the Soviet Union was lagging far behind the advanced Western countries and not faring well in comparison with the newly industrialising countries of Asia. Moreover, the war in Afghanistan was proving costly and becoming increasingly unpopular. Yet all the mechanisms of political control were firmly in place and it is highly likely that the system – and, accordingly, the Soviet state – could have survived into the twenty- first century had not radical reform, or ‘revolution from above’, shaken its foundations. Although Gorbachev, with some justification, spoke of the presence of ‘pre-crisis phenomena’ in the Soviet Union he inherited, it was not so much a case of crisis forcing radical reform as of radical reform generating crisis.
159Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? Initially, Gorbachev believed that it was possible to reform the Soviet system and retain communist control. His original plans for reform were quite limited. He wanted to: ● open up debate within the Party ● allow intellectuals more freedom of expression ● allow the public to have more access to information. However, Gorbachev’s reforms had consequences that he did not foresee. Reform led to greater pressure for change. 2 Gorbachev’s early political reforms, 1985–86 Gorbachev’s appointment as General Secretary was the beginning of a shift of power from one generation to the next. Gorbachev was 20 years younger than his predecessor Chernenko. Indeed, whereas Chernenko, Andropov and Brezhnev had all been born before the revolution, Gorbachev was born during Stalin’s reign. Gorbachev’s first priority as General Secretary was to replace the senior officials who had been close to Brezhnev. This was part of Gorbachev’s desire to end the stagnation of the Brezhnev era, but also part of his desire to heighten his own authority through patronage. He appointed young communists, who supported reform, to senior positions. In his f irst year Gorbachev focused on economic reform (see pages 149–151). However, as economic refor m fai led Gorbachev became convinced that political reform was an essential part of reviving the economy. He argued that traditionalist Communist officials were standing in the way of his reforms because of their faith in old-fashioned economic methods. Gorbachev also argued that the Soviet economy was too highly centralised and that accurate information, which was essential for effective planning, was almost impossible to obtain due to official manipulation of economic data. His solution to these problems was democratisation and openness. ● He hoped that democratisation would limit the power of traditionalists and therefore speed up economic reform. He also hoped that democratisation would end strict centralisation by passing some power to the people. ● Gorbachev hoped openness would help economic recovery by ending the distortion of economic information. 3 Glasnost, 1986–88 Gorbachev spoke repeatedly about the need for the government to admit the truth. Gorbachev first spoke of the need for openness in December 1974. Indeed, from 1983 the term was used by supporters of Andropov who wanted to expose corruption within the Party. Initially, glasnost was primarily a commitment to being open about the state of the Soviet economy. Glasnost became an increasingly important initiative from 1986. This was due, in part, to opposition to Gorbachev within the Communist Party. Hardline communists opposed Gorbachev’s reforms. Therefore Gorbachev looked for support from outside the Party. He invited writers and intellectuals to criticise hardliners and support his reforms. Gorbachev believed that intellectuals, writers and artists were natural allies against Party hardliners. Note it down Using a note-taking style of your choice, note down: 1 the reasons for and nature of Gorbachev’s early political reforms. Make sure you note down: ● the key words that Gorbachev introduced to Soviet politics ● the changing meaning of Gorbachev’s new words. 2 note down the following aspects of glasnost: ● how Gorbachev understood glasnost between 1983 and 1985 and why he wanted to introduce glasnost in this period ● the political impact of the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress ● the impact on the Communist Party of Yakovlev’s liberalisation of the press ● the political impact of the Nineteenth Party Conference ● the political significance of the Chernobyl disaster. Don’t forget to note down the key details: the names of key individuals and the dates of key events. Gorbachev’s ‘reformers’ Gorbachev appointed a new generation of ministers who favoured reform. For example, he made Nikolai Ryzhkov Prime Minister, he appointed Viktor Chebrikov head of the KGB, and made Egor Ligachev a member of the Politburo and at the end of 1985 he made Boris Yeltsin head of the Communist Party of Moscow. At the same time Andrei Gromyko and Viktor Grishin, who had worked closely with Brezhnev, were removed from their posts. These changes were significant because they gave power to communists who backed reform. However, many of Gorbachev’s new appointees, like Ryzhkov, backed an extension of Andropov’s reforms rather than anything more radical. Indeed, during 1985 and 1986, Gorbachev’s policies looked much like a continuation of Andropov’s initiatives.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin160 The Twenty-Seventh Party Congress The Twenty-Seventh Party Congress held in February and March 1986 set out a new program me for the Communist Party. This was the first time that the Party had adopted a new set of priorities since 1961. Gorbachev’s new programme committed the Party to the ‘systematic and all round improvement of socialism’, including ‘genuine democracy – power exercised for the people and by the people’. Gorbachev linked democratisation to glasnost . However, there were few signs of genuine openness at the Party Congress. Nor did Gorbachev set out detailed proposals for achieving the Part y’s new goals. Nonetheless, the adoption of a new programme was a symbol that Gorbachev wanted to break with the past. Liberalisation of the media In order to help create an alliance between communists, reformers and Russian intellectuals Gorbachev allowed much greater freedom of expression in the Soviet media. He hoped that greater freedom would allow intellectuals to criticise the Party and develop new ideas. Following the 1986 Congress, Gorbachev gave Aleksandr Yakovlev responsibility for the Soviet media. Yakovlev appointed new radical editors to head the Moskovskie Novosti (Moscow News) and Ogonek, a Communist Party newspaper. As a result, the Soviet media was liberalised. Newspapers began to publish accounts of the scale of Stalin’s atrocities, as well as stories that admitted problems in the Soviet economy. Yakovlev permitted the publication of previously banned books, plays and f ilms by a nti- communist intellectuals. An important early example was the release of the film Repentance. The film, made in 1984 but only released two years later, was highly critical of Stalin’s terror. Gorbachev also authorised the release of dissidents from prison. Indeed, in December 1986 he invited Andrei Sakharov to Moscow from exile in Gorky to support political reform (see page 89). This was a clear signal that Gorbachev wanted to work with intellectuals outside of the Communist Party to promote reform. The extension of glasnost During 1987 and 1988 glasnost was extended. Initially, the media had criticised Stalin. These criticisms were not new. Khrushchev had initiated criticism of Stalin in 1957. However, in 1988 Aleksandr Tsipko, supported by Yakovlev, went much further, publicly criticising Marx and Lenin. Tsipko’s criticisms attacked the foundations of Soviet Communism. Additionally, from 1988 citizens were permitted to listen to foreign radio broadcasts and read foreign newspapers. The Nineteenth Party Conference of June 1988 took openness to a new level. Senior Party off icials admitted the scale of the problems facing the Soviet Union, including the inadequacies in healthcare and education and the poverty of the rural populations. This was a huge contrast to traditional high profile meetings which claimed the Communist Party was improving all areas of life. Moreover, the scale of the problems that the Part y now admitted shook the public’s faith i n communist r ule. The consequences of glasnost Gorbachev had hoped that glasnost would benefit him at the expense of his opponents. Certainly, glasnost allowed Gorbachev, communist radicals and Soviet intellectuals to criticise moderates in the Communist Party and aspects of communist government that were not working. However, Gorbachev did not escape criticism. He was accused of reforming too slowly or of reforming too little. Even more concerning were criticisms of the whole Soviet system. Revelations about Stalin’s terror led some to question the foundations of the communist system. Moreover, groups in the Soviet republics began to demand not merely reform, but independence from the Soviet Union. Fundamentally, glasnost destabilised party rule because it permitted profound criticism of the Party that Gorbachev had not anticipated. Chernobyl The explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor was an early test of Gorbachev’s commitment to glasnost. The accident, the largest nuclear accident on record, occurred in April 1986. Initially, local officials attempted to cover up the scale of the catastrophe. Indeed, the disaster was not reported to the central government for two days. The Soviet media were slow to report the accident, and initial reports played down the seriousness of what had happened. Gorbachev did not speak in public about the accident for over two weeks. Although the government eventually acknowledged the scale of the problems, it continued to conceal the real cause of the disaster. The final report blamed the people who operated the power station rather than acknowledging fundamental problems with the design of Soviet nuclear power stations. Chernobyl became a symbol for the problems of the Soviet Union. The disaster was caused by some of the fundamental failings of the communist system: the reactor’s design was flawed; the authorities hid the design flaws from the operators; the power plant was cons
161Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? Divisions in the Party Many Communist officials refused to support Gorbachev’s political and economic reforms. Hardliners believed that glasnost and perestroika would end the power of the Party and the privileges of Party members. In short, they feared reform would risk destroying the communist system. By 1988, there were at least two factions in the Party: ● Moderates: Party members, such as Ligachev and Ryzhkov who had supported Andropov, accepted the need to tackle corruption and promote limited economic reform. However, they believed that Gorbachev’s reforms were undermining the power of the Party. ● Radicals such as Yeltsin and Yakovlev believed that exposing the Party to criticism and giving greater power to the Soviet people were an essential part of revitalising Communism. Gorbachev attempted to balance both wings of the Party, but in so doing he often alienated both radicals and reformers. Historical interpretations: Gorbachev and the Party Historians disagree about Gorbachev’s relationship with the Communist Party during the 1980s. George W. Breslauer, for example, argues that Gorbachev antagonised and alienated the Communist Party. David Lane and Cameron Ross, on the other hand, argue that Gorbachev tried to work with the Communist Party and only turned his back on the Party in 1989. Extract 3 From George W. Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders, published in 2002. Gorbachev was engaged in a relentless process of destruction of the Brezhnevite order. He was in effect stripping the apparat and the official classes of immunity from public, systemic criticism and thereby also emboldening the intelligentsia and the masses to believe that such forceful criticism could now be safely advanced in public. Such public criticism also assisted Gorbachev in his efforts to maintain the initiative against the Brezhnevites and conservative forces within the Central Committee and Politburo. Puritans such as Ligachev and technocrats such as Prime Minister Ryzhkov found themselves increasingly disillusioned with Gorbachev. Their alienation from Gorbachev’s evolving definitions of perestroika only deepened as the General Secretary permitted civil liberties to expand in the areas of religion, travel, emigration, speech and mass media. As the bounds of the permissible grew, so too did the boldness of journalists, academics, writers, artists and political activists. Increasingly, Gorbachev’s unwillingness to draw and enforce limits alienated those members of the Central Committee who had always assumed that the alternative to order would be anarchy. 1 Having read Extracts 3 and 4, write short answers to the following questions: a) What is meant by the following terms: – Extract 3: ‘Brezhnevite, ‘Puritans’, ‘technocrats’, ‘the bounds of the permissible’ – Extract 4: ‘executive presidency’, ‘a check on the Party bureaucracy’? b) How does Extract 3 characterise Gorbachev’s relationship with the Party? How does it support its characterisation? c) How does Extract 4 characterise Gorbachev’s relationship with the Party? How does it support its characterisation? 2 Having answered these questions, discuss them with a partner. How far do you agree? Where you disagree, how can you use the extracts and the information in this section to resolve your disagreements? Extract 4 From David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism, published in 1999. Gorbachev was the last Russian communist leader who believed that he could reform state socialism from within, that he could reassert the role of the Communist Party. In the early years of his regime, he increased the numbers of top Party officials who were moved into government posts. This policy failed. After September 1989, he revoked this policy and began to move power away from the Party to the new executive presidency. At this stage, he was pushed into a more radical reform. He sought to move authority to executive bodies under his newly created executive presidency. Again, in similar vein to Khrushchev, he tried to gain the support of the masses against the bureaucracy. In 1989, he was able to direct the new and more democratically elected congress and Supreme Soviet (where ministers could no longer be elected deputies) to act as a check on the Party bureaucracy.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin162 4 Democratisation, 1988–90 Note it down Using a note-taking style of your choice, note down the following aspects of democratisation: ● the nature of Gorbachev’s reforms ● the impact of the 1989 and 1990 elections ● how far the reforms of 1988–90 weakened the Soviet Union ● the nature of constitutional reform in 1990 ● how far constitutional reform strengthened the Soviet Union. Don’t forget to note down the key details: the names of key individuals and the dates of key events. Gorbachev had committed the Party to creating a ‘genuine democracy’ in 1986. The turning point, however, came at the 1988 Party Conference, where Gorbachev set out his proposals for ‘socialist democracy’. Soviet power The Nineteenth Party Conference of 1988 embraced radical democratic reform. In essence, Gorbachev introduced multi-candidate elections to the Supreme Soviet. From 1989 onwards, Soviet citizens had the right to vote in elections where there was a choice of Communist Party candidates. Independent candidates could also stand for election. Since 1917 Russian citizens had elected local soviets. However, since the 1920s citizens had no choice of candidate. Rather, single candidates had been appointed by the Communist Party. In this way, the Communist Party had gained control over the elections and guaranteed their control over the soviets. Gorbachev changed this. Multi- candidate elections stripped the Communist Party of its power to appoint the candidates. Therefore there was a considerable shift of power from the Party’s leadership to the Soviet people. The 1988 reforms were only partial: ● In multi-candidate elections 1500 of the Congress of People’s Deputies would be elected. ● The remaining 750 would be appointed by the Communist Party and other official organisations. ● Equally, multi-candidate elections did not allow citizens to vote for different political parties. Nonetheless, the reforms allowed them to make a real choice between radicals, moderates and independents. Gorbachev hoped that the Soviet people would back radical candidates and in so doing provide a mandate for further reform. The new Congress of People’s Deputies would elect the Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet was also reformed. Rather than meeting once a year, the Supreme Soviet was given the right to meet for two three-month sessions every year. Gorbachev appointed himself Chair of the Supreme Soviet. The reforms meant that, for the first time since 1921, the Supreme Soviet was, at least partly, independent of the Party’s leadership. Therefore the reforms signif icantly weakened the Party. Election, 1989 The March–April election of 1989 was an important step in reducing the power of the Communist Party. During the campaign candidates were forced to engage in public debate in order to win votes. As a result of the election, the communists won 80 per cent of the seats in the Congress of People’s Deputies. Nonetheless, several high-ranking communists were defeated, including five members of the Central Committee. Radicals, on the other hand, did well. Yeltsin won with 89 per cent of the vote in Moscow. Soon after the election a group of newly elected deputies, including Yeltsin and Sakharov, formed the Inter-regional Deputies’ Group (IRDG), which embraced a radical anti- communist agenda including the i ntroduction of private property and greater autonomy for the republics. The creation of the IRDG was a n important step towards democracy because it became an organised opposition group with an off icial position within the Soviet system. Congresses and Conference Traditionally, big changes of Communist Party policy were agreed at meetings that represented the whole of the Soviet Communist Party. ● Party Congress: The Communist Party’s most important meetings were the Congresses. These were semi- regular meetings which elected the Central Committee. Ther e were 28 Par ty C ongress es between 1900 and 1990. ● Party Conference: Conferences were smaller meetings called to discuss specific issues. They could be held between Congresses. Eighteen Party Conferences were held before 1941. The Nineteenth Party Conference of 1988 was the last.
163Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? The consequences of the election The election weakened the position of the moderates, as Gorbachev had hoped. However, it also led to consequences that he did not intend: ● Nationalists who wanted to break up the Soviet Union used the election to campaign for independence. In Georgia, these campaigns resulted in violence (see page 74). ● Yeltsin emerged from the election as a popular figure and a rival to Gorbachev. Indeed, Yeltsin’s desire to replace the Soviet Union with a loose confederation of truly independent states was extremely popular w ith nationalists acros s the Soviet Union, and therefore a threat to the Soviet Union. Republic elections, 1990 Anti-communist trends were also obvious in the March 1990 elections in the republics. In Moscow, for example, a group called Democratic Russia won 85 per cent of the seats. Similarly, in Leningrad the group Democratic Elections 90, another new anti-communist group, took 80 per cent of the seats. Gorbachev had assumed that democratisation would strengthen the radicals within the Communist Party. However, the soviet elections weakened the whole of the Party, increasing the authority of anti-Party and nationalist groups. The consequences of democratisation, like the consequences of glasnost, were much more radical than Gorbachev had anticipated. Historical interpretations: The significance of the 1989 elections Historians have interpreted the 1989 elections in different ways. Robert Service, for example, sees them as a turning point: the moment when Gorbachev decisively broke with the past and embraced revolutionary change. However, Neil Robinson sees them quite differently. For Robinson, the elections were designed to reinvigorate the Party, not to transform it. In this sense, they were a development in Gorbachev’s original programme rather than a major change in direction. Extract 5 From Robert Service, Comrades! A History of World Communism, published in 2007. In 1985, Gorbachev was aiming not to terminate the one- party state but to enhance its effectiveness. Supremely optimistic, he genuinely believed that reforms in Moscow would create an order superior to the best on offer from advanced capitalism. By 1989, he was no longer seeking to adjust and revitalise the Soviet order: he wanted to transform it. He was turning many of the basic features of the Soviet Union into their opposites. He did this with ingenuity and audacity. The first great step in constitutional change was to scrap the pyramid of appointed soviets in favour of elected ones. In 1990 he gave scope for the formation of rival political parties by repealing article six of the Soviet Constitution which guaranteed the leading role of the Communists. There had been nothing like this since the early years of the Soviet state. 1 Having read Extracts 5 and 6 write a short answer to the following questions: a) Why did Gorbachev initiate the 1989 elections according to Extracts 5 and 6? b) What is Ex tract 6 referring to when it mentions ‘the Party’s vanguard role’? Having answered these questions, swap your answers with a partner. How far do you agree? Whose answers analyse Extracts 5 and 6’s claims about Gorbachev’s motives most clearly? What can you learn from each other’s answers? Extract 6 From Neil Robinson, Ideology and the Collapse of the Soviet System: A Critical History of Soviet Ideological Discourse, published in 1995. It was inconceivable to the leadership that the Party would suffer during the March 1989 elections. As far as Gorbachev was concerned the Party’s vanguard role and its acceptance by the people was the same thing. The people would inevitably recognise the true nature of the Party as a politica leader. The elections were definitely not supposed to be about altering the Soviet political system in any way. During the election Gorbachev claimed that the elections and the Party’s leadership role proved that there was no need for the development of multi-party politics.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin164 Constitutional reform Democratisation had succeeded in weakening the Communist Party. However, it had not produced a strong government. This posed problems for Gorbachev who needed a strong central authority in order to push through his economic reforms and maintain order. Democratisation had al so raised questions about the role of the Part y. Yeltsin demanded a new const itution that officially stripped the Communist Party of its leading role. Gorbachev too wanted a constitutional change that would give him new powers to deal with the Soviet Union’s growing economic and political problems. The presidency In March 1990 Gorbachev was appointed as President of the Soviet Union. In the short term this was a victory, but in the longer term the appointment created huge problems for Gorbachev. Gorbachev created the presidency for a number of reasons. First, he wanted to increase hi s power. Democratisation had weakened his position. He had hoped that democratisation would give him a power base independent of the Par ty. However, while democratisation had given the Supreme Soviet new authority, Gorbachev was not able to control the new institution. Therefore he decided to set up a new position, President of the Soviet Union, which would be independent of the Par ty a nd the Supreme Soviet. Standing for election as President was a gamble. Yeltsin’s popularity had been increasing since the election of 1989, and therefore it was possible that Yeltsin, rather than Gorbachev, would win the election. Consequently, Gorbachev decided that the President would be appointed by the Congress of People’s Deputies, where he had a majority of support. While this ensured Gorbachev’s appointment as President, it meant that Gorbachev lacked democratic legitimacy, unlike his rivals who, like Yeltsin, had been elected to their positions. Following his appointment Gorbachev was given emergency powers for 18 months in order to deal with the economic crisis and with growing unrest in the republics. On occasion, Gorbachev used his new powers to censor the press, or to use Soviet troops to restore order, particula rly in the non-Russian republics. As a result, Gorbachev was criticised by radicals for abandoning reform and introducing a new form of d ictatorship. Indeed, Eduard Shevardnadze, a key supporter of Gorbachev in the 1980s, resigned from the government in December 1990. He claimed that Gorbachev had abandoned the path to democracy. Conclusion: Gorbachev in 1990 Gorbachev hoped that glasnost and democratisation would help revitalise the Party and the economy. However, the reform process failed to achieve either of these goals and contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Greater openness destroyed the authority of the Party, while simultaneously allowing the anti-communist opposition to criticise the government. Democratisation weakened the Communist Party by bring ing its democratic legitimacy into question. By 1990, Gorbachev’s reforms had destroyed his power base, and therefore he had increasing diff iculty pushing through his reforms. Significantly, although Gorbachev stressed the importance of democracy, he refused to stand for election. Therefore he never gained a mandate for his power or his reforms. Gorbachev consistently hoped that the Soviet people would back his reform agenda. However, Gorbachev misunderstood the mood of the people. Ultimately, democratisation undermined the Soviet Union because the Soviet people had lost faith in the Communist Party and the Union.
165Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? Essay technique: Structuring your essay Extract 1 From George E. Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders, published in 2002, page 293. Gorbachev lost control of his political reforms and proved unable or unwilling to prevent things that he clearly hoped to avoid: the total collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the USSR, and the abolition of the Communist Party. Gorbachev made a great start, but was a poor finisher. This was especially the case in those realms such as economic and ethnic policy. However, marketising the economy and federalising the Union were the two most intractable problems facing the Soviet regime. Perhaps nothing Gorbachev did would have averted the collapse of the economy and the Soviet Union – given the forces he had unleashed 1987–1989. Extract 2 From Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR 1917–1991, published in 1993, page 415. By the summer of 1991 the process of disintegration was proceeding at an accelerated pace. Gorbachev’s government had now neither money nor authority. Looking back, one is struck by a fundamental problem. To carry through the fundamental perestroika of the economy required strong government. In the first three years of Gorbachev’s rule the mechanism for imposing a policy did exist. So Gorbachev set about dismantling the apparatus, changing its personnel, allowing criticism of the privileges, putting the whole system into question. Glasnost and demokratizatsiya undermined the power to implement policy. So by the time the reform programme was radicalized, the means to enforce it no longer existed. This, as well as doubts and hesitations about how far and how fast the reform process should go, plus the disastrous economic policy led to failure. Add the forces of nationalism and regionalism, and one had collapse. In order to do well, your essay needs to focus on the interpretations of both extracts. Although there are only two extracts, your essay may have to deal with several interpretations, as each extract might contain an argument and a counter-argument. Your essay structure should allow you to: ● analyse all of the interpretations effectively ● deal with the different interpretations in turn ● deal with the different interpretations in a logical sequence. Therefore your essay should be structured around the key interpretations contained in the extracts. Analysing the extracts In order to deal with the different interpretations in a logical sequence, you should look for the ways in which they support and challenge each other. Imagine you are answering the following question. Guidance on how to plan an essay in answer to this question is given on page 166. In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed because ‘Gorbachev lost control of his political reforms’? (Extract 1, line 1) To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extract s using your own knowledge of the issues.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin166 Extract 2 Argument The failure of Gorbachev’s final reforms plus a series of other factors led to the break-up of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s reforms failed because: ● they required a strong government to force them through ● the reforms themselves weakened the government. Evidence By 1991 Gorbachev’s government had no real power. For example, your plan could look like this: Extract 1 Argument Gorbachev lost control of the process of reform, and therefore was unable to stop the Soviet Union’s collapse. Nonetheless, the reforms started well. Counter- argument The problems facing the Soviet Union were so big that once reform started the collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable. 1(a) Main argument 3(a) Resolution: there were many factors involved. 3(b) Both extr acts agree that Gorbachev’s early reforms were more successful. 1(b) Supports the main argument. 2(a) Counter- argument 2(b) Evidence extends the counter-argument. Activity: Question practice Plan an answer to the following question using the extracts on page 168, In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that ‘without Gorbachev the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union would not have occurred’? (Extract 1, lines 10–11) To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts using your own knowledge of the issues. Follow the steps below: 1 Read both extracts. 2 Analyse them by looking for: ● the main arguments ● counter-arguments ● evidence. 3 Look for contrasting arguments between the extracts. 4 Look for aspects of the extracts that support each other. TIPS: ● Your first main paragraph should analyse the interpretation set out in the question. ● Your second paragraph should analyse the interpretation that contrasts most strongly with the interpretation in the main paragraph. ● Other paragraphs should deal with other arguments that the extracts put forward. ● Try to use both extracts in each paragraph. ● Overall, you can try to achieve an argument – counter-argument – resolution structure. Planning your essay In order to plan your essay to the question on page 165, you need to analyse the two extracts, that is to say, you need to break down the extracts into the different arguments, counter-arguments and pieces of evidence they contain. While you are doing this: ● look for contrasting arguments between the extracts – these can be the major sections of your essay ● look for aspects of the extracts that suppor t each other, or aspects of the extracts that contradict each other.
167Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? Work together Having completed the activity on page 166. Consider the following questions with a partner: 1 Did you both identify the same arguments and counter- arguments in the extracts? 2 Did you agree about which aspect of the extracts was the biggest contrast to the main argument of Extract 1? 3 How was your partner’s plan different to your own? 4 Did you miss anything that you should note down? 5 What can you learn from your partner’s approach? 6 Which plan better answers the question and why? Use these questions to feed back to each other and improve your analysis of the extracts. Activity: AS-Style question Historians have different views about the reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union. Analyse and evaluate the extrac ts and use your knowledge of the issues to explain your answer to the following question. How far do you agree with the view that Gorbachev’s political reforms led to the collapse of the Soviet Union? Extract 1 From Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, published in 2003, pages 330–31. Gorbachev’s idealistic rush to bring the Soviet Union into the ‘common European home’ made him the grave digger of Soviet power. After the Soviet ‘empire’ in Central Europe collapsed, the Soviet Union itself became vulnerable. Growing domestic anarchy, deepening economic crisis, rise of nationalist separatists and the weakening of the existing state structures demanded action. Yet Gorbachev, as before, continued to believe he could create a new democratic Soviet Union. His over confidence let him down. In 1987 he refused to get rid of Boris Yeltsin, who had already emerged as a major trouble maker. He also kept hard-liners in charge of the army, the KGB and the military-industrial complex. Without Gorbachev the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union would not have occurred. At each stage Gorbachev made choices that destabilised and weakened the USSR. The unwitting destruction of the Soviet Union made him one of the most controversial figures in Russian history. Extract 2 From Martin McCauley, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, published in 2007, page 450. Poor leadership provoked political and economic collapse. A major weakness was the Party-state system. The Party never possessed the technical expertise to run the country. Gorbachev’s attempts at economic reform provoked a collapse. One of the reasons for this was that economic reform needs time to produce positive results. Gorbachev was impatient and introduced more radical reforms to accelerate growth. He eventually wrecked the system. He was quite unqualified for the role he had to play. He had little understanding of economics. This meant he was swayed by economists who promised him success. When it did not materialise, he listened to more radical economists. None of these economists had ever worked in a market economy, let alone industry. They were all theoreticians. They assumed that the planned economy was infinitely malleable. Reformers could pick and choose policies and the economy would improve as a result. Hence they had no understanding of the consequences of any of their reforms.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin168 Activity Having read the essay, answer the following questions. Comprehension 1 What does Sakwa mean by the following phra ses: ● ‘The Soviet Union could have continued if Gorbachev had not removed the keystone in the arch.’ ● ‘Gorbachev sought to create a new system that is conventionally ca lled “reform Communism”, which he defined as “ humane, democratic socialism”. This ended up provoking numerous contradictions.’ ● ‘Gorbachev increasingly found that when he pulled the levers of power, they were not attached to anything.’ Evidence 2 Make a list of the examples of Gorbachev’s failures in Sakwa’s essay. Interpretation 3 Identify the passage in which Sakwa explains why, in his view, the Soviet Union collapsed. 4 Summarise Sakwa’s interpretation in 25 words or less. Evaluation 5 Using your own knowledge, write a paragraph explaining how far you agree with Sa kwa’s interpretation of the fal l of the Soviet Union. Extended reading: Interpretation Richard Sakwa, Professor of Russian and European Politics at the University of Kent, considers the extent to which Gorbachev’s political reforms led to the downfall of the Soviet Union. Why did a system that had defeated the world’s most powerful military force in 1941–45, launched the world’s first artificial satellite (Sputnik 1) into earth’s orbit on 4 October 1957, achieved the first human spaceflight by Yuri Gagarin on 12 April 1961, gained nuclear parity with the United States in the mid-1970s, and attained standards of living typical of a mid-level developed country, collapse so quickly and suddenly? The fundamental reason is Mikhail Gorbachev’s botched attempt to reform the political system. The Soviet Union could have continued if Gorbachev had not removed the keystone in the arch, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its ‘apparatus’ (apparat), the gigantic machinery of government. Gorbachev came to power in March 1985 not to destroy the Soviet system of governance but to save it. However, as perestroika gathered pace his reforms became increasingly radical, and instead of simply reforming Communism, Gorbachev sought to create a new system that is conventionally called ‘reform Communism’, which he defined as ‘humane, democratic socialism’. This ended up provoking numerous contradictions. The overall principal aim was to create a ‘socialist legal state’, with the separation of powers and a genuine parliament. However, the system ended up trapped between a disrupted old Soviet system of governance and a new system that could not be established. The steering mechanism of the state was destroyed but no effective alternative system was put in place, and by the end of 1991 the whole order collapsed. Gorbachev launched a number of political reforms. First, glasnost (openness) allowed the problems facing the country to be discussed, but the criticisms soon turned into a condemnation of the whole system that had allowed Stalin’s crimes and the continuing repression. Second, the Nineteenth Party Conference marked a turning point in reform of the CPSU, and from now on the Party was intended to guide rather than to lead. In September 1988 power was shifted away from the party machinery to ordinary members, and from the party to the state. The process began whereby the party was stripped of its supervisory machinery. Six new commissions responsible for party affairs, ideology, social and economic policy, agriculture, international affairs and legal reform were created, and following their reorganisation in October the powers of the Central Committee Secretariat were effectively transferred to them. The vast apparatus of the Central Committee was drastically reduced. Third, and no less important, in 1990 at the CPSU’s Twenty- Eighth Party Congress the Politburo’s status was radically changed, with 15 of its 25 members ex officio becoming the leaders of the Union republics. Gorbachev was freed
169Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? Work together Having completed the activity on page 168, swap your notes with a partner. Consider the following questions: 1 Did you both spot the same evidence in Sakwa’s essay? 2 Has your partner missed anything? 3 Did you agree on which passage contained the interpretation? If not, who was right? 4 List three things that were good about your partner ’s summary of Sakwa’s interpretation? 5 Can you learn anything about Sakwa’s interpret ation from your partner’s summary? 6 How far did you both agree with Sakwa’s interpret ation? Use these questions to feed back to each other and improve your analysis of the extracts. from Politburo control, and the once-mighty body was marginalised. However, a genuinely competitive party system was not introduced – the old system was destroyed but nothing effective was put in its place. Fourth, In December 1988 the USSR Supreme Soviet created a three-chamber Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD), two chambers of which (the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities) were to be chosen in multi-candidate elections, while the third (the Soviet of Representatives) was to be made up of delegates from social organisations, including 100 guaranteed seats for the Communist Party. The full Congress was to meet twice a year while current parliamentary business was to be conducted by a smaller Supreme Soviet drawn from the CPD. This was a strange and unworkable body. Fifth, competitive elections were introduced. In the first instance these affected the lowest levels of governance, but gradually the whole system became focused on competitive elections. The March 1989 elections to the new Soviet parliament were dramatic, as many of the old CPSU leaders were defeated. In March 1990 the elections to the new Russian parliament were even more democratic, and indeed in many ways these were the freest and fairest elections that Russia has ever seen. Sixth, at the first convocation of the Soviet CPD in May 1989 Gorbachev was elected chairman of its new 542-member Supreme Soviet, a post he assumed without winning an election at any stage. Power began to shift from the Party to what would in the end become a fully-fledged presidency. However, the fact that Gorbachev did not put himself forward in a national election meant that he lacked electoral legitimacy. This would ultimately cripple Gorbachev’s ambitions, especially when it came to facing the leader of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, who won a national election in June 1990. In short, Gorbachev’s political reforms made the whole system of governance unworkable. A full-scale constitutional reform should have been planned and implemented, and instead endless small-scale reforms destabilised the whole system of governance. This may not have been so dangerous in a time of calm, but with economic and nationality problems getting worse, and conflict with Yeltsin over the fate of the country, Gorbachev increasingly found that when he pulled the levers of power, they were not attached to anything. No single cause can be identified that precipitated the fall, but a ‘perfect storm’ swept the Soviet Union away. Gorbachev’s inept attempt to reform the Communist Party and Soviet government is certainly one of the key factors. Richard Sakwa is Professor of Russian and European Politics at the University of Kent and an Associate Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House. He has published widely on Soviet, Russian and post- communist affairs. Recent books include The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism, and the Medvedev Succession (Cambridge University Press, 2011), Putin and the Oligarch: The Khodorkovsky–Yukos Affair (I. B. Tauris, 2014) and Putin Redux: Power and Contradiction in Contemporary Russia (Routledge, 2014).
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin170 3 The impact of the nationalist resurgence Overview The Soviet Union comprised 15 republics. In this s ense, the Soviet Union was a supranational organisation, rather than a nation. Gorbachev assumed that the Union was genuinely popular, that Soviet citizens felt loyal to the Soviet Union rather than to their individual republics . However, faith in the Soviet Union declined following 1985. A combination of economic crisis and revelations about the crimes of the Communist Party weakened the authorit y of the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, Gorbachev’s political reforms allowed opposition gr oups to flourish. By 1988 there were popular nationalist gr oups in many of the Soviet republics. These groups claimed to represent the national identity, traditions and freedom of the various nations that made up the Soviet Union. By 1990 many of these nationalist groups had beaten the Communist Par ty in elections. Therefore they had more authority than the Communist Party or Gorbachev, who remained an unelected leader. The popularity of nationalist groups, the growing weakness of the Soviet Government and Gorbachev’s reluctance to use force to hold the Union together were key aspects of the fall of the Soviet Union. This chapter considers: 1 The Union and the republics before 1985 2 The impact of Gorbachev’s reforms 3 Growing nationalist unrest 1988–90 4 The coup, 1991. 1 The Union and the republics before 1985 In 1985 Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union, a collection of republics controlled by the Communist Party. According to the Soviet Constitution each of the republics, which included the Soviet Republics of Russia, the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Latvia, was an independent nation. Indeed, each republic had its own Supreme Soviet and its own governmental institutions. However, in reality, the Soviet Communist Party, which was based in Moscow, governed the entire Soviet Union, and the republics had little real independence. Indeed, the Soviet Government was dominated by Slavs, the vast majority of which were Russians. In this sense, the Soviet Union was similar to an empire, with the non-Russian republics as Russia’s colonies. From 1917 to 1985 nationalism in the republics was managed by a mixture of economic and political incentives and repression. Note it down Make notes in the form of a spider diagram showing the different ways that nationalism was understood and expressed in the Soviet Union prior to 1985. Use arrows to show the way in which the different powers conflicted or complemented each other. Nationalism Many historians have argued that nationalism was one of the main causes of the fall of the Soviet Union. However, the term ‘nationalism’ has a number of different meanings, therefore it is important to clarify what it can mean. There are at least two different types of nationalism, and some writers distinguish between ‘liberal nationalism’ and ‘chauvinistic nationalism’. In essence liberal nationalism is the view that all nations should be self-governing, that is to say independent of the control of other nations. This is the kind of nationalism that emerged as a powerful force in the Soviet Union in the 1980s and lead to campaigns for the Republics to break away from the Soviet Union. Chauvinistic nationalism, by contrast, is the view that a specific nation has the right to rule or play a guiding role in the development of other countries or nations. This view was common in the Empires that played a dominant global role in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Nationalism of this kind was common in Russia before the October Revolution and influenced Soviet nationalism, justifying Soviet control of the Republics. The Soviet Union Some historians refer to the Soviet Union simply as ‘the Union’. Indeed, the term Union can be used to draw attention to the disputed relationship between the central Soviet authorities and the Republics. After all, it was the Union, that is to say control from Russia, which nationalists in the Republics objected to and wanted to end.
171Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? Soviet politics and nationalism Political opportunities and political organisation were one way in which the Soviet Union kept nationalism at bay between 1917 and 1985. First, each republic had its own government system. Stalin’s purges wiped out the previous generation of leaders in each republic, therefore from 1938 energetic and talented people could gain powerful and well-paid positions in each republic. Republican governments tended to be dominated by people of each republic, so the government of Georgia, for example, was dominated by Georgians. These people owed their power and wealth to the Soviet system and therefore they tended to be loyal. While governments were dominated by local people other important organisations were not. The secret police and the army were always dominated by Russians and kept under strict central control. Therefore the Soviet Government was always ready to deal with unrest through terror or military action. Moreover, under Andropov’s leadership, the KGB kept nationalists under constant surveillance. By 1975 around half of the people in prison or subjected to repressive psychiatry were nationalists. ‘Soviet nationalism’ Although the Soviet Union was not a nation, the government tried to inspire loyalty to the Union through the creation of ‘Soviet nationalism’. In the 1920s and again after Stalin’s death, citizens of the republics were encouraged to put loyalty to the Union ahead of loyalty to their own nation. The government argued that traditional nationalism encouraged division and competition, whereas ‘Soviet nationalism’ was superior because it was based on ethnic equality and unity. Moreover, from 1945 all Soviet citizens were encouraged to take pride in the Soviet Union’s superpower status and the fact that they were part of one of the most powerful nations on earth. ‘Soviet nationalism’ was, however, unpopular in many of the non-Russian republics because, in reality, it was based on Russian values and traditions. Therefore non-Russians were expected to renounce their existing customs, traditions and language and assim ilate by adopting Russian customs. In that sense, ‘Soviet nationalism’ was based on the assumption of Russian superiority and the inferiority of other cultures. Significantly, Gorbachev did not understand the weaknesses of Soviet nationalism. He seems to have genuinely believed that Soviet citizens had renounced their national identity and become a united ‘Soviet people’. Therefore he assumed that the Soviet Union was more stable than it really was and the strength of nationalism in the republics took him by surprise. The Soviet economy and nationalism Economic benefits were another way in which nationalism was controlled prior to 1985. From 1953 economic planners targeted i nvestment at the poorer regions of the Soviet Union. As these areas tended to be in the non-Russian republics, they led to an improved standard of livi ng for the majority of people in the 13 non-Russian republics. Under Brezhnev the ‘social contract’ (see page 117) was as important to manag ing the republics as it was to managi ng Russia. In return for obedience, lives were transformed as area s of Central A sia were urbanised and modernised. Educational investment was also higher in the non-Russian republics, and it was easier for non-Russians to get university places. Under Brezhnev the system developed into what historian Terry Martin has called an ‘aff irmative action empire’. Consequently, non-Russians who made the most of the opportunities could get good jobs and improve their standard of living. Significantly, these benefits could only continue while the economy continued to grow. Economic decline in the 1980s threatened to reduce the standard of livi ng and opportunities for people in the republics and therefore undermine the Union. Nationalism under Brezhnev Under Brezhnev the government encouraged some forms of national self-expression. This increased tolerance of nationalism would later play a role in the emergence of anti-Soviet nationalist movements. Following 1964: ● Each of the republics had the right to introduce education in their own language. ● There was an increase in the publication of books and newspapers in non-Russian languages in the republics. ● Folk art, folk music and museums devoted to national culture were allowed in each of the republics. ● Brezhnev established new universities to educate non- Russian citizens of the Union. ● Brezhnev’s ‘trust in cadres’ policy allowed local elites to consolidate their hold over the Communist Parties in the non-Russian republics. ● There was greater representation of Turkic people in the Central Committee and Politburo.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin172 2 The impact of Gorbachev’s reforms Note it down Gorbachev’s reforms led to the emergence of nationalism in a variety of ways. Make notes in any form you choose to dealing with: ● Gorbachev’s policies ● the ways in which they encouraged nationalism. Cadre change and anti-corruption Following Brezhnev’s death there was a change in policy towards the republics. Andropov and Gorbachev both argued that effective government was more important than representative government. Therefore they were no longer committed to ensuring that the governments of the republics were staffed by local people. Rather they argued that all government posts should go to the best candidates. In practice this meant that Andropov and Gorbachev replaced existing leaders in the non-Russian republics with Russians. This process was linked to the anti-corruption campaign, which led to the sacking of many local leaders. Gorbachev’s purges of the republican governments were particularly far reaching. For example, he removed relatively popular leaders in the Central Asian republics in 1986. Moreover, at the top of the Soviet Government Brezhnev’s appointments from the republics were replaced by Russians. Gorbachev’s Politburo, for example, only had one non- Russian. As a result, following Brezhnev’s death Soviet Government became more dominated by Russians at all levels. This created resentment in the non-Russian republics. Indeed, in Kazakhstan in 1986, for example, there were riots when the new Russian leader Gennadii Kolbin replaced local Kazak leader Dinmukhammed Kunaev. Acceleration Gorbachev’s economic reforms led to economic decline. Therefore standards of living in the republics either declined or stagnated. This change happened at the same time that Gorbachev was replacing local leaders with Russians. The economic decline became associated with the new Russian leadership, whereas economic growth was associated with the previous generation of local leaders. Gorbachev did not challenge the privileges of Communist Party off icials. This made matters worse. As the economy declined, the inequalities between the new privileged Russian leaders and the people they ruled became obvious. Therefore Gorbachev’s reforms led to growing nationalism because of their failure and because they were associated with a new privileged Russian leadership. Glasnost Glasnost and democratisation had led to problems that Gorbachev had not foreseen. The most significant of these issues was the demand for greater autonomy or full independence from the Soviet republics. Glasnost led to the rise of nationalism in a number of ways: ● It exposed the ways in which Stalin’s government had persecuted non-Russian people. ● It allowed Soviet people to see how much higher Western standards of living were than those w ithin the Soviet Union. This was a significant change. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s citizens in the republics were broadly happy with their standard of living. The Soviet economy had improved living standards compared to the 1920s or 1930s. However, compared to the West living standards were still poor. Therefore Glasnost undermined the perception that the Soviet Union had benefited people in the republics. ● It allowed nationalist groups to publish material that demanded greater autonomy. The Sinatra Doctrine Gorbachev’s foreign policy reforms also led to a rise in nationalism. The most significant change in this context was to redefine the relationship between the Soviet Union and the East European ‘satellite states’ it had controlled since the late 1940s. Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev these states, which included East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, were only allowed very limited freedom. Reforms in Hungar y and Czechoslovakia which threatened Soviet interests were crushed by the Soviet military. The Soviet Union’s relationship with the Eastern European satellite states was summed up in the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ of 1968. In essence, Brezhnev argued that the Soviet Union had a right to intervene in the affairs of other European socialist countries in order to protect socialism across the whole of Europe. Gorbachev rejected the Brezhnev Doctrine in August 1989, renouncing the Soviet Union’s ‘right’ to intervene in the affairs of other socialist countries. Rather, he argued that different countries could all follow their own path to Communism. This new doctrine, nicknamed the ‘Sinatra Doctrine’ after Frank Sinatra’s song ‘My way’, allowed much greater freedom in the Eastern European countries. As a result, during October and November 1989 Communism fell across Eastern Europe (see Figure 1).
173Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? In Poland and Hungary new leaders won democratic elections; in Czechoslovakia and East Germany there were peaceful revolutions against communist rule. The destruction of the Berlin Wall, which began on 9 November 1989, symbolised the end of Soviet control of Eastern Europe. Once again, these changes went well beyond what Gorbachev had anticipated. Nonetheless, Gorbachev allowed them to happen, refusing to use Soviet troops to restore communist rule in the new democracies. The revolutions in Eastern Europe clearly had implications for the Soviet republics. Across Eastern Europe countries had regained their independence from the Soviet Union. Nationalists in the non-Russian republics hoped that they could do the same. Democratisation Democratisation further aided nationalists by allowing them to fight and win elections. Significantly, nationalists SOVIET UNION POLAND EAST GERMANY WEST GERMANY ROMANIA YUGOSLAVIA BULGARIA N 0 500 km Gorbachev tells East Germany that Soviet troops will not put down East German demonstrations. 300000 people protest in Leipzig. One million people protest in East Berlin. Berlin Wall is opened. Germany reunified into one country. East Germany October 1989 23 October 1989 4 November 1989 9 November 1989 1991 Huge demonstration against communism begins. Communist government resigns. Václav Havel becomes first non-communist President of Czechoslovakia since 1948. Democratic elections won by Civic Forum – an alliance of anti-communist groups. Czechoslovakia 17 November 1989 24 November 1989 9 December 1989 1990 Strikes throughout the country. Free trade union – Solidarity – wins elections. Mazowiecki becomes first non-communist Prime Minister in eastern Europe. Poland 1988 1989 Democratic elections won by renamed Communist Party. Bulgaria 1990 Gorbachev accepts that Hungary can become a multi-party state. Democratic elections won by Democratic Forum, an alliance of anti-communist groups. Hungary 1988 1990 Secret police fire on demonstrators in Timisoara. Huge crowd in Bucharest boos President Ceausescu, who flees but is captured later. Army joins rebellion and fights secret police. Hundreds are killed. Ceausescu and his wife are shot by a firing squad. Democratic elections won by National Salvation Front, containing many ex-communists. Romania The most brutal government in eastern Europe. 16 December 1989 21 December 1989 22–24 December 1989 25 December 1989 1990 Black Sea HUNGARY CZECHOSLOVAKIA Berlin Figure 1: The break-up of the Soviet Empire in the years 1988–91.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin174 gained majorities in several of the republic’s parliaments in the elections of 1990. These elections led to the first major nationalist challenge to the Soviet Union since 1921. In March 1990 the newly elected parlia ment of Lithuania declared Lithuanian independence from the Soviet Union. Gorbachev claimed that the declaration was illegal and imposed economic sanctions. Although the sanctions were lifted in the summer, there was no resolution to the issue. Yeltsin took this process further by insisting, in May 1990, that laws made by the Russian parliament were legally superior to Soviet laws. In effect, Yeltsin’s statement gave Russia a significant degree of independence from the Soviet Union. Further evidence that nationalism was on the rise in Russia was the re-emergence of the old Russian flag and the double headed eagle – the symbol of the old Russian monarchy. Both the flag and the symbol of the monarchy had been banned by the Soviet Government. The use of these symbols by Russians who supported Yeltsin indicated that nationa lists in Russia wanted to break away from the Soviet Union and assert Russia’s independence. 3 Growing nationalist unrest, 1988–90 From 1988 there was growing nationalist unrest in the republics. In some cases this led to religious violence. Nationalist violence In 1988 nationalist protests broke out in Karabag h, a region of Azerbaijan. The crisis was caused by Armenian nationalists living in Karabagh who wanted to unite with Armenia. Armenian nationalists organ ised protests in favour of redrawing the republic’s boundaries in February 1988. Azerbaijani nationalists organised a counter campaign, and by the end of the month there were violent riots. Note it down As you read this section, make notes on the following topics using the 1:2 method (see page x): ● the nature of the new nationalisms ● the impact of the new nationalisms on Gorbachev and the Soviet Union ● government responses to the new nationalisms. TIP: Remember to make a note of the names of the places that were affected by the emergence of nationalism. Gorbachev responded by introducing direct rule of Karabagh. However, this pleased neither side. New groups emerged fighting for their different national communities.The situation led to massacres and mass migration of Armenians. Both sides began to denounce the corruption of the Soviet Union. The Soviet authorities failed to contain the crisis, and by the end of 1989 the Communist Party had lost control of the Republic of Azerbaijan. In January 1990 Azerbaijani nationalists, who now effectively controlled the republic, massacred Armenians. Mass Azerbaijani rallies demanded formal independence from the Soviet Union. A year later in Central Asia in 1989, Uzbeks massacred the Muslim minority of Meshketians. Soviet authorities were unable to restore peace in these areas, nor were they able to negotiate compromise. This led to a loss of faith in the Soviet Government which appeared incapable of either ensuring peace or meeting the demands of nationalists. In both Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan the Communist Government failed to contain nationalist demands and failed to solve intercommunity issues. In both cases nationalist protests that started against a minority community escalated into violence and demands for independence from the Soviet Union. The Tbilisi massacre Similar events took place in Georgia, which demonstrated the limits of Gorbachev’s real power. On 9 April 1989 Georgian nationalists protested against the rights of the Abkhazian minority. On this occasion Soviet troops attempted to restore order by force. Consequently, Soviet forces killed 19 Georgian protestors and wounded thousands more. The killings outraged Georgian nationalists. As in Uzbekistan the government’s response turned Georgian nationalists against the Soviet authorities. The killing s in Georgia had two main consequences: ● The massacre led to concern among nationalists in all of the republics that the Soviet Government was prepared to use lethal force to stop nationalism. ● The government refused to take responsibility for the killings and blamed local military leaders. As a result, military commanders became increasingly unwilling to use force against protestors. This refusal to use force became known as ‘Tbilisi syndrome’ and weakened the government’s position, because it could no longer rely on military support. Russian nationalism During the late 1980s there was a growth in Russian nationalism. Traditionally, Russians had benefited from
175Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? the Soviet Union, and many Russians had identified with the successes and world power that had been achieved under the communists. However, the Soviet Union and Soviet leaders were blamed for the onset of the economic crisis. Therefore, from 1988 there was a growing demand for a change that put Russia first. Russian nationalism was also spurred on by a growing environmental or green movement. Russian citizens were first alerted to the environmental impact of Communism in 1986 due to the explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor. As a result of glasnost, the government published environmental data that demonstrated that Russia was much more polluted by Soviet industry and farming than had been previously admitted. The green movement began to f lourish in Armenia in the late 1980s. Indeed, in 1987 environmentalists organised mass demonstrations against the Soviet Government’s environmental policies. These demonstrations were unprecedented and indicate how powerful the green movement was in some of the republics. In 1989 the State Committee for Environmental Protection published a report which acknowledged serious levels of pollution in 16 per cent of the Soviet Union’s land. The report admitted that the Aral Sea was an area of ‘ecological calamity’ due to pollution from biological and chemical weapons testing and from oil and gas extraction. More generally, industrial pollution was affecting water and air quality, and extensive use of chemical ferti lisers was poisoning some of the Soviet Union’s great lakes. Environmental groups in Russia tended to express their concerns in terms of saving the Russian landscape and saving the Russian environment. Therefore increasing support for green issues undermined the Soviet Union and aided the growth of Russian nationalism. Equally, Russian nationalists began to use some of the arguments that emerged from the green movement. Specifically, they argued that Soviet Communism was unnatural and had smothered and poisoned national culture like the chemicals from Soviet factories. Nationalism also f lourished among groups established to protect national monuments. Protecting national monuments and traditional buildings was part of a bigger movement to protect Russian culture and re-evaluate the past. Indeed, some Russians began to argue that Tsarism had been a better system than Communism. Moreover, as the economic and political crisis deepened a minority of Russians began to back extremist movements which were openly anti-Semitic and nationalistic. Baltic independence The break-up of the Soviet Union started in the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. These states had been independent in the 1920s and 1930s, but had been conquered by Stalin in 1940. Nationalists in these states wanted a return to independence. By 1988 large ‘popular fronts’, movements dedicated to gaining independence, were growing in all three Baltic states. Estonia declared itself sovereign from the Soviet Union in November 1988. Estonia did not leave the Union, but the government claimed the right to revive the old flag and begin educating citizens in the Estonian language. Lithuania’s declaration of independence, in March 1990, came af ter nationalist v ictories in the election of a new Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Gorbachev refused to accept the declaration. However, criticisms of the Tbilisi massacre meant that Gorbachev was only prepared to use force against nationalists in the Baltic in ext reme circumstances. Gorbachev imposed economic sanctions, rather than using force. Sanctions fai led to force Lithuania to accept Soviet rule. Therefore, in January 1991 the Soviet Government sent in troops. Soviet forces occupied the press and television headquarters, kil ling 14 people. There was outrage across the Soviet Union at the use of force. Ukrainian m iners in Donetsk organised protests at the government’s action. Yeltsin also asked Russian soldiers to refuse to obey any orders from the Soviet Government that would suppress political protest. Yeltsin a lso starte d creati ng a Russian army to defend the Russian Republic from Soviet attack. Reforming the Soviet Union Gorbachev’s response to the growing nationalism was to propose a reformed union, in which the republics would have a greater degree of independence. Gorbachev first proposed a new union treaty in 1990. Negotiations were hampered by Gorbachev’s declining authority. Whereas nationalist leaders had won elections and therefore had the authority to act as representatives of their people, Gorbachev was unelected. Therefore Gorbachev was unable to deal with nationalist leaders as an equal. In March 1991, following the crisis in Lithuania, Gorbachev proposed a referendum of all the people in the Soviet Union, hoping to strengthen his position by winning popular support for a reformed union. Six of the republics, including the Baltic republics, refused to particip
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin176 Historical interpretations: The impact of nationalism Historians have disagreed about the origins of the nationalism that emerged in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Ronald Grigor Suny in Extract 1 argues that the weaknesses of the Soviet regime and Gorbachev’s mistakes allowed nationalism to grow and threaten the Soviet Union, at least in Armenia, Georgia, and the Baltic republics. In Extract 2 Anatoly Michailovich Khazanov, by contrast, argues that nationalism emerged due to specific problems with Soviet policy, particularly the ecological problems created by the Soviet economy and the abuses of minority cultures within the Union. Extract 1 From Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, published in 1993. When Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, the Soviet state was already in a profoundly weakened condition. The Soviet Union had experienced not only years of political and economic stagnation but also a frustrating absence of able and stable leadership in the first half of the 1980s. Weakness in the centre had enabled the local ethnic and regional mafias within the Party-state apparatus to increase their power. In nearly every Transcaucasian and Central Asian republic, a series of purges (1985–1988) eliminated the top leaders, although not without resistance. In Kazakhstan the removal of long-time party Chief Dinmukhammed Kunaev and his replacement by a Russian brought demonstrators onto the streets. When these ‘democratic’ forces began to act, the emergence of nationalist politics burst the bounds of the old politics in a number of republics. In a number of republics – Armenia, Georgia, the Baltic – this rapidly undermined the power of local Communist parties. In other republics, however – in Central Asia most particularly – perestroika was contained and Communist apparatchiks maintained their hold on both state and society. 1 Read Extracts 1 and 2 and write a brief answer to the following questions: a) Extract 1 refers to ‘a series of purges (1985–1988) eliminated the top leaders’. Which purges is this a reference to? b) What reasons do the extracts give for growing nationalism in the period 1986–91? c) How far do the two extracts agree about the extent to which Gorbachev’s policies were responsible for growing nationalism in this period? 2 Having answered these questions share your answers with a partner. How far do you agree? Where you disagree, can you resolve your disagreements referring to the interpretations of the extracts and the information in this chapter? Extract 2 From Anatoly Michailovich Khazanov, After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States, published in 1995. From the end of 1986, at the onset of a period of change, representatives of the non-Russian peoples began to express in the press complaints about the Soviet nationality policy, specifically its abuses of non-Russian cultures. Estonian economists and reform minded officials began to insist on economic and financial independence for their republics. In 1987, groups sprang up in various republics to address social, cultural and ecological problems that were of ten connected with national interests of these people. Ecological movements were particularly active in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Estonia and Moldavia. In September and October of 1987 in Armenia, the Greens organised mass demonstrations – an uncommon phenomenon in the Soviet Union at the time. By 1988, the economic and political crisis in the Soviet Union began to be accompanied by an explosion of nationalism and tension in interethnic relations. won the election with 57 per cent of the vote, beating the communist candidate who only gained 16 per cent. The victory clearly strengthened Yeltsin’s position and weakened Gorbachev. Yeltsin’s election gave him popular legitimacy. Indeed, as Russians made up 60 per cent of the Soviet population, Yeltsin could claim to be a truer representative of the Soviet Union than Gorbachev. Clearly, Gorbachev had never won a popular election and therefore lacked a democratic basis for his position. Negotiations for a new treaty continued throughout the spring. In mid-July a complete draft of the treaty establishing a Union of Sovereign States had been agreed by the leaders of eight of the Soviet republics. Gorbachev announced that the treaty would be signed on 21 August.
177Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? 4 The coup, 1991 Note it down Using a note-making style of your choice, make notes on: ● the causes of the coup ● what happened during the coup ● how far the coup weakened the Soviet Union. Don’t forget to note down the key details: the names of key individuals and the dates of key events. Gorbachev’s new Union Treaty did not have the support of hardliners in the Party. Gorbachev’s conservative opponents thought that the new treaty allowed the republics to have too much power. Gorbachev’s decision to go on holiday immediately prior to the signing of the new treaty allowed his hard line opponents to overthrow Gorbachev. On 18 August, eight senior Communists announced the establishment of an Emergency Committee, which would replace Gorbachev’s government. The Emergency Committee was led by Gorbachev’s deputy, the head of the army and the head of the KGB. The plot to overthrow Gorbachev had been growing since the beginning of the year. The coup’s leaders launched the coup when Gorbachev was on holiday, hoping that he would be unable to stop them as he was away from the centre of government. On 18 August, the Emergency Committee announced that Gorbachev had resigned due to poor health. However, Gorbachev refused to resign, and Yeltsin called a general strike to resist the coup. The plotters stated that their goal was to stop the break- up of the Soviet Union and to restore law and order. Significantly, they recognised that Communism was deeply unpopular and therefore did not take power in the name of the Communist Party. Yeltsin headed resistance to the coup. Army units were sent to the White House, the Russian parliament building, to arrest him. However, the soldiers refused to obey orders and Yeltsin demanded Gorbachev’s return to power. Without the support of the army the Emergency Committee could not continue, and the coup collapsed on 21 August. The consequences of the coup The coup had a series of consequences: ● Gorbachev’s position weakened. His statement following the coup indicated that he was signif icantly out of touch with majority opinion. On his return to Moscow, Gorbachev declared that he still had faith in the Communist Party, that he remained committed to renewing the Party, and that he still wanted the Party to play a key role in the future of the Soviet Union. However, due to glasnost, the public had lost faith in the Party. Moreover, the coup further weakened the Party as it showed that senior Party figures wanted to reverse democratisation. Gorbachev’s statements demonstrated that he did not represent the aspirations of the majority of the public. Consequently, while Gorbachev was reinstated as President his authority did not recover. ● The Party, the army and the KGB were discredited as they were behind the coup. ● Yeltsin’s authority grew. He emerged as the defender of democracy. His actions following the coup won him even greater support. ● The coup led to the end of the Communi st Party. On 23 August Yeltsin suspended the Commun ist Party in Russia. As there was little popular opposition, Yeltsin went fur ther and banned the Part y on 6 November. ● The coup led to the break-up of the Soviet Union. Fear that the Emergency Committee would re- establish a communist dictatorship led the Republics of Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan to declare their i ndependence by the end of August. Armenia followed suit after a referendum in early September. Gorbachev was also forced to recogn ise the independence of the Baltic state s. Consequently, the coup destroyed the treaty establishing a Union of Sovereign States. Gorbachev worked hard throug hout October and November but could not revive the treaty. ● The coup led to the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In December, Yeltsin and the leaders of Belorussia and the Ukraine signed the Minsk Agreement which stated that the Soviet Union had been replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Eleven of the 15 former Soviet republics joined the CIS on 21 December 1991.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin178 Historical interpretations: The significance of the coup Most historians agree that the coup was a significant moment in the fall of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, there are differences of emphasis. Peter Kenez, for example, argues that the coup was significant because it exposed the bankruptcy and weakness of communist hardliners. Martin McCauley, by contrast, emphasises the way in which the coup strengthened Yeltsin and Russian nationalism at the expense of Gorbachev and the Communist Party. Extract 3 From Peter Kenez, A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End, published in 2006. On August 19, 1991, the premier, the vice president, and the head of the KGB, among others – all Gorbachev appointees – formed a ‘state committee on the state of emergency,’ which assumed all governmental powers, banned strikes and demonstrations, and introduced censorship – that is to say, they staged a coup d’état. The conspirator s were ludicrously inept, lacking both charisma and political sense. Beyond a dislike of Gorbachev’s reforms and a desire for a return to the defunct Soviet order, they had no political program. Worst of all from their point of view, they took no serious measures to disarm the opposition. Within two days the coup had failed. The putschists accomplished the opposite of what they had intended: by their actions they demonstrated that there was no force behind them, and that the old order could not be reconstructed. Their press conference, in which they allowed themselves to be ridiculed and showed themselves to be helpless, drunken, and fearful men, was a demonstration of the bankruptcy of the old order. Although the regime managed to hang on for four more months, this ill-considered conspiracy was the real end of the Soviet era. Extract 4 From Martin McCauley, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, published in 2008. Had Yeltsin and his aides been arrested on the first day of the coup, it would probably have succeeded. KGB officers watched him leave his dacha but did not arrest him because they had not been given a written order to do so. Yeltsin was a brilliant populist and knew how to arouse passions. He was astute enough to demand the return of Gorbachev. He avoided the impression of going for power himself. The legal, constitutional norms had to be observed. Yeltsin appealed to Russian patriotism. The coup was anti-Russian as the Committee wanted to force Russia back into the old Soviet Union. This message struck a responsive chord among the intelligentsia. They knew that their lives would be blighted if the Committee secured power. Many workers were indifferent. Things had been going from bad to worse in the late Gorbachev era. Why should they suddenly improve if the leader came back? Yeltsin’s answer was that we Russians can do it, if we are permitted to. Let us regenerate Russia together. 1 Having read Extract s 3 and 4: ● Summarise the argument of Extract 3 in one sentence. ● Write a paragraph arguing either for or against the argument in Extract 3. Use your own knowledge and Extract 4 to justify your claim. 2 Swap paragraphs. Now write a counter-argument to your partner’s argument. 3 Having read the arguments and counter-arguments, discuss how far you agree with Extract 3. Ukrainian independence Following the coup on 1 December 1991, 90 per cent of the people of Ukraine voted for independence from the Soviet Union. The Ukraine had the second largest population of any of the Soviet republics, containing almost 20 per cent of the Soviet population. Therefore the Ukrainian decision to leave the Soviet Union effectively ended Gorbachev’s plan to save the Union. The coup led to a series of fundamental changes. In essence it finally destroyed the authority of Gorbachev, the Communist Party and the army, the three forces holding the Soviet Union together. However, in many ways, the coup simply accelerated trends that were already obvious in mid-1991. Prior to the coup, Gorbachev’s authority was declining and Yeltsin’s was increasing, there were signs that at least six republics were going to leave the Union and the authority of the Communist Party was declining sharply.
179Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? RUSSIA RUSSIA KAZAKHSTAN BELARUS ESTONIA UKRAINE MOLDOVA GEORGIA AZERBAIJAN ARMENIA UZBEKISTAN TURKMENISTAN TAJIKISTAN KYRGYZSTAN LITHUANIA LATVIA 500km0 Figure 2: The break-up of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States. The end of the Soviet Union The creation of the CIS effectively destroyed the Soviet Union (see Figure 2). In this sense, from 21 December Gorbachev was the President of a state that no longer existed. Gorbachev formally resigned as President of the Soviet Union four days after the creation of the CIS and declared that the Soviet Union would formally cease to exist on 31 December. Conclusion Nationalism clearly played an important role in the demise of the Soviet Union. From 1985 the Soviet Government’s economic failure, the revelations about the political and environmental crimes of the Soviet Government, and Gorbachev’s refusal to seek a democratic mandate all weakened the Soviet Government. At the same time local leaders were able to present themselves as defenders of natural local traditions against the tyra nny of the Union. Moreover, local leaders, like Yeltsin, had genuine authority, as they had been elected by the people. Therefore they had more respect and power than Gorbachev, who was associated with the failures and crimes of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s attempts to save the larger part of the Union, however, were destroyed by the communist hardliners who led the coup. The coup finally destroyed the authority of the Soviet Union and ended Gorbachev’s attempts to restrain the growing nationalism.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin180 Extended reading: Interpretation Historian Robert Hornsby considers the nature and significance of nationalism in the fall of the Soviet Union. By the time that Mikhail Gorbachev officially dissolved the Soviet Union in December 1991, most of the fifteen republics that made up the union had already declared their independence. Essentially, once the different republics that made up the Soviet Union decided to go their own way, there was no Soviet Union left for Gorbachev to rule over. There had been a certain amount of nationalist dissent for years in parts of the USSR – most notably in the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, but also in the likes of Ukraine and Georgia – but it had never threatened the survival of the system as a whole. In large part, this was because the authorities had been willing and able to suppress it: by force if necessary. As economic decline became ever sharper by the 1980s, and then Gorbachev’s reforms toward the end of that decade began to loosen the political shackles, it became far harder for the authorities in Moscow to control swelling nationalist sentiment. One commentator in the late 1980s even argued that, if the Russian Empire of the tsars had been a ‘prison of nations’ (as Karl Marx once claimed), then the Gorbachev-era Soviet Union had become a ‘volcano of nations’. As Gorbachev sought to reform the Soviet system, he inadvertently created more and more possibilities for those who simply wanted out. Then, when he tried to reasser t control in t hose republics pursuing independence, his own credibility as a reformer nosedived. Introducing democratic elections to the Council of People’s Deputies in 1988, for example, helped bring long-suppressed nationalism into the open: it created the possibility to organise, to hold rallies, and to campaign for independence. Gorbachev fought hard to avoid Soviet disintegration, but he was mostly prepared to do so through compromise with the demands of nationalists. Plenty of others near the top of the Soviet system, however, were not so willing. As Gorbachev made concessions to one group, he alienated the other and eventually neither trusted him. When hardline conservatives tried to overthrow Gorbachev in August 1991 – largely because he was about to complete a new and looser agreement between the different republics – separatists became ever more convinced that it was time to leave, and leave quickly. Activity Having read the essay, answer the following questions. Comprehension 1 What is meant by the following phrases: ● ‘a “prison of nations”’ ● ‘a “volcano of nations”’ ● ‘ethnic and national conf licts that marked its last days remain only frozen, not solved’? Interpretation 2 Summarise Hornsby’s interpretation of the causes of the growth of nationalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 3 Summarise Hornsby’s interpretation of Gorbachev’s role in the growth of nationalism. Evaluation 4 Using your own knowledge, write a paragraph explaining how far you agree with Hornsby’s interpretation of the role of nationalism in the break-up of the Soviet Union.
181Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? One of the key factors that quickly made nationalism a powerful force almost everywhere in the late 1980s was that so many leaders and elites in the different parts of the Soviet Union – most famously, Boris Yeltsin in Russia – decided that their ultimate allegiance was not to the Soviet Union but to their own republic, be that Russia, Ukraine, Georgia or anywhere else. Some surely made this decision based on genuine consideration of what was in the best interests of the people, others did so more cynically: with an eye on how best to protect their privileges and status in a post-Soviet world. After years in which they had mostly been left to their own devices under Brezhnev, and many had grown extraordinarily corrupt and wealthy in the process, local leaders did not take kindly to Gorbachev attempting to shake up and clean out the system. He, in turn, probably did not realise the extent to which such people commanded loyalty locally and held the power to derail orders coming from Moscow. Public demonstrations for independence in cities like Minsk, Kiev and Tbilisi topped 100,000 people by the turn of the 1990s. In the Baltic States around two million people held hands in a human chain that stretched right across the region. In some places the public mood turned much uglier. Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted in massacres of Armenians in Baku, ethnic riots broke out in Kyrgyzstan, and even individual republics faced breakaway movements from within their own territory, such as in Chechnya (Russia), Abkhazia (Georgia) and Transnistria (Moldova). While the Soviet Union is no more, most of these ethnic and national conflicts that marked its last days remain only frozen, not solved: proof enough that Gorbachev stood little chance of dealing with them as the Soviet system began to crumble around him. No single factor caused the collapse of the Soviet Union. What made nationalism so significant, though, was the unique way in which it was fed from virtually every direction: by economic decline, by limitations on religion and culture, by both political reform and political retrenchment, by local and national problems, and by the popular mood among the masses and the manoeuvring of local elites. One only needs to look today at the fifteen countries that emerged from the Soviet collapse as independent states to see that holding them all together under one umbrella was a virtual impossibility without the use of force. Robert Hornsby is a Research Fellow at the School of History, University of Kent. His present research focuses on the Komsomol in the Soviet Union between the 1950s and the 1980s. More generally, he is interested in the relationship between conformity and non-conformity in dictatorships. This is also reflected in the title of his first book, Protest, Reform, and Repression in Khrushchev’s Soviet Union. Work together Having completed the activity on page 180, swap your notes with a partner. Consider the following questions: 1 Did you identify the same causes of the growth of nationalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s? 2 Did you both agree with Hornsby’s interpretation of Gorbachev’s role in the growth of nationalism? 3 What was good about your partner’s summary of Hornsby’s interpretation? 4 Can you learn anything about Hornsby’s interpretation from your partner’s summary? 5 How far did you both agree with Hornsby’s interpretation? Use these questions to feed back to each other and improve your analysis of the debate.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin182 Essay technique: Integrating own knowledge Extract 1 From, Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State, published in 2002. A great deal of attention has been focused on Gorbachev’s personal role in bringing down the Soviet state. Other historians, by contrast, have placed emphasis on political, economic or social conditions which prepared the way for both Soviet liberalisation and the eruptions of nationalism that precipitated Soviet collapse. Still others view the Soviet collapse as largely unrelated to the nationalist explosions that rocked the Soviet state in the glasnost years. Obviously, nationalism was both a cause of and consequence of the declining power of the Soviet state brought on by glasnost and failed reform. But in a period of revolution, insurrection, and major upheaval in which hundreds of thousands took to the street on a daily basis, explanations that focus solely on the elites lack the ring of authenticity. For the Soviet Union was brought down in large part by a remarkable explosion of nationalism, and the impact that explosion had on the ways in which both Russians and non-Russians thought about the Soviet state. Challenge: Beissinger considers a series of alternative arguments. Support: Beissinger argues that nationalism was central to the break-up of the Soviet Union. Section C of the exam requires you to evaluate the interpretations offered by the two extracts. You will need to consider the interpretations in the light of your own knowledge of the debate. Therefore, once you have identified the interpretations (see page 157) and worked out the structure of your essay (see page 165), you will need to integrate your own knowledge into your essay. Imagine you are answering the following question: In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the ‘Soviet Union was brought down in large part by a remarkable explosion of nationalism’? (Extract 1, lines 14–16) To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extract s using your own knowledge of the issues. You should integrate your own knowledge to support and challenge different aspects of the extract. You can plan this quickly in the exam by annotating the extract. You could use different coloured pens to indicate support and challenge. As you go through the extract consider the strengths and the weaknesses of the interpretation. It is a good idea to make a brief note of your overall judgement at the bottom of the extract. For example:
183Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? Activity Using the question on page 182 complete the following activity: 1 Read Extracts 1 (page 182) and 2. 2 Analyse them by looking for: – the mai n arguments – counter- arguments – evidence. 3 Look for contrasting arguments between the extracts. 4 Look for aspects of the extracts that support each other. 5 Identify where you can support or challenge different aspects of Extract 2 using your own knowledge. 6 Make a brief note of your overall judgement at the bottom of the extract. 7 Make a full plan, showing how you will structure your essay, where you will use the dif ferent aspects of both extracts and where you will bring in your own knowledge. TIP: Own k nowledge should be used to support or challenge the interpretations contained in the essays. It is best used to evaluate the extracts; it should not dominate the essay. Work together Having completed the activity, consider the following questions with a partner: 1 Did you both identify the same arguments and counter- arguments in the extracts? 2 Did you agree about which aspect of the extracts was the biggest contrast to the main argument of E xtract 1? 3 How did your partner’s use of own knowledge differ from your own? – Did they use it to support the same things? – Did they use it to challenge the same things? 4 Did you miss anything that you should note down? 5 What can you learn from your partner’s approach? 6 Whose use of own knowledge: – better analysed the interpret ations contained in the extracts – better integrated own knowledge with the extracts? Use these questions to feed back to each other and improve your essay planning. Activity: AS-Style question Historians have different views about the reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union. Analyse and evaluate the extracts and use your knowledge of the issues to explain your answer to the following question. How far do you agree with the view that Gorbachev’s political reforms led to the collapse of the Soviet Union? Extract 2 From Norman M. Naimark, Preface to The Revenge of the Past, published in 1993. The collapse of the Soviet Union was caused in good measure by nationalism, that is, by the demands of the subject nationalities of the Soviet Union for genuine independence and autonomy. Unified in their hostility to the Kremlin’s authority, the fifteen constituent Union republics, including the Russian Republic, declared their sovereignty and began to build state institutions of their own. The demands of the nationalities of each republic became the dominant motif in the program of both Communist and non-Communist leaders. With the failure of the August 1991 putsch attempt, sovereign republics obtained their independence. Nationalism reigned supreme.
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin184 4 Gorbachev and Yeltsin Overview Two leaders, more than any others, are associated with the fall of the Soviet Union. Historian Archie Brown pointed to what he called the ‘Gorbachev Factor’, the significance of Gorbachev and his reforms in the transformation and fall of the Soviet Union. According to Brown, Gorbachev played an important early role in realising that reform was necessary, and by the early 1980s, in realising that reform was not enough and that the system had to be transformed. In many ways Gorbachev’s reforms undermined the system he was trying to save and therefore led to the fall of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin also played an important role; indeed, Brown has also written of a ‘Yeltsin Factor’. Yeltsin was consistently more radical than Gorbachev; by 1990 he was more popular and by 1991 he was more powerful. Yeltsin encouraged nationalism and took a series of decisive steps to strengthen the nations that made up the Soviet Union at the expense of the Union. Moreover, Yeltsin played a key role in defeating the coup with a counter-coup against the Communist Party. This chapter considers: 1 Gorbachev: perestroika; Westernising; his missteps; China 2 Yeltsin: his role as a popular radical; nationalism; the coup; the Union. 1 Gorbachev Gorbachev’s goals emerged over time. Initially, he proposed economic reforms, later political reforms and finally reforms to the nature of the Union. Gorbachev’s goal was to revitalise both Soviet Communism and the Soviet Union. He failed in both of these ambitions. His reforms, his political and economic failures, and his failure to foresee the outcomes of his policies all played a role in the destruction of the Soviet Union. Note it down Using a note-making style of your choice, note down the different ways in which Gorbachev played a role in the fall of the Soviet Union. Perestroika Gorbachev played an important role in the fall of the USSR by initiating perestroika, a series of economic and political reforms that led to the transformation of the Soviet Union (see page 149). The three phases of Perestroika, Nationalism, Reform and Transformation (see page 149) weakened the Soviet Union: ● Rationalisation led to a decline in economic growth, making economic conditions worse and undermining faith in the Party. The failure of these reforms also led Gorbachev to initiate more radical economic and political reforms. ● Reform further weakened the Soviet Union. Glasnost exposed the crimes of previous Soviet Governments. Consequently, it undermined faith not only in the Communist Party but also in the ideology on which it was based. In this sense glasnost led to a more profound loss of faith in the system than rationalisation. Democratisation weakened the Communist Party by allowing a lternative candidates to stand. It also weakened Gorbachev’s control of the Party as Soviet voters chose their candidates; therefore the Party no longer had a monopoly of patronage. ● During the transformation stage Gorbachev abandoned the essential features of Soviet Communism. His reforms further weakened the Soviet Union and allowed rival national powerbases to emerge. From this perspective Gorbachev’s reforms were an important cause of the break-up of the Soviet Union for the following reasons: ● In 1985 extensive reform was not necessary. The Soviet Union was experiencing decline, not a crisis. Equally, between 1979 and 1982 Andropov had successfully eliminated the dissident movement. Finally, there was support for more conservative reform options within the Party. Therefore Gorbachev played an important role in the fall of the Soviet Union because he introduced reform in spite of the fact that he was not under immediate pressure to do so. ● Gorbachev’s reforms themselves created the crisis that led to more reforms and the ultimate break-up of the Union. ● Gorbachev was prepared to embrace more radical reforms as time went on. ● By 1990 Gorbachev was prepared to abandon the essential features of Soviet Communism, the very features that held the Soviet Union together.
185Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? New thinking: new vocabulary One of Gorbachev’s crucial achievements that underpinned his political reforms was introducing ‘new thinking’ to Soviet politics. The ‘new thinking’ was based on a new language of politics. The ‘new thinking’ helped erode the Soviet Union. First, Gorbachev embraced the term ‘perestroika’ rather than ‘reform’. ‘Reform’ was associated with the failure of Khrushchev and policies that had destabilised the Soviet Union. Consequently, communists were suspicious of the notion of reform. Perestroika, by contrast, was a neutral word which implied scientific restructuring in order to achieve efficiency. Therefore the term did not arouse opposition. Secondly, Gorbachev introduced words which had previously only been used critically. For example, Soviet politicians had traditionally rejected ‘pluralism’, which they associated with the weaknesses of Western democracy. Gorbachev, however, began to advocate ‘socialist pluralism’. Adding the word ‘socialist’ al lowed Gorbachev to suggest that pluralism was compatible with the values of the Soviet Union. Similarly, he spoke publicly about ‘socialist markets’, in so doing advocating political and economic approaches that socialists had traditionally rejected. Gorbachev’s new vocabulary included: ● Glasnost – literally ‘openness’. Originally, Gorbachev used it to mean greater freedom of information, but quickly it became associated with freedom of speech. ● Perestroika – meaning ‘reconstruction’. Initially, perestroika meant economic reform, but it too gained a new meaning and by the late 1980s implied economic and political reform. ● Uskorenie – ‘acceleration’ (see page 150). ● Demokratizatsiya – ‘democratisation’. Democratisation too changed its meaning from 1985 to 1991. Early on, it meant giving workers a greater say in the running of their factories. By the late 1980s, Gorbachev used it to indicate that signif icant aspects of the government should be elected. Gorbachev’s willingness to embrace new ideas allowed radicals in the Party, intellectuals and members of the public to advocate radical alternatives to Communism such as freedom of speech, free market economics and democratic elections. Westernising Gorbachev also played an important role in reorienting Soviet politics towards more Western values. At the beginning of his reign, Gorbachev stated that he wanted the Soviet Union to abandon isolation and re-enter ‘our common European home’. Whereas previous leaders had rejected Western values as capitalist and argued that Soviet values were superior, Gorbachev believed that European standards could make the Soviet Union more humane. Gorbachev endorsed a number of Western values that previous leaders had rejected. First, he embraced the importance of human rights. In 1985 he allowed 129 dissidents to move abroad in order to be united with their spouses. He also allowed Sakharov’s wife to leave the Soviet Union to receive lifesaving medical treatment. In 1986 travel restrictions were eased for all Soviet citizens, Soviet authorities stopped jamming Western radio transmissions, Sakharov’s internal exile was ended and glasnost allowed unprecedented freedom of speech. Gorbachev also embraced pluralism by allowing Soviet citizens to form their own groups and stand for election. Pluralism was a step towards Western multi-party politics and a step away from the single-party state. Indeed, in March 1990 Gorbachev removed Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution. As a result the Communist Party lost its right to a leading role in Soviet society and other parties were legalised. Finally, Gorbachev also renounced violence as a method for holding together both the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Gorbachev set out his vision at the Twenty- Eighth Party Congress in July 1990. He argued that ‘a civil society of free people is replacing the Stalinist model of socialism’ and that the Soviet Union was moving towards ‘genuine democracy … with free elections, a multi-party system and human rights, real people’s power is being reborn’. This commitment to Western values played a signif icant role in the fall of the Soviet Union because it weakened the power of the Party, which had held the Union together since its creation. Gorbachev’s mistakes Another way in which Gorbachev could be said to be responsible for the fall of the Soviet Union is through his mistakes and miscalculation. Gorbachev’s fundamental miscalculation was to believe that reform could save the Soviet Union. The aim of perestroika was to revive the Soviet system, to unleash its potential. However, the reforms ultimately created a crisis from which the Soviet Union could not recover. Gorbachev failed to anticipate the effects of glasnost, the extent to which revelations about the past would undermine the claims of the Communist Party. He also failed to see the fragility of commitment to the Soviet Union. In this sense, he
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin186 Gorbachev not only made fundamental m istakes, he made policy mistakes that underm ined his position. Having embraced democracy he refused to stand for election, and having sur vived the coup he failed to abandon the Communist Part y. Moreover, he set competing goa ls and his policies were often inconsistent. For example, his initial policy of uskorenie was designed to restructure industry and increase output. Restructuring would disrupt production and increasing production would make it impossible to restructure. T hese competing objectives are one reason why the policy fai led. Gorbachev was also inconsistent in his approach to the Communist Party. From 1985 to 1990 he sided with the radical reform ists in the Communist Party, whereas in 1990 and 1991 he tended to side with conservatives and resist more radical reforms. In terms of the economy, he shifted from one plan to the next without allowing any to develop fully, further undermining the economy. Finally, Gorbachev failed to win over the Communist Party. The Party was the only institution that was strong enough to introduce reform. However, in practice the Party resisted reform and therefore hampered Gorbachev’s programme. Gorbachev’s mistakes u ndermined the authority of the Communist Party and his own position, thus weakening the Soviet Union. Specifical ly, as President of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was in a position to hold the Union together. However, the fa ilure of his political and economic policies led to a rapid decline in h is authority and therefore he no longer had the power to hold the Union together. Gorbachev and China Since 1992 historians have attempted to understand the fall of the Soviet Union by comparing it to the survival of Communism in China. Both communist regimes embarked on a reform process in the 1980s, yet while reform in the Soviet Union led to the fall of Communism, in China Communism grew stronger. The comparison highlights a number of Gorbachev’s policies. ● China embraced market reform more quickly and comprehensively than the Soviet Union. As a result, China’s economy continued to grow and therefore the Communist Party retained its political authority. By contrast, Gorbachev’s economic reforms were slow and inconsistent. Gorbachev mistakenly tried to integrate markets into a command economy. This approach failed creating an economic crisis which led to widespread dissatisfaction with the Soviet Communist Party. ● The Chinese Communist Party was prepared to be more flexible than the Soviet Communist Party. Therefore economic reform in China had a high degree of support from the Communist Government. In the Soviet Union, by contrast, the majority of communists, including Gorbachev, were committed to the command economy and viewed markets with suspicion. ● Communist leaders in China introduced economic reform without increasing political freedom. The lack of political reform meant that China continued to be politically stable during the reform process. From this perspective, the Soviet Union collapsed because Gorbachev tried to introduce economic and political reform at the same time. Therefore when perestroika led to economic chaos, the government, which had been weakened by political reform, was not strong enough to retain control. Conclusion Ultimately, Gorbachev’s project of reviving and renewing the Soviet Union failed. Gorbachev’s reforms led to economic chaos and a decline in faith in the Communist Party. His mistakes and his inability to see the consequences of his policies undermined his own position. Perhaps Gorbachev could have saved the Union if, like Chinese leaders, he had focused on the economy rather than trying to reform the political system, the economy, the relationship between the republics and foreign relations all at the same time.
187Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? Historical interpretations: The Gorbachev Factor? Historians have disagreed about the ex tent to which Gorbachev was responsible for the fall of the Soviet Union. Archie Brown’s The Gorbachev Factor clearly argues that the appointment of Gorbachev was central to the destruc tion of Communism in the Soviet Union. However, Peter Kenez argues that Gorbachev was timid and lost control of the process well before the Soviet Union collapsed. Extract 1 From Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, published in 1997. The changes in what used to be the Soviet Union have been so great that it is easy to forget what the unreformed Soviet system was like and how modest were the expectations of significant innovation when Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as top Soviet leader in March 1985. Neither Soviet citizens nor foreign observers imagined that the USSR was about to be transformed out of existence. If the scale of the change in the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev years is considered with dispassion, what is most remarkable is the extent to which it occurred peacefully. Given the failure of all who had openly attacked the system from within the country to make any positive impact on policy outcomes prior to the late 1980s, it is doubtful if change of such magnitude could have taken place with so little violence — especially in Russia — in any way other than through the elevation of a serious reformer to the highest political office within the country. Without the promotion of a genuine reformer and highly skilled politician to the top Communist Party post in 1985, fundamental change in the Soviet Union would certainly have been delayed and could well have been bloodier as well as slower than the relatively speedy political evolution which occurred while Gorbachev was at the helm. There were many stimuli to the changes which followed the succession of Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership in March 1985, including (some two or more years into perestroika) the moral and intellectual legacy of the dissidents of the 1960s and 1970s. But the choice of Gorbachev, rather than of any of the other people in the Communist Party leadership who could aspire to the Part y’s (and at that time the country’s) most powerful post, was of critical importance. Extract 2 From Peter Kenez, A Histor y of the Sovi et Union from the Beginning to the End, published in 2006. Gorbachev’s timid reforms not only did not bring about the desired results, but made matters worse. The reforms brought greater shortages to the Soviet people, a decline in productivity and production, inflation, and a black market controlled by criminals. The signs of deterioration were ever more visible. Liberal politicians and economists were telling Gorbachev that the way out of the crisis was to introduce more radical reforms. However, he knew that there was no constituency supporting such reforms, and indeed that the opponents of abandoning the foundations of the Soviet system were powerful, numerous, and well organized. Beginning in late 1989 his leadership became hesitant and erratic. He temporized, at one time supporting the reformers but then, a short time later, withdrawing his support. He became increasingly isolated. The Gorbachev era was over at the end of 1990. From this point on, Gorbachev had no new ideas for reform. He was a spent force. In reorganizing the political system, just as in matters of economics, he temporized. The danger of spreading disorder – indeed, the possibility of civil war – brought him closer to the conservatives, and he adjusted his policies accordingly. On the one hand, he did not want to go further in reforming away the Soviet system; on the other, he wanted to protect his reforms but did not know how to restore stability. 1 Having read Extracts 1 and 2: a Summarise the key argument of the two extracts. b Select three details from your own knowledge that support the argument of Extract 1. Write these down as a list under your summaries. 2 Swap your summary with a partner and discuss your lists: a Which summary best captured the argument of Extract 1? b Which summary best captured the argument of Extract 2? c Which details most precisely supported the argument of Extract 1?
Paper 1 Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin188 2 Yeltsin Boris Yeltsin also played a crucial role in the fall of the USSR. Historians have focused on different aspects of his role, arguing that he was significant for a number of different reasons. Note it down Skim read this section and note down the different ways in which Yeltsin helped break up the Soviet Union. Use these as the headings in a note-making style of your choice. Popular radical Yeltsin played an important role as a popular radical in a period in which Gorbachev was becoming increasingly unpopular and conservative. Yeltsin made a name for himself in 1986 at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress by denouncing the privileges of Party leaders and advocating a renewed focus on equality. He also called for multi-candidate elections to all posts in the Party. Yeltsin continued his radical career by publicly attacking communists who opposed reforms in 1987. In doing so, he exposed the factionalism that existed in the Party, thus damaging the Party’s reputation for unity. As a result of this, he was sacked as leader of the Moscow Communist Party. In 1988 at the Nineteenth Party Conference, Yeltsin made another public attack on Party conservatives. The attack was broadcast to millions on Soviet television and again highlighted the deep splits in the Party. Between 1986 and 1988 Yeltsin’s attacks on the leadership made him popular with many Soviet people who hated the privileges of senior Party off icials. Moreover, his call for multi-candidate elections attracted the support of middle- and low-ranking officials in the Party, who saw elections as a way of advancing their own careers. Consequently, during the 1989 Soviet elections Yeltsin won a massive victory in Moscow, gaining 89 per cent of the vote. Yeltsin was one of the founders and leader of the Inter-regional Deputies’ Group, which functioned like an opposition political party. From this point, Yeltsin was important as he was the leading opponent of Gorbachev. Yeltsin in 1990 Yeltsin became more important throughout 1990. Indeed, 1990 was a turning point in the history of the Soviet Union. It was the year in which Gorbachev lost control of the reform agenda and was forced to react to popular protest calling for radical change. During 1990 there were elections to soviets in all of the Soviet republics. Consequently, Yeltsin became Chair of the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies, Russia’s new parliament, in May 1990. A month later in June, the Congress declared Russia’s sovereignty. In practice this meant that Russian laws were superior to Soviet laws. The Baltic republics had already declared themselves sovereign, but Russia’s declaration was more significant as Russia contained 75 per cent of the Union’s population. Yeltsin also moved to establish a Russian army, independent of the Soviet army, and started to build support for an elected Russian President. These moves towards Russian power led to the ‘war of laws’, a series of disputes between the Russian Government and Soviet authorities about who had the right to rule Russia. Yeltsin publicly resigned from the Communist Party in July 1990. His resignation was highly dramatic and weakened support for the Party. Indeed, Yeltsin’s resignation was part of a mass exodus from the Party: during 1990 Party membership dropped from 19.2 million members to 16.5 million. Party popularity also dropped to a mere 18.8 per cent. Boris Yeltsin, 1931–2007 Boris Yeltsin was the first President of the Russian Federation after the fall of the Soviet Union. He joined the Communist Party in the early 1960s. In 1985, Yeltsin was elected to the Central Committee. From 1985 to 1987, Yeltsin was a keen supporter of Gorbachev’s reforms. Under Gorbachev Yeltsin became the leader of the Communist Party in Moscow, where he became popular for fighting Communist Party corruption. He was also appointed to the Politburo, but resigned in 1987 in protest at the slow pace of reform. Following clashes with Gorbachev, Yeltsin lost his most important jobs within the Soviet Government. However, following Gorbachev’s political reforms he was elected to the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies. Yeltsin played a key role in the destruction of the Soviet Union by using his power to advance radical political and economic reform.
189Historical interpretations: What explains the fall of the USSR, c.1985–91? During 1990 Yeltsin became increasingly popular. Gorbachev’s policies seemed unsuccessful and confused. By June Yeltsin was more popular than Gorbachev among Russian voters. Moreover, from 1990 Gorbachev became more cautious about reform. Yeltsin, by contrast, clearly advocated market reform and democracy. Moreover, Russian people viewed Yeltsin as one of them, whereas they believed that Gorbachev was distant and had no idea of the problems facing the country, or how to solve them. Yeltsin and nationalism Yeltsin was also significant because of his attitude to nationalism. Yeltsin encouraged non-Russian republics to establish their independence from the Soviet Union. Yeltsin embraced nationalism, in part, to outmanoeuvre Gorbachev. By emphasising the rights of Russia, Yeltsin weakened the Soviet Union, which was Gorbachev’s power base. His election as Chair of the Russian Congress was a symbol of the growing Russian nationalism. As Chair, Yeltsin was able to speak on behalf of the Russian nation. In that sense, Yeltsin becoming Chair was centra l to the process which led to the declaration of Russian sovereignty. Yeltsin attempted to consolidate his own power base in Russia by being elected Russian President. Yeltsin’s election as Russian President in June 1991 was significant because it gave him the right to speak and act on behalf of Russia. Moreover, it gave him a status within government that rivalled that of Gorbachev. From then on Gorbachev had to accept a secondary role in Russia and was forced to begin renegotiating the relationships between the republics. Not only did Yeltsin embrace Russian nationalism, he also supported the growth of nationalism in other Soviet republics. During the summer of 1990 Yeltsin visited several Soviet republics advising their leaders to ‘take as much sovereignty as you can swallow’. In 1991 Yeltsin supported the Baltic states’ declarations of independence from the Soviet Union. He publicly denounced the actions of Soviet troops in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania (see page 175). Gorbachev criticised Yeltsin for encouraging a ‘parade of sovereignties’ and in so doing threatening the survival of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin and new elite Some historians argue that the break-up of the Soviet Union was the result of conflicts w ithin the Communist Party, rather than conflict between the Communist Party and democrats. From this perspective Yeltsin was important because he represented and worked for the interests of middle-ranking Communist officials, against the interests of high-ranking Communist officials. According to this i nterpretation, Gorbachev’s Communist Par ty was never a united group. Rather, there were divisions within the Party between the senior levels and the lower levels. Senior Communists tended to want to preserve the Soviet Union because their status and power were tied up with the Communist Par ty and the Soviet system. Lower-ranking officials, however, saw Gorbachev’s reforms as an opportunity to improve their position. For example, some Communist officials joined nationalist movements or bought state-owned factories that were privatised in the early 1990s in order to advance their own careers and safeg uard their power and privilege. Yeltsin had been a champion of lower-ra nk ing Party officials since the mid-1980s. Indeed, one of the reasons for his sacking as Moscow Party Leader in 1987 was his decision to dismiss established Party off icials and replace them with younger Par ty members. Gorbachev criticised this as a dangerous policy of ‘instability of cadres’. Yeltsin’s rise to power, and the g rowing power of Ru ssia over the Soviet Union, led to the emergence of a new elite at the expense of the old Soviet elite. For example, of the 230 people who were minister s under Gorbachev from 1985 to 1991, only nine were sti ll at the top level of Yeltsin’s government after the coup. At the same time Yeltsin’s new government had relatively few ‘new men’, people who had no government experience at all. The vast majority of Yeltsin’s new government, a lmost 70 per cent, had held middle-rank ing positions in Gorbachev’s government. Only around 13 per cent of Yeltsin’s new government had been elected to any of Gorbachev’s new democratic institutions. In this sense, Yeltsin was able to contribute to the fa ll of the USSR because he had the support of a ‘counter- elite’ – middle-ranking Communists who supported the destruction of the Union in order to enhance their own power. Moreover, from this point of view Yeltsin’s power base was made up of former Party officials and government officials rather than people associated with the Soviet Union’s new democratic institutions. Yeltsin, the coup and counter-coup Yeltsin also played a signif icant role in the destruction of the Soviet Union due to his handling of the coup. First, the coup transformed Yeltsin’s strategy. Prior to the coup Yelt